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(iv) 
Thesis f\bstract 
The development of Australian maritime law was closely assoc-
iated with Britain's Ernpim-building. To promote, and later consolid-
ate, trade and security links within til£'1 Empire, a merchant 
fleet to be manned almost t:~xclu~Jively by British seamen was created. 
For merchant shipping to operate as an effective and coherent force, 
a single body of law was special}\/ e!lacted to regulate this enter-
prise. 
Maritime law was a clcmain for the Parliament of (3reat 
Britain and later the United Kingdom. The nature <cmd content of 
this subject, as imported, adrninisterml and developed in tim Au~ltral­
ian colonies, and latE~r States, are analysed in the lis1ht of the Imper-
ial goals. This body of law developed and changed in conformity with 
the Imperial objectiv£!5. The use of paramount legislation, the in-
validation of inconsistent colonial laws and the establishmFmt of 
courts in the colonies, and later' States. to administer Imperial mal'itime 
law t'liere clearly part of a coordinated Imper'ial stratogy. The mech-
anisms for exacting compliancp bv Commonwealth les1islators continued 
until thEl Statute of Westminster 1931 ([mp.) IAJas adopted. 
nne of the main peoblems which the High Court had to resolve 
was the recurring conflict between Commonwealth and ~3tate legisla-
tion on shipping. The cause in most ca~ms was the lack of precision 
between the powors conferrerJ under the Commonwealth Constitution 
and those exercisable by rnoeting the requirements of the Imperial 
legislation. Several High Court decisions have significantly enlarged 
the role of Commonwealth legislation at the expense of State legis-
lative powers. 
The major differences between the maritimr:~ laws of Australia 
and the United f'\ingdom are traceable to several factors. First 
there was delay or failure by thf3 Commonwealth and State Parliaments 
to f~xtend to Australia or tho States the operation of those provis-
ions of' the United KinrcJdom's legislation that would not otl1erwise 
apply. Second, the md~Jting backwardness of Australian maritime lm'll 
has stemmed from a prolonged indifference to a numbEJr of inter-
national con\/entions which have produced vital changes in maritime 
law. Third, i\ust['alia's departure from the strict "British ship'' con-
cept led to a rnarkt:ld relaxing of Um requirements for owninq 
Australian ships or shares therein. 
Wherever considered appropriate, emphasis is placed on the 
advantages 1.\lhich proceedings in rem have over common law actions. 
(V) 
The comparati\18 analysis has brought to light manv anomalies. With 
regard to a number of maritime matters the laws of the Commonwealth 
and several States are inconsistent. In manv instances, it is patentlv 
illogical for penalties and strict liabilitv to tJe imposed personallv on 
shipowm'!rs and the master under thB anti-pollution laws. Often the 
Bnforcement of such laws mav also result in the unjustified destruction 
of maritime property, with the consequent loss of the existing mari-
time liens and other claims against the ship and freight. A workable 
solution mav be found bv integrating anti -pollution legislation with 
maPitime law. MoPeover, the methods for enforcing payment of stat-
utorv compensation fop accidental injurv or death suffered by sea-
men ar·e examined with the view to strengthening the position of 
claimants. 
The vaPious problem areas and anomalies highlighted are dealt 
witll in the context of the Peforms and changes which are deemed 
clesirable to upgrade Australian maritime law. Chapter Nine discusses 
the important benefits and new protection that will be conferred on 
maritime claimants when the Dl'aft Admiraltv Bill 1985 enacted as 
law. 
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C1rmeral Inteoduction 
1. Definition and Background 
for ttle purpose of this research work, tt1e expre~i~3ion "Aus-
tralian maritime la~v" is to bEo ur1derstood mainly in the traditional 
sense. Unless othEmN'ise statecl ln the context, the expression1 is 
defined to include ttle follmving asp£~cts of the law - namely: 
(1) Australian policy on ship registration and mortgages of Aus-
tralian ships or shares thc:Jrein as security, including tt12 
stCJtutory protection accorded to registered mortgages; 
(2) The right~3 and mmedies of seamen, masters, necessaries men, 
ship-repairers, salvors, carg0-0\tJners. and other claimants in 
contract or tort; 3 
(3) IVJaritime liEms and their order of ranking;4 
(4) Matters relating to collision damage, contributory negligence, 
limitation of liability of shipowners and others,S including the 
defences available; and 
(5) The enforcement of claims by proceeding~ rem and admiralty 
juri~3diction exercisable LJV courts 0 rern.b 
The above arr:?as cml:3titute ttle "con1'' matters. fhe thrust of the 
imJestigation is directed towards an analytic and evaluative study 
of the growttl and extension of, and changes in, this body of prin-
ciples. 
Britain's initial policy to expand overseas and rmr plan to 
(::Jstablish a British merchant fleet to link Her IVJajesty 1s Dominions 
formed the groundwork of the Empire-building. These basic goals set 
in motion thu process of growth and advancement in Australian mar-
itime law. Behind thB Briti~'h merchant fleet concept was the phil-
osoph~J of creating a body of law to regulate \/irtually all maritime 
matters. including claims. It is against this background of Imperial 
thrusts ill the political, legislati\/e, judicial and economic spheres 
ttlC:Jt the dmJelopment of 1-\ustralian maritime law mu~1t be examined. 
1. Fur rneanln~1 of "maritime law", see Earl Jowitt and C. l1Jalsh, 
Jm·dtt's Dictionary of English Law (2nd ed. 1977), voL II, p. 
111o~7. As to meaning of "admiralty causes", ~>eu J.S. James, 
~it.roud's Judicial Dictionary (4th ed. 1971), \/Ol. I, p. 69. 
2. See Chapter' Four. 
3. ~)E!~? Chapter Six. 
'•· See Chaptt?r S~:c~ven. 
~). See ChaptBr Ei~]ht. 
6. See Chaptnr 1\Jine. 
(xlviii) 
fhe task is to a;:1certain, mainly from the legislative and case mat-
erials, the effects of the various factors at work during the time 
span of about twenty decadeJ. 
The Imperial programme alone and its implementation are in-
sufficient explEmation for the existence of Australian marl time law 
in its present statt!. Attempts are made to evaluate the extent to 
which events in /\ustralian legal and constitutional history coordin-
ated to determine the character and content of the law. Australian 
input,in terms of judicial and legislative contributions)1as been a 
significant on-going process at State and Commonwealth levels. The 
emergence of the Commonwealth of 1\ustralia, as an independent 
sovereign nation~ has resultmi ifl the implementation of new mari-
time policies, and expedited the development of Australian maritime 
law. 
2. Imperial Initiatives 
A substantial part of Imperial law ha~:i been woven into the 
fabric of Australian maritime lm\1. The opemtions of unenacted prin-
ciples of English maritime law and Imperial legislation were the key 
factors. It is questionable as to how far early Imperial policy had 
mapped out the nature, content and growth pattern of Australian 
maritime law. Tho answer is foumJ by a clo~3e anah;sis of the nlmper-
ial legislation package". The opoch-makinSJ /\cts are the Australian 
Courts Act 1B28 (Imp.): Lhe ~)uprtmm Court (Admiralty) Act 1832 (Irnp.}.0 
the Colonial Laws Validilitv /\ct IB65 (Imp.)} 1 the Vice-Admiralty Court:c; 
Act 1863 (Imp.)} 2 the 1067 J\ct (Irnp.)} 3 U1e series of MPrCQ<;lnt :3hipping 
7. The period covered eonsws from 26th January, 1788, the 
elate of Australia's fir~3t ~>ettlement, to 30th June, 1986, 
before the proposmJ /'\drniralty l\ct (Comth.) became law. 
8. I.e. when the Statute of Westminster Adoption /\ct 1942 
(Cornth.) came into forCE! on Yth October, 1942; see China 
Ocean Shipping Co. and Dthers v. State of ~3outh Australia 
(1979) 27 A.L.R. 1, p. B, per Barwick, C.J.; cf. Kirmani v. 
Captain Cook Cruises (1985) 59 A. L.J. 265, JJ: Z76, per Murphv, 
J. -
9. 9 Geo. IV, c. 83. 
10. 2 William I\/, c. 51. 
11 . 28 & 29 Vic., c. 63. 
12. 26 & 27 \lie., c. Zl1. 
13. Viq~.-.. Admiralty Court~:; Act Amendment Act (30 & 31 v·· 45) 
__ _ _ lC.,C. . 
(xlix) 
.8~ts (Imp.)} 4 and the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 (Imp.)~ 5 
It is interesting to identifv the functions which such Acts were in-
tended to serve. The Australian Courts Act 1828 (Imp.) and the 
chant Sllipping Acts (Imp.), passed in succession for more than two 
decades, stand out in legal historv as the major "law transfer" mech-
anisms. To expedite the process, the Colonial Laws Validitv Act 
1865 (Imp.) and the Imperial merchant shipping legislation conferred 
on Colonial Parliaments new legislative powers. The third part of 
the Imperial plan was to establish tribunals in the Australian colon-
ies, and to invest them with admiraltv jurisdiction to administer 
Imperial maritime law. Just how far were the preconceived goals 
achieved under the Australian Courts Act 1828 (Imp.), the Supreme 
Court (Admiraltv) Act 1832 (Imp.), the Vice-Admiraltv Courts Act 1863: 
(Imp.), the 1867 Act (Imp.), and the Colonial Cour·ts of Admiraltv Act 1890' 
(Imp.)? The result will be known onlv after the iml8stigation.16 
3. Australian Contribution 
The early laws enacted bv the Legislative Councils for the 
"peace, welfare and good government" 17 of the colonies extended to 
shipping in the ports and harbours. Thev are examined for elements 
of maritime law. In time colonial maritime trade and activities 
expanded. This fact called for extended legislative powers to be 
conferred on the colonial legislatures. Colonial laws, with limited 
extraterritorial operation, were required for regulating shipping and 
for protecting passengers and the rights of seamen. Moreover, 
within U1e Imperial merchant st1ipping codes, which applied to the 
colonies, flexibilitv was needed to accommodate the local conditions 
and circumstances prevailing in the Australian maritime environment. 
Tho studv enquires into the ingenious methods emploved bv the Im-
perial Parliament to cater for such needs, and also to ensure that 
the colonial, and later State, enactments passed were, or are, in line 
with Imperial policy:s An examination of the Imperial methods used 
14. Including the 185l, Act (17 & 18 Vic., c. 104), the 1869 Act 
(32 & 33 Vic., c. 11), the 1894 Act (57 & 58 Vic., c. 60), the 
1898 Act (61 & 62 Vic., c. 14), the 1900 Act (63 & 64 Vic., c. 
32), and the 1906 Act (6 Edw. VII, c. 48). 
15. 53 & 5l, Vic., c. 27. 
16. CmiBred mainlv in Chapter Nine. 
17. As to the powers given for such purposes, see R.D. Lumb, 
The Ce-nstitutions of the Australian States (4th ed. 1976), 
pp. 10, 114, 30, 31,, 35 and 38. 
18. Sr')e Merchant Shippinq Act 1854 (lrnp.), s. 547; Merchant 
St1ipping Act 1891! (Imp.), ss. 264, 735 anc1 736. 
(1) 
necessarily entails an m;aluation of tht-J validity of the colonial and 
State enactments and their effects as law "reception" mechanisms. 
A substantial contribution came from the vital role played by 
judges of the colonial Supreme Courts, the Vice-Admiralty Courts 
and the Colonial Courts of Admiralty. The manner in which maritime 
law was, or has been, administered and the adherence to Imperial 
policy, as an on-going ''law reception" mechanism, are highly relevant 
factors. Imperial legislation providing for appeals against decisions 
given in maritime law to be taken to the Privy Council was a power-
ful check against Australian adventurisms: 9 
A landmark in legal histor·y is the passing of the Navigation 
Act 1912-73 (Comth.). It is understandable that,in the early years 
of the Commonwealth,most sections of this Act were merely a re-
enactment of the Imperial provisions. One outstanding constitu-
tional event paved the way for significant development in Austral-
ian maritime law. The ~)tatute of Lllestminster /\doption Act 1942 
(Comth.) removed the limitations imposed by Imperial legislation on 
the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament. This new competence 
and the fact that f\ustralia is a Federation of States gave rise to 
problems of inconsistency between Commom"1ealth and State legisla-
tion. It is part of uur investigation to examine the areas of con-
flict, and what dynamic legislative measures have been taken to 
upgrade this branch of the law. (Jne solution has stemmed from the 
1980 Constitutional Agreement which has been formalised by Comm-
onwealth and State legislation~0 Each State Parliament is now 
empowered to pass laws to operate beyond the low-water rnark 
adjacent to the high seas. 
4. Comparative Aspects 
Development can only be gaugt:d in relati\te terms. For our 
purpose, the Unitod 1\ingdom's maritime law in the present state is 
19. Vice-Admiralty Courts l\ct 1863 (Imp.), s. 22; Colonial Courts 
of /\dmiralt~i Act 1890 (Irnp.), s. 6. 
20. Coastal Waters (State Pmvers) Act (Comth.) (No. 75 of 1980); 
Constitutional Powers (Coastal Waters) Act (N.S.W.) (No. 138 
of 1979); Constitutional Powr:~rs (Coastal l.Uaters) Act (Qld.) 
(No. 1 of 1980); Constitutional Powers (Coastal LlJaters) Act 
(S.A.) (No. 68 of 1979); Constitutional PowBrs ~Coastal Wat-
ers) Act (Tas.) (No. 62 of 1979); Constitutional Powers (Coas-
tal WatF!rs) Act (Vic.) (1\lo. 9366 of 1980); Constitutional Powers 
(Coastal Waters) Act (lll.A.) (No. 95 of 1979). 
(li) 
largely taken as the norm. The areas of f\ustralian lm'll, as defimllj 
above, are examined alongside their counterparts in the United 
Kinqdom's law. This approach makes it possible to evaluate the 
extent and pace of development achieved,as well as the gaps,in 
Australian maritime law. There is a second facet of comparison. To 
ascertain how progressive or efficacious /\ustralian maritime law is, 
it is necessarv to compare the relative advantages or disadvantages 
of instituting personal actions at common law \,\lith tr10se of bringing 
proceedings in ~· A third facet involves an examination of the no-
fault liabilitv for oil-pollution dama(Je and ttle claims arising out of 
oil spills. Because maritime propertv, shipowners, and, in manv 
cases, masters are directlv affected, a study of the relevant legis-
lation in relation to maritime law principles will throw light on tt1e 
future development~1 
The imtestigation will also highlight Australia's departures 
from the United Kingdom's law. Thev include the requirements for 
registration of Australian ships, the order of ranking of the wage lien 
and master's disbursement lien, the limitation of liability of ship-
owners and others, and differences in admiraltv jurisdiction. Att-
empts are made to analyse the effects of the principles relating to 
such matters on the rights of persons under Australian law. It is, 
of course, questionable as to how far the policv underlving the Aus-
tralian approach in each of those areas h:; sound or in her best 
national interests. 
21. Discussed in Chapter Five and elsewhere. 
CHAPTER ONE 
RECEPTION OF ENGLISH MARITIME LAW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter traces the dm;elopment of maritime law based on 
early authorities. The nature of this body of rules and the English 
courts which administered them will be identifie1J. This approach is 
essential to a proper understanding of the process by which maritime 
law was imported into tt1e Australian colonies. 
Unlike the more commercially advanced states of the early ages, 
England had no maritime codes of her own. The wide popularity of 
England's seaports and fairs, as centres of maritime trade, attracted 
numerous European merchants and cargo ships to her harbours. This 
necessitated the recognition and application of foreign customs and 
sea laws in the settlement of commercial disputes involving foreign 
'I 
merchants. It was clearly in England's mterests to encourage the 
steady flow into the country of this enormous source of wealth. 
Moreover, to gain recognition as one of the maritime states, England, 
more by necessity than choice, adopted the laws of Oleron. According 
to Sir William Blackstone,2 such laws 11are received by all the nations 
of Europe as the ground and substruction of all their marine consti t-
utions." 3 
At a later stage, these laws were incorporated in the Blar.k 
Book of the Admiraltv~ The Select Pleas in the Court of f-'\dmiralt.~5 
1. Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law ()rd ed. 191+5) 
vol. V, p. 129. 
2. Commentaries on the Laws of Englanq, vol. 1 (Coleridge's ed.) 
P. 1119. referred to in footnote of Augusta v. Eugenie (1822) 
1 Hag. Adm. , p. 17. 
3. Radcliffe and Cross, The English Legal System (15th ed. 1971), 
p. 243: "The origin of our maritime law is to be found in the 
sea-laws promulgated by Eleanor of Aquintaine at the castle 
on the isle of Oleron in the Bay of Biscay, in the late twelfth 
century." 
'•· Monuments iuridica, with appendix edited by Sir Travers T\lliiss 
(1871-1876), vols. rr-rv. 
5. Edited by R.G. Marsdon (1891,, 1B97), 2 \Jols. 
1 
contained the records of the Court of Admiralty. They showed numer-
ous cases which had been decided based on the usages of foreign mer-
chants and marinr:Jrs and the laws of Oleron. According to Welwood,6 
''The debates of seafarers, and seafaring actions should 
be decided according to received laws and statutes of 
the sea ... and if neither written nor unwritten custom nor 
consuetude occurs ... the last refuge is the opinions and 
sentences of skilled and upright men in the profession and 
exercise of seafaring ... " 
Tt1e general sea laws and maritime usages imported into England in those 
early days provided judges with the "core material" of this discipline. 
By analogy\ and through judicial creativity, new principles ~\/ere devel-
oped. Towar·ds the end of the seventeenth century, the distinctive 
outline of English maritime law was beginning to assume its modern 
aspect. This trend signalled departures in a number of ways from the 
maritime lm\ls of its European counterparts. 
II. ANALYSIS OF EARLY JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES 
A study is made of the law prior to 26th January, 1788, and its 
progress through to 25th July, 1828, and beyond. Early in its history, 
the development of this branch of the law was greatly expedited by 
court decisions. It is vital to note that, as regards the contributions 
made, little difference existed between judges exercising jurisdictions 
in common law, equity and admiralty. The body of law was made up of 
rules laid down by a large section of the judiciary. This Fact accounted 
for its rapid growth and its potential to cope effectively with the ele-
ments of international character. An insight into legal history is found 
in the "Ruckers•7 in the following words: 
"The jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty was exercised 
by the Kings of England in their household, with the assis-
tance of the Judges of the Common Law, till the reign of 
Edl.\1. 3." 
In the late nineteenth century, Lord Esher\M.R., in Tht:J Chartered 
Merchants Bank of India, London and China v. The Netherlands India 
Steam tiorf3 referred to "maritime law" as "part of the common 
law of England." However, maritime law as administered later by the 
6. William l!Jelwood, An Abridgement of all Sea Lm~t~s (1613 ed.), 
Title V. 
7. (1801) 4 C. Rub. 73, 74, footnoto (b). 
8. (1883) 10 Q.B.D. 521, p. 537; 5 Asp. M.C. 65, p. 68, per Lord 
Esher, M.R. 
2 
High Court of Admiralty was different from common law and equity in 
their traditional sense. The differences, attributed to the nature and 
exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction, laid in matters of procedure and 
substantive law? In time, the law as administered in the High Court of 
Admiralty, assumed a distinctive maritime character. Consequently, in 
tracing the development and the importation into Australia of this branch: 
of the law, care must be taken to identify its two-fold character. A 
clear distinction must be drawn between the High Court of Admiralty 
decisions and those of the other courts, e.g. the Court of Common Pleas, 
the Court of 1\ing's Bench, the Court of Chancery, etc. Although these 
courts were involved in developing the law, the distinction is of funda-
mental importance. It helps to explain tr1at, for the purpose of the 
reception, this branch of the law was treated as comprising two 
segments. 10 
1. Sale of Ships in early Law 
England had to rely on the sea laws and maritime codes of Europe. 
The principle relating to the sale of ships was stated by Malyne as 
follows:11 
''The selling of a ship is not a sufficient cause to 
alienate the same; but the quiet possession thereof 
must be delivered upon ttlB sale made." 
I 
The delivery of quiet possession, as an essential condition, was not always 
possible. This meant that a ship while at sea could not be effectively sold. 
Probably to expedite commerce, the ancient practice was supplanted 
by a more acceptable method. This took the form of a bill of sale as the 
instrument of transfer which came into common use. One of the earliest 
English cases, which gave effect to its use, was decided in June 1790 by 
Lord Thurlow. In Ex parte Stodgroom1 2 it was held that the vendee 
was entitled under a bill of sale to a share of the property in a ship. 
9. A number of basic distinctions between the three branches 
of law were highlighted in the Privy Council decision in The 
Neptune (1835) III Knapp 95, 100, 104, 117. The procedure 
differed according to whether the claim against the ship was 
bmught. in the Court of l<ing's Bench or the Court of Admiralty: 
The Flora (1929) 2 rlag. Adrn. 298. 
10. As will tJe shown, each segment was inported into the colonies 
at a different phase of development. 
11. Gerald Malynes, Lex Mercatoria (l1th ed. 1688), p. 123. 
12. (1790) 2 Cox. 234; Ves. Jr. (1755-1792), vol. 1, 162. 
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It not only undermined the ancient principle but judicially recognised 
a bill of sale as a means of passing property. No delivery of possess-
ion was considered necessary. 
The scope of the decision was extended by M'Donald, C.B. to 
apply to a ship, of which the owners had no physical possession. He 
held that "the sale of a part of the property of a ship to be similar 
to that of a ship at sea, as actual delivery cannot take place." 13 
Judicial authorities had consistently enhanced the use of the 
bill of sale as proof of title to a chattel. This recognition enabled 
the document to serve a new commercial function. It was often used 
by shipowners for assigning their interests in the ship as mortgage 
. . f h 14 
security or t e repayment of debts. Its admissibility as evidence 
of a transaction was placed beyond doubt by the Court of Chancery. 
In Ex part Halkett~'j the issue raised was whether or not the ship's 
master had the authority to pledge the ship for necessaries supplied. 
Lord Chancellor Loughborough said: 16 "It laid down that the ship 
may be bound by the bill of sale; but it cannot be by parol.. .. " 
Minor exceptions aside, bills of sale had become a permanent 
feature of commercial transactions involving the sale and mortgage of 
ships. The commercial usages and judge-made law were amended by, and 
incorporated in, the "Registry Acts" of 1786 and 1794.17 Non-compli-
ance with the provisions rendered the bills of sale and other instru-
ments null and void. 
The condition of the ship was an important aspect of the law of 
sale. A vendor was required to fulfil a duty half-way between the 
utmost good faith and strict liability. He was under a mandatory 
obligation to disclose fully all the defects. Lord Kenyon greatly 
increased the onus of a vendor where he was aware of the defects: 8 
13. Addis v. Baker & Others (1792) Ar1 Struther's Rep., val. 1, 222, 
p. 22£1. Property in a ship would also pass by capture and 
condc-:1mnation as lawful prize by a court of competent juris-
diction. 
14. v. Gillespie (1805) Ves. Jr. (1805-1806), vol. 11,621, 
p. 627. 
15. Ves. Jr. (1812-1817), vol. 9, 473. 
16. Ibid, p. 475. 
17. 26 Gen. III, c. 60 and 34 Geo. III, c. 68, respectively. 
18. Mellish v. Motteux (1811) Peak. 156. 
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Thus in such cases, the offer for sale of a ship, with ail faults and with-
out warranty, ~vas held insufficient to exonerate the vendor from the 
dutv of disclosure. In the later case of Baglehold v. Walters; 9 the doc-
trine propounded by Lord Kenyon was not followed. The plaintiffs bought 
two-thirds of the ship "with all faults." In giving judgment for the defend-
ants, Lord Ellenborough laid down a more equitable principle. Where a 
ship was sold with all faults, the seller was not liable for not disclosing 
anv latent defects known at the time of sale, unless he had used some 
device to conceal them. This principle would not avail a seller where 
there was fraudulent misrepresentation as to the condition, description 
or nature of the subject matter. In Schneider v. Health, 20 the vessel and 
her stores were sold \"with all faults ... without any allowance for weight, 
length, quality, or defect whatsoever." After the purchase, the ship's 
bottom was found to be worm-eaten, her keel broken, and she was quite 
unseaworthv. In that dilapidated condition, sl1e was not a vessel but 
a wreck! She by no means corresponded to tl1e description used bv the 
vendor. Mansfield, C.J., who gave judgment for the plaintiff vendee, 
'd 21 sal : 
" .. .if the seller was guilty of any positive fraud in the 
sale, these words (of exemption) will not protect him. 
There might be such fraud, either in fal~1e r(~presentation, 
or in using means to conceal some defect." 
Theldecisions show the pioneering role of judges. Thev laid dmvn rules 
I 
which sougt1t to provide a reasonable balance between the freedom of 
contract and the protection of innocent buvBrs of ships. As the ratio 
decidendi of each case depended on the judqe and policy consider-
ations the law imported into the colonies would accordingly be affected. 
An issue closely related to the subject was raised before the ~·Hgh 
Court of Admiralty. Probably for the first time, in 1822, a master's auth-
ority to sell a ship was considerod. In The Patridge,22 U18 ship struck a 
shoal in the Bay of Bengal. The damage sustained was not surveyed. 
There was no authority from her owner and no necessity for the sale. 
The sale was held to be void. It could only IJe valid, if, with knowledge 
of all that the master had done, the owner had subsequentlv ratified 
and confirmed the sale. 
19. (1811) 170 E.R. 1338. 
20. ~1813) 170 E.R. 1462. 
21. Ibid, p. 1463. 
22. (1822) 1 Hag. Adm. 81. 
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An inference having a bearing on the duty of seller may be drawn. 
ln the absence of necessitous circumstances justifying the sale, prior 
authority or subsequent ratification, a master had no right to effect 
a sale. It followed, therefore, that the owner was not bound by any 
false representation or concealmr'!nt of defects made by a master, who 
was purporting to sell her. 
2. Rights of Part-mMners 
It had been a practice for a ship as a valuable chattel to be div-
ided into sixty-four shares. Before the advent of limited liability 
companies, those shares, more often than not, were held by different 
persons as part-owners. Frequently, the part-owners were not unanimous 
in their decision regarding the employment of the ship. In dealing with 
disputes between the majority and minority part-owners, courts often 
had to lay down rules which determined how far the interests of individ-
ual part-owners should be protected. The remedies available would in 
turn depend on the application of those rules. 
In 1684, an interesting case23came before the Lord Keeper in the 
Court of Chancery. Ltlithout the consent of the third part-mvner, two of, 
the three part-owners went ahead to have the ship fitted out for a 
voyage. The ship was lost at sea. Based on the concept of equity, the 
court approached the problem by examining how the profits earned 
would be distributed. Thus a part-owner's right to receive a share of 
the profits meant he would have to bear a corresponding proportion of 
the loss. Rules covering two alternative situations were laid down. 
(i) The two part-owners had obtained from the High Court of 
Admiralty an order. It permitted them to navigate the ship 
despite the refusal of the third part-owner, and to keep all 
the profits to be earned. In this case, the loss of the ship 
would fall entirely on the two part-owners. 
(ii) The third part-owner had refused to have the ship fitted 
out for the voyage. But he was entitlud to a share of the 
profits to be earned. In this instance, he would bear a 
proportion of the loss. 
23. Strelly v. Wenson 1 Vern. 298; [1] Eq. Ca. Ab. 7 plo. 12, 372, pl. 1. 
In this case, the loss of the ship was to be borne equa(ly 
by the three part-owners. However, in Robinson v. Thompson 
(1687) 1. Vern. '~66, the Lord Chancellor applied a different 
rule with regard to profits. The major port-owners were held 
to be entitlPd to settle and agree or1 the amount of the profits 
of a voya~Je. 
6 
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In this case, the third part-owner was held to come within the 
second alternative. 
It is clear that equity had recognised part-owners as tenants 
in common. Each of them was entitled to make an independent 
decision on the employment of the ship. Once that stage was reached, 
further developments followed. Part-owners were recognised as having 
proprietary rights to the ship. This principle enabled the courts to 
grant wider protection. Suppose the ship's master and chief part-
owner insisted on taking the ship out against the will of the minority 
part-owners. In around 1745, the latter could, by an action ir:trem, 
have the ship arrested, and compel security to be given before per-
mitting her to leave port?4 An alternative to the action was to 
obtain in the High Court of Admiralty a stipulation from the majority 
25 part-owners for her safe return. 
The increasing protection given by courts was the result of 
the growing importance attached to ship-owning and maritime trade. 
This is seen as part of the British policy to encourage investments 
and enterprise in the shipping industry in England and the colonies 
overseas. Later, when partnerships· and corporations were. formed 
solely to operate or own ships, those problems hardly arose. 
The nature of the contractual right of part-owners was consid-
ered by Abbott, C.J. In John Card and David Cannan v. William Hope~6 
A and B as managing owners, holding nine-sixteenths of the shares of a 
ship , by deed sold five-sixteenths of the shares to C. The deed 
empowered A and B to continue with the management and to be 
employed as C's agent in managing the ship. Under the deed, C was 
appointed to the ship's command. He could not sell the shares except 
on the condition that the purchasers would abide by the same stipula-
tions and would not remove A and B. The court held that the coven-
ant on C's part to engage A and B as agent in the ship's management 
was lawful if it stood alone. However, as the covenant was founded 
on contract for the sale of shares and for the appointment to the 
ship's command and the continuance of the management, it was invalid 
and unenforceable. rt was contrary to the interests of the East India 
24. Duston v. Hebden (17L.5) 1 Wils. K.B. 101. A !:Jirnilar prin-
ciplEl was applied in ~arnbert v. Ar~retf'le ~1 Raym. Ld. 233. 
25. Degrave .v. Hedges, 2 Hayrn. Ld. 1285 
26. (1824) 2 B. & C. 661. 
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. Company, as charterers, and to the other part-owners. The Court 
gave judgment for C. 
The decision is to be applauded. It is consistent with the 
valuable rights enunciated by courts in connection with part-
ownership. To allow the minority shareholders a power of management 
of the ship based on provisions in a deed would undermine the progress. 
made in the past decades. If left unchecked, the practice would 
result in the rights of part-owners being encumbered and eventually 
rendered valueless. 
3. Masters as Agents 
Late in the first half of the eighteenth century, English 
courts had to adjudicate upon the scope of a master's authority. As 
fortuitous events encountered on a voyage were often unpredic-
table, the master was not empowered beforehand to act in every 
emergency. Two underlying questions had to be resolved. How far 
were shipowners bound by the acts of a master arising in contract 
or quasi-contract? When would a master be regarded as an agent of 
necessity? The circumstances justifying a master to so act were 
I 27 
stated by Lord ChancellorHardwickelin Buxton v. Snee: 
"Certainly by the maritime law, the master has power 
to hypothecate both ship and cargo for repairs & c. 
during the voyage; which arises from his authority as 
master, and the necessity thereof during the voyage; 
without which both ship and cargo would perish; there-
fore both that and the law of this country admit such 
a power." 
In the interests of the owner, certain limits were imposed. Thus no 
such authority was held to exist if the ship was in her home port. 
Nor would repairs effected on a ship in her home port, based on the 
master's order, create a lien on her?8 
The master's authority was later extended to include the 
receipt of stores and money. In Rocker v. Busher~9 Lord Ellenborough, 
C.J.,held that the owner of a vessel was liable to a person who had 
supplied articles or advanced cash to the captain of the vessel in 
circumstances where she had entered a foreign port in distress. 
27. (1748) 1 Ves. Sen. 155. No such power existed when the 
ship was in her home port. 
28. Watkinson v. l:larnardiston 2 P. Wms. 367. 
29. 1 Starke 26. 
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In a number of ways, the judgc;s of Common Law Courts, the 
Court of Chancery and the High Court of Admiralty t1ad snparately 
contributed to the protection of forr:Jign creditors and financiers. 
The case of v. Davies30 was heard by Lord f"lansfield, C.J., who 
was well known for his role in Incorporating law merchant as part of 
common law. He held that where, for the benefit of the ship, credit 
was given to her owners, the creditor had a "specific lien" on the 
ship. As the report makes no mention of the nature of the lien one 
could not conclude that it was a maritime lien. It tvas probably a 
right which gave the holder a charge on the ship. The lien or charge 
was intended to place such a creditor in a better position to be paid 
out of the proceeds of sale of the ship than the other claimants. 
!his common law rule was thus another addition to the pre-existing 
remedies. In the earlier case of Sansum v. Bragginton~ 1 the Court 
of Chancery had laid down rules which operatBd in personam. After 
a ship was repaired, refitted and supplied by the plaintiff for the 
homeward-bound voyage, she was captured. It was hold that, whBro a 
ship was hypothecated for repairs done abroad and afterwards lost, 
the part-owners were liable personally as if they were partners. 
rheir liability could extend beyond the value of their respective 
shares and interests in the ship. Thus the personal assets of the 
part-owners, like those of the members of a partnership, were sub-
ject to the claims of their creditors~2 But as tt1e personal liability 
imposed was based on mvnership or equitable interest in the chattel, 
it could be rebutted. This was donEJ by proof that, before repairs 
were effected on the ship, he had parted with ttle beneficial interest 
therein and had ceased to be involved in her rnanagement?3 
30. (1786) 99 E.R. 1000. 
31. (1750) Ves. S!:m. Supp. 189. 
32. l'ich v. Coe et. al (1777) 2 Cowp. 635, p. 640, l:!!lr l"'lansfield, 
C.J. 
33. Jennings \/. Griffiths (182l,) Rv. & Mood 43 Cf. Flower v. Young 
(1812) 170 E.R. 1368, where an action w<:Js brought for stores 
supplied to a ship. ttm defendant pleaded in abatement that 
he was only jointly liable witll the others, it was held to be 
insufficient for him to produce merelv tile ship's register. 
9 
A special form of maritime security, which had come into 
common use before 1746, was the bottomry bond. .£\s we shall see, 
the rights of the holders of such security were protected by a 
3!~ 
statue of George II. The security was referred as "bottom-ree or 
respondentia bond." Its use was clearly a move by the LegislaturP 
to avo.id the principle of unlimited personal liarJility established in 
Sansum v. Bragginton.35 Unlike an ordinary hypothecation, it was 
executed under seal containing tile clause: "The lender of the money 
shall bear the risk of the voyage and the principal and interest shall 
be at stake upon it." Although the owner was not personally liable 
beyond his interests in the ship, the sympathy of the court of equity/ 
was on the side of the lender! In Ladbroke v. Cricket:6 further 
protection was granted for bottomry bonds. All the four common 
1. aw judges held that, where a bottomry bondholder had taken 
possession of the ship, she could no longer be seized by way of exe-
cution initiated by another creditor. Some fourteen years later, for 
commercial reasons, the status of such bonds was enhanced to cover 
the ship and the earnings of a subsequent voyage. This rule was 
stated in the High Court of Admiralty by Sir W. Scott. In the Jacob, 37 
the bond given in America was expressed to bind the ship and freight 
which was not defined. Although it described a voyage from 
Baltimore to Cork, the ship arrived at Dublin, discharged her goods, 
and sailed to England. The judge held that, as the proceeds of ttm 
sale of the ship were insufficient, the freight earned on a subse-
quent voyage was included to meet the bondholder's claim. 
To save the expense of keeping the crew on board, the same 
Court .recognised tile issue of a bottomry bond to a person who 
undertook to pay the crew off. For reimbursement, he was given a 
lien on the proceeds of the sale, entitling him to priority over 
other claimants. 38 
34. Statutes at 15-20, Geo. II, val. 18, chap. 32, infra. 
35. (1750) Ves. Sen. Supp. 189, supra. 
36. (1788) 2 T.R., 61.9. 
37. (1802) '~ C. Rob. 245. 
38. Kammerheire v. Rosenkrants (1822) 1 Hag. Adm. 62. 
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Bv "the operation of law acting upon an emergency and un-
provided necessity," a master was given the authority to execute 
bonds on behalf of the shipowner. 39 
The decisions are seen as part of a wider Empire-building 
policy.: By statute, British ships were permitted to trade mainly 
between Britain and her colonies, and also between the colonies. 
One effective way of enhancing British maritime power and interests 
overseas was active colonial participation. The protection given 
to bondholders l and suppliers of stores and cash to British merchant 
vessels would attract massive colonial investments. Britain took 
the lead in providing ships, trade incentives and expertise, while the 
colonists responded by raising the finance. For the resources to 
be protected, the settlers in Australia and elsewhere had to apply, 
and operate within the context of, British laws. Such involvements 
were calculated to strengthen the relationship between Britain and 
and her colonies. 
l1. Personal Liability of Master 
The position of a ship's master considered from a different 
aspect. Good intentions on his part, expediency and necessitous 
circumstances would not justify any act done in excess of his auth-
ority. The law on the subject comprised rules enunciated by the 
Court of Chancery and common law judges in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. 
Equity was not slow to fasten its constructive trust doctrine 
on the conscience of a person exercising the authority of a master. 
An interesting case40 came before Lord Keeper Harcourt in 1711. 
The ship's master died during the voyage, leaving £800 which he had 
intended to invest in trade. A mate, who took over responsibilities 
as captain, invested the money, and made a great profit. Although 
allowance was made for his care and management of the money, he 
was held to be "more like a trustee than an executor." He was required 
to account for the profits made, and not just for the interest 
received. 
39. The Zodiac (1825) 1 Hag. Adrn. 320, 362, miT Lord Stowell. 
40. Brown v. Litton (1711) 1 P. Wms. 1l1D. 
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In an unprecedented move, the Court of King's Bench excer-
cised its authority by rejecting a custom in the seafaring industry. 
In Blainfield v. Mard1~1 a seaman died in the course of the voyage. 
The captain, in accordance with a usage, took all the deceased's 
goods and sold them at the ship's mast. He made an inventory of the 
goods sold and the sums received, and delivered them to the admin-
istrator on his return. Holt, C.J., held that the usage was "void." 
Both in the eighteenth century and today, the decision would be 
supportable on several grounds. Certainly apart from public policy, 
the goods and possessions of a deceased seaman should be disposed 
of according to his wishes. But if foul play was suspected; they 
should be retained for the purpose of coronial inquiry. 
In a 1793 case~2 the court protected the interests of cargo shippers' 
by imposing personal responsibility an the master. He was adjudged 
liable in an action on the case for the value of the goods which he 
had received for carriage overseas. They were stolen from the ship 
while she was lying ln the River Thames. The decision, central to the 
promotion of maritime trade in the British Empire, was endorsed twenty-
43 
three years later by Gibbs, C.J. There the master of a storeship 
in the king's service took on board a bullion belonging to a merch-
ant for carriage from Gilbraltar to Woolwich. He was held liable for 
the loss of the valuable cargo. 
The question as to when a master could render himself liable 
to the mariners far their wages arose in Forsboom v. Kruger.44 While 
proceeding on a voyage, the ship was wrecked. The captain gave to 
a crew member an order drawn upon the shipowners for a sum of money 
payable as wages. Lord Ellenborough held that, until a demand l1ad 
been made upon the owners pursuant to the order, an action for 
wages was not maintainable against the master. 
41. (1796) val. 7 Mod. Rep. 141. 
42. Mars v. Sluce (1793) 1 Mod. Rep. 85. 
43. Hatchwell v. Cooke (1816) 6 Taunt Rep. 577. 
'•4. (1812) 170 E.R. 1353. 
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The decision in Thompson v. Find en 45 underscored the doctrine 
of freedom of contract. Generally, shipowners were legally, bound to 
pay for repairs done on, or supplies delhtered to, the ship. To this rule, 
Tindal, C.J.Jhad created a noteworthy exception. A master would be 
held personally answerable if it was proved that the nature of the deal-
ing was such that the goods supplier looked exclusi\/ely to the master 
who had instructed the supplies to be deli\/ered. The exception may 
be seen as judicial endorsement of lais sez-faire. 
5. Sal\/age 
The law of sal\/age was de\/eloped mainly by the judges of the 
Common .law Courts,. the High Court of Admiralty and the Court of Chanc-
ery. Little formal reliance had been placed on the maritime usages of 
ci\/il law countries~6 Sir Christopher47 fa\/oured an equitable remunera-
tion for ser\/ices rendered. This was a bold departure from the rule of 
making awards based on a proportion of the \/alue of the ship sa\/ed -
"a course of proceeding familiar enough in ancient times." 
From early days, the decisions were consistently geared towards 
the encouragement of salvage services. This element was no doubt an 
integral part of the British shipping policy. The principles laid down by 
Holt, C .J ., in a pre-1788 case are central to the subject. The defendants, 
in Hartfort \/. Jones had risked their lives in saving the goods from a 
fire which broke out in a ship. They refused to part with them unless 
they were paid salvage. In dismissing the action of tro\/er brought by 
48 
the owner against them, Holt, C.J.,said: 
"[T]hey might retain the goods until payment ... 
And sal\/age is allowed by all nations, it being reason-
ble that a man shall be rewarded who hazards his life 
in the service of another." 
The rule crystallised that a person entitled to salvage had a possessory 
lien upon the property saved for payment. Judicial awards for benefic-
ial work performed beyond the call of duty were made to further this 
aspect of the policy. Thus redemption of goods by the master from pir-
ates, who had captured the ship, was recognised as a species of sal\/age. 
45. (1829) 172 E.R. 651. 
46. I<::.E. Roberts says: "Maritime salvage can be traced to 
Rhodian law, the maritime codes of the Mediterranean sea-
port cities and the sea laws of the Baltic regions:" ft Sink-
ing, Salvage, and Abandonment" (1977) 51 Tul. L.R., p. 1197. 
47. Salada (1829) 2 Hag. Adm. 262. 
48. 1 Raym. Ld. 393. 
13 
He was afforded a possessory lien.49 Sir W. Scott extended maritime 
property to include freight saved. It was essential that freight was 
in the course of being earned and the voyage was afterwards com-
pleted.50 In "The Acguila,'51 he held that salvage reward for finding 
a derelict was much in the discretion of the court. He refused to 
follow the ancient rule of granting a moiety de jure to ttm finder. 52 
In the early nineteenth century, a significant decision was made. 
fhe High Court of Admiralty held that a salvor's right to remunera-
53 
tion was not affected by relinquishing possession of the goods saved. 
A concept of antiquity was that only ships' masters and crews 
could qualify as salvors. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, 
probably due to a charge in philosophy, non-mariners were also entitled 
to salvage reward.54 An initial breakthrough came in 
..;,_,._"'--~~~-
nardo." 55 The Court held that the owners of the salvaging vessel had 
"no great claim." Their rights, lmwever, were given "the equitable con-
sideration of the Court for damage or risk, IAihich their property might 
have incurred." In evaluating the exertions of non-mariners, the courts 
applied a somewhat new criterion. Thus in Newman v. Walters, 56 a 
strong Court of Chancery recognised the services of a passenger to 
be of sufficient merit for the purpose of salvage. 
In 1801, a new type of claim, viz. military salvage, came to be 
heard before Sir W. Scott.57 Due to bad weather and her leaky con-
dition, a British vessel laden with cargo was compelled by her crew to 
49. ,A.nonymou?(1796) 11 Mod. Rep. 6. 
50. The "Dorothy Foster" (1805) 6 C. Rob. 88. 
51. (1798) 1 C. Rob. 37. Thi:3 rule was followed in later cases. 
52. .As to remuneration imposed on goods by statutes in favour 
of salvors, see R.G. Marsden "Admiralty Droits and 
Salvage - Gas Float Whitton, No. II" (1899) 60 L.Q. R. 353. 
53. Eleanora Charlotta (1823) 1 Hag. Adm. 156. 
54. As to present position. see K.C. McGuffie, !_<;ennedy's 
Ci\;il Salvage (4th eel. 1958), pp. 124 et. seg. 
55. (1799) 1 C. Rob. 177. 
56. (1804) 3 8()S. & Pul. 613. 
57. The Franklin (1801) 4 C. Rob. 146. 
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put into an enemy port. She was saved by a British cruiser from certain 
capture and confiscation. The rescuers brought her and her cargo safe 
into another port. These services were accepted by the High Court . 
of Admiralty to be of sufficient merit for salvage reward. 
Subsequent decisions were consistent with the "merit" test. The 
courts were not deterred from making awards where the salvaging ship 
and the ship saved belonged to the same employer. 58 
Inherent in the salvage awards made was the public policy to 
encourage exertions on humanitarian grounds for the rescue of life and 
property. However, judicial pronouncements were made on a number 
of disentitling factors. In the following situations, no salvage award 
would be made in X's favour: 
(i) Some Malay mutineers had fallen upon the master of the ship and 
taken possession of her. The ship and cargo were later rescued 
by the ship's own crew (X).59 
(ii) Under an agreement certain ships were to sail as consorts 
and to provide mutual assistance. Pursuant to the agreement, 
salvage operations were rendered by one or more of the ships 
(X). 60 
(iii) A commander allowed his men to carry out salvage work using 
the ship's boats. H~1 CX) was not actually im10lved in the salvage operations. 
(iv) A barge without anchor or crew was found at a spot at sea 
where it was comng~n to leave barges. The finder (X) brought 
her back to port. 
(v) While carrying goods to market, a ship rendered salvage services 
for which the sum agreed was paid. Due to the delay entailed, 
the goods carried had depreciated in value. The owners (X) 
of the ship sought to recover a further sum as consequen-
tial loss. 65 
(vi) Before a vessel in distress could be salved, temporary repairs, 
including caulking, had to be done to her. A sum was paid 
for salvage. The salvor (X) claimed a further amount for the 
temporary repairs.64 
58. "Waterloo" (1820) 2 Dads. 432. 
59. "Governor Raffles" (1815) 3 Dads. 13. 
60. Zephyr (1827) 2 Hag. Adm. 43. 
61. Vine (1825) 2 Hag. Adm. 1. 
62. Upnor (1826) 2 Hag. Adm. 3. 
63. Mulgrave (1827) 2 Hag. Adm. 77. It was probable that the rule 
might not apply in the absence of the aoreernent. 
64. Rainger (1827) 2 Hag. Adm. 112. 
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6. Collision at Sea 
It is relevant to consider the position tAihere loss or damage was 
sustained in a collision between two ships~5 Early in 1797, the case of 
Sedgworth v. Overend 66 came before the Court of Chancery. A ship 
jointly owned by two persons was negligently damaged in a collision. 
A strong court held that the part-owners, as tenants in common, could 
each in a separation action sue the defendant for the damage caused 
to his share of the property. This harassing procedure was not open 
to a plaintiff if the defendant, when first sued by a part-owner, had 
pleeded an abatement to the action. 
At the start of the nineteenth century, the principle of vicarious 
liability for collision damage due to negligence was established by the 
Court of Common Pleas. It was held that shipowners who supplied the 
crew on board the ship, which was adjudged to be at fault, would be 
erima facie liable. The presumption was not rebutted by the fact that 
at the time of collision she was chartered to the Commissioners of the 
Navy and had on board a commander and a King's pilot. 67 There were 
two grounds on which the application of the principle in the circum-
stances could be supported. It was impossible for the plaintiff to 
ascertain whether the collision arose from the negligent acts or defaults 
of the cre1,v or those of the naval officer. The matter as between the 
shipowners and th~e} Commissionees of the Navy could later be settled. 
The judgment in The ~oodrop:Sims"68 laid down the law with un-
usual clarity. Sir W. Scott classified the causes of collision in four sit-
uations and declared the rules as the liability. He explained: 69 
65. As to rule relating to division of loss under the Laws of 
Oleron, see K.C. i"lcGuffie, The Law of Collisions at Sea 
(11th ed. 1961), para. 161. 
66. 7 T.R. 278. 
67. Fletcher v. Braddick (1806) 2 Bos. & Pul. (N.R.) 181. 
68. (1815) 3 Dads. 82. The classification into the four possibil-
ities by Sir W. Scott was approved by the House of Lords in 
Hay v. Le Neve 2 Sr1aw's Scotch App£-Jal Cases, p. 395. 
69. (1815) 2 Dads. 82, 85. 
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"In the first place, it may happen without blame bPinn 
imputable to either party; as where the loss is occasiom:d 
by a storm, or any other vis major: in that case, the mis-
fortune must be borne by the party on whom it happBns to 
light; the other not being responsible to him in any degree. 
Secondly, a rnisfm'tune of this kind may arise where both 
parties are to blame; where there has been a want of due 
diligence or of skill on both sides: in such a case the rule 
of law is that the loss must be apportioned between them, 
as having been occasioned by the fault of both of them. 
Thirdly, it may happen by the misconduct of the suffering 
party only; and then the rule is that the sufferer must bear 
his own burden. Lastly, it may have been the fault of the ship 
which ran the other down; and in this case, the injured party 
would be entitled to an entire compensation from the other." 
For the damage caused, The "Woodrop-Sims" was held solely to blame. The 
reason for the decision and the rule of navigation which applied to sail-
ing vessels were stated by the High Court of Admiralty. "The law imposes 
upon the vessel having the wind free, the obligation of taking proper 
measues to get out of the way of a vessel that is close-hauled, and of 
showing that it has done so, if not, the owners of it are responsible 
for the loss which ensues."70 In its application to steam vessels the 
rule was modified. Thus in the case of Shannon, decided in 1828, two 
vessels, the Shannon (a steam vessel) and the British Union, while coming 
from opposite directions, collided in a channel. The court held that 
the Shannon alone was blamable for the damage. The judge said?1 
" ... the rule of navigation should be applied according 
to the character of the two vessels ... 
Stoam boats from their greater Pot•Jer oughL always to 
give IAJay ... also being satisfied that the ;?hannon had seen 
the Wnion_ ... the Shannon was to blame." 
The judicial pronouncements were no doubt observed as rules for the 
safety of navigation on water. They existed before the internation.al 
regulations for the pre\tention of collision at sea were formulated?2 
Prior to the passing of the Australian Courts Act, 1828 (Imp.), 73 
a new issue was raised before Lord Stowell. It had never been deter-
mined whether consequential loss could be tacked onto and recovered as 
part of the claim for collision damage. The "Minerva," while assisted 
by the "Flora" in towing a foreign vessel, was run down by the 
70. The "Llloodrop-Sims," ibid., 87. This rule was followed at 
nisi prius in the later case of Handaysyde v. Wilson (1828) 
172 E.R. 532. 
71. 2 Hag. Adm. 173, pp. 174-175. 
72. For effoct given to early collision regulations in New South 
Wales, see Chapter Two. 
73. 9 Geo. IV, c. 83, infra. 
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"Betsy Caines." 74 There was evidence of an agreement to pay the "Minerva'' 
the sum of fifty pounds for salvage. The collision had incapacitated 
her from completing the work. Consequential loss was allowed by the 
High Court of Admiralty as part of the claim.75 
7. Wages of Seamen 
To poor seamen seeking redress from economic oppression, the High 
Court of Admiralty was the "court of equity and conscience." The 
current of decisions, which upheld seamen's rights to their wages, seemed 
to be based on a biblical precept that the "labourer is worthy of his 
hire."76 
In The Countess of Harcourt?7 the mariner was engaged to sail 
from "the port of London to Van Diemen's Land and ... back to London." 
On the ship's return to London, the captain had directions to proceed 
to Rotterdam. Lord Stowell held that the seaman's refusal to work dur-
ing the continuance of the voyage to Rotterdam was not a desertion of 
his duty. It would not, therefore, gi\/e rise to a forfeiture of his wages. 
A seaman was not bound to accede to an alteration of the voyage. 
In the early days of merchant shipping, virtually no de\/iation 
from the articles signed by seamen would be permitted. Where under 
the articles a person was bound to serve on board as seaman for certain 
wages, he \Mould be unable to maintain an action against the master for 
extra wages if he acted as a cuddy ser\/ant?8 It was questionable 
whether an exception would arise if there was an agreement to pay 
additional wages. This rigid rule had stemmed from an old Court of 
Common Pleas decision in White v. Wilson?9 It was based on the pre-
mise that where a person had, by articles, agreed to ser\/e for certain 
74. (1826) 2 Hag. Adm. 28. 
75. Later, it was in the court's discretion to decide whether an 
item of loss arising after collision was reco\/erable as dam-
ages in the action: The Maid of 1\ent (1881) 6 P.O. 178. 
76. St. Luke's Gospel, chapter 10, verse 7. 
77. (1821!) 1 Hag. Adm. 248. 
78. Dafter \/. Creswell (1826) 172 E.R. 73, per Abbott, C.J. 
79. 2 8os. & Pul. 116. 
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wages he could not ask for more. Its injustice: led the High Court of 
Admiraltv to adopt a more rational approach to the problem. One of 
the first inroads on the doctrine wm; made in 1825. In The 
Providence~0 the second mate was directed to take over the duties of 
chief mate. No alteration was made to the remuneration and articles 
signed, and he continued 1.vith a second mate's pav. Lord Stowell held 
he was entitled to be paid on quantum meruit for the work done as chief 
mate. This decision meant that a master's refusal to make the alter-
ation would not prejudice the enforcement of a seaman's claim. Another 
departure from the strict adherence to the articles was reflected in 
The Harvev.81 In the schedule to the ship's articles, Thomas was entered 
as the second mate on the vovage to Van Diemen's Land and New South 
Wales and back to Great Britain. But no rate of wages was affixed to 
his name. The court permitted parol evidence of the agreement to be 
given. 
Attempts bv the ship-owning class to exploit seamen and forfeit 
their wages met with little success. The courts had often extended the 
rights of seamen who would otherwise be placed at the mercies of the 
masters and the fortuitous circumstances. In Train v. Bennett5!2 a sea-
man sued the shipowner for wages. The articles provided that the 
seamen's wages would be forfeited if thev neglected their work, or 
refused to obev the lawful commands of their superiors. The court 
found that the master had acted improperlv and had kept him at work in 
such circumstances as would waive a previous forfeiture. In giving 
judgment for the plaintiff seaman, Lord Tenterden, C.J., said:83 
"Now a master of a ship is not, bv his own conduct, to 
induce a forfeiture of the men's wages; and if vou think 
the captain acted improperlv in refusing to sav whom he 
would knock off, or in obscurelv saving that he 1-\IOUld 
knock several of them off, and the plaintiff ... refused to 
work, I think that then, ln point of law, the wages are not 
forfeited." 
80. (1825) 1 Hag. Adrn. 391. 
81. (1827) 2 Hag. Adm. 77. 
82. (1827) 172 E.R. 296. 
83. Ibid., p. 297. 
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The courts were concerned with building up a uniform bodv of rules 
which governed the rights of seamen throughout the realm, including 
the colonies. Local port customs and usages affecting the interests 
of seamen were narrowh; construed. In an earlv nineteenth-centurv 
case~14 the court had to consider the effect of an established port 
custom. Thus all seamen entering into articles were bound to continue 
in the ship's service until the deliverv of the cargo and full com-
pletion of the vovage. Lord Stowell t1eld that such a custom would not 
prevent a seaman from leaving the ship on legal grounds. Therefore, 
desertion from a ship on the ground that the captain failed to provide 
him with food would not cause a forfeiture of wages. 
In a bold attempt, Lord Stowell carne to grips with fraudulent 
acts which had harassed seamen for centuries. He struck down as 
invalid stipulations in the articles which were harsr1 or believed to have 
been inserted without the seamen's consent. In the Minerva,85 the words 
''to New South Wales and India, and to return to port" were visiblv 
written in the articles signed by the plaintiff seamen. Later, on a close 
inspection, it was found that the words "or elsewhere" were obscurely· 
written after the word "India." The shock this gave the crew and their 
dissatisfaction with the captain's conduct caused twelve of the marin-
ers to leave the ship at Calcutta. The court found that the ship-
owners and the master had exploited the illiteracy and unequal pos-
ition of the seamen. The seamen had signed contracts which embodied 
the provisions and penalties of two Acts. 86 Thus the terms of the arti-
cles were rendered 11 binding and conclusive." Judgment, however, was 
given for the seamen. Lord Stowell said: 87 
... the Court of Admiralty, being a Court of Equity, will con-
sider how far those engagements are reasonable or not ... 
I find great difficulty in persuading myself, under these 
principles and these authorities, that such special engage-
ments can be imposed upon these men as binding and con-
clusive, though directly contrary to all natural justice, and 
to the known principle of maritime law .... " 
84. The Castilla (1822) 1 Hag. Adm. 59. 
85. (1825) 1 Hag. Adm. 3117. 
86. 2 Geo. II, c. 36; 37 Geo. III, c. 73. 
87. (1825) 1 Hag. /\dm. 347, p. 357. 
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The extending role of t11e Court of Admiralty as guardian of the 
rights of seamen is further fJxemplified. In The New Pheonix,BB the 
master sought to forfeit a seaman's wages on grounds of drunkenness. 
Lord Stowell gave judgment for the seaman. It reflected judicial sym-
pathy for the lot of seamen. Lord StOIMf-Jll took into consideration not 
only the occasion when the intemperate excess occurred but also the 
conduct of the master. There was proof "that on all occasions he con-
ducted himself in a sober and orderly manner; and that the master, upon 
the most trivial occasions, gave way to \Jiolent fits of passion, and 
frequently struck and cruelly maltreated him." Moreover, the defence 
of desertion would fail unless there were signed articles given as 
evidence of the contract with the mariner and of the time of making 
the contract~9 
Another of the notable judicial pronouncements in favour of sea-
men was added in Le Loir v. Bristo\;\/:?0 In some ways, an inviolable char-
acter was conferred on a seaman's right tolhis wages. The plaintiff 
seaman sued for the balance of his wages. He admitted that through 
his negligence he had lost certain articles of value entrusted to his 
car-e, and that he was liable to pay for them. Lord Ellenborough 
refused to allow the defence plea of a set-off, unless it was proved 
to be part of the original contract that wages would be paid only after 
deducting the \Jalue of chattels lost. The decision greatly prejudiced 
the legal position of an employer of seamen. It took away the implied 
right of an employer to be reimbursed in respect of loss caused by the 
negligence of his seamen. 
It had long been the policy of courts to give seamen the benefit 
of the doubt. Disruption of the work of seamen while in a foreign port; 
probably not as a result of their fault, would not in certain circum-
h . I 
91 h'l . R . stances deprive them of t e1r wages. n one case, w 1 e m a uss1an 
port, the crew were taken out of the ship and imprisoned. The court 
held that they were entitled to be paid their wages, if on release they 
88. (1823) 1 Hag. Adm. 198. 
89. The George Banifer (1823) 1 Hag. Adm. 168. In Hillyard v. Mount 
(1823) 172 E.R. 338, the articles provided a seaman would lose 
his wages if he failed to return to London with the ship. 
He was discharged during the voyage. Lord Tenterdon, C.J., 
held he was entitled to be paid a reasonable remuneration 
for the services rendered. 
90. (1815) 171 E.R. 43. 
91. Delamainer v. Winteringham (1815) 171 E.f<. 60. 
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returned to the ship and completed the voyage. They were deemed to 
have worked and laboured for the shipowner from the commencement 
to the conclusion of thl~ voyage. 
l.Lle hm1e looked at judicial developments relating to the recovery 
of seamen's wages. Early law took cognizance of the effect which the 
bankruptcy of st1ipowners or the loss of the ship would have on sea-
men. 
In an unusual pre-1823 case, 92 a spinster brought a claim for 
\Aiages before Lord Stowell. She had worked on board a ship firstly 
as a cook and steward, and secondly as a keeper of the ship and her 
stores. The shipowner having become bankrupt, the court held that 
she could pursue her claim against l1is estate. Nowhere does the 
report mention that her claim had any priority over the other claims. 
Pobably she was not paid in full. 
The implication of the ancient maxim "freight is the mother of 
wages" was examined in The Neptune. 93 Would the maxim disentitle a 
seaman from receiving wages if no freight was earned? The ship, 
driven by a gale, stranded upon the French coast. Through the extreme 
exertions of the plaintiff and the other seamen, certain parts of the 
ship wer·e saved. Evidently, the proceeds of sale of those parts con-
stituted the only fund for paying the seamen's wages. Lord Stowell 
found for the seamen. It meant the end of the curious maxim. The 
court recognised the seamen's wages as giving rise to a right which 
attached to the ship, on which they were employed, as a res. Lord 
Stowell placed seamen's wages on the same footing as those of their 
European counterparts. He said?4 
"The practice, at least the modern practice of great 
maritime states, shows a repugnance to the application 
of this particular rule, of total forfeiture of wages where 
92. & Matilda (1823) 1 Hag. 1\dm. 187. 
93. (1824) 1 Hag. Adm. 225. This decision was followed in "The 
Warrior" (1862) Lush. 481; approved in "Le Janet" (1872) L.R. 
3 Ad. & Ecc., 559. 
94. (1824) 1 Hag. Adrn. 225, 233. 
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parts and fragments of U18 vessel are preserved that can 
be applied to a total or partial satisfaction of them. The 
French, a great maritime state, enjoin expressly in their 
celebrated Ordinances of Louis the Fourteenth, that they 
shall be so applied. By the Ordinance of Spain of 1563, when 
that country was at the zenith of maritime glory, the same 
practice was enjoined. In Holland, a country the most 
exclusively\ maritime, the Ordinances of Rotterdam prescribe 
it. Such likewise the rule of the Danish Code ... that if any 
part of the vessel is saved, the crew are to be paid out of 
the materials of the wreck which they ha\Je saved." 
The insolvency of shipowners, as employers, generally brought 
hardships on seamen. Apart from the lack of financial resources to ·· 
pursue their claims. seamen often had to compete with other creditors 
of their employers. One of the high-water marks of judicial contrib-
ution to the welfare of seamen has been the high priority given to 
the wage claims of seamen. The facts of The Flora 95 give an interest-
ing insight into an important area of the law in 18Zll. W, a sole owner 
of a ship, was indebted to R, a general creditor. A writ of :fi8.ri 
facias was issuecl in the Court of King's Bench. After the ship was 
arrested by the sheriff and while she was in his custody, a suit for wages 
was instituted by the mariners. Consequently, she was also arrested 
by the deputy-marshall of the Court of Admiralty. After the st1ip was 
sold, the wages and costs were paid out of the proceeds of the sale. 
The surplus was held by the sheriff to await the outcome of the legal 
battle between the general creditor and the shipowner. 
It is a corollary that the materials or necessaries, .fWL ropes, 
tackle and provisions, supplied to a ship had never been rated on par 
with the services rendered by seamen. In The Majtland,96 the ship was 
arrested in a suit for wages brought by seamen, and later sold. 
95. (1823) 1 Hag. Adm. 198. 
96. (1829) 2 Hag. Adm. 253. This decision was endorsed by 
the Privy Council in The Neptune (1835) 3 Knapp. 94. 
23 
The other creditors were a bottomry bondholder and the ''necessaries" 
men. The proceeds of the sale were first used to pay wages. Sir 
Christopher Robinson ruled that the surplus was to "remain in the reg-
istry," as the other claims were disputed by the former shipowner. 
By 1828 or thereabouts, a strong current of precedents had been 
built up for the protection of the vital interests of seamen. The case 
authorities were tllB result of judicial understanding, interpretation 
and implementation of the national policy of Great Britain. Prior to 
legislation assuming a major role, they pa11ed the way for progress in 
maritime trade in the colonies and the Empire as a whole. As a mon-
ument to the work of judges, many of the rules have been preserved 
and codified by statutes. 
8. Claims· of Material Men and Others 
We shall consider the ranking of various claims brought by the 
creditors of shipowners. 
A debt commonly incurred arose from the supply of material or 
necessaries to the ship. In the early years, more from the influence 
rather than reception of civil lml\/ and foreign maritime laws, material 
men were gi\Jen a lien on the ship and the proceeds of the sale. Thus 
in England, between the years of 1760 and 1833, the records show seven 
cases decided according to such influence~? Based on the orders of 
the Court of Admiralty, the material men ~vere paid out of the balance 
98 
of the proceeds of the sale of ships, left in the registry. 
However, a historic departure from the ci\Jil law trend occurred in 
1835. The Privy Council in The Neptune "declared that the maritime 
courts had erroneously applied the doctrine of foreign maritime law 
to contracts madB in this country (England)."99 It denied that "material 
men ever had by the English maritime law, in respect of such contracts, 
any lien upon the ship, or any preferencD over any simple contract 
creditors." The balance of the proceeds of tl1e ship sale was deposited 
in the court registry. The sum of over £361 together with costs was 
97. The Neptune (1835) 3 Knapp.%, 118-119 (P.C.) For the cases, 
see (1834) 3 Hag. Adm. 130, 150. 
98. Ibid., 95. Decision of High Court of Admiralty taken on 
appeal to tile Privy Council. 
';19. Ibid., 116. 
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pronounced to be payable to material men. H, to whom the ship was 
twice mortgaged, opposed the award. Pursuant to provisions in the 
mortgage deeds, H had taken possession of the ship before she was 
arrested and sold. In reversing the decree of the Court of Admiralty, 
the Privy Council held (inter alia): 1 
" ... [T)he law of England never had adopted the rule of 
the civil law with regard to necessaries furnished here 
in England. If then material men never had any lien on 
the ship itself, in respect of supplies furnished in 
England, how would they ever acquire a lien upon the 
proceeds of the sale of the ship." 
The claims of material men appeared to have been relegated to actions 
in personam. They had to be pursued against the shipowner or the 
master in the jurisdictions where personal credit was given? If tl1e 
personal assets of a shipowner, including what remained after the meet-
ing the claims of a ship mortgagee, were insufficient, material men had 
to bear the loss. 
So far as the proceeds of the sale were concerned, the rule 
in The Neptune favoured the ship mortgagee. One avenue thought to 
be open to material men to recoup their outlay was considered in 
.J§ckson v. Vernon.3 The plaintiff supplied the ship "Three Sisters" with 
cordage and stores in February and July, 1787. By a bill of sale, the 
ship was mortgaged to the defendant who later took possession thereof. 
The material men sought to recover from the defendant the value of 
the supplies made to the ship. It was alleged that the latter, who 
took possession ofthe ship, was also bound to defray the debts 
incurred. The court, however, drew a clear distinction between the 
defendant taking possession as mortgagee and the liability of the 
shipowner. It was held that, as the mortgagee was not the absolute 
' 1. Ibid., 117, per Lord Hardwicke.: 
2. Admiralty jurisdiction in rem was exercisable under the 
Admiralty Court Act 1840 (3 & l1 Vic., c. 65), s.6, for necess-
aries supplied to foreign ships. 
3. (1789) 1 H. B.L. 114. By the Registry Act (4 Geo. IV, c. 41, 
s. 43) ship mortgagees were not deemed to be owners, 
except in so far as might be necessary to render the ship 
available for the payment of debt. 
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owner, he was not liable for the necessaries provided for the ship 
before possession was taken. 
In many situations, the law preferred ship mortgagees to other 
claimants. In the 1767 case of Gillespy v. 4 the litigants were 
tt1e mortgagees and one of the purchasers. The owner of eight-
sixteenths of a ship mortgaged his shares to Coutts and Stephens, and 
later sold the same to different persons. The plaintiff, purchaser of 
two-sixteenths of the shares, took possession of the ship and got 
possession of the grand bill of sale. The names of all the purchasers 
were endorsed on the instrument, but without dates. Lord Chancellor 
Camden granted preference to the mortgagees on the following premise: 
" ... the plaintiff and the seven other purchasers are to 
be considered as standing in the place of Duncan Eyre 
(j.!,L. the owner), and took the shares subject to the debts 
due to Coutts and Stephens, and charged upon them by 
Eyre ... there were no circumstances in the case sufficient 
to enable the plaintiff to any priority against the 
defendants Coutts and Stephens .... "5 
Once it was resolved that mortgagees had a better ranking than owners 
or part-owners, the application of the rule to those who derived their 
interests from the latter was simply a logical extension. The competing 
claims between a mortgagee and the assignees in bankruptcy were heard 
before three judges in Atkinson v. Maling.6 By a grand bill of sale, 
executed on 16th March, 1785, the plaintiff was assigned a ship at sea 
as security. The ship mortgagor having become bankrupt, the plain-
tiff immediately took possession of the ship when she arrived in England. 
The assignees of the bankrupt took the ship from the plaintiff. There 
was no demand made on the bankrupt or his assignees to give up poss-
ession of the ship. As mortgagee under the bill of sale, the plaintiff 
succeeded in an action for trover against the bankrupt's assignees. 
4. (1767) A.M.B. 652 
5. Ibid., p. 653. 
6. (1788) 2 T.R. 462. 
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The judicial pronouncements in favour of mortgagees served to 
enhance the value of British ships as mortgage security. As mortgagees 
were not regarded as owners even where they had taken possession 
of the ship, the doctrine of British ownership remained intact. 
Inherent in the decisionsrrsy be seen the policy to expand the British 
merchant fleet involving the raising of finance from foreigners. 
III. UNENACTED LAW 
We shallconsider how maritime law was imported into the 
Australian colonies. In the years 1788 7 and 1828, English judges had 
already built up a body of unenacted rules. These rules had actually 
crystallised from decisions of the Common Law Courts, the Court of 
Chancery and the Court of Admiralty.8 As the term "common law" is 
not defined to include all these rules, close attention is focussed on 
the reception process. One difficulty encountered is the lack of pre-
cision in the use of terms. Occasionally, an excerpt from a judgment 
may imply that the law transferred to a colony by settlement was not 
confined to the principles administered by the Common Law Courts alone. 
Dickinson,C.J., viewed the law received into the colonies as comprising 
natural law adminisered by British courts. He said: 9 
['r]hat natural law ... has been discovered and declared from time 
to time by British courts as circumst;ances. fori ts applic-
ation arise in litigation. Of that iaw most propositions 
can be proved to be logical consequences from some prin-
ciples or first truths of natural justice, appreciable by 
the ordinary intelligence of mankind. That law is so 
universal in its nature as to be applicable to all nations and 
in all times and being common to England and all other places 
is necessarily carried with them by Englishmen in coming to 
as colony like this; or, more properly speaking is found by 
them to exist in it equally as in the United Kingdom. No 
statute was necessary to introduce such law into this colony .... " 
7. 26th January, 1788, was presumably the date of settlement 
when the Union Jack was unfurled at Sydney Cove. 
8. We have seen that maritime law was regarded by Lord Esher, 
M.R. as part of common law: The Chartered Mercantile Bank 
of India, London and China v. The 1\Jetherlands India S.N. 
Co. Ltd. (1883) 10 Q.B.D. 521, p. 537. 
9. Ex parte The Rev. George King (1860) 2 Legge 1307, p. 1313. 
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Unfortunately, this view failed to take into account that part 
of maritime law had originated from the laws of Ole ron 10 and ancient 
customs. As we have seen, often the rationes decidendi of case author-
ities were geared towards specific national policies. Rather than as 
norms of natural justice, the principles of maritime law were better 
regarded as judicial criteria for the settlement of admiralty or shipping 
disputes. 
In Ex parte Nicholas} 1 Will. J., alluded to the imperialistic charac-
ter and unlimited potential of English law. He said: 12 
"When the Court of King's Bench travelled into Scotland 
with Edward I, it administered justice in Scotland, not 
according to Scots law, but according to the law of England. 
It is manifest, therefore ... that the laws of England are not 
so confined to that kingdom, but that there are circum-
stances in which they extend throughout the British dominions 
and even beyond them." 
It is submitted that the use of the words "laws of England" is intended 
to imply not just the common law13 but, subject to certain exceptions, 
the general body of English laws. By analogy of reasoning, it may be 
argued that the colonial judges were appointed by letters patent to 
administer such laws. 
It has been stated in several cases that the colonists carried 
with them to the newly occupied territory the entire fabric of the 
common law. The expression "common Law" is either a misnowner or to be 
understood in a much wider sense. By the inviolable judicial "authority 
f 11141 d h p . c 'l d . . 15 . 1 d o Salkeld · an t e r1vy ounc1 ecismn, It was promu gate : 
10. Supra. 
11. (1839) 1 legge 123. 
12. Ibid., p. 132. 
13. Cf. view of Mason J. He held the words 11laws ... of England' 1 
in section 3 of the Act No. 9 of 1872 (S.A.)referred to the 
common law of England: State Government Insurance 
Commission v. Trigwell and Others (1978) 142 C.L.R. 617, p. 635. 
14. Pages 411 and 666, referred to by Dowling J. in Rex v. Farrell, 
Dingle and Woodward (1831) 1 Legge 5, p. 16. 
15. 2 P. Williams 75. 
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"That if an uninhabited country be discovered and planted 
by Englishmen, all the laws then in being, which are the 
birthright of every subject are immediately in there in 
force." 
However, Sir William Blackstone 16 subjected the reception mechanism 
to "very great restrictions." According to him, the colonists carried 
with them only as much of the English law as was applicable to their 
own situation and the condition of an infant colony. In Rex v. Farrell, 
Dingle and Woodward,17 the chief justice explained the selection mech-
anism. He said: 
"lilhat laws do or do not apply must necessarily be left to 
the local authorities to determine always subject to an 
appeal to the King in Council." 
Based on the infancy of the settlement and the anomalous character 
of the society, the general proposition is that the laws of England 
could not be indiscriminately applied in the then conditions of the 
colony.18 It clearly follows that the corpu~3 of maritime law principles, 
discussed in the preceding pages, would not be imported in the year 
1788. They were unsuitable in their nature to the needs, or could not 
be reasonably applied in the existing circumstances, of the colony at 
that date. 19 However, the Privy Council statement, re-stated by Sir 
William Blackstone, was subsequently given a wide ambit. In delivering 
the decision of the Privy Council in Cooper v. Stuart~0 Lord Watson 
referred to Blackstone's classic proposition. He stated categorily: 
"If the learned author had written at a later date he would 
probably had added that as the population and wealth of the 
colony increase, many rules and principles of English law, 
which are unsuitable to its infancy, will gradually be 
attracted to it, and that the powers of remodelling it 
belong also to the colonial legislature." 
16. Commentaries on the Laws of England (4th ed. 1876), voL 
1, p. 81, supra. 
17. (1831) 1 Legge 5, p. 10, supra. 
18. Duncan v. Mirror~:; Newspapers Ltd. (1978) 142 C.L.R. 585, 
p. 587, per Barwick, C.J. 
19. Quan Yick v. Hinds (1905) 2 C.L.R. 3lt5, pp. 356, 367. 
20. (1889) 14 App. Cas. 286. 
21. Ibid. pp. 291-292. 
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What Lord llJatson probably meant was that that part of the English law 
which is suited to a more advanced territory lies dormant until the 
occasion arises for enforcing it.22 Thus the significance of the above 
statement in relation to the subsequent reception of English maritime 
law must be seen in the light of subsequent increase in shipping and 
overseas trade in the colonies. f~ecords23 showed that in April, 1799, 
Governor Hunter was issued with instructions to keep a register of all 
"vessels as may arrive at or proceed from Port Jackson in the course 
of each year." Between 8th January,i1810, and 30th September, 1811, 
sixty-eight cargo ships from America, England, China, South Africa, 
India, etc., traded with Port Jackson in New South Wales. 24 
A number of crucial factors had combined to expedite the applic-
ation of English maritime law to merchant shipping in the colony. The 
ships engaged in colonial and intercolonial trade were largely 
British ships and owned by British subjects. Britain consistently pur-
sued a national policv of requiring British ships to employ tler own 
subjects as mariners. In practice, the body of maritime law principles 
would seldom, if ever, be departed from in all dealings affecting shipping 
matters in the colony and the British Empire. Moreover, despite tile 
restrictions placed bv Blackstone on the reception machanism, neither 
the colonial courts nor the colonial legislatures, subsequentlv est-
ablishe::3., sought to make unenacted English law yield to local circum-
t 'I' . th I 25 s ances prevm mg m e co any. 
22. Duncan v. Mirror Newspapers Ltd. (1978) 142 C.L.R. 583, p. 590, 
per Barwick, C.J. View of Barton and o'connor,J.J., in 
Oelohery v. Permanent Trustee Co. of N.S.W. (1904) 1 C.L.R. 
283, p. 291, endorsed. 
23. H.R.A. Ser. I, val. !I (1797-1800), p. 3l,1. 
24. H.R.f\., Qe. , pp. 321-433. 
25. "The cases in which a principle of the common la1.v has been 
held inapplicable to a settled colony are comparativelv 
few. Indeed, some authorities speak as though the whole 
of the common law became applicable to a newlv settled 
1 u . co any: Falkland Islands Co .. v. The Queen (1863) 2 Moo. N.S .. 
266, p. 273; Municipality of Pictou v. Geldert [1893J A.C. 524, 
p. 527. State Government Insurance v. Trigwell and Others1 
(1978) 142 C.L.R. 617, p. 626, per Barwick, C.J.; see also · 
/\.C. Castles, "The Reception and Status of English Law in· 
Australia" (1963) 2 Adel. L.R., p. 9. 
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The age-old concept of common law as the birthright of British 
subjects had an important part to play. It meant unity between England 
and the colonies in adopting and implementing a similar body of unen-
acted principles and also a common goal in the field of merchant ship-
ping. This bond of hal'mony was greatly fostered, as an overt policy, 
by the Privy Council at the apex of the hierarchy of colonial courts. 
An example is found in Trimble \/. Hm~6 The Privy Council stressed the 
importance "that in all parts of the Empire where English law prevails, 
the interpretation of that law should be as nearly as possible the same." 
After the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia, the policy 
of the Privy Council had been faithfully pursued by the High Court of 
Australia. The attitude of some judges towards the matter is reflected 
in the words of Dixon,J.,in Waghorn v. Waghorn: 27 
"[W]here a general proposition is involved the court should be 
careful to avoid introducing in Australia a principle inconsis-
tent with that accepted in England. The common law is admin-
istered in many jurisdictions and unless each guards against 
needless divergencies of decision its uniform development is 
imperilled." 
There is another factor actively at work to preserve the unity 
of English and colonial laws. The continued operation in the colonies 
of those maritime law principles after the initial transfer and their 
subsequent development are largely due to the irreversibility of the 
reception mechanism. Once such principles became part of the law of 
a territory, they did not cease operation because changes in circum-
stances had later rendered them unsuitable. They continued in force 
until they were repealed or amended by legislation~8 
One issue central to the subject of reception of English laws 
must be resolved. It is imperative that before maritime law could b1:~ 
imported into a colonial legal system there had to be judicial machinery 
in the colony to administer it. That raises a searching question. What 
courts in England exercised jurisdiction over shipping matters in the 
years 1788 and 1828? The High Court of Admiral tv no doubt comes to 
mind. There were - as we have seen - at least three other courts, 
26. (1879) 5 App. Cas. 31~2, p. 345. 
27. (1941-1942) 65 C.L.R. 289, p. 297. 
28. Duncan v. Mirror Newspapers LtQ..(1978) 142 C.L.R. 583, pp. 
586-587, per Barwick, C.J. 
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viz. the Court of Common Pleas,29 the Court of 1'\ing's Bench 30 ami the 
31 
Court of Chancery. These courts had contributed significantly to 
the development of maritime law. By the statute of 15 Richard II, 
chapter 2,32 the High Court of Admiralty was prevented from exercising 
jurisdiction over contracts arising within the body of any county as 
well as on land. For example, it had no cognizance of mortgages of 
ships.33 Moreover, where the agreements involved were special or under 
seal~ 4 it had been prohibited from entertaining suits for seamen's wages. 
In such cases, the Common Law Courts and the Court of Chancery had 
unlimited jurisdiction. 
Moreover, as an incident of legal history, certain maritime 
causes or matters could be dealt with by either the High Court of 
Admiralty or some other court. Thus by a statute of George IV, 35 
the action could be heard in any of His Majesty's Courts of Record at 
Westminister or in the High Court of Admiralty. The option only applied 
where tt1e damage was caused by a foreign ship to any British ship, 
boat or barge in a harbour or creek. Moreover, by section 31, 11 there 
shall be a concurrent jurisdiction between the Courts of Westminister 
and the High Court of Admiralty in cases of salvage rendered between 
high and low-water mark!' 
29. See e.g. 7 Taunton 258, referred to in The Christina (1828) 
2 Hag. Adm. 185, p. 188. 
30. For names of common law judges involved in shipping cases, 
see supra, including Abott, C.J. §.:..9..:. in Malton v. Nesbitt 
(1824) Hil. Term 4 Geo. IV 70; Tenterdon, C.J. e.g. in Bowden v. 
Fox (1830) Mich. Term 1 Will IV 150, etc. -
31. For shipping cases decided by Lord Chancellors, see supra. 
32. A.D. 1391. 
33. The Portsea (1827) 2 Hag. Adm. 84. 
34. Howe v. Napier (1766) 4 Burr 1945. 
35. (1821) 1 & 2 Geo. IV,c. 75, s. 32. 
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It is essential to consider whether the earliest "Court of 
Civil Jurisdiction" established under the First Charter of Justice 36 
in New South Wales was competent to adjudicate upon maritime causes. 
The Letters Patent merely empowererJ the court to determine in a 
summary way "all pleas concerning lands, houses ... and all debts, account 
or other contracts and all manner of personal pleas whatsoever." It 
is questionable whether, under the terms of the Charter, the Court 
was invested with any jurisdiction over shipping matters. Professor 
Castles argued that U1e "most important civil courts in New South Wales 
between 1788 and 1823 were not constituted legally~" The grounds he 
gave were that there were important departures in the methods of 
operating such courts from the practice of English superior courts 
exercising civil jurisdiction and the absence of civil juries.37 These 
grounds are suggestive of the somewhat restricted role of the colonial 
courts. It is unlikely that principles of maritime law would be 
administered. 
Certainly an important channel of reception of English maritime 
law was open by the passing of the Australian Courts Act 1828 (lmp.)~8 
It meant that for the first time in history jurisdictions in maritime 
matters exercised by the Common Law Courts and the Court of Chancery 
were conferred on the Supreme Courts in the Australian colonies. By, 
section 3 of the Act the Supreme Courts of New South Wales and Van 
Diemen's Land were constituted "Courts of Record." They "shall have 
Cognizance of all Pleas, Civil.. .Jurisdiction in all cases whatsoever, as 
fully and amply, to all intents and purposes ... as His Majesty's Courts 
or King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer, at Westminister, or either 
of them lawfully hath in England .... " Doubts as to the jurisdictional 
competence of colonial Supreme Court judges were also set aside. 
By section 3, the judges "shall have and exercise" "such and like Juris-
diction and Authority" as the judges of the Courts of King's Bench, 
36. See Warrant for the Charter of Justice, Letters Patent, 
2nd April 1787, H.R.A. Ser IV, vol. 1 pp. 6-12; Imperial Act 
1787 (26 Geo. III, c. 2). 
37. A.C. Castles, An Introduction to Australian Legal History 
(1971 ed.), p. 27. 
38. q Geo. IV, c. 83. 
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Common Pleas, and Exchequer, in England, or any of them, lawfully 
have ... for carrying into Effect the several Jul'isdictions, Powers and 
Authorities committed to the said Courts respectively." The 1828 Act (Imp.) 
went one step further. The Supreme Courts of New South Wales and 
Van Diemen's Land were constitutE:d courts of equity. They were 
empowered to administer justice and exercise equitable jurisdiction 
in the same way as the Lord Higll Chancellor of Great Britain~9 It 
submitted that the jurisdictions exercisable by the colonial 
Supreme Courts included not only the common law and equitable juris-
dictions, but also the jurisdiction conferred by statutes on the English 
courts named down to the date of the Australian Courts Act 1828 (Imp.). 
By way of colonial enactments, the Supreme Courts of Queens-
land/41 Western Australia 42and South Australia 
43 
were invested with 
similar powers. Under section 6 of the l!Jestern Australian Act 1832, 
the Civil Court of Western Australia was given cognizance of "all Pleas 
and Jul'isdictions in all cases as fully and amply ... as His Majesty's 
Courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer lawfully have 
in England." The Supreme Courts of South Australia and Queensland 
were conferred similar jurisdiction in 1837 and 1867, respectively. 
In Victoria, after it became a separate colony in 1851, the New South 
Wales court system was retained as an interim measure. 44 
39. Ibid. s. 11. 
40. See the Letters of Patent constituting the Vice-Admiralt~; 
Court of New South Wales, citing various statutes on criminal 
offences as underlying authority for the issue: H.R.A., Ser. 
IV, vol. 1 (1786-1827), p. 13; Piracy Act 1850 (Imp.), 13 & 14 Vic., 
c 26. See generally J.M. Bennett, A History of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales (1974),pp. 153-159. 
41. Supreme Court Act 1867 (Qld.) (31 Vic. No. 23), ss.21 and 22. 
42. (1832) 2 Williams IV No. 1. 
43. (1837) 7 Williams IV No. 5. The Supreme Court was constituted 
a Court of Equity in the province of South Australia and its 
Dependencies: s. 8. 
41~. A.C. Castles, An Introduction to Australian Legal History, 
(1971); p. 103. 
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The Australian Court;j Act 1828 (Imp.) and the other colonial 
court enactments are milestones in Australian legal history. They 
empowered Austl~alian courts to administer mc:mv of the principles of 
English maritime law. This fact is well reflected in the earlv reports. 
A large number of the cases decided by the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales between the passing of the 1828 Act and 1862 c--of:lGerr:J.i+-19 
shipping matters, e.g. wages of seamen,45 collisions46 and the arrest 
of ships~7 The process of importing English maritime law into the 
colonies through the common law side of the court system continued~8 
despite the passing of tt1e \/ice-Admiralty Courts Act 1863 (Imp.). 49 
In addition, the role of the Privy Council, as the "Final Court11 in en-
tertaining appeals against decisions of the colonial Supreme Courts, 
was significant. Thus under the watchful eyes of the Judicial Cmnm-
ittee, colonial courts were duty-bound to take cognizance of a 
common body of maritime law principles. to administer them correctly, 
and to give eFfect to Imperial policies!0 
There was another channel of reception. None of the legisla-
tion considered thus far conferred on colonial Supreme Courts any 
part of the jurisdiction which belonged exclusively to thl=! High Court of 
Admiralty. It is true that the Vice-Admiralty Courts were established 
under Letters Patent to administer criminal law. The view is held that 
45. Geary v. Nivian (1830) 1 Legge 1. 
l16. Paterson v. Knight (1849) 1 Legge 497. The issue raised was 
whether the master was personally liable for damage caused 
to another ship. For another collision case, see Spier and 
Another v. The Hunter River S.N. Co. (1860) 2 Legge 1351. 
47. Lyons v. Elyard (181{6) 1 Legge 328. The question raised was 
whether the arrest of a vessel by an officer of the Vice-
Admiralty Court was a conversion. 
48. Examples include Goldsbrough v. Melbourne Banking Co. (1867) 
4 V.L.R. 105 (ship mortgage); Morse and Another v. The Aus: 
tralasian Stearn Navigation Co. (1870) S.C.R. (N.S.lJJ.). 7 (mas-
ter's authority to sell cargo in cases of necessity); The 
Australasian Steam Navigation Co. v. Smith & Others (1885-
86) 7 N.S.W.R. 207 (conflict of New South Lt.Jales Navigation 
Act 1871 with Merchent Shipping Act 1854-73 (Imp.) on the 
matters concerning collision); Iverson v. Rowlands (1886) 12 
\/.L.R. 57 (cas£:1 on appeal from County Court relating to the 
transf'Pr of a rhiBr barge without a registered bill of sale). 
49. 26 & 27 Vic., c. 24. 
50. Ibid., ~3S. 22 and 23. 
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not long after their establishment Vice-Admiralty Court judges began 
to assume jurisdiction in civil matters:1 It is believed that this 
jurisdictional extension was due to the construction the Commissioners 
placed upon certain terms in the Letters Patent. For example, the 
Commissioners were, alia inter, authorised "to award execution of the 
offenders convicted and attainted as aforesaid according to civil 
law and the methods and rules of the Admiralty ..... " 52 Support for the 
view is also found in the wording of part of the long title and section 
'• of the Supreme Court (Admiralty) Act 1832 (Imp.)~3 If our reasoning 
is correct, it is relevant to enquire into the matters or causes over 
which civil jurisdiction was asumed before 1832. 
The statutes of Richard rf4 were construed by common law judges 
as strictly confining the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty 
to matters arising on the high seas - ''super altum mare." The subjects 
of admiralty suits were reduced to torts committed at sea, ~· collis-
ions between ships,55 salvage contracts to be performed at sea and 
56 
hypothecation of ships for necessaries supplied on the voyage. Except 
for the last item, the Common Law Courts assumed jurisdiction over 
51. D.J. Cremean, Jurisdiction in Admiralty in Australia, Ph. D. 
Thesis, Monash University, 1980, p. 46, footnote 1. 
52. Letters Patent constituting the Vice-Admiralty Court, op. cit, 
p. 18. 
53. 2 Williams IV, c. 51 
54. 13 Richard 2 stat. 1, c.5; 15 Richard 2, c.3. In Howe v. Napier 
(1766) l1 Burr 1945, prohibition was issued by common law judges 
against the Court of Admiralty in a suit for seamen's wages. 
This case involved a special agreement or contract under seal. 
55. The "Johern Friederick" (1839) 1 W. Rob. 36. The Court of 
Admiralty was held to have jurisdiction over collision between 
two foreign vessels on the high seas. 
56. Benzen v. Jeffries 1 Raym. Ld. 153. 
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virtually all other matters or causes if they arose within the 
territorial limits of England. Subject to the prohibitions, statutory 
and also those imposed by common law judges, the High Court of 
Admiralty was competent to adjudicate upon similar matters arising on 
the high seas throughout the Empire. The body of principles admin-
istered had a uni\Jersal character and was sometimes known as "common 
law of the sea." lt may be presumed that, from the viewpoint of 
reception of maritime law into the Australian colonies, the jurisdic-
tion of the Vice-Admiralty Courts was confined to those maritime 
causes within the competence of the High Court of Admiralty. 
IV. STATUTE LAW PRIOR TO 1828 
A distinction was drawn between unenacted law and statute law. 
It was in the nature of the rules of common law to transfer virtually 
the bulk of unenacted law to the colonies. But with regard to statute 
law, the reception mechanism was selective and subject to many res-
traints. 
In the year 1724, a crucial question was raised as to what English 
laws were in force in Jamaica as a settled colony. Sir Phillip 
Yorke and Sir Clement Weary replied: 57 1 
"Such Acts of Parliament as have been made in England 
to bind the Plantation in general or Jamaica in particular 
and also such parts of the ... statute law of England as have 
by long usage and general acceptance been received 
and acted under there ... are to be considered in force." 
In the celebrated case of Campbell v. Han,58 Lord Mansfield endorsed 
the above view as a "maxim of constitutional law." According to Burton., 
J., for any pre-1788 statutes to be applicable they should be suitable 
to the condition of the colony.59 Other Cl'iteria were formulated. 
Was the Act "a law of local policy adapted solely to the country in 
which it was made?" Was it ''founded on reasons which were peculiar 
to England in their application, and which had no reference to the con-
ditions of an infant settlement?" 60 
57. For citation, see Macdonald v. Levy (1833) 1 Legge 38, p. 53. 
58. Lofft 650, Cowp. 20l~. 
59. Macdonald v. Levy (1833) 1 Legge 38, p. 52. 
60. State Government Insurance Commission v. Trigell and Others 
(1978) 142 C.L.R. 617, p. 626, eer Gibbs, J. 
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Section 24 of thB t\!Jli.t.I'i:!H~t!:LEm~ 1828 61 reads: 
" ... all laws and statutes in force within the realm of 
England at the time of passing of this Act ... shall be applied 
in the administration of justice in the courts of New South 
Wales and Van Diemen's Land respectively .... " 
The section has been regarded as "merely declaratory of what the law 
was before, which directs that so much of the statute and common 
law shall be as can be applied.'' 62 By section 21+, the Imperial Parli-
ament had cast upon colonial judges the initial duty of determining 
the applicability of English statutes to the colonies. 63 
The factors closely linked with the British plans for overseas 
trade and settlements prior to 1828 must be analysed. They often 
provided valuable background information for judges to decide whether 
a given merchant shipping Act would apply in the colonies. 
In a number of ways, Britains's expansion programme, primarily 
through the building up of a large merchant fleet, had been retarded. 
The major obstacles were the heavv financial strains placed on British 
shipowners both in England and Ule colonies. It also meant that British 
ships might not be able to compete on par with foreign ships. Bv a 
early rule of common law, applicable throughout the Empire, owners of 
ships operating as common carriers were treated as insurers of the 
goods carried.64 The result was that for anv loss or damage sustained 
by such goods during transit the shipowners would be fully answerable. 
The only exceptions which availed shipowners were the act of God, 
61. 9 Geo. IV, c. 83, also known as the Huskisson Act (Imp.) 
62. Rex v. Farrell, Dingle and Woodward (1831) 1 Legge 5, p. 10, 
12er the Chief Justice. 
63. Ex parte Lyons- In re l!Jilson (1839) 1 Legge 140, p. 11,2, per 
the Chief Justice. 
64. The liability can be traced to the earlv eighteenth century 
where in Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 2 Ravm Ld. 909 Holt, C.J. 
justified it on the groumJs of policv. It was to prevent the 
carrier from conspiring with thieves to plunder goods placed 
under his care. 
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inhenmt vice in the goods and thE! King's enemies. 
f\ccordinglv between the year~:> of 1734 and 1813, several Imperial 
Acts were passed to give a new boost to British merchant shipping. 
These Acts may be construed as applicable to the colonies because 
they were of general application, indicating the necessary intendment 
of the British Parliament for the purpose. A consequent development 
was the passing of the Australian Courts Act 1828 (lmp.)65 The 
Supreme Courts thus established were constituted courts of equity. 
It is submitted that they were competent to adjudicate upon claims 
and to grant reliefs and limited-liability benefits under the Imperial 
66 Acts of 1786 and 1813. 
An early setback suffered by the British merchant fleet was 
the crippling cargo losses. They were believed to have been 
caused by embezzlement committed by ships' masters and crews, though 
often in necessitous circumstances. The Imperial Parliament inter-
vened to protect shipowners as they had no effective control over 
the conduct of their employees at sea. Where, without the privity and 
knowledge, of shipowners, loss or damage was caused to goods carried 
on board, including valuables, the statute of George n 67provided impor-
tant relief. The liability of shipowners was limited to the value of the 
carrying vessel, together with her appurtenances, and the full amount 
of the freight earned during the voyage. 68 
65. In Quan Vik v . .!::!.!rJ..Q§ (1905) 2 C.L.R. 345, the High Court of 
Australia found a particular provision of the statute 4 Geo. 
IV, c. 60 inapplicable to New South Wales. The reason was 
that the machinery necessary for the enforcement was 
unavailable. 
66. For provisions empowering "any Court of Equity" to hear and 
adjudicate upon such matters, see (1786) 26 Geo. III, c. 86, 
s. 4; (1813) 53 Geo. III, c. 159, s. 7. 
67. (1734) 7 Geo., II c. 15. 
68. Ibid., s. 1. 
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Further measures were introduced to stimulate the grmvth of 
merchant sllipping. They were designed to curtail the rigllts of cargo 
owners. As an epoch-making event, tile statute of George m69 con-
ferred wide immunities on sllipowners and, in some cases, masters. Tile 
above statutory limitation of liability was extended to cover cargo 
loss or damage, though not caused by the embezzlement or privity of 
tile master or crew members?D For loss or damage caused to goods by 
fire on board, shipowners were fully relieved from liability. 71 
Moreover where valuables, e.g. diamonds, were lost or damaged due to 
embezzlement, robbery, etc., shipowners and masters were generally 
not liable. 72 The exception to the rule was where, at the time of ship-
ment, tile true nature, quality and value of sucll valuables llad been 
inserted in the bill of lading or declared to tile master or shipowner. 
The absence of the "fault or privity" element on the shipowners' part 
remained the basis for limiting liability for cargo or damage. Another 
statute of George m73 extended the relief. The maximum liability of 
shipowners was confined to the value of the carrying vessel plus the 
freight due or to be E3arned for the voyage. 
A useful rule relating to the applicability of statutes may be 
inferred. Once an Imperial Act is adjudged to extend to the colonies, 
unless otherwise provided, subsequent enactments on the subject 
would be similarlv construed. 
JVlowo \Jer, because of the necessary intendment and the general 
nature of the provisions, parts of a number of statutes would be con-
strued as applicable to the colonies. The overall strategy to strengthen 
the merchant fleet as an Empire-spanning measure underlay much of 
British shipping legislation. Britain regarded Empire shipping as her 
69. 26 Geo. III, c. 86. 
70. Ibid., s. 1. 
71. Ibid., s. 2. 
72. Ibid., s. 3. 
73. 53 Geo. III, c. 159, s. 1. Value of freight defined in s, 2. 
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legislative monopoly. Thus everv Imperial statute or parts thereof, 
which served to further or promote the Empire-building doctrine, would 
fall within this category. For the purpose of the reception, there was 
a difference between mE"rchant shipping legislation and other statutes. 
It is evident that one aspect of the doctrine is to achieve 
certain predetermined goals for the benefit of Britain and her colonies. 
For example, a statute of George III prohibited British ships being 
built or repaired in foreign ports?4 It sought to promote shipbuilding 
and ship-repairing in the colonies. Its object combined with the over-
seas element would make it binding on colonial courts to impose 
the penalties against British ships for contravening its provisions?5 
Section 2 of the statute of George II 76 introduced an important 
incentive for colonial and foreign investors to advance money under 
the Act on the hvpothecation of British ships. Its thrusts were two-
pronged. Firstlv, it promoted the value of British ships as universal 
mortgage securitv. Secondly, it provided protection for the holder 
of a bottomrv or respondentia bond, including the beneficiary of an 
insurance policy taken out by such holder. Under the statute, he was 
entitled to prove his claim in the bankruptcy of the debtor-obligor. 
He would be able to recover from the bankrupt's estate part of the 
debt as if the loss or contingency had occurred before the bank-
ruptcy. 
The impact of Imperial policy on colonial and intercolonial 
shippinfJ soon characterized much of British legislation. In marked, 
contrast to the earlier approach, the necessary intendment of the 
British Legislature became more pronounced in a number of ways. 
77 For example, the preamble to a statute of George IV reads: 
74. (1786) 26 Geo. III, c. 60, s. 20. 
75. Ibid., s. 32. For non-compliance with registration procedure 7 
British ships would be prevented from leaving port and enjoy-
ing the privileges. Moreover, a ship leaving port without 
the registry certificate would be forfeited. 
76. (1746) 19 Geo. II,c. 32. 
77. (1823) 4 Geo. IV, c. 41. 
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"Whereas the Wealth and strength of thb Kingcjom and tt1e 
Prosperity and safety of every part of the British Empire 
greatly depended on the Encouragement given to Shipping 
and Navigation .... " 
This entitlement to the privileges of British ships was closely linked 
to ship registration?8 Consequently, the provisions dealing t-~Jith such 
matters would be applicable in the colonies whenever the status of 
ships trading there was raised. 79 Colonial authorities were bound to 
detain, or enforce the forfeiture against, ships in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act. 
The Supreme Courts were empowered by the Australian Courts 
Act 1828 (Imp.) to "adjudge and decide 11 as to what Imperial legislation 
was applicable to the colonies. Their task was simplified by the use 
in the Acts of the words "British Empire," signifying the intendment 
of the British Legislature. For example, a statute of George IV 8Dstated, 
inter alia, "this Act shall come into and be and continue in full force 
and operation, and shall constitute and be the law of navigation of 
the British Empire."81 Statutory encouragements to British shipping 
and navigation throughout the Empire were maintained. Transport of 
goods between British possessions, including the colonies, was limited 
to British ships which had to be duly registered. The provisions 
extended to procedures for ship transfers and ship mortgages 
as security. In the light of the fast-growing boat-building industrv 
78. Ibid., s. 2. As from 31st December, 1823, registration was 
required for all ships having decks, or for ships of the 
burthen of 15 tons and above. Otherwise they would not be 
entitled to the privileges DI' advantages of British ships. 
79. Ibid., s. L1 ships would be forfeited for contravening certain 
pi'ovisions. 
80. (1825) 6 Geo. IV, c. 109. 
81. Ibid., s. 1. 
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in New South lllal8s established prior to 1797, section 13 of the 
Act was of special significance. Although not registerE!d, all British-
built boats or \Jessels under fifteen tons, wholly-owned and navigated by 
British subjects, were recognized as British \/essels for certain purposf~s. 
They could be used for navigating the rivers and the coasts of the 
United l<;ingdom or the British possessions within the limits prescribed. 
V. STATUTE LAW AFTER 1828 
Consideration is now given to an important development in admir-
alty law in the Australian colonies. In 1825, when Van Diemen's Land 
became a separate colony, another Vice-/\dmiralty Court !Alas estab-
R3 lished: Indeed, such courts had become a feature of many British 
colonies.811 Apparently, the civil jurisdiction exercisable by the colon-
ial Supreme Courts and the Vice-Admiralty Courts over maritime ccJuses 
was grossly inadequate. This setback would hinder the expansion of 
maritime activities in the Empire in the early part of' the nineteenth 
century, and also Britain's plan to transfer her laws to the colonies. 
The answer to the problem came when the British Parliament 
enacted the ~,!;lpreme Court (1.\dmiralty) Act 1832 (Imp.). It was the first 
of a series of Imperial Acts which had the object of constituting the 
Vice-Admiralty Courts to administer the laws according to the practice 
and rules of the High Court of Admiralty. It empowered Vice-Admiralty 
Courts in His Majesty's possessions abroad to adjudicate upon 
"suits for seamen's wages, pilotage, buttomry, damage to a ship by 
collision, contempt in breach of the regulations and instructiofls 
relating to His Majesty's service at sea, salvage and droits of 
/\dmiralty." 85 The Vice -Admiralty Courts werrJ givm1 jurisdiction over 
82. H.R.A. Ser. I, vol. II, op. ' p, 203. 
83. See Warrant fm· Commission of \/ice-Admiralty Court in 
Van Diemen' s Land, 1st September, 1825, HJ<.A. Ser III, vol. 
IV, p, 598. 
84. For correspondence addressed to Governor~3 of colonies where 
Vice-Admiralty Courts flad been established, see H.R.A. Ser 
I. vol. II, cit., p. 37G. 
85. (1832) 2 ltlilliarns IV. c. 5, s. 6. 
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suits EJrising both 1r11ithin and out of the local territorial limits.86 By 
summary application to the High Court of Admiralty, an appt.ml could 
be taken thereto by any person wt1o was aggrieved by the charges or 
costs imposed by a Vice-Admiralty Court~7 The /~ct ushered in a new 
phase of admiralty jurisprudence for the colonies. It marked the post-
1828 reception of the High Court of Admiralty procedure, the remain-
ing aspects of the law not prmliously imported, and also whatever new 
principles developed by that Court down to the date of the 1832 Act. 
Among the shipping legislation listed in the Victorian Imperial 
Acts Application Act88 is a statute dating back to 1705~9 Sections:17, 
18 and 19 relating to actions and the limitation period for the recovery 
of seamen's wages were received as part of Victorian law. The six-year 
limitation period applied to all suits and actions for seamen's wages 
in the ''Court of Admiralty." Distinction existed between two types of 
seamen's employment contracts. By the issue of prohibitions, common 
law judges had prevented the High Court of Admiralty from hearing 
wage claims based on agreements executed under seal. It is logical 
to infer that the common law jurisdiction which colonial Supreme Courts' 
had derived under the Australian Courts Act 1828 (Imp.) and the colonial 
court legislation would empower them to entertain such claims. But 
until the Supreme Court (Admiralty) Act 1832 (Imp.) was passed, it was 
doubtful whether causes based on sections 17 to 19 of the 1705 Act (Imp.) 
could be heard anywhere other than the High Court of Admiralty. 
The Victorian case of l.tJallace v. Hitchin~0 is of special rele-
vance. It concerns the reception and application of sections of the 
1845 Act (Imp.)91 dealing witt1 ship registration. Under a bill of sale, 
B bought the schooner "The MarDaret") then lying in the Port of 
86. Ibid., s.6. 
87. Ibid., s.5. 
88. 13 Geo. V No. 3290. 
89. See S<~cond Schedule to (1705) 4 & 5 Anne, c.3. 
90. A Beckett's Reserved Judgment l1Jilliams Practice Cases 
(1846-51), p. 52. 
91. (1845) 8 & 9 Vic.,c 89; commonly known as the "Registry 
Act." 
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Mf.!lbourne. On 18th July, 18SO, by de£:~d B and his partner, H, jointly 
assigned their assets inclucling the schooner, to 5 and C to hold on 
trust for the creditors of B and H. []n 9th November, 18SO, the 
schooner was accordingly rngistered in B's name. Dn 5th December, 
1850, the plaintiff obtained judgment against B, resulting in the ship's 
transfer to the former by a bill of sale executed by the sheriff on 
16th December. The transfer was registered on 21st March, 1851. 5 
and C had sold and transferrec1 the ship to the defendant on 4th 
December, 1850. The judgment plaintiff purchased the ship with know-
ledge of the sale. Dn 1st April, 1851, Sand C by another deed con-
veyed the ship to the defendant. Both the ship and the certificate 
of registry were in the defendant's possession. The court resolved 
the conflicting claims by applying the provisions of the Imperial stat-
ute. By section 37 of the 18lf5 Act (Imp.), no bill of sale or other in-
strument could ('JffecthJE!ly pass the property of any ship or share 
therein for any purpose until the statutory requirements were satis-
fied. The bill of sale or other instrument had to be produced to the 
Collector amJ Controller of the port where the ship was registered. 
Her particuiars had to be entered by the Collector and Controller in 
writing in the book of registry. The court gave effect to section 37 
by holding that the title to the ~1chooner IAJas complete not from the 
date of the bill of sale but from the date uf registration. B's title 
was complete on 9th 1\Jovemtmr, 1850, after the transfer was registered 
as required by section 37. The plaintiff'f> title became complete 
under the bill of sale from the sheriff, follmAJed by the registration. 
Judgment was given foi' the plaintiff. 
In this case, Imperial legislation was administered by the court 
as part of thE? law of Victoria and was not applied in a conflict of 
laws situation. Its paramountcy showed the intention of the British 
Parliament to rt::~~ulate, throughout the Empire, all dealings affecting 
BI'iti~;h ships. [t foreshadowed Britain's plan to formulate to a 
merchant shipping code for tho Empire. 
/J.. landmark in Australia's legal histmy carne when the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1851, (lmp.)92 was passed. With the exception of four 
92. P & 18 Vic., c. 104. 
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93. 
Parts, most of the seven Parts were expressed to extend to Her 
9/~ 
Majesty's Dominions, livhilst certain provisions were applicable solely to 
the colonies. ·The /-\ct consolidated, in a revised form, the well-tried 
provisions drawn from a number of previous enactments. Its object 
was to implement, as an Imperial policy, in Her Majesty 1s Dominions a 
five-fold plan. The five areas cmmrod may be idontified as (i) tho 
Empire-wide regulation of Britisr1 ships; (ii) the encouragement of 
shipping and seamen; (iii) the protection of mariners; (iv) the promo-
tion of safety at sea and prevention of collision; and (v) the expans-
ion of British maritime trade and commerce. 
The effect of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp.) 95 
on the situation merits consideration. In no way did the new powers 
given to colonial legislatures change the pattern of maritime law 
already set for the Australian and other colonies. Under the 1865 Act, 
English laws received into the colonies are placed within two cate-
gories. Included in the f'ir~3t category were unenacted and statute 
laws. They were imported on account of their applicability according 
to tf18 circumstances and conditions prevailing in the colony in 1788 
or at the time when the Australian Courts Act '!828 (Imp.) became law. 
The Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp.) is seen as a lmv reform instru-
ment in that it empowers colonial legislatures to review, amend or 
repeal such laws received?6 Section 1 creates a special category of 
93. They were (a) Part I: Board of Trade and its functions; 
(b) Part VI : Pilotage (only applicalJle to the United Kingdom); 
(c) Part VI: Lighthouses (only applicable to the United l<.ingdom); 
and (d) Part VII: Mercantile Marine Fund (not applicable to 
colonies generally). 
94. See below. 
95. 28 & 29 Vic., c. 63. 
96. Ibid., s. 3 
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"paramount laws." It includes all Imperial legislation which applied 
or continues to apply to colonies by reason of "the express words or 
necessary intendment." Most of the statutes considered belong to 
this category_97 They combined to lay down an infrastructure within 
which colonial legislatures and maritime law in the colonies were to 
operate. 
As will be seen later, the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (Imp.) 
provided for tile registration of ships and ship mortgages and a wide 
range of other matters relating to merchant shipping in the colonies~JS 
The Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) consolidated the law and extend-
ed to the colonies by "paramount force" a larger body of statutory 
principles than its precedessor. 99 It is the capstone representing 
two centuries of Empire-building efforts. Besides building upon the 
foundations laid, it strengthened the position of the Imperial Parlia-
ment as the ultimate authority to determine the form and substance 
of maritime law in the Empire. It is interesting to note that Imperial 
legislation which applied to the colonies did not stop at the passing 
of the 1894 Act (Imp.). There were at least three Acts enacted after 
97. Ibid., ss. 1 and 2. Colonial lm.Ms which are repugnant to such 
Imperial Acts are rer1dered null anrJ \/Did to the extent of 
their repugnancy. 
98. As to the major areas of the lc-JW co\/ered by Imperial legis-
lation, see e.g. P<Jrt II on owner~;hip and r·egistration of ships 
extending to the whole of Her ~1ajesty's Dominions, s. 1!; Part m 
on masters and seamen applicable only in certain aspects, 
s. 109; Part IV on safety and pt·evention of accidents applicable 
to all British and certain foreign ships, s. 291; Part VIII on 
wr'£1cks, casualties and salvage applicable only in limited 
aspect~3. ss. 486 et seq.; Part IX on liability of shipownt-:rs, 
s. c:i02, and Part X or1 legal procedure, s. 517, extending to the 
hlt1ole of Her Majesty's Dominions; and s. 5l,7. 
99. 57 & 5B Vic., c. 60. E><amples of provisions which applied 
tD the colonies include th8 followinsJ: Part I on registration 
of ships and ship mortgages, etc.; Part II on masters and sea-
men; Part VIII on liability of shipowm:rs; Pm·t XIII on legal 
pr·oceprJings; ss. 735 and 7.36. It is almost double the length 
of trm 1854 Act. 
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it. the last in the series being the 1"1erchant Shipping Act 1906 (Imp.)~ 
Mainly substantive principles of statutory law !A/ere imported 
into the colonies through the operation of Imperial legislation. How-
ever, between the years 1863 and 1890~ a number of Imperial Acts 
WBre passed to restructurEJ the courts, the Vice-Admiralty Courts 
and later the Colonial Courts of 1\dmiral tv for administering English 
maritime law in the colonies. Undoubtedly, through the work of these 
specialised tribunals, the substantive principles of case law and the 
practice and rules of the High Court of Admiralty came to be IAIO\/en 
into the fabric of the ,1\ustralian legal systems. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We have considered the three main channels of reception of 
English maritime law into the Australian colonies. They were the par-
amount legislation, the courts exercising common law and equitable 
jurisdiction and the Vice-Admiralty Courts, later superseded by the 
Colonial Courts of Admiralty. Merchant shipping in the Empire was a 
subject that the Imperial Parliament had eeserved for itself to the 
virtual exclusion of colonial legislatures. Cognizance of this fact is 
found in the unanimous judgment in The Australian Bankinq Co. v. 
Burn~ 1delivered bv the Supreme Court of New South Wales, sitting in 
bane. It \.Mas pointed out that by section 10 of the Vice-Admiralty 
Courts Act 1863 (imp.) claims in respect of eleVE3n different matters 
could be brought in Vice-Admiralty. The Chief Justice is reportt~d to 
have said: 4 
"The jurisdiction of the Vice-Admiralty Court having been 
determined by the Imperial Parliament, cannot be extended 
by the Navigation Law Amendment Act (NSW) Cl•5 Vic. No. 6). 
Ttlere fore if this Act of Parliament does ... attempt to give 
jurisdiction to the Judge Commissary In other than the 
matters specially mer1tioned ... then the Act of Parliament is 
ultra \/ires." 
1. 6 Edw. 7, c. Ml. By s. 71, the word ''owner" in the 18% /\ct, 
s~;. 502-509, was amended to include a demise charterer; see 
Mcilvvraith McEacharn Ltd. \/. The Sh(~ll Company of l\ustralia 
Ltd. (194S) 70 C.L.R. 175, pp. 213 and 215, RB.r Dixon, J. The 
pro\/isiom> relatinq to the limitation of shipowner's liabllity in 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1906, ss. 70 and 71, and in the other 
two ·Acts, viz. i"lerclwnt Shipping (Liability of ShipowmJr~;) Act 
1898, s. 1 a5'8mend£'ld, and Meectlant Shipping (Uabilit\f of Ship-
owners and others) Act 1900, ss. 1, 3 and 4, appliod to the 
whole of Her Majest\f s Dominions. 
2. Vice-Admiralty Courts Act 1863 (26 & 27 Vic.,c. zt,):Vice-ArJmir-
alty Courts 1\ct Amendment Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vic. ,c .. 45);Colon-
ial Courts of Admiralty 1\ct 1890 (53 & 54 Vic.,c. 27 ). 
3. (1889) 9 l.tJ.N. (N.S.IJJ.) 19. 
t •. Ibid., p. 20. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ENVOLVEMENT OF l"lARITIME LAW IN THE COLONIES AND STATES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Our object here is to evaluate the work of Australian colonial 
legislatures in building up the body of maritime law. Essentially, the 
Imperial legislation, which established the colonial lr:Jgislative councils. 
empowered them to make laws for the peace, welfare and f]ood govern-
ment of the colnnies.1 The laws and ordinances passed were subject 
to one overriding condition. They were not to be repugnant to the 
Imperial laws, e,._g. orders in council, charters, letters patent and stat-
utes, which applied whether directly or indirectly to the colonies? In 
the context of the powers given and the responsibilities thrust upon 
them, the colonial legislators had to come to grips with the problems 
facing them. It i~1 intended to ascertain how far, within the terms of 
the legislative powers given, ttH:-J legislatures in the Australian colonies, 
enact£~d laws which corresponded to English laws. Our examination is 
confined to two areas of colonial contribution. 
The pacl~ and rmture of progress in each of the colonies were 
often affected by local circumstances, economic conditions and polit-
ical factors. It tt1erefore necessary to focus attention on the sit-
uation of each colony ~3eparately. The work tracEJS the evol vernent of 
the rights and protection of seamen from the early days of colonial 
~;ettlement throuf]h to the present time. That this legislation has stood 
out as the foundation of colonial or ''t<ome-grown" seafaring industry 
beyond dispute. The othr~r significant contribution to the growth 
1. R.D. Lumb, The Constitutions of the Australian States (4th 
ed. 1976), pp. 10, 12, (for New Soutr·1 Wales); p. 26 (for 
Victoria); p. 30 (for South i\ustralia); p. 54 (for Tasmania); 
p. 35 (for Queensland); p. 38 (for Western Australia). 
2. See B.g. the Ne1111 South Wales /\ct 1823 (Imp.) (4 Geu. IV, c. 96), 
ss. 4 and 9; the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp.) (28 
& 29 Vic., c. 63), s. 2. See generally Prof£~ssor Enid 
Campbell, "Colonial Legislation and the Laws of England" 
(1964-67) 2 Univ. of Tas. L. Rev. 148, 
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of colonial and intercolonial maritime trade \Alas colonial legislation 
passed to promote the safetv of life at sea and prevent collision at 
sea. An examination is made of the interaction bet\AJeen, and the com-
parative aspects of, the laws of the six colonies in these two areas. 
It is interesting to consider how far colonial legislators had, 
bv legislation, extended Imperial laws to applv to their territories. 
This process could constitute another law reception mechanism. 
II. SEAMEN 
1. New South Wales 
The territorv of New South Wales under the governance of 
Captain Phillip comprised the whole of eastern Australia, including 
T . 3 asmama. 
An initial concern of the colonial legislators was to ensure the 
steadv flow of shipping trade and its wealth into tr1e colonv. Effecthte 
control had to be maintained over the increasinglv large numbers of 
mariners and sl1ips coming to Port Jackson and other ports~ The cir-
cumstances and conditions of colonial ports and harbours were vastlv 
different from those of English ports and harbours. Consequentlv, 
English port authoritv laws, which were mainlv statutorv and largel v 
specific, and port customs would not be applicable in the colonv. 5 
Moreover, earlv colonial legislation had to satisfv an important criter-
ion. lt had to in line with the Imperial policv of enlarging the 
British merchant fleet.6 
Thus legislation in the colonv was passed to direct the proper 
performance and discharge of seamen's duties. Ships' masters were 
required to issue certificates to their seamen on discl1argEl) and were 
3. Windever, Jegal Historv (2nd ed. 1957), p. 297. 
1+. For the regulation and control of seamen withir1 the colonv 
of New South Wales and its Dependencies, <md for the 
establishment of a police force, see earlv New South Lllales 
enactments, e.g. (1840) 4 Vic. No. 17: (1849) 13 Vic. No. 30. 
5. In Erl!;JlamJ, the pun authorities were adminis-
tered as corporutions established bv Acts of Parliament, 
which had no application to other ports, whether local 
or overseas. 
6. Sr:!e C:llapter One. 
7. 4 Vic. No. 17. s. 14. 
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forbidden to engage any seamen not in possession of such certific-
ates.8 Colonial courts were empowered to impose penalties on seamen 
for acting in breach of the law. 9 These measures instilled discipline 
into seafaring as a growing industry. A further boost to the process 
was the establishment of a permanent official record of all seamen at 
each colonial port. This was achieved by extending10 certain provisions 
of an Imperial Act.11 They required, inter alia, the keeping and main-
taining of "a Register of all the men engaged in that service." 
The vulnerable position of seamen and the pressures brought 
to bear on them led to legislative intervention to alleviate their prob-
lems. The 1847 Act (N.S.W.)12 made it an offence for any person to 
demand or receive payment from any seaman "on account of the hiring, 
supplying or providing any such seaman." No payment of wages made 
to a seaman in contravention of the provisions was valid: 3 Shipowners 
and masters, however, had little difficulty in circumventing the law. 
Before the articles were signed, seamen were often subjected to 
pressure from their employers to execute documents relinquishing their 
rights to wages and salvage rewards. Another device for exploiting 
seamen was the pre-arranged disposition of their wages in favour of 
some third party. The 1849 Act (N.S.W.)14 was passed to render null 
and void all such agreements. Despite "prior disposition made by bill 
of sale or assignment or any attachment or encumbrance made thereon," 
"every payment of wages to a seaman" was "effectual in law."15 Further 
protection was conferred on seamen. Before any seaman was carried 
to sea in a British ship or a !\lew South Wales registered ship of the 
burden of eighty tons or more, a written agreement containing all the 
required particulars had to be signed; 6 
8. Ibid., ss. 8 and 16. 
9. E.g. fines were imposed on any seamen found on shore after 
9.00 p.m. without a pass: (1843) 7 Vic. No. 21, (N.S.W.), ss. 2 
and 10. 
10. Sea Act (181~3) 7 Vic. No. 22 (N.S.W.), s. 17. 
11. 5 & 6 Wm. IV, c. 19. 
12. 11 Vic. No. 23, s. 8. 
13. Ibid., s. 7. 
1/.1. 13 Vic. No. 28. 
15. Ibid., s. 12. It prevented unlawful depri\Jation of a seaman's 
wages. Moreover, wages of less than £20 could be recovered 
summarily before a Justice of the Peace: ibid., s. 15. 
16. Ibid., s. 2. 
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There lfllas one difficulty in giving effect to the 1849 /\ct. As 
most of the St'lamen were illiterate, Shipping Masters were appointed 
at Sydney and other ports to authorise the engagement and disct1arge 
of seamen, and witnoss the execution of the ship's articles.17 
Hardships to seamen were often occasioned by the insolvency 
of shipowners as ernplovers. The ship and tackle would be arrested by 
t11e creditors in satisfaction of their claims. It meant that seamen 
would be unjustly deprived of their \,\!ages. To remedy the situation, 
colonial legislation intervened by providing that a seaman's right to 
wages could be enforced by a "lien upon the ship," 1&: by a claim of 
proprietary nature1.8 Similar protection was extended to the wages of 
the ship's master1? The Seamen's Laws Consolidation Act 1864 (N.S.W.) 
struck down anv agreement which deprived seamen of their lien and 
remedy for the recovery of their wages. Before long, seafaring in the 
colonv became a family-supporting career. Seamen's family members 
or relatives in whose favour allotment notes were made out could 
sumrnaril v sue for and recover the amounts payable. (O When a seaman 
died at sea, the master \,vas duty-bound to take custody of the 
deceasBd 's effects and 1-1and them over, including anv IAiages due, to 
the Shipping Master at the port of destination. 21 
The Seamen Act 1898, 22 currently in force in New South Wales, 
is largely a consolidating statute. The omission in section it of a pro·· 
vision similar to section 90 (4) 23 of the l86l1 Act makes the position 
17. Act (1853) ('17 Vic. No. 36) (N.S.W.), ss. Lt, 9 and 7. 
1 B. This right had long been recognised at common law in 
"Neptune" (1824) 1 Hag. AcJm. 225, supra. RefBrence to this 
right is made in (1849) 13 Vic. No. 28, s. 19. For further 
protection of seamen's wages, st:m (1853), 17 Vic. No. 36, 
ss. 7 and 10 and Chapter Seven. 
19. Ibid., s. 19. In Earp v. 10 W.N. 85, it 
was held tt1at a ship's master was the only person who could 
sue for disbursements under the Act 26 Vic. No. 21~ (N.S.W.), 
s. 10 (2). 
20. (1864) 27 Vic. i\lo. 13, s. 29. 
21. Ibid., ss. 51 and 52. As to wages and personal effects of 
seamen dying in the colony, see s. 54. For recovery of 
wages when seamen WBre lost with tho ship, see s. 60. 
22. Act No. 46 of 1898. 
23. By this sub-section, certain provisions of the Act were 
E!xpressed to apply to foreign st1ips including their owners, 
rnastl~rs and crews when such ships were within the colony. 
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unclear. One suggestion is that the 1898 Act is not intended to apply 
to Foreign ships which are within the territorial waters of New South 
W l 2ll a OS. 
2. Tasmania 
The creation of Tasmania as a separate colony in 1825 meant 
that she had to map out her strategy in dealing with the problems of 
seamen. In her innovative effor·ts to align herself with Britain's 
Empire-building programme, Tasmania showed initiative in establishing 
a legal framework to regulate and promote seafaring in the colony. 
In England, the law relating to merchant seamen, which had passed into 
colonial jurisprudence, was amended and consolidated by a statute of 
William IV enacted in 1835.25 To avert any disunity which would other-
wise result, the Tasmanian Legislative Council on 29th July, 1837, passed 
its first shipping legislationf6 It extended to Tasmania the provisions 
of the Imperial Act. Consistent with the underlying British doctrine, 
important provisions were enacted to safeguard the interests of seamen 
and their rights to wages.27 This factor characterised most of Tasmanian 
shipping objectives. 
Certain gaps appeared in the law. Crews of Tasmanian-
registered ships were often engaged in the United Kingdom and else-
where under agreement~; subject to the Mercantile Marine Act 1850 
(Imp.) 28but not in the Form prescribed by the la\AI here. Somehow for 
certain offences, e.g., desertion, the seamen involved were not punish-
able because the prerequisites as to form IJ\Iere not met. The difficulty 
was removed in 185f9 by importing the provisions of the Imperial Act. 
24. S. 4 defines its scope. It applies to all persons in New South 
Wales including the owners, masters and crews registered in 
or belonging to New South Wales, the United Kingdom and any 
of Her Majesty's Dominions. For provisos, see ss. 4 (1) and 5. 
25. (1835) 5 & 6 W. IV, c. 19; see its long title. 
26. (1837) 8 Wm. IV No. 10 (Tas.). 
27. Ibid. s. 3. No seamen could be deprived of any f'}Xisting 
remedies for the recovery of their wages, e.g. their lien 
upon the ship; and no agreement contrary to this Act would 
be valid: s. 7. By the Foreign Seamen Amendment Act 1870 
(34 Vic. No. 22) eras.), s. 1, no debt in excess of five shill-
ings could be recovered after he had agreed to serve, until 
the service was concluded. 
28. 13 & 14 Vic .. c. 93, s. 121. 
29. (1852) 16 Vic. No. 11~ (Tas.). 
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Tim Act 185930 was the first to inLnHJuco inLo Tasmanian 
seafaring a number of new aspects. These related, inter alia, to 
apprenticeship to the sea ~:;ervicJ, 1 the employment of seamen,32 the 
allotment of 1Aiages 33 and th~] protection of their rights and interests~'· 
Tasmanian legislators, no doubt, took cognizance of the developments 
in English law. In Chapter One, we have seen how a group of case 
authorities had invested seamen's rights to their wages with a unique 
character. The judicial principles laid down must have strongly influ-
enced legislators' consideration as to the content of the Act. 
Obviously another weighty factor was the passing of the Imperial 
Merchant Shipping Act 1854 as a consolidating measure. These reasons 
explain the similarity, in terms of substantive principles, between the 
Seamen Act 1859 and English law. 
Four decades later, the provisions on merchant seamen in Part 
II of tl1e Imperial Merchant Shipping Act 1894 35 set the pattern for colonial 
legislation. Tasmania adhered to the policy bv conferring on her sea-
men the same status and protection as those of their English counter-
parts. This goal was achieved by the passing of the Merchant Seamen 
Act, 1935 (Tas.)36 which currently remains in force. It has opeated as 
a reception mechanism. The provisions of Part II of the 1894 Act (Imp.), 
as modified, are extended to "all British ships registered at, trading 
liltith, or being in any port in the State [Tasmania] and to the owners, 
30. (1859) 23 Vic. No. 7 (Tas.) Strict discipline was imposed 
for desertion. In Cox v. La Fook, Lo Lock and Ho Poo (1909) 
Tas. L.R. 53, the defendant seamen were charged with deser-
tion under s. 92. Although their written agreements had 
expired before reaching New Zealand, the court held that 
the defendants had come from New Zealand to Tasmania 
under some kind of verbal agreement with the master. They 
were, therefore, convicted of desertion under s. 92. 
31. Ibid., ss. 13-19, similar to Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (Imp.), 
ss.-141, 143 and 145. 
32. Ibid., ss. 20-33; see also 1854 Act (Imp.), ss. 1li7, 1LI9, 150, 
156-158 and 161-167. 
33. Ibi_Q., ss. 34-35; stem also 1854 Act (Imp.), ss 170-175. 
34. Ibid., ss 36-LJ1. The word "lay" was defined in s. 1 to mean 
"remuneration by a share in the proceeds or profits of the 
adventure"; 1854 /~ct (Imp.), ss. 170-175; see also ibid. ss. 
42-liB. As to wages, lays and effects of deceased seamen, 
see ibid., ss. 56-66. 
35. 57 & 58 Vic., c. 60. 
36. 26 Gem. V No. 93. 
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masters and crews thereof."37 WhaLEC?Vf~r doubts one has about 
Tasmanian legislative thinking anJ removed by the rider in section 4 
of Um 1935 Act. The Governor is. empowered to appoint mercantile 
and other officers to perform the same duties as their English counter-
38 parts under the Imperial Act. 
3. Victoria 
For over a decade after Victoria became a separate colony in 
1851, the importance of her ports and harbours as the centres of mari-
time commerce and trade was highlighted by the early legislation.39 
The first VictorianAct of 1853•0 on shipping reflects a thrust on two 
fronts. Firstly, it served to raise the level of professional conduct 
among seamen in the colony. The overriding objective was implemented 
by the creation of a number of arrestable offences, including deser-
tion, insubordination and refusal to wori/:1 Secondly, for the mainten-
ance of law and order, the colonial courts assumed an increasingly 
important role. The problems created by the presence in the colony 
of large numbers of foreign seamen were resolved by an Act passed 
• 18c442 m :J • 
Victoria, too, contributed her share towards Empire-building. 
Her efforts in promoting the "British seamen" concept was seen in the 
enactment of the Seamen Statute 1865 (Vic.). 43 Its historical importance 
lay .in the substantial adoption of Part III of the Imperial Merchant 
37. Ibid. s. 3. The 1894 Act (Imp.), s. 264, reads: "If the legis-
lature of a British possession, by any law, apply or adapt 
to any British ships registered at, trading with, or being 
at, any port in that possession, and to the owners, masters, 
and crews of those ships, any provisions of this Part of 
this Act which do not otherwise so apply, such law shall have 
effecL.as if it were enacted in this Act." Tasmania is a 
British possession within the meaning of this section. See 
also the Imperial Interpretation Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vic., c. 63), 
s. 18 (2) and McArthur v. Williams (1936) 55 C.L.R. 324. 
38. Ibid., s. 4 (2). Also the Governor is empowered to make 
regulations for the purposes of the 1935 Act eras.). 
39. At the time of separation, the New South Wales legislation 
in force applied as part of Victorian law. 
40. 16 Vic. No. 33, which repealed two New South Wales Acts, 
(181~0), L~ Vic. No. 17 and (1Bld), 7 Vic. No. 21. 
41. Ibid., ss. 4 and 5. 
42. Foreign Seaman's Act 1854 (18 Vic. No. 6). After conviction 
foreign seamen could be imprisoned with t1ard labour: s. 2 
(1)-(6). 
43. rhis Act (28 Vic. No. 245) consolidated the law relating to seamen. 
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Shippin~J Act 1854. By section 3 of tho Victorian /\ct, Part III of the 
Imperial Act was modified for application to 11 all Bri ti~:;h ships rc~gistered 
at, trading with ancJ being at any placE:~ within ... Victoria c:mcJ to the 
owners, rnasterfi, mates and crews thereof .... " The continuing parity 
of Victorian seamen with their Englisr1 counterparts was maintained by 
an ingenious device. Section 4 of the 1865 imported into Victoria not 
only the changes made by the Merchant Shipping Amendment Act 1862 
(lmp.),44 but also the provisions of future Imperial Acts repealing or 
amending Part III of the 1854 Act (Imp.). 
The Sc~amen StatutE! 1865 dealt, inter Blia, wit,h the misconduct 
of foreign seamen and the abuse of the Vice-Admiralty Court process.45 
HowevEJr, its adoption of the provisions of Part Ill of the Imperial 
Merchant Shipping ,L\ct 1854 relating to masters and seamen was not 
totally !:-iatisfactorv. The conditions and circumstances prevailing in 
the colony rendered certain provisions of the 1851, Act (Imp.) unsuitable. 
1"1oceover, due to the prugress achieved some twenty-five years later, 
thEJ 1865 statute ppoved inadequate. 
Accordingly, the Seamen's Act 1890 (Vic.)46 was passed. It 
repealed and virtually re-enacted all the provisions of its predecessor 
with the exception of Part I on "Adoption of Imperial t'\ct." With minor 
excE~ptions, similar adoption provisions V\lere included in section 230 of 
the Marine Act 1890 (Vic.).47 A number of important amendments were 
made. Sections 241 and 242 of the /\ct (Imp.) W£~re not adopted as 
part of Victorian law. The expressions "Board of Trade" ami "United 
44. 25 & 26 Vic., c. 63, ss. 13··21 .. 
l~S. E.g. unlawful arrest of a vessel or master V\Jould render 
the complainant and proctor liable for costs and damages: 
Seamen StBtutue 1865, ss. 17 and 18. 
46. (1890) 51 .. Vic. No. 1139. 
47.54 Vic. No. 1165. Though reservecl on 10th July, 1890, this Act 
did rHJt n~cc>ive the Royal /\ssent until 10th DecrJmb£Jr, 1890. 
Apparently, between 10th July and 10th December, when a 
lacuna existed in the law, those matters relating to masters 
and ~mamen were governed by r:ornmon law, as tllB Marine 
1B9D (Vic.) did not operate 1111ith retrospecti\/8 effect. 
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f'\ingdom" were to be read "Governor in Council" and "Victoria". respec-
tively. The Victorian legislators dealt with the local problems by 
stopping short of importing certain Part III provisions which were in 
conflict with those of the 1890 Act. One glaring incongruitv was the 
indiscriminate adoption of English legislation on seamen which, though 
not in conflict with colonial logislation, had no relevance. Consequently, 
unlike the previous practice, the 1928hB (Vic.) followed a 
selective approach. Section 234 was expressed to import into \/ictoria 
only those provisions of Part II of the Imperial 1891~ Act relating to 
49 
specific aspect5 of seamen. The Marine Act 1958 (Vic.) re-enacted 
the provision which was later repealed. 
4. Queensland 
The bulk of the St[-:Jtute law which Queensland had inherited from 
New South Wales in 1859 was found in the Merchant Seamen Act 
5!J ' '] 1 . 18lt7, the Merchant Seamen Act 1849, and the Merchant Seamen (Foreign) 
1t352:52 The legislative stagnation in this area of the law for almost 
eight decades shows the slow development of seafaring and maritime 1 
trade in the colony. The abovo three Acts continued to apply until their 
repeal by the Navigation Acts Amendment Act 1939 (Qld.)?3 The position 
of Queensland thus differed markedly from that of each of the other 
54 three States. Moreover, the Queensland legislatuee made no attempt 
48. Act No. 3728. 
49. This Act (No. 6302) (\lie.), cuerently in force, was repeinted 
on 25th March, 1979, incorporating amendments by Act No. 
9178. The Seamen's Act 1958 (1\Jo. 6362) (Vic.) is only concerned 
with water police and foreign seamen. Victorian seamen must 
theeefore look to tile unenacteli maritime law and, wherever 
possible, the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) for peotection. 
50. 11 Vic. No. 23 (New South LtJales Act). 
51. 13 \lie. No. 28 (New South Wales Act). 
52. 16 Vic. No. 25 (New South LLJales Act), including the Water 
Police /~ct. 1853 (17 Vic. No. 36). 
53. See Schedule I to the 19.39 /-\ct (3 Geo. VI, 1\lo. l:'G). 
5l,. Sueprisingly, the Navigation Act 1876 and the amendments 
made thereto up to 1933 had added little to Queensland 
law on seamen, e.g. Port Dues Revision Act 1882 (l16 Vic. No. 
12): Navigation ACt, Amendment Act 1896 (60 Vic. No. 31); 
Navigation Acts Amendment Act 1930 (21 Geo. V No. 21); 
and Order in Council published in Gazette, 25th November, 
193~. 
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to import into the colony any EnDlish legislation on seamen. HrcJr first 
move to align herself with Britain's Empire-building programme came 
late in 1939, witt1 the passing of the Navigation Acts Amendmr:mt Act, 
't939. Part I\/ of the Act not only consolidated the law for the protec-
tion of seamen previously introduced by the New South Wales Merchant 
==:...:;.:..:..:....;....:."'"""' 1849, but also invested them with rights to further wages. 
For example, where the ship did not proceed to the port of discharge 
mentioned in the agreement made with the seamen, he was entitled 
to be discharged and paid wages until the time of his arrival at the 
proper return port. 55 A rigid distinction was drawn between personal 
loans made to seamen and seamen's wages for which special protection 
was given. To prevent financially hard-pressed seamen from exploita-
tion by unscrupulous shipowners, the Act invalidated agreements as 
to any wage advancB made to, or paid on account of, seamen. In: 
respect of any money paid as advance, no deduction was permitted 
from seamen'~' wages. Also such creditors had no right of action or 
set-off against the wages of seamen. This protection extended to 
persons to whom the~ wages were assigned~ 6 One problem often encount-
tered by seamen was the late payment of wages. The Act dealt with 
the situation by pro\/iding that where a seaman's wages were not paid 
or settled at the end of the \/oyage or agreement they would continue 
to r·un and be payable until the final settlement.57 An uncertainty 
which could financially cripple seamen was the loss of wages through 
the loss or wreck of the ship. Again the law alleviated the hard~;hip 
by conferring on them two months' wages and the rigt1t to a free 
passage back to the agreed port?8 The protection of a seaman's 
55. Navigation Act Amendment Act 1939, s. 38 (5). 
56. Ibid., s. 36 (1), (2) and Seamen's wages were not subject 
to any court attachment or· arrestment, nor to any prior 
assignment. No power of attorney or authority given by 
seamen for the receipt of wages was irrevocablE'L Payment 
of wages to seamen or apprentices was valid despite any 
previous sale or assignment thereof: ~>. L16; see also 
Queensland Marine Act 1958 (7 Eliz. II No. 37), s. 75. 
57. Ibid., s. 37 (8). 
58. Ibid., s. l1Z (1). 
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right~.:; to ~vages, including his lien on the ship and other remedies 
originally conferred under the Merchant Seamen Act 1849 (N.S.W.), was 
extended to apprentices~9 
The high-water mark of the statutory protection was reached 
whr:m liens for Sl~amen's and apprentices' wages were given priority 
11 ll ·th 1' "60 Th . .f. b . h . over a o ,,er IEJns. e :JJgm 1cance must e seen m t e light of 
competing claims. If the proceeds of the sale of a ship were inadequate 
to meet the claims of all the creditors, seamen's wages had to be paid 
first. l"'loreover, the special status of seamen's wages was not negot-
iable. Any stipulation in an agreement which varied or was inconsistent 
with the top priority given to wage lien under the Act was struck 
down?1 Far the first time, a master's liens and remedies for the recov-
ery of his wages were extended to the recovery of disbursements or1 
liabilitim; properly incurred by him as master on account of the 
vessel. 62 
fhe Queensland Marine .Act 1958 has included under the category 
of seamen all persons engaged on board in whatever capacity. Pres-
63 
cribed allowances are included as wages. The effect is the extension 
of the rights and remedies in respect of seamen's wages to all per-
sons engaged on board. The Act adopts the correct approach by not 
condoning default, neglect or breach of duties on the part of any sea -
man. As under English mai'itime law, a seaman's wages are not depend-
ent on the ear-ning of freight. However, they are not payable if it is 
proved that he has not exerted to the utmost to save human life, the 
59. Ibid., s. L1Z (2). As in the other states, the common lmv 
principle was given statutory effect, ie. the right of a 
seaman or apprentice to wages was not dependent em the 
earninrJ of freight: s. h1 (5). See §.:..9.:, the Searmm's Lat\ls 
Consolidation Act 186h (27 Vic. No. 13) (N.S.W.), s. 40. 
60. Ibid., s. t~1 (2). 
61. Ibid., s. 41 (3). 
62. Ibid., s. 48; similar to Seamen's Laws Consolidation Act 1864 
(27 Vic. No. 13) (N.S.W.), s. 50. 
63. (1958), 7 Eliz. II No. 37, s 71 (1). Seamen discharged before 
completion of full employment term WBre entitled to recover 
wages up to the time of discharge: s. 7/.f (3). 
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ship, cargo, stores or the equipment. 64 
5. South /\ustralia 
This settlement was proclaimed a colony in 1836. Decisions of 
both the Supreme Court of South Australia and the High Court of 
Australia have confirmed that for the purpose of application of 
English laws that province is to be regarded as if it "never had any 
association with the mother colony. '65 Consequently, for til('! first two 
vears after settlement the seamen were governed by the body of 
English laws transferred on 28th December, 1836~6 Historically, the 
!jebut of local legislation on shipping and crews came in 1838?7 Some 
encouragement to seafaring as an integral part of Britain's Empire-
building policy was given in 1852. Legislation was passed 68 to facilitate 
the engagement and discharge of seamen at the Port of Adelaide. At 
the turn of the decade, the spectacular increase in the seafaring 
workforce and the numbers of ships calling at her port led to new 
rm:Jasures being implemented. By the 1860 Act, the Marine Board of 
South Australia was established to exercise jurisdiction over the 
owners, masters and seamen of British ships in the colony, including the 
power to require the production of documentation relating to seamen.69 
6l~. Ibid., s. 70 (5). The 1958 Act and the amending Acts are 
collectively referred to as the Queensland Marine Acts 
1958-1979. 
65. lllhite v. McLean (1890) 25 S.A.L.R. 97, at p. 100, per Boucaut 
J. and Delohory v. Permanent Trustee Co. of N.S.W. (1904) 
1 C.L.R. 283, at p. 297, per Griffith, C.J. 
66. This date is legislath1ely defined in the South Australian 
Ordinance No. 2 of 1843. 
67. Act No. 3 of 1838 (S.A.). This Act represents the earliest 
attempt to regulate seamen in the colony. Four years later 
this Act was extended by Act No. 18 of 181~2 (S.A.). 
68. Act No. 24 of 1852 (S.A.). 
69. Act No. 17 of 1860 (S.A.). As regards its other rluties and. 
functions, see ss. 10-15, 18, 40, 69, etc. 
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/\side from the other salutary aspects, this /\ct introduced into sea-
faring the essential ingredients to make it a viable career. /\s in the 
other colonies, stringent mandatory requirements Wf~re laid down to 
rogulate the payrnEmt of crews' wages, their employment and dis-
charge/0 In common with the situation elsewhere, no seaman could be 
carried to sea unless an agreement in the manner prescribed contain-
ing the statutory particulars was first signed. 71 
To prevent exploitation, the /\ct prohibited the discharge of 
seamen except after payment of their wages made before a Shipping 
Master at a port?2 Also, a seaman's presence was required for the sign-
ing by the master or owner of mutual release of claims regarding the 
past voyage or engagement.73 In favour of seamen, the law made it 
obligatory for the master to sign a report sanctioned by the Marine 
Board as to the conduct, character and qualifications of the persons 
7lt 
discharged. 
Ttle 1860 1\ct stopped fairly short of giving effect to the "British 
seamen" concept. Glaring discrepancies existed between the rights 
and protection of seamen under English law and those of seamen under 
South Australian law. Colonial shipowners began to experience the 
drain of able-bodied seamen to the United Kingdom. The deteriorating 
situation, unless rectified, would gravely undermine the morale of sea-
men and seafaring in South Australia. Rather than embarking on exten-
sive reforms which might still not produce the desired result, the leg-
islators utilised the law-reception mechanism. Section 45 of the 
Marine Board Amendment Act 1873 (S.A.) 75 made applicable to South 
Australian-registered ships, including their owners, masters and crews 
when they were within the colony's jurisdiction, certain provisions of 
70. Ibid., ss. 63 and 70. 
71. Ibid., s. 65. 
72. Ibid. s. 67. 
73. Ibid., s. 68. 
74. Ibid., s. 69. 
75. No. 6 of 1873. 
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Part III of the ImpE~rial MFJrchant Shippinq /\ct 1851!. These provi~>ions 
related to seamon's "rights to ~\IElges amJ rem£~die~; for the recovery 
thereof, to th(~ shipping and discharge of seaman ... to the powers of 
seamen to make complaints, t:o the protection of seamen from impos-
ition ... " 
Continuing uniformity bet~vF~en colonial and English laws r-elating 
to seamen ~'lias maintained by section 9 of the Marine Board Act 1876 (S.A.). 
It extended to South Australia the above provisiorl!'i anci any Imperial 
Act amending any of the matters in so far as it was applicable and 
consistent to form part of the law of the colony. South Australia's 
enthusiasm to ali~1n herself with Britain'~' seafaring policy reached a 
high level at this stage. In a surprisinq move, her legislature invested 
the 1B76 Act with what appeared to be extraterritorial operation of 
a dubious nature. The law was stated to apply to all British ships, 
wherever reqistered, to South Australian-registered ships, and to the 
masters and crews of such ships, even though they were out of the 
l ' . . d' t' 76 CO any S ]UriS- lC lOll. 
It is reasonable to presume that the colonial legislature had 
realised its blunder and the invalidity of the 1876 /-\ct on constitutional 
grounds. The Marine Boai'rJ and Navigation .t\ct 1881 (S.A.)?7 was con-
fined in its application to mm;ters, mates and crews of British and 
South Austra Han-registered ships. It had, howe\/er, one grave short-
corning. The crmo~.~s of non-British ships were left out of its scope. In 
a number of respects, the new remedial measures introduced by the 
Act served to improve the terms and conditions of seafaring. They 
related to apprenticeship to the sea sen1ice?8 tl1e rating of seamen 79 
and the property of deceased seamen.80 Under the Act, ships' masters 
76. No. 50 of 1876, s. 9. s. 2 prmlided that the Act was to be 
construed as one with the Marine Board Act 1860 (S.A.) and 
th£-J Marine Board Amendment Act 1873 (S.A.). 
77. No. 237 of '!881. 
7f3. Ibid., ss. 145-48, similar to 18511 Act (Irnp.), ss. 1l11-1t.S. 
79. Ibid., s. 130. 
80. Ibid., ss. 93-101, which were modelled on a number of the 
provisiom> in the 18Sl1 Act (Imp.), e.g. ss. 1%, 195, 199, 202, 
etc. 
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enjoyFJd ~;irnilar remedies as seamen with regard to the~ recovery of 
81 
wagf3S. 
To meet the pressinn needs of poor seamen, a departure was 
made from the usual trend of the law against the prepayment of wages. 
Section 73 of the 1881 Act 1111as arnended82 to permit aqreements made 
with seamen to stipulc:-:Jte the advanced payment of not morE:~ than one 
month's wages. All other paymentrJ made in contra\/ention of 
the law would not be dBductible from seamen's to\lages. They would also 
not be reco\/E:Jrable in any action or "set-off" claim against seamen or 
t h • ' 83 'ft 'd d ,, 1811' assignees. 1ese measures were cons1 ere necessary to protect 
seamen, hard pressed by financial circumstances, from unconscionable 
shipowners and demisEJ charterers. One of the recurring grie\/ances 
which undermined the \liability of seafaring in the colony stemmed from 
shipowm'lrs' default in paying their employees' wages. Often the infer-
ioe economic position of seamen and tho prFJdorninance of shipowners 
complicated the situation. It was for the 1902 Act (S.f\.) to pro\/ide that,. 
in all cases of ships trading in the colony and whert} seamen were en-
gaged under time agreements, all wages earned had to bt:J paid rnonthh~.4 
The onerous and often personal liability thrust upon ships' 
mastt=:Jrs by reason of the nature of their responsibility 85had been a 
problem under South Australian law. This serious defect was cured by 
thr~ Marine and Navigation Act Further Amendment Act 1906 (S.A.). 
For the reco\/ery of disbursements and liabilities properly incurred by 
the master on the ~3hip's account, he and every person lawfully auth-
orised to act as such were given tile same right~1. liens and remedies 
as a master had for reco\/ering his wages.86 The rights and remedies of 
87 
ma~>ters and seamen ha\/e been consolidated in the Marine Act 1936 
(S./\.), ~vhich is currently in force. 
81. Ibid., s. 92, similar to Imperial Act, s. 191. 
82. By the l"larine Board and 1\laviqation t~ct (No. 81 h of 1902) 
(S.A.), s. Zl1. 
83. /\ct No. 16 of 1881, s. 73, as E1mendod by J\ct 1\lo. 814 of 1902. 
5. 2ll (2). 
81~, /\ct No. 814 of 1902, s. 32. 
85. f.\s to tllf~ master's liatJilitv for compensation for breach of 
contract concerning the passage of any passenger, see 
Act (No. 8 of 1852) (S.A.). 
86. Act No. 917 of 1906, !:1. 6 (1), (?) and (3). 
8/. /\ct No. 2337 of 1936-1937. Tile Marine f\ct 1936-1975 {S.A.) 
has incorporated many of the drnendrmmts. 
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6. LLiestern Australia 
The-'! date set by the In.!.:.~I.I?rPt13X:iQQ~ct of ll.lestern /\ustralia for 
ttm application of English statute law to this colony is 1st June 1829~8 
There is no indication that for thn first seven decades English laws 
rEJCPivmJ into the colony weee inadequate to meet the ner-'!ds of its 
seamen and the problems of seafaring. 89 
One of the occupational hazards of seamen in the oarly days 
was to be stranded overseas after the wreck of their ship, or to be 
left behind in a foreign port,~Jick and penniless. The colony's first 
significant contribution to Britain's Empire-building programme was 
to promote the welfare of the colony's seamen. Under tt1e 1871 Act 
(W.A.),90 the Governor was given the power to direct certain payments 
to be made for the benefit of needy seamen. Such financial assistance 
was available to seamen who had served in WestEJrn Australian ships 
and had been shipwrecked, discharged or left behind in any place out-
side ttm colony. The underlying object of the Act, apparently one 
of the few enactments of its kind in the t<istory of Australian maritime 
law, was twofold. It was to encourage third parties and the public tD 
give financial support and relief to seamen in distressed circumstances. 
These who had voluntarily incurred liability or provided financial m· 
other assistance could expect to be reimbursed.91 
The Merchant Shipping Act Application Act 1903 (W.A.P2 repres-
ented a historic boost to the development of the law on seamen. It 
reflected an overt alignment by the colony with Britain's policy rela-
ting to merchant seamen. The advantages which accrued were note-
IAIOrthv. It spared the colonial legislature tt1e cumbersome task of 
88. 9 Geo. V No. 20, s. 43. 
1 
89. It is probably becouse the level of shipping activity was low. 
Enid Russell, /\ History of the Law of Western Australia and 
its De\mlopment from 1829-'1979 (1980), pp. 165-166, says that 
tt1ere are "no admiralty cases in thE: law reports between 
1935 and 1939.n 
90. (1871) 34 Vic. No. Z. 
91. The /\ct of 1880 (l14 Vic. No. 1) (W.A.) further provided that 
shipwrecked seamen found in the United 1.<\ingdom would be 
relievf::d and sent home at the public oxpense. 
92. 3 Edw. \/II (1\lo. 7 of 1903), amended by Act (No. 23 of 1919). 
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reforming and updating its law in a manner that would fit into the gen-
eral pattern that was well established in the other Australian colonir~s 
at this time. Similarity in the laws meant parity between English anrJ 
colonial seamen, thus giving effect to the concept of "British seamen." 
By the colonial 1-\ct of 1903, Part II of the Imperial Merchant Shipping 
Act 189'• was extended to "all British ships registered at ... or being at 
any port in Western Australia and to the mMners, masters and crews 
thereof so far as it is not already applicable .... "93 The Govenor was 
authorised to appoint officers to perform the same functions as their 
English counterparts pursuant to Part II of the Act. 94 The expressions 
"Board of Trade" or "Board" and "United Kingdom" were amended to 
read "Governor" and "Western Australia," respectively. 95 
Unlike the other States, Western Australia has adopted a logical 
approach by drawing a demarcation line between coast-trade and 
Empire-wide shipping. Section 8 (1) of the Western Australian Marine 
Act 1948.defines a "coast-trade ship"96 as a ship, including a steam tug J 
engaged in trading or going between any ports within the State's jur-
isdiction. Section 110 (1) is expn;.;ssed to apply to coast-trade ships 
of eighty tons registered tonnage or over. The combined effect of 
section 8 (1) and section 110 (1) is the creation of a distinct class 
of local seamen. Their engagement, conditions of employment, and 
93. Ipid., s. 2 (1). Part II of the 18% Act (Imp.) has been repealed 
by the English Merchant Shipping f\ct 1970 (1970 c. 36), s. 100 
and Schedule 5. Althougt1 English law relating to seamen and 
masters consolidated in this Act, it is a separate Act and 
not expressed as a substitution for the repealed law in Part 
II. It is submitted that the 1970 Act will not replace Part II 
of the 1894 Act which will continue to have the force of law 
in Western Australia. 
9h. Ibid., s. 2 (3). 
95. Ibid., s. 2 (2). 
96. However, by the Western Australian Marine Act 1966, s. 4 
(I:J) a "coast-trade ship" in Part III of the Western Australian 
Marine Act 1948 does not include a limited coast-trade 
\JPssel. 
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discharge are subject to the provisions of Part VII of the l.Llestern 
---
Australian Marine Act 194B. The Act seeks to implBment objects in the 
best interests of the State and its seamen. This inference is based 
on the fact that Part VII is made up of selectod provisions drawn from 
a number of enactments?7 Incorporated in the Act for the protection 
of local seamen and their rights are safeguards specially adapted to 
the needs of the State. 98 
III. NAVIGATION 
1. NeiM South l!Jales 
There is no suggestion that English port authority laws, mainly 
of statutory origin, were received into t11e colony. The body of 
unenacted rules and statute law so imported had no relevance to port 
administration.99 The Acts passed bY the colonial legislature within 
the first 30 years of settlement were the spadework to establish har-
bour facilities for shipping trade and communications with the outside 
world. 1 Central to the system were the Steam Na\Jigation Board and 
the Pilot Board, which were later replaced by the Marine Board under 
the 1871 Act.2 The first traces of maritime law were connected with 
the duties of the Marine Board 3 in reducing navigational hazards and 
97. I.e. U1e fvlerchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.), the Navigation Act 
1912 (Comth.), including some of the amendments, and the 
Queensland Navigation Acts Amendment /\ct 1939. 
98. By the 1948 Act (W.A.), s. 8 (1) admiralty jurisdiction is 
defined to cover the navigable waters within one nautical 
league of the coast and the inland navigable waters of 
the State.· 
99. See the earlier part of this chapter. 
1. (1840) 4 Vic. No. 4 (N.S.W.) dealt· with the preservation of 
pDrt~:i, harbours navigable ri\/ers, etc.; 11 l!Jrn. IV No. 7 (N.S.LLI.) 
regulated the police in the Port of Sydney and prevented 
nuisances and obstructions therein. The finance required 
for the port facilities and their maintenance was raised by 
imposing pilotage rates, ~;vharfage rates, dues and other 
charqes. 
2. 35 Vic. No. 7 (N.S.W.), ss. 1 and 2. This Act repealed and 
consolidated some 13 Acts on shipping. 
3. For the wide-ranging powers of the Marine Board, see ss. 
17-27. 
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prnventing accidents in those areas within its jurisdiction. The 1871 
Act contained some of the early elermmts of maritime law. At the time 
when marine trade in the colony c:~nd elsewhere was fast expanding, 
the most serious causes of shipping disasterEi were collisions on the 
high seas, in busy ports and along waterways. Often unfamiliari tv 
with the sailing rulE~s. '~which variRrl in different countries, and the 
lack of pilotage assistance accounted for the high toll of accidents. 
New South Wales is seen a::~ one of the early advocates of worldwide 
maritime safetv. Along with thirtv-one other countries, she gave 
statutory effect to the collision regulations, the most advanced by 
the standards of the time. 5 Apart from the mandatory obligation of 
all shipowners and masters to observe the regulations,6 their prepon-
derant effects are demonstrated by two nineteenth-century cases. 
From the viewpoint of navigational safety on the high seas, the advan-
tages of adopting a common set of rules for international shipping are 
exemplified in The lU-1. Badger. 7 A British barge on a voyage fmm New 
South Wales t.o New Zealand collided with an Am£:!rican ship. By an Act 
of Congress of April 186h, the British collision regulations enacted 
under the Imperial Merchant Shipping Amendment Act '1862 were rendered 
applicable to American ships when they IAJere beyond the limits of 
British jurisdiction. Stephen, C.J., said: 8 
t~. As to the rule of navigation applied by the Court of 
Admiralty in England, see The nwoodroop-Sims" (1815) 2 Dads. 
82, p. 87, ~· 
5. They were the sam£3 as those proclaimed by the Queen in 
Council on 9th January, 1863, and 30th Julv, 1868; and 
applied to ships tmlonging to countries and places whether 
within thB British jurisdiction or not: (1871) 35 Vic. No. 
7 (N.S.lll.), Schedule G. 
6. lbid., s. 96. 
7. (1872) 11 S.C.R. (N.S.l.U.) 157. 
8. Ibid., pp. 17"1-172. 
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"Practically, therefore in respect of all the rules of 
navigation, and rules concerning lights, the law adminis-
tered in the Admiralty Courts of Great Britain and the 
United States in cases of collision on the high seas is the 
same. The simple difference is this - that in the United 
States ... the decisions are founded on the general law or 
usage of the sea, evidenced by written rules or statutes 
identical in both countries, whereas in the British Courts 
the decisions rest directly on the rules, as the expression 
of that law and usage." 
The direct link as a weighty factor between the non-observance of thB 
collision regulations and fault in a collision was long recognised by thP 
Vice-Admiralty Courts. In The Kurrara, the Judge Commissary saicj? 
" ... there is no rule customary or otherwise which prescribes 
how a vessel approaching this harbour is to enter it, nor is 
there any point within the line of safety at which she must 
pass from the sea to the harbour; the rules for preventing 
collisions are the sole matter with which the master must 
comply and which he has to take into his consideration." 
By the 1871 Act (N.S.W.);o the non-observance of any regulations made 
under it would give rise to two forms of presumption. The twofold 
consequences imposed were intended to avoid the grave risks which 
would otherwise be entailed. By secti.on 97, where personal injuries 
or property damage was caused by the non-observance of any reg-
ulation, the loss or damage was deemed to have resulted from the wil-
ful default of the person in charge of the ship's deck. This presump-
tion, however, could be rebutted by proof to the court's satisfaction 
that departure from the regulations was rendered necessary by the 
circumstances. Moreover, in any case of collision due to the non-
observance of any regulation, the ship which failed to observe it 
would be deemed to be at fault unless the proviso was applicable:'] 
9. (1889) 10 N.S.W. R. 1, p. 4. 
10. (1871) 35 Vic. No. 7. 
11. Ibid., s. 98. As to powers of the Governor to enact reg-
ulations, see Navigation Act 1901-19l~9 (N.S.W.), s. 113, as 
amended by Navigation (Amendment) Act (No. 8 of 1954) 
(N.S.W.), s. 2. 
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Th1::1 common law position of a rnastPr was dramatically altered 
by the colonial legislaturE~. In 8Very case of collision between two 
ships, the master was - wllE!revt:Jr possible and necessary - duty-bound 
to render assistance to the other ship and persons on board. This 
"mutual help" obligation was enforcF:JalJle by the suspension or cancell-
ation of the cerU ficate of the rna~'lter or officer 1111ho \Alas guilty of 
default. 12 
Three decades later, Um 1\lavigation Act 1901 (N.S.ui.P was 
passed as a consolidating measure. It stands out as a fine example of 
how maritime law takes cognizancB of and gives effect to nautical 
technology amj expertise in navigation. The Act contains many safety 
provisions. They relate to navigation, the prevention of accidents, 
thn sEJaworthiness requirements, life-saving appliances, 14 deck and load-
lines, and thE: carriage of dangerous goods, including a more comprehen-
sive set of collision regulations in the Seventh Schedule. These 
r
1
evarnping features are deemed necessary to keep pace with the dev-
elopments prevailent in many of the countries with which New South 
Wales has enjoyed close shipping links. Viewed from the maritime law 
angle, this f\ct together with the subsequent amendments has thrust 
towards promoting the safety of navigation involving all types of 
ocean-going vessels. It applies to passenger steamships and trade 
ships. Moreo\/er. it extends to ships mechanically-propelled, whether 
British or foreign; 5 plying between any New South Wales port and 
12. Ibid., s. 102. 
13. No. 60 of 1901, whid1 repealed tl1e 1871 /\ct together with 
a number of amending Acts. 
14. Ibid., Part VII. As to the df~tailed rules on life-saving 
appliances, see the Sixth Schedule. 
15. Bv Na\ligation Amendment /\ct 1941 (N.S.W.), s. 2, the 
provisions of tht::: Navigation Act 1901-1935 (N.S.W.) relating 
to steamships and steam navigation are, subject to cer-
tain modification, extended to mechanically-propelled 
vessels and their navigation. 
69 
16 
another port in any uf Her Majesty's Dominions. 
2. Tasmania 
Since the early days, unlike in the other States, shipping trade 
and activities in Tasmania had developed around a number of ports 
and seaside towns, and 1111ere not confined to Hobart. The foundation 
of Tasmania's navigation law was laid by the 1856 Act. 17 An ingenious 
effm·t was made to adopt certain provisions of Part III of the 
Imperial fvlerchant Shipping Act 185l~ to regulate the growing shipping 
traffic around the island. The Governor of Tasmania was f:Jmpowered 
to establish Shipping lJffices and appoint Sl1ipping Me:1sters' in the same 
way as the Board of Trade in Britainl8 However, it was not until the 
1889 Act19 ~vas passed that the internationally-accepted norms basic to 
safety in navigation were introduced. It was a misdemeanour for any 
person involved in sending,or attemptin!:J to send, to sea a ship in such an 
unseaworthy state as to endanger life. 20 The thrust of the law towards 
the protection of human lives at sea was necessitated by the increasing 
use of large steamships as the major mode of transporting passengers r 
16. Act No. 60 of 1901 (N.S.W.), s. 33 (1). The Governor is 
empowered to extend tile application of the Act to any ship 
trading between any 1\lew South Wales port and any other port 
outside Great Britain or Ireland: s. 33 (2). 
17. (1856) 19 Vic. No. 21 (Tas.). 
18. Ibid., s. 1. The powers exercisable by the F>overnor included 
those vested in the Local Marine Boards under Part III of the 
1854 Act (Irnp.). 
19. 53 Vic. No. 31! (Tas.). The~ jurisdiction of tt1e l"larine Board 
of Hobart under this /-\ct vvas considered in McArthur v. 
ChrNerton (1907) Tas. L.f\. 89. C was charged with having 
caused ponderous matter to be thrown into the port of 
Hobart in breach of s. 77. As the offence was committed 
within high and low water mark, the court !1eld that it was 
not within the Board's jurisdiction which extended to or 
above the high-water mark only. 
20. Ibid., s. 140. 
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at the close of ttm nineteenth century. To the owners and operators 
of steamships, more crippling than the pecuniary penalty imposed for 
the offence, tvas the result of the exercise of the power under section 
141. As part of its duties, the Marine Board was empowered, partic-
ularly where human life would be endangered, to detain and carry out 
a survey of the ship. The underlying object of the legislation was to 
reduce the loss of life and property. /\ number of compulsory meas-
ures wer'e introduced by the Act to secure the ship's seaworth-
iness as the major safety factor. They included the marking of deck 
and load lines~1 the full range of proper equipments designated for 
the ship~2 the complement of duly certificated crew and other require-
ments to be met?3 However, in a number of ways, the 1889 Act (Tas.). 
inadequate. It did not define seaworthiness or unseaworthinessf4 
In imposing the seaworthiness obligation, the Act made an unwarranted 
distinction between human life and property. It was not an offence 
for any one using a leaky vessel to carry goods if no life was endan-
gered! Even where human life was endangered, the person charged 
with the offence, including the master, could escape conviction by 
proving that "sending her to sea in such unseaworthy state was reason-
able and justifiable." 25 
A breakthrough in the anm of navigational safety has come 
through the Marine Act 1976 (Tas.). Section 135 (1) empowers the 
Governor to enact regulations relating to the prevention of collisions, 
the lights to be carried and the signals to be used by vessels. The 
constructive step taken was the passin~l of legislation similar to that 
of other countries. This approach enables Tasmania to implement 
changes periodically initiated by advanced maritime countries. By 
the collision regulations, effect may be given to such international 
21. Ibid., ss. 150-153. 
22. Ibid., ss. 15L,-156. 
23. Ibid., ss. 157-159. 
24. "Unseaworthiness" is defined in Marine Act 1976 (No. 18), 
s. 122. An unsafe vessel may be detained for inspection: 
ss. 124-128. 
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treaties, agreBments, conventions, etc. which are "in force", as the 
Governor considers desirable~6 An outstanding effort to produce 
uniformity in this area of the law is provided by the Marine (Collisions) 
Regulations 1977 (Tas.). 27 The International Regulations for the Prev-
ention of Collisions at Sea 1972 are given the force of law within 
Tasmanian territorial waters. 28 
In one respect, Tasmania was ahead of the other States. Man-
datory observance of the collision regulations by every master or owner 
of a vessel was introduced early in 1976. The sanction to enforce the 
regulations for the promotion of safety at sea and certainty in 
navigation is the pmsumption of fault for non-observance.29 This could 
give rise to serious implications. A new element to strengthen the 
force of the regulations is introduced by the Marine (Collision) Amend-
ment Regulations 1979 (Tas.)~0 Regulation 5 reads: 
"In proceedings taken against a person for an offence 
alleged to have been committed in contravention of the 
... regulations, an averment by the complainant contained 
in the complaint is erima fa~ie evidence of the matter 
averred." 
The above regulation operates to shift to the defendant the 
onus of proving to the court's satisfaction that the charge is un-
founded, or the availability of one of the defences provided in the 
26. Marine Act 1976, s. 135 (2). 
27. Statutory Rules (No. 88 of 1977) (Tas.). 
28. By para. 3 (3) of the Statutory Rules 1977, the 1972 rules 
are expressed to apply to all vessels used or· capable of 
being used for the purposes of navigation on (a) all waters 
within a marine board's jurisdiction, and (b) the waters of 
all inland lakes, rivers and streams (whether within the 
jurisdiction of a marine board or not). Subject to certain 
amendments, the 1972 rules are given the force of law in 
England on 1st June, 1983, by the Merchant Shipping (Distress 
Signals and Prevention of Collisions) Regulations 1983, reg. 
1 (1), s. I. No. 708 of 1983. 
29. Marine Act 1976, s. 136 (2). 
30. Statutory Rules, No. 55 of 1979, whjch have amended tt1e 
Marine (Collission) Regulations 1977 by inserting a new 
regulation 5. As a subsidiary legislation, lt could have been 
ultra vires. Its validity is affirmed as a result of the amend-
ment t~135 of the 1976 Principal Act by the Marine Act (Tasl 
(No. 125 of 1977), s. 6. The Board's powers to m<ike-Ei"Y-.:.Taws 
undEJr s. 198 of the Principal Act for the prevention of 
collisions were extended by s. 9. 
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Regulations.31 In contrast, the other States do not have similar 
legislation. It signals an import.::mt pr<JDmatist move bv the Tasmanian 
Parliament to reinforce the existin~J law, by further promoting the 
safety of life and property at sea. Section 8 of the Marine Act 1977 
(Tas.) makes it possible for the legislation to rigorously enforced 
without fl~ar of liability for any loss or damage that may be caused. 
It applies to the exercise in good faith bv any warden, member or 
employee of the Navigation and Survev Authority of Tasmania or a 
Marine Board of any power, functlon or duty under the Act. Statutory 
immunity conferred in respect of any act done or omission in fulfilling 
any such function or duty. 
3. Victoria 
One of the grave navigational hazards in Victorian territorial 
3'1 
waters was the lack of statutory directions. ~. The rules of sailing 
33 based on common usage, though adequate in fine weather, proved 
totally ineffective in poor visibility conditions and with the dramatic 
. . . ff' h f h f' . . 34 r1se m marme tra 1c. T e reasons · or t e 1rst V1ctonan Act, 
which related to the lights to be carried and the signals to be used 
by sea-going vessels, can best be understood in that context. In the' 
second half of the nineteenth century, when steamships became the 
single largest mode of transporting passengers, the legislature had to 
review the safety criteria. The Pass~:mgers Harbour and Navigation 
Act 1865 (Vic.)35 was passed to meet the problems. It impos~;d on 
shipowners, masters and others a numbel' of compulsory requirements. 36 
31. . Marine (Collision) Regulations 1977, Rule 2 (Q) proviso 
or Rule 38 exemptions, if applicable. 
32. However, between the separation of Victoria in 1851 and 
1B65, twelve Acts dealing witll local shipping were passed. 
Five of them dealt with ports, wharfs, payment of wharfage 
and harbour rates (16 Vic. No. 12, '17 Vic. 1\lo. 18; 17 Vic. 
No. 27, 17 Vic. No. 28 and 27 Vic. No. 209); fi\/e with the 
regulation of passenger com;eyance (18 Vic. No. 5, 18 Vic. 
No. 19 Vic. No. 7, 25 Vic. No. 133 and 27 Vic. No. 174); 
one with the amendment of mercantile law (27 Vic No. 182); 
and only one had sorne bearing on maritime law. 
33. As to such rules, see supra. 
31~, 16 Vic. No. 25 (Vic.). 
35. 28 Vic. No. 255. 
36. Provision was rnade in her certificate as to the maximum 
numbnr of passunger~> allowed to be carried on board: ibid., 
~i. 103. 
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Apart from the penalties imposed for breach, it required certain pre-
cautionary measures to be taken, ~ the installation of fire fighting 
d l 'f . . 37 f h 11' . . an 1 e-savmg equipment. Observance o t e co rs1on regulatwns 
was enforced by two statutory presumptions both rebuttable. The 
presumption of wilful default operated against the deck officer per-
sonally under section 119, while the presumption of fault under 120 
38 
would render the ship liable. 
The Marine Act 1890 (Vic.)39 represented new efforts to revamp 
the law. It broadened the scope of control over navigation in Victorian, 
waters by the use of an updated version of the collision regulations.40 
Safety of navigation and the prevention of accidents at sea were the 
twofold object of Part VI of the Act. Apart from strengthening tt1e 
pre-existing requirements as to the standard equipment, e.g. lights, 
fog signals, etc., new prm1isions to deal with the problems of unsea-
worthy ships and overloading were introduced~1 It was not the legis-
lative object to attempt to provide a fool-proof system of marine 
transportation. Moreover, far from pursuing an approach to pave the 
way for uniformity, the Victorian court had construed the concept of 
seaworthiness only in the narrow compass of the 1890 Act. In 
1<\ilpatrick v. Huddart, Parker & Co. Ltd.:Jz the plaintiff sued the def-
endant shipowners for damages for sending to sea their ship in an un-
seaworttw condition in breach of section 103 of the Marine Act 1890. 
The ship, which had been surveyed by the Marine Board and issued 
with a certificate of fitness for sea traffic, foundered and all her crew· 
were drowned except her cook! Madden, C.J.)held that the Board's 
certificate granted under the 1890 Act was conclusive as to the state 
37. Ibid., ss. 107 and 108. 
38. Unless it was pro\/ed to the satisfaction of the court in 
each case that the circumstances made departure from tt1E: 
regulations necessarv: ss. 119 and 120. 
39. No. 1165; repealed the Passengers Harbour and 1\lavigation 
Act 1865. 
L,O. See the Sixth Sct1edule. 
41. Ibid., ss. 99-112; 119-122, respectively. 
42. (1895) V.L.R. 125. 
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and condition of the t>hip at the time of the issue. The rule was said 
to be subject to one exception. This was where shipowner or his agent 
had fraudulently cancealed the defects or neglected to provide 
against obvious defects which were calculated to endanger the ship. 
After the Commonwealth was established, the Victorian legis-
lature confined the operation of this area of maritime law to its territ-
orial waters. Minor exceptions aside, tile provisions of Part VI of the 
Marine Act 1915 (Vic.) were expressed to apply to "all British ships 
registered or being at any place within Victoria and to no others." 43 
Apart from the fear that the Act might be held , the Act 
is viewed in one respect as a retrogression, especially when Victoria 
was vying for a large share of international shipping trade involvmg 
non-British vessels. The Marine A~t l':t'::>tl (Vic.)~4 currently in force, 
has consolidated the law. It has incorporated new elements introduced/ 
in a piecemeal fashion by the legislature over nine decades. Prior to 
its enactment, tile Victorian shipping industry had to grapple with two 
difficulties. The first of these was created by owners and operators 
of ships who, for the purpose of gain, had no disregard for human life 
and property. Part VI Division 2 makes it an indictable offence45 for 
any person who in any way involved in sending a ship to sea from 
any Victorian port in such a state as to endanger the life of any 
person~6 A master who knowingly takes such a ship out to sea could 
be convicted of a similar offence. It is therefore a distinct improve-
ment over the common law position. The mandatory undertaking as to 
the ship's seaworthiness is implied in every employment contract 
made between the shipowner and the seaman,including the master, 
and also in every apprenticeship instrument. Under the Act. the 
shipowner, master or agent is duty-bound to use all reasonable means 
l{3. S. 93. For definition of "British ship", see Chapter Four. 
1;4. No. 6302, reprinted on 25th March, 1979. Part V Division 
6 dealing with deck and load lines has been amended by 
Marine lkt (No. 8293 of 1972) (Vic.), s. 9. 
45. As amended by Msrine (AmPndmnnt) Act (No. 9576 of 1981) 
(Vic.), s. 11 (1) substituting "indictable offence" for ''misdem-
eanour." 
L,6. Marine Act 1958 (Vic.), s. 97. 
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to ensure the seaworthiness of the ship for the voyage at its com-
mencement, and to keep her in such condition rJuring the same.47 ThP 
second problem was due to the operation of a common law rule that 
a person is not liable for not rendering assistance to another in 
distress. It has been amended by section 133. This imposes on every· 
master or person in charge of each ship involved in a collision cer-
tain positive duties of mutual assistance .• and also to provide thE! 
information required. A necessary outcome of this provision is the 
creation of a third presumption. The collision is deemed to have 
been caused by the party who is guilty of U1e breach. 48 
4. Queensland 
The problems of navigation, which endangered shipping in other 
colonies, did not apparentlv cause·grave concern in Queensland for 
'·9 over a decade after she became a separate colony. · 
The Navigation Act 1876 50 featured as the first Queensland Act 
on the ~;ubject. It put an end to the outdated sailing rules.· Under 
Part lV of the Act, the Governor was empowered to enact regulations 
on the lights to be shown, the signals to be used and the sailing 
rules to be observed by vessels in Queensland waters?1 In some ways, 
the regulations promulgated proved unsatisfactory. With effect from 
1st November, 1882, the regulations made by Her Majesty in Council 
52 
under the Imperial Merchant Shieping Amendment Act 1862 became 
47. Ibid., s. 98. 
48. Ibid., s. 133. 
49. This was probably due to the slow growth of shipping 
traffic and to Queensland's extensive coast line. 
50. 41 Vic. No. 3, representing the first attempt by legisle::Jture 
to consolidate and amend the law on shipping. The Marine 
Board of Queensland establishod under s. 5 wCJs charged ~;vittJ 
a broad range of duties and responsibilitios under Parts 
I and II, including the enactment of regulations under s. 93. 
51. S. 80 was substituted for the original section by tho Ports 
Dues F~nvision Act 1882 (l,6 Vic. No. 12) (Qld.), s. 13. --
52. 26 Vlc. c. 63, s. 32, latnr repealed tJy the Imperial IVJerchant 
Shipping Act 1894. The collision regulations of 16th May, 
1901, ~·Jr~re published in Government Gazette of 9th June, 
1901, and also rescinded the rngu1ations relating to signals 
and distress appended to Schedule D of the 1876 Act 
(Qld.). 
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opE)rative in Queensland waters. Observance of the requlatior1s was 
secured by penalties imposed for wilful default. Presumption of 
wilful default would also arise where property damage or personal 
injuries occurred as a result of non-observance of ttle regulations.53 
ftle Queensland legislature appeared to tlave been able to come to 
grips wittl some of ttle underlying problems which sprang from the 
ship's unseaworthiness. Stringent provisions were introduced as 
to tile personnel required to man the \Jessels and the equipments to 
be installed on board. However. the concept, though sound as an 
axiom, did not in practice prevent profit-greedy owners and operators 
of ships from endangering the lives on board by overloading. 
To deal with the situation, the Navigation Act Amendment Act 
1896 (Qld.) made the marking of deck lines and load lines mandatory. 54 
The legislation, originally applicable to steamships, was extended to 
ships propelled by other forms of power .55 
After the law had apparently fallen into rJece:1dence fm over 
sixty years, the Queensland Marine Act 19Str6 was passed as a rev-
amping measure. The law was brouqht into line with the modern shipp-
ing policy of the State. It provides strict criteria for achieving 
safety in navigation and for preventing accidents at sea. Unlike 57 
any innovations considered so far, a new presumption is cr·eated to 
deal with the problems of unseaworthy ships. Subject to the proviso, 
a ship is deemed to be unseaworthy under tile 1958 f"\ct unless she 
53. Navigation Act 1876 (41 Vic. 1\lo. 3) (Qld.), s. 82. 
54. 60 Vic. No. 31, ss. 6-15. These sections were modelled on 
the 1894 Act (Imp.), ss. 437-441. 
55. Under the Navigation Acts Amendment Act 1911 (CJld.) (2 Geo. 
V 1\o. s. l1, the Ciovernor was empowered to extend the 
application of the Navigation Acts 1876-1896 (Qld.). Jn New 
South Wales, however, such power was conferred thirty 
years later by the Act No. 27 of 19/~ 1. 
56. 7 Eliz. II No. 37. 
57. , ss. 111-123 on ship surv(~ys; ss. 12L+-159 on safety and 
prevention of accidents; and ss. 183-195 on shipping 
casualties, misconduct, etc. 
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satisfies the conditions spl:?Cified in section 125. A related facet of 
this c:1ppeoach consists of the preventive and punitive measures. Sub-
ject to the prmJisos,knowingly sending or taking to sea a ship in such an, 
unsemvortlw condition as to be likely to endanger life is a criminal 
offence?8 Overloading of and overcrowding on passenger ships are 
prohibited. A duty is imposed on every shipowner and his agent to 
ensure that the ship is properly equipped.59 Basic to the underlying 
objects of the Act is the establishment of a modern, uniform system 
of "rules of the road." 60 As in the case of Tasmania, statutory effect 
is given to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at' 
Sea 1972.61 Compliance with them is enforced by the presumption of 
wilful default against the deck officer where damage is caused by 
non-observance. For breach of the duty of mutual assistance which 
arises in a collision between two ships the defaulting master will be 
imprisoned. The penalty imposed is therefore more serious than the 
presumption of fault, wrongful act or neglect?2 which may be rebutted. 
The likelihood that his certificate may be suspended or cancelled 
for breach of the collision regulations is an effective deterrent, 
even for the wayward master. 
In two remarkable ways, the legislature has gone further than 
its counterparts in implementing the concept of safety at sea. 
Firstly, it is incumbent upon the master on receiving at sea a signal 
of distress or similar information to proceed at all speed to assist 
every person in danger of being lost. Without sufficient cause,! 
he will be found guilty of a misdemeanour for failure to render such assis-' 
tance?-' Secondly, on encountering a dangerous derelict, a tropical 
storm or any other danger to navigation, the master of a ship is 
under a strict duty to ~varn ships in the vicinitv and the shipping 
58. L9id., s. 126. 
59. Ibid., s. 136. 
60. The C3overnor in Council is empowered to enact collision 
regulations: s. 1110 (1 ). 
61.covernment Gazette, 16tll Julv, 1972. Thus Queensland shares 
the same forward-looking policy with Tasmania (see Statutory 
r~ules No. 88 of 1977, supra.) in gh1ing effect to the most 
recent international collision regulations. 
62. Queensland Marine Act 1958, s. 143 (2) and (3). 
63. , s. 1M. 
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authorities on shore?4 These statutorv developments have markedlv 
altered the common law position. 
5. South /\ustralia 
The South Australian Acts of 183&5 and 184 766 were enacted for 
the preservation of the ports, harbours and navigable rhters and for 
the regulation of shipping and the crews in the colonv. Provisions 
were made for the maintenance of a steam tu~J. for pilotage anrJ other 
port facilities. 
The Marine Board Act 1860 (S.A.)67 laid the groundwork for prom-
oting safetv and certaintv in navigation. The Marine Board of South 
1\ustralia was established, amongst other things, to formulate rules 
to be observed bv ships whEm meeting and passing at sea. Thev also 
related to ttle lights to be carried on board and fog signals to be 
used.68 Failure to observe the rules would give rise to the presump-
tion of fault against the master. Often the unpredictable climatic 
and maritime conditions prevailing at the material time could operate 
to justifv a departure from the rules~9 To achieve its legislative 
objects, South 1-\ustralia went one step ahead. Section 80 reads: 
"If in anv case of collision it appears to the Court ... that 
such collision was occasioned bv the non-observance of anv 
rule ... the owner of the ship by whict1 such rule has been in-
fringed shall not be entitled to recover anv recompense 
whatever for anv damagB sustained bv such ship .... " 
One implication of the section is this. A ship, which failed to observe 
the rules, could at am; time be rammed into and sunk bv another ship. 
64. Ibid., s. 145. 
65. Act No. 3 of 1838 (S.A.), one of the earliest Acts on shipping. 
66. Act No. 13 of 18h7 (S.A.). 
67. /\ct No. 17; as to some of its main functions, see ss. 6-18; 
further powers were given under ttle Marine Board Amendment 
Act (No. 155 of 1879), (S.A.). 
68. Marine Board f\ct 1860, ss. 77-79. 
69. As to const-Jquences otherwise, see s. 81. 
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It might be argued that adherence to the rules could relieve a master 
from liability for negligently running into another ship which violated 
the rules. Prima facie the shipowners would be unable to recover: 
fori the damage sustained, unless they could discharge the burden: 
of bringing the case within the proviso. The Act. stopped short of 
imposing liability for damage caused by the pilot's fault in situations 
where pilotage was rendered compulsory by law?0 It questionable 
whether, under the law at the time, the ship would be subject to 
admiralty proceedings £.!ill!l for damage caused to third parties as 
a result of a pilot's fault. However, following the pattern set by 
the other colonies, the presumption of wilful default was imposed on 
the deck officer, who was in charge, for violation of the rules?1 
The Marine Board and Navigation Act 1881 (S.A]2 upgraded the 
law by introducing a number of new measures to promote the safety 
of navigation, life and property at sea. Two main methods to ensure 
observance of its provisions were used. In the first place, the Marine 
Board could exercise its wide powers to detain any unsafe ship, 
British or foreign, in South Australian waters. 73 This was a powerful 
weapon viewed with concern by wayward shipowners and charterers. 
For business purposes, detention of a ship would inflict heavy financ-
ial losses. Consequently, the fear of such an action being taken 
would lead to ships in the colony being properly maintained and kept 
under repair. 
The second method based on the imposition of personal penalties 
appeared to be less effective ti1an the first. Under section 174, sub-
ject to the proviso, any person involved in sending or attempting to 
send to sea an unseaworthy vessel endangering human life would be 
guilty of a misd£~mec-:mur. Also, the master who knowingly took to sea 
an unseaworthy ship in such circumstances would be guilty of a sim-
ilar offence. It is doubtful whether the above provisions conferred 
any right on the persons injured to recover compensation. They were 
70. Ibid., s. 143. 
71. Ibid., s. 81. 
72. 44 & 115 Vic. No. 237. nm provisions of Part III on safety 
and prevention of accidents applied to all British ships 
registered at, or being at any place within, the colony. 
73. S. 175. By s. l8l1, foreign ships which were unseaworthy 
could also be dete:1ined. 
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not free from uncertainty. If, by reason of a ship's unseaworthiness) 
injuries were caused to a passenger or crew member, would this fact 
alone be regarded as sufficient to render the shipowner guilty? When 
would a master be held as "knowingly taking" an unseaworthy ship 
to sea? Would the knowledge of the owner or a crew member be 
imputed to the master? 
Moreover, the glaring shortcomings of the safety provisions 
are exemplified by three cases. In Rogers v. Loutit?l1 a seaman sued 
the master and part-owner for personal injuries sustained due to 
defects in the ropes. The action failed because the court was not 
satisfied by the evidence that the defendant was aware of the 
defects in the rope or that his attention had been called to that 
fact. The court held that, based on the decision in Couch v. Steele75 
there was no warranty of seaworthiness. It is submitted that, if sec-
tion 174 had been in force when the accident occurred, the 
shipowner and possibly his agent would have been convicted of an 
offence, unless they were able to invoke the proviso. 
In Staples v. Stephens?6 'a barge came into Port Adelaide with 
the disc submerged. The master was charged with "allowing his ship 
to be so loaded as to submerge in salt water the centre of the disc" 
in breach of section 19L! of the Marine Board and Navigation Act 1881. 
However, the court held that the offence contemplated by the Act applied 
to tho loading at the port where cargo was put on board, and not 
when she arrived at the port of discharge. The narrow construc-
tion put on the words shows how court decisions could fall out of 
line with legislative policy. 
Following the precedent set by some of the other States, me 1v1arioe. 
Act 1936-75 (S.A.) has, in a number of respects, upgraded the law relating , 
to safety. It takes cogn1zance ot and gives effect to modern shipping 
technology as one way of achieving its objectives. There was, how-
ever, one setback in enforcing observance of its provisions. It 
is submitted that the law enforcement officers and the Minister could 
74. (1881) S.A.L.R. 4. Apparently, this case was decided before 
the Marine Board and Navigation Act 1881 (S.A.) was passed. 
75. 3 E. and 8. l10Z. 
76. (1883) S.A.L.H. 131. 
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be subject to unlimited liability for the improper or unlawful exercise 
of their powers under the Act?7 Unless this problem was removed, 
it would seriously weaken ll~gislative efforts to deal with the hazards 
created by unseaworthy ships. Limited immunity is conferred under 
section 8 of the Marine Act Amendment Act 1976 (S.A.).78 It reads: 
"No civil liability attaches to the Minister or any other 
person acting in the administration of this Act, in respect 
of any certificate, permit or other instrument issued under 
this Act." 
It does not provide protection against the consequences of unlawful 
acts of officers and/or the Minister which are not connected with 
certificates, the wrongful detention of a ship. 79 
6. Western Australia 
For almost eight decades after the settlement, legislative 
activity in this area was geared mainly to pilotage and maritime traffic 
in the colony's harbour~0 
The use of coastal vessels and large steamships as the common 
mode of conveying passengers and settlers in the late nineteenth 
century highlighted gaps in the colony's law relating to navigation. 
The Navigation Act 1904 (W.A.) 81 alleviated the public concern for the 
safe carriage of passengers by sea.82 In place of the traditional 
marine board, the Chief Harbour Master was charged with the respon-
sibility of achieving the objects of the Act. Several forms of stat-
utory control to ensure the safety of life at sea were implemented. 
By section 70, where a British ship's unseaworthiness was such 
as to endanger human life, she could be detained~3 The investigations) 
Tl. See e.g. Marine Act 1936-75 (S.A.), s. 35. As to cancellation 
or refusal to issue certificates relating to ship's equipments, 
etc., see s. 78. 
78. No. 55 of 1976, adding a new section 145 to the principal 
Act. 
79. Marine Act 1936-75 (S.A.), s. 35 confers on the Minister or 
anv officer of the Department of Marine and Harbour powers 
of detention of unsafe ships in Australian waters. 
80. E.g. tile Shipping and Pilotage Consolidation Ordinance 1855 
(18 Vic. No. 15) (W.A.) together with the amendments has 
been n~pealed and replaced bv the Shipping and Pilotage Act 
(No. 17 of 1967) (W.A.). 
81. No. 59 of 1904. 
82. See Parts IV and VI. 
83. Navigation Act 190L,, s. 70. By the Navigation Act Amendment 
Act (No. 33 of 1926) (W.A.), s. 10, the word "steamship" in the 
NaVigation Act 1904 (except in s. 43) was replaced by "ship". 
82 
which followed 1 would include a survey of the ship and an ascertain-
ment as to her crew sufficienc\,1. Unfortunately, this method of 
stamping out tile use of unsafe vessels was undermined b\,1 the fear 
of liabilit\,1 for wrongful detention. lJJhere a ship was detained 
"without reasonable and probable cause," the loss or damage recov-
erable under section 73 (1) would embrace the cost of or incidental 
to the detention and surve\j of the ship~4 The extension of the 
detention provisions to foreign vessels under section 77 demonstrated 
the colon\j's firm polic\,1 to get rid of all unsafe vessels which were 
a threat to life. 
The compulsor\,1 marking of deck and load lines was introduced 
as a related aspect of seaworthiness. This requirement applied to 
all Britisll ships except those expressl\,1 exempted under section 81. 
In one respect, Western Australia was ahead of the other States. 
Nowhere in an\,1 of the other State, legislation can one find rules that 
were more comprehensive that those in the Second Schedule to the 
1904 Act (llJ.A.). The\} prescribed in detail the life-saving appliances 
to be carried b\,1 different classes of British ships used for carr\}ing 
passengers. The clear-cut classification spelt out the range of 
equipments and other requirements appropriate to each categor\,1 of 
ships. The rules also applied to foreign-going vessels - sailing ships 
and steamships included. The\,1 were given a wide scope of operation 
by the incorporation of certain provisions of the Imperial Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894~5 To avoid repugnanc\,1, the Governor's power was 
restricted b\,1 section 78 (2) to promulgating rules which were similar 
to their Englisl1 counterparts. For contravention of the rules, the 
shipowner or the master, who was proved to be at fault, would be 
fined and the ship detained.86 
84. The shipowner would be able to recover compensation against 
the government for wrongful detention of the ship under the 
Crown Suits Act, 1898 (62 Vic. No. 9) (W.A.). 
85. Navigation Act 1904, Second Schedule Division (A) Class 1, 
Division (B) Class 1 and Class 2 •. etc. 
86. !Q!.9.., s. 79 and s. 80 (3). 
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Like the legislation of the other' States, the 1904 Act (IJJ.A.) was 
inadequate in one important respect. It did not providr~ for the 
payment of compensation where passengers lost their lives or were 
injured as a result of non-observance of the rules by shipowners or 
the ship's master. Moreover, in the absence of an invalidating prov-
ision in the Act, shipowners would attempt to exonerate themselves 
from all liability by inserting exemption clauses in contracts of 
carriage of passengers. 
In line with the policies of other States, the Western Australian 
Marine .Act 194887 has translated into reality the twofold concept, 
namely, the safety aspects of navigation and the prevention of 
accidents. As a new measure to deal with the problems posed by 
collisions, observance of the collision regulations by all coast-trade,B8 
harbour and river ships within the State's jurisdiction was rendered 
obligatory .89 With regard to the presumption for non-observance, 
of the collision regulations and the master's duties after a collision, 
the Act merely follows the pattern set by the other States. The 
underlying philosophy of the legislature is oriented towards the 
enhancement of trade and the protection of property as well as 
human lives. 
Two further measures to promote safety at sea are noteworthy. 
Under the Western Australian Marine Act Amendment Act 1965?0 
the role of the Harbour and Light Department was extended. Where 
a vessel after being boarded by an authorised person is found to 
be unseaworthy or in an unsafe position or locality, it may be ordered 
to the nearest port or some other place. 91 This provision enables 
87. No. 72 of 19LI8. The body charged with the administration 
of the Act is the Harbour and Light Department: ss. 8 (1) 
and 9. 
88. The expression "coast-trade ship" in the 1948-1972 Act 
(W.A.), s. 8 (1) was amended by the Western Australian 
Marine Act Amendment Act 1966 (No. 69), s. 4 to include 
a "limited coast-trade" except in Part III of the 1%8 Act. 
89. Ibid., ss. 89 and 90. The collision regulations are appended 
to the Second Schedule. 
90. No. 25 of 1965. 
91. Ibid., s. 195 A (2), as amended by the WE1stern Australian 
Marine Act Amendment Act, s. 2; also ibid., s. 206 A as 
amenrJed by Western Australiafl Marine Act Amendment Act 
(No. 67 of 1977), s. 13. 
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the Department's officers to stop 'and, at random, inspect vessels 
an\jwhere within the State's jurisdiction. A new approach to safte\f 
requirements was introduced b\f the Western Australian Marine Act 
1973. The Manning Committee set up under this Act is charged with , 
the responsibilit\f of determining the minimum qualifications, exper-
ience and complement of crew required to ensure the ship's safe 
navigation and the safe use of its equipments and machiner\j. Its 
functions include reviewing and var\jing an\f determinations 
previously made.92 The impact of its work on the smaller \Jessels 
will result in the formulation of new guidelines. No coast-trade, 
harbour or river ships can proceed to sea or be navigated within the 
State waters, unless the Committee's determination made with 
respect to the vessel is complied with. 93 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In terms of the rights, remedies and protection of seamen and 
ships' masters, the laws in the six Australian States, as the end pro-
duct of a long legislative process, are similar. The favoured treat-
ment was part of the Imperial polic\f to encourage British subjects 
to work as seamen in Britain's merchant fleet. 94 In the early days, 
it was mandator\/ for British ships to be manned almost exclusivel\f 
by British subjects. 95 
The similarity between the State laws and Ul8 Imperial law on 
92. Ibid., s. 21 C, as amended b\f the Western Australian Marine 
Act Amendment Act. (No. 2) (No. 109 of 1973), s. 6. 
93. Ibid., s 21 D, as amended. 
94. See £.:.8..:1835 (Imp.) (5 & 6 Will IV, c. 24), "An Act for the 
Encouragement of the \Joluntar\f Enlistment of Seamen ... ;" 
1845 Act (Imp.) (8 & 9 Vic., c. 87), "An Act for the Encourage-
ment of British Shipping and Navigation." See also Chapter 
Four. 
95. See Chapter Om-J. 
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the subject largely t:.he result of pre-conceived planning by the 
Imperial legislators. This fact is evident from section 1 D9 of t:.he 
Merchant Shipping Act 1851~ (Imp.), section 261 of the f"lerchant Shipp-
ins Act 189/_. (Irnp.) and the other provisions. Australian State laws do 
not differr-Jntiate between the rights, remedies and protection of 
ships' masters and seamen engaged in inter-State trade and thos1-3 of 
th1-2ir counterparts engaged in foreign trade. 
The dangees of navigation to life and property increased dram-
atically with the volume of maritime traffic. Clearly the success of 
colonial and Empire-wide shipping as the major mode of cargo and 
passenger transportation depended on reducing the risks to an accept-
able level. In the early stages, Imperial legislation provided a solu-
tion to the problems in a piecemeal fashion. Part IV of the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1854 (Imp.) was concerned lhlith the promotion of safety 
and the prevention of accidents. It was expressed to "apply to all 
British ships." Following the progressive example of the Imperial leg-
islation?6 colonial legislatures gave effect to the internationally-
accepted rules of sailing. Like Britain, the Australian colonies dealt 
with the hazards of navigation by implementing a manifold approach. 
This includes the adoption of the international collision regulations;7 
the marking of deck and load lines, the stipulation of stringent 
requirements as to seaworthiness, and trm imposition of the duty of 
mutual assistance after a collision?8 Western Australia is the only 
State that has provided special procedures based on current technol-
ogy to promote safety in navigation~9 
96. As to the adoption and application of the international 
collision regulations t1y Britain up to the present time, see 
R.H.B. Sturt, The Collision RE~gulations (1984), Lloyd's of Lond. 
Press Ltd., Land., pp. ·1-3. 
97. The statutory presumption of fault for non-observance of 
such regulations has been abolist1ed by the Navigation Act 
1912-73 (Comth.), s. 263 (1), and under British lalt\1 by the 
Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (Imp.) (1 & 2, Geo. V, c. 57), 
s. 4. 
98. For position under the 1\lavigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), see 
s. 265. 
99. See the Western Aue>tralian Marine f.\ct Amendment Act (No. 
2) (No. 109 of 1973), s. 6. 
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The bodv of maritime law pl'inciples in each of the Australian 
colonies was built up in a number of wavs. Most of the pre-185£, 
enactments passed as part of the laws for the peace, welfare and 
good government of the colonies were of a varied nature. 1 
Their operation was of a limited duration. More permanent in char-
acter and effect than a number of the ear lv "indigenous" enactments 
were those English laws which were imported into Australia and adminis-
:~ered under the Australian Courts Act 1828 (Imp.).t The incorporation of· 
English case principles in, and the extension of the Imperial legis-
lation bv, later colonial enactments had significantlv fostered the 
de\Jelopment of Australian laws. 
We have reserved for treatment in the next chapter the grounds 
on which colonial and State laws mav be struck down as invalid. 
1 .. tg, in the exercise of powers b\f colonial legislatures under 
the respective constitutions. See the beginning of this 
chapter. 
Z. 9 [3eo. IV., c. 83. 
87 
CHAPTER THREE 
VALIDITY OF COLONIAL, STATE AND 
COMMONWEALTH LEGISLATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been observed that the Australian Courts Act 1828 
(Imp.) distinguished betWf)£-:m common law and statute law: The: 
axiom applied bv courts is that Imperial statutes which were not 
imported at the time when the 1828 Act carne into force would be in-
applicable at a later date or stage~ Under section ZL1, whenever 
doubts existed, the Governors with the advice of the Legislative 
Councils ~vere empowered to declare what laws and statutes were 
applicable. Discretion was also given to establish "such limitations 
and modifications of arw such laws and statutes ... as mav deemed 
necessary ."3 
The growth of Britain's Empire necessitated the extension of 
her laws to her 0\ier~>eas Eiettlements and colonies and the formu-
lation of a uniform code of macit.ime law. Iilith this policy in vimv, 
the Imperial Parliament passed the Merchant Shippinq Act '1854 (Imp.) 
which consolidated the provisions of a number of Acts. By reason 
of the application of numerous provisions of this Act to Her Majesty's 
Dominions, a foundation was laid for the establishment throughout 
the Empire of a common system of maritime law:t The Mecct1ant Shipp-
Act 1894 (Imp.), with broader aims and perspectives than its pre-
.......;:;...__ 
decessor, implemented further the Impecial doctrine. By Imperial 
legisatiorl, the underlying philosophy and concepts of English maritime 
law were made an integral part of colonial jurisprudence. 
The object of this chapter is trweefold. First, consideration 
is given to the mechanisms which streamlined colonial laws and also 
imposed stringent requirements to be met before any departure from 
1. See chapter Ono. 
2. Ex (1839) 1 Legge 123, p. 138, per Stephen J. 
3. /\u~c;tralian Court9 Act 1828 (Imp.), s. 2l•. It was pointed 
out that this Act was of a general constitutional char-
acter: The Commonwealth v. The Limerick Steamship Co. Ltd.' 
(1929) 35 C:.L.R. 69, p. 103, eer Isaacs and Rich, J J. 
l1. We sav.1 abo how colonial legislatures extencJc]d to their 
territories the operation oF vacious provisions nf Imperial 
Acts. 
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the Imperial legislation could be validly made. Second, as an analy-
tical study, we shall look closely at instances of conflict between 
colonial and Imperial legislation and also between State and Common-
wealth legislation. Third, it is proposed to examine the measures 
designed to remove doubts as to the valitiity of certain laws,and the 
legal difficulties which had arisen. 
II. EFFECTS OF COLONIAL ENACTMENTS 
1. Pre-1900 Colonial Legislation 
One of the recurring problems concerned the competence of 
colonial legislatures. It was closely related to the validity of colon-
ial enactments on maritime matters. Often the issue could only be 
resolved by expensive litigation, sometimes by time-consuming appeals 
to the Privy Council. 
In a number of ways the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (Imp.) had 
crucial effects on colonial legislation. It was expressed in broad 
terms to cover many different aspects of shipping. Certain matters 
were, however, left out of its scope. They included shipping and 
navigation in the harbours, rivers, canals and ports of colonies, the 
establishment of marine boards and the enactment of rules for instit-
uting proceedings in the local courts. 5 It appears that colonial 
legislation dealing with such matters was valid.6 Moreover, colonial 
legislation passed after the 1828 Act (lmp.J which gave effect to the 
provisions of the 1854 Act (Imp.) would not be affected unless they 
were subsequently amended. What was the situation where a local 
5. In the Australasian Steam Navigation Cg. v. Smith & Others 
[1885-6] 7 N.S.W.R. 207, at p. 239, Windeyer, J., was of the 
opinion that collision regulations enacted under the 
Imperial Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854-1873, "might not apply" 
to vessels navigating "harbours, ports or places.'' A similar 
view was expressed by Barwick, C.J., in China Ocean Shipping 
Co. and Others v. State of South Australia [1979-80] 27 
A.L.R. I, p. 11. 
6. ItJid., p. 239, Windyer, J.,was also of the opinion that the 
Navigation Act 1871 (N.S.W.) (35 Vic. No. 7), s. 89 was invalid 
as it was repugnant to the Imperial Merchant Shipping Act 
Amendment Act 1873, s. 17. But s. 89 "will still lle 
operative" with regard to vrmsels navigating "harbours, 
ports or places" referred to in s. 120 of the colonial Act of 
1871. This case is a good example of the attitude of judges 
not to construe repugnancy rnore widely than was necess-
ary. 
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Act, \.vhich had been jn force prior to the 185~ Act (Imp.), \Alas found 
to be inconsistent with sorne provision of that Act or with the sub-
sequent amendments? The local legislation would be construed sub-
ject to Imperial legislation. Thus local Acts, which were in conflict 
with Imperial enactments, would be rendered null and void to the 
extent of their inconsistency with the latter. 7 For four decades 
after the 1854 Act was passed, colonial shipping legislation had been 
thrown into a state of uncertainty and discredit. It is true that 
section 547 had provided an answer to the problems peculiar to the 
colonies. For certain reasons, few of the post-1854 colonial Acts 
passed can strictly be regarded as the valid exercise of the new 
power given to alter the Act in its applica.tion to the colonies. 8 
To come within the ambit of that section, the colonial Act had "to 
be confirmed by Her Majesty in Council." This was a prerequisite 
for the repeal, whether wholly or in part, of the provisions of the 
Imperial Act relating to ships registered in the British possession. 
Furthermore, the colonial Act would not be operative until the 
approval was proclaimed in the colony, or "until such time thereafter 
as may be fixed by such Act ... for the purpose." Meeting the con-
ditions laid down in section 5~7 is essential to the validity of all such 
colonial enactments. 9 Obviously the confirmation would only be given 
after the bills had :been reserved for the signification of Her 
Majesty's pleasure. It appears that assent ordinarily given by a 
Governor to the bills is insufficient. 
Section 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) has r(3-
enacted section t~ of the Merchant Shipping (Colonial) Act 1869 (Imp}0 
7. Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp.), s. 2. 
8. Subject to the conditions being met, s. 547 empowered 
certain changes to be made with respect to the law applic-
able to the colony. But it did not ensure the validity of the 
pre-1854 colonial legislation. 
9. This section has been re-enacted as Merchant Shipping 
1894 (Imp.), s. 735. 
10. 32 & 33 Vic., c. 11. 
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It empowers colonial legislatures to requl<:3te coasting trade. Colonial 
enactmrmts for such purposes will only be operative where the con-
ditions laid down are satisfied. They include the following, viz. the 
prc'lsence of a suspending clause in the bills, the public signification 
of Her Majesty's pleasure in the British possession and the equal 
treatmEmt under the proposerJ enactments of all British ships in the: 
possession. 
The dubious validity of many of tim colonial enactments, hlhether 
passed before or after the 1854 Act (Imp.), undermined the foundations 
of colonial maritime trade. Moreover, there were genuine fears that 
some of the decisions given, including penal ties imposed, based on 
the application of colonial enactments were invalid. It was fortunate 
for all concerned that their validity was subsequently confirmed. 
The preamble to the Colonial Acts Confirmation Act >1894 (Imp.) 11 
referred to two categories of colonial legislation. 12 The Act was 
stated to apply to the colonies of New South LJJales, Victoria. Tasmania, 
South Australia, Queensland and Western /-\ustralia. 
Section 2 remedied the defects as follows: 
"Any Act passed by the legislature of a colonv to which 
this t'\ct applies, and assented to in Her Majt=~sty's name by 
the Governor of such colony, and not disallowed by HHr 
Majesty before tile passing of tt1is Act, shall be deemed to 
be and to have been, as from the date of such assent, as 
valid as if the same had been reserved for the signific-
. ation of Her Majesty's pleasure. and Her Majesty's assent 
to tt1e Act had been duly given and signified in the colony 
at the date aforesaid." 
Subjoct to the requirements of the section being met, colonial enact-
rmmts pa:c;sml on or prior to 20th FFJLlruarv, 1891.:3 IA!ere drJomed to 
Lm \ialid. Its relativelv 1-vidE! \cJDITling sug[~f:Jsts tJrat coloni<:]l enact-
ments \~Jhicll failc!d Lo rnec?t thE: rr.Jquirr~mt-mts of sections 73r; and 736 
of the 18% 1\ct (Imp.) li\/ould be \mlirlCJLcd. 
In Chapter Two, we saw how various prm;isions ln Part II of the 
Merct1ant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) relating to masters and seamen 
wert:~ i mportf3d by val'ious State enactments. By sections Z60 and 
261, Part II was f~xpressed to apply to ships I'Elgistered in the United 
1'\ingdom and to British ~>hips registered elsewhere. It follows that 
by "paramount force" most of the provisiDns in Part II would extl3nd 
11. 56 & 57 Vic., c. 72. 
12. The doubts and difficulties relating to both these cate-
gories WE!re remm1ed by s. 2. 
13. Operative rJate of tilt~ Act (56 & 57 Vic., c. 72). 
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to the Australian colonir?s, and later States, as part of their laws. 
The objc'!ct of the local enactments was to take public cognizance 
of such Imperial provisions so as to make the position beyond doubt. 
Section 261 was subject to a proviso in paragraph (9_). The provisions 
in Part II were inapplicable where the "ship within the jurisdiction 
of the government of the British possession in which the ship is 
registered." This small hiatus was filled when those provisions were 
extended by local enactments to the States. Uniformity in the law 
was thus ensured. It has been established that the territorial 
14 boundary of a State is along the low-water mark. fhe laws relating 
to masters and seamen passed by each State Parliamont for the good 
government of the State st-10uld be valid within its territorial waters. 
An alternative basis for supporting the validity of the gap-
filling legislation was prm;ided by section 26LI of the 1894 Act (Imp.). 
It empowered the legislature of a British possession to apply or 
adapt to any British stlips registered at, or being in, any of its ports 
and to the owners, masters and crews of those ships the provisions 
in Part II. Naturally, it was limited to those provisions which did not 
apply by "paramount force." The effect of the section was to 
render the gap-filling legislation operative "in the same manner as 
if it were enacted in this Act." 
A further ground may be adva~ced. It appears that most of 
the Imperial provisions dealing with the rights and remedies of mas-
ters and seamen merely put together in statutory Form the case law. 
This body of principles haa over the years been administertJd by 
Australian courts as part of State laws.15 It is arguable that, in 
14. New South Wales v. The Commonwealth (1976) 50 A.LJ.R. 
218, p. 219, view being held by five of the seven Judges. 
15. See Chapter One. It is submitted that tt1e views Bxpressed 
by B.A. Helrnore as to the invalidity of the various State 
enactments on seamen are not tenable: B.A. Helmore, 
"Validitv of State Nm1igation Acts" (1953) 27 A.L.J. 16. The 
rec:lson is that the State enactments - as we have seen -
generally reproduced Imperial legislation on the subject. 
Where intra-State tradEl was carried on outside State 
waters, by the Merchant Shipping Act 189ll (Imp.), ss. 260 
and 261. the pr.ovi~>ions in Part l! vvoulc1 applv tJv pc.n·amount 
force. 
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extending the operation of thosr~ ImpE~rial provisions, Au~>tralian 
State Parliament~; ~.\Jere doing no more than consolidatinq the princ-
iples which already formed part of their legal svst~:;ms. 
For the reasons ghmn, it i~1 unlikelv for anv of the State 
enactments relating to master's and seamen to be held invalid for 
non-compliance with section 735 or 736 of Um 18% Act (Imp.). 
One vital issue concerns color1ial legislation which was opera-
ti\;e, or cl~1emed to be operative, in repealir1g crJrtairl provisions of 
the 1854 Act (Imp.). This /\ct and the amending legislation were in 
turn amended and consolidated bv the Merch<:mt Shipping Act 1894 
(1mp.).16 What is the effect of such colonial legislation relating to 
ships registered in the colonv on the provisions of the 1894 Act 
(Imp.)? If a colonial Act was valid, or deemed to be valid, under the 
pre-1894 lugislation, would it be \Jalid under the 1894 Act? The answer 
is found in the savin~l provisions of ~;ectior1 735 (2) as follows: 
"l.uhere anv /\ct or Ordinance of the legislature of a British 
possession has repealed in IAihole or· in part as respects 
that possession am; provision of the Acts repealed bv this 
Act, that Act or CJrdinance sl1all have the same effect in 
relation to the corresponding provisions of this /-\ct as it 
had in relation to thrc:; prm1ision nw~::aled bv this Act." 
2. Imperial Pollcv 
From the viewpoir1t of the British Cornrnonwealth of Nations as 
a whole, the subject of merchant shipping ~\las mainlv governed b\f the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.). In considering the legislation of 
the Australian colonies and later States, /\u~jtralian shipping must 
be seen "not as a separate integer but as a component part of the 
Imperial ir1teger." 17 
Britain's underlving policv in relation to her colonies as 
embudiedj in the 1854 Act (Imp.), steadilv reinforced bv the amending 
l(3gislation, was extended in large measure bv the 1894 Act (Imp.). 
The repeal of the pre-1 1394 Acts (Imp.) would not render inoperative 
16. This Act has been amer1ded tJv a SI'Jries D f othfJr Acts, 
including the Merchant Shipping 1-\cts (1970 c. 36) (U.K.) 
and (1979 c. 39) (U.I<.). · 
17. UniDn Steams~1ip Co. nf 1\Jew Zealand Ltd. v. The Common-
wealth (1925) C.L.R. 130, p. 148, per Isaacs, J. 
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the statutes which the colonial Jr:::gislature:::J had been authorised by 
such Acts to pass. It seems certain that the pre-1894 colonial legis~ 
lation would continue to operate unless it is inconsistent with the 
provisions of the 1894 Act (Imp.). Moreover, colonial legislation had 
not in every case been held invalid on the ground of the lack of 
total conformity to certain provisions of the 1894 Act (Imp.). A good 
example is found in the Western Australian case of Rex v. Mason and 
Another. 18 An inquiry was held under the Inquiries into Wrecks 
Ordinance 1864 (W.A.);9 as amended. Certain chaeges of misconduct 
brought against Captain Landgren were proved. In consequence, the 
tribunal constituted under the Ordinance ordered that his master's 
certificate be suspended. The local legislation and the tribunal 
constituted thereunder were within the express authority of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (Imp.), as amended. Subsequently, the 
1854 Act (Imp.) together with the amendments was repealed by the 
1894 Act (Imp.). Section 478 of this Act confers wider powers on the 
colonial legislatures than section 2'•2 (5) of the repealed 1854 Act 
(Imp.). Howe\;er, section •'I7B makes no mention of colonial statutes 
passed previously but refers to future statutes to be enacted by 
the colonies. Landgren sought to quash the OI'der suspending his 
master's certificate by relying on two major grounds. Firstly, as the 
1854 Act (Imp.) on which the Inquiries into Wrecks Ordinance 1864 
(W.A.) was based had been repealed, the Ordinance and its amendments 
were no longer operative. He alleged that the tribunal constituted 
under the Ordinance (W.A.) had ceased to exist, and therefore had no . 
jurisdiction in the matter. Secondly, reliance was placed on section 
478 of the 1894 Act (Imp.). It ~AJas said to have shown the British 
Parliament's intention to repeal those provisions of the 1851• Act 
(Imp.), as amended, in so fae as they empowered local legislatures to 
pass Acts constituting a tribunal to enquire into wrecks or casualties. 
In rejecting the above arguments, the Chief Justice said: 20 
"Although the Acts of 1854, 1862 and 1882 have been 
repealed, they have been repealed for the purposes of 
18. (190l!) 6 W.A.R. 131 •. 
19. 28 Vic. No. 2. 
20. (1904) 6 W.A.R., pp. 138-139. 
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rearrangement, and their provisions have been re-enacted 
in substance in thr~ consolidation Act of 18%, and there has 
been no moment at which the substance of the old enact-
ment has ceased to be in force .. .! think it is clear that, 
this being a consolidation Act, the intention of section '~78 
was not only to keep alive the authority previously vested 
in the local Legislatures of British Possessions .... " 
Apart from reasons of expediency, the intention of the Imperial 
Parliament, as correctly inferred by the judges from the consolidat-
ing Act of 1894, seems to be an overriding factor in the decision. 
It may be seen as part of Britain's Empire-building policy.21 
An earlier case relating to this concept is In re Victorian 
Stearn Navigation Board, Ex parte Allan~2 The steamship '.'Gulf of 
Finland" struck a rock off Cape Jaffa in the colony of South Australia. 
The Victorian Steam Navigation Board established by the Passengers, 
harbours and Navigation Statute 1865 (Vic.)23 found the master guilty 
of default in not observing the sailing directions. His master's cer-
tificate, wt1ich had been issued by the Board of Trade in England, t'\las 
suspended for three months. His application for a certiorari to quash 
the proceedings was heard by the Full Court of the Supreme Court 
of Victoria. 
Section 242 (5) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (Imp.) 
empowered the legislature of a British possession to set up a tribun-
al to hold inquiries into charges of incompetency or misconduct on 
the part of masters or mates of ships. Moreover, section 23 (1) of 
the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act 1862 (Imp.)Zll read: 
"The power of cancellins.J or suspending the certificate 
of a master or mate by the 24Znd section of the principal 
Act conferred on the Board of Trade, shall...vest in and 
be exercised by the local marine board ... or tribunal by 
which the case is investigated or tried .... " 
21. Ibid., p. 141. McMillan J. found in the consolidating Act 
such a real intention of Imperial Legislature to keep alive 
the courts already constituted in the colonies that he 
avoided applying the literal interpretation. The purpose 
\,vas to avoid the absurd consequences which would otherwise 
arise. 
22. (1881) 7 \/.L.R. 248. 
23. 28 Vic. No. 255. 
21,. 25 & 26 Vic., c. 63. 
95 
Section 77 of the Passengr~rs, Harbours and Navigation Statute 186S 
(Vic.) was intended to confer a wide jurisdiction on the Victorian 
Steam Navigation Board. The fir~>t part of that section empowered 
the Board to carry out the provisions of Part IV of the statute in 
Victoria. The second part referred to ttrE~ Board as being constituted 
to exercise "all such pow!~rs" as were confE~rred by section 242 of 
the 1854 Act (Imp.) and section 23 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
Amendment Act Hl62 (Imp.). It is arguable that a literal interpreta-
tion of section l7 supports the dissenting viet-v of Higinbotham, J. He 
expressed a strong view that section 77 did not impose any "local 
or geographical limits whatever" on the Board, and that in section 
23 of the 1862 Act (Imp.) there was also no limitation of the extent 
of the local jurisdiction of the Board.25 Two of the three judges 
allowed the applicant's summons for the prohibition. The two judges 
construed section 77 ;:md considered the jurisdiction of the Board 
in thf; light of the policy of Imperial legislation. Steptmn,J. 7said:
26 
nThe Enqlish Legislatw'e, carrying out the policy to give 
one :jurisdiction over the Empire, has endE~avoured as 
Far as it could, to place departmental as 1-vell as judicial 
control over ttle certificates in the hands of local tribun-
als but (the] local Legislatures cannot interfere with those 
certificates." 
Section 77 of the 1865 statute and indeed any local Acts purporting 
to deal with certificates granted by the Board of Trade in England 
were subject to important limitations. Stawell, C.J., held that the 
Imperial Acts did not confer extra-territorial jurisdiction on the local 
tribunal and that the 1865 statute (Vic.) did not attempt to confer' 
such jurisdiction. Otherwise it would have been in violation of the 
powers conferred on the constitution of the colony. Really, this 
approach served to save the statute fi'Om being declared ultra vires. 
It \Alas further held that the local statute only applied to locally-
issued certificates. 
The confinement of the jurisdiction of a local tribunal to 
cases which arosCJ in the waters of a colonial territory was found to 
give rise to grave inconvenience. In the English Hansard for 1882 { 7 
25. (1881) 7 V.L.R., pp. 255-257. 
26. Ibid., p. 265. 
27. P.D., vol. 272 (3rd. ser.), col. l1l6. 
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the above decision was reportc-3d as the primarv cause of the new 
legislation. The Merchant Shipping (Colonial Inquiries) Act 1882 
(Imp.f8 was passed to empmver colonial tribunals to hold inquiries 
into charges of incompetfmce or misconduct and :Jhipplng casualties 
in certain cases occurring outside the limits of the colony. This sit-
uation furnishes a classic GX4:1ri;pie of a narrow Impmial policy being 
extended· to promote safety in navigation for the benefit of the 
Empire. 
,'\nother development involving a further relaxing of the policv 
is found in section 478 (1) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.). 
Under this provision, the "legislative authority in any British poss-
ession" is !empowered to invest a colonial tribunal with extra-territ-
orial jurisdiction in respect of shipwrecks or other casualties 
occurring abroad.29 
3. Procedure 
lt is not uncommon to find colonial legi~:1lation IAihich differed 
from the Imperial Act with respect to proCEJdural matters. Unless 
there were departures in important matters, e rules o I' sailing or 
safety, courts would generally be reluctant to curtail OI' strike down 
the local legislation. In the ship, s.s. Brighton, 
under the charge of Setterfield, collided with the ship, s.s. Brunner. 
Based on the investigation held, the Court of Madne Inquiry found 
that the collision was due to the failure of the masters of the two 
ships to observe the colHsion regulations closely. rhero was further 
default on the part of Setterfield in that he failed to keep a proper 
lookout. As the ship's mate, he and the captain of the other ship 
were asked "to show cause why their CEH'tificates should not be 
suspended." Setterfield's certificate was ordered to be suspended 
for twelve months. He applied to the Full Court for a prohibition to 
restrain the Marine Court of Inquiry from acting on the suspension 
order. To support the contention that the Marine Court of Inquiry 
28. l15 & 46 Vic., c. 76. 
29. ~}ee The King v. Turner; Ex parte the Marine f3oard of 
Hobart (1927) 39 C.L.R. 411, p. 430, fllil' Isaacs. 
30. (1900) 17 W.N. 174. 
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had no suct1 authoritv, two grounds were ad\lanced. Firstl\f, bv sec-
tion 10 of the Navigation U\mendment) ;;ct 1899 (N.S.W.) 31 the Marine 
Court of lnquirv should exercise the power of suspending certific-
ates in the same manner as a court carrving out a similar inquirv in 
England. Secondly, by section 470 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
1894 Act (Imp.) it could not suspend a certificate "unless a copy of 
the report or a statement of the had been served on the 
applicant. The application \Mas not granted on the ground that the 
1899 Act (N.S.W.) neither provided for anv tribunal to hold a prelim-
inarv inquirv nor required anv report or statement of the case to 
be made to the applicant. The point of importance for' our purpose 
that the three judges unanimously upheld the validity of the 1899 
Act (N.S.lJ.J.) and the suspension order made thereunder. It is submitted 
that colonial enactments, though not similar to Imperial legislation, 
would seldom be impugned as invalid if in the light of the local con-
ditions the differences were considered necessarv. In a limited 
sense, the decision sought to reduce. the Imperial restraint. It 
appears that the jurisdiction of the colonial legislatures was not 
confined to cases involving locally-issued certificates where the 
collisions occurred within their territorial 1.\laters. 
4. Collision Regulations 
As a politic principle, tho Imperial Parliament had never con-
templated allowing colonial legislatures to interfere with the basic 
rules of sailing and navigation. The reasons were well stated bv 
Windeyerl J., in Australaslan Steam Navigation Co. \1. Smith and 
Others. He said:32 
"The safety of England's vast mercantile marine and of 
the lives of thousands largely depr.mds upon the exist-
ence of a universal code of rules of uncontradicted and 
undoubted authority over everv British subjc-:!ct that sails 
the seas." 
Near Newcastle, the Birksgate, a ~:;teamer belonging to the plaintiffs, 
collided with the Barrabool, a str.:!amer belonging to the defendants. 
Both vessels were seriously damaged. Evidence showed that at the 
time of the collision, which occurred at midnight, the Birksgate was 
31. No. 32 of 1899. 
32. fhe Australasian Steam Navigatio~. v. Smith and 
Other's (1885-6) 7 N.S.lll.R. 207, p. 237. 
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on the wrong side of the harbour. Section 120 of the Navigation Act 
33 
1871 (N.S.W.) enacted the starboard rule, and imposed a penalty "not 
exceeding £5" on the master for non-compliance. Section 98 read: 
"If in any case of collision it appears to the Court before 
whom the case is tried, that such collision was occasioned 
by the non-observance of any regulation made by or in 
pursuance of this Act, the ship by which such regulation 
has been infringed shall be deemed to be in fault unless 
II 
The section was identical in its terms with section 29 of the Merchant 
Shipping Amendment Act 1862 (1mp.f.4 which was repealed by section 
35 
33 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1873 (Imp.). Section 17 of the 
latter Act provided: 
"If in any case of collision it is proved to the Court before 
which the case is tried that any of the regulations for 
preventing collision contained in or made under Mercllont 
Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1873, has been infringed, the ship by 
which such regulation has been infringed shall be deemed 
to be at fault, unless .... " 
The major issue before the court was wh~3ther thr~ provisions of the 
local Act or those of the Imperial Acts would apply to the case. By 
section 291 of the IVJerchant Shipping Act 1854 (Imp.), Part IV of the 
/\ct was applicable to British ships throughout the world. Section 
2 of the Merchant .Shipping Act 1873 (Imp.) provided that this Act 
was to be construed as one with the 1854 Act (Imp.). Effect was given 
to section 2 of the Colonial Laws Validity /\ct 1865 (Imp.). The Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that, in so far 
as there was any repugnancy, sections 98 and 120 of the 1871 Act 
(N.S.IJ.J.) were to be read subject to section 17 of the Imperial Act. 
Windeyer, J ., said: 36 
"Just as it is impossible to suppose that the Imperial 
Legislature ever contemplatc~d allowing a colonial LE:!gis-
lature power to establish regulations for the safety of 
life and property conflicting with the Imperial regulations, 
33. 35 Vic. No. 7. 
34. 25 & 26 Vic. c. 63. 
35. 36 & 37 Vic., c. 85. 
36. (1885-6) 7 N.S.W.R., p. 239. 
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r-iD it is impossible to suppose that the Imperial Legislat-
ures would allow the authoritative and coerch1e power of 
its regulations of universal application to bB affected by 
colonial legislation imposing different responsibilities upon 
persons offending against them." 
Tho judgment of Windeyer, J.lalso highlighted the paramountcy of 
Imperial laws. Ltlhere a colonial Act was merely a re-enactment of an 
Imperial statute, the local judge trying the casr~ would be administer-
ing Imperial and colonial laws. What was the effect of those regula-
tions enacted under a colonial Act, which was in identical terms 
\1\}ith an Imperial Act, in their application to the vessels and mariners 
within the scope of tho Imperial statute? l\pparently such colonial 
regulations would declare that the colonial legislatures had expressly 
recognized them. The object was to bring them prominently to the 
notice of local shipowners and mariners. But if the Imperial statute 
did not extend to them, they would then become subject to the local 
enactment.37 
The reasoning in the abmJe decision was followed three 
decades later in Coal' Cliff Collieries Ltd. v. The Saros; Hazelwood 
Steamship Co. Ltd. v. The Saros. 38 Two vessels, namely, the 
and the Saros, \Mere involved in a collision at Sydney Heads. One of 
the questions raised was whether the Herga was at fault in respect 
of any act or omission on her part prior to the collision. It was 
found that the Herga, as the overtaken vessel, had committed a 
breach of the collision regulations in not keeping her course. Sec-
tion 117 of the Navigation Act 1901 (N.S.l.tL)39 corresponded to section 
98 of the old Navigation Act 1871 (N.S.W.). Subject to the proviso, 
section 117 provided that where a collision was occasioned the 
non-observance of the collision regulation, the ship guilty of such 
breacll would be deemed to be at fault. On the other hand, .if 
section '{19 (4) of the Imperial Merchant Shipping Act 1894 applied, 
vance of the regulations \.vould arise. The court lmld that section 
l,19 (L•) continued to apply to Nf.:?IJ\1 South Wales. Firstly, the Maritime 
37. ' p. 238. 
38. (191 33 W.N. (N.S.W.) 3. 
39. No. 6(J of 1901. 
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Conventions Act 1911 (U.K.),40 whictl repealed section Lt19 (4) dic1 not 
extend to the Australian State. Secondly, although section 263 of 
the Navigation Act 1912 (Comth.) nullified the statutory presumption 
of fault, which would otherwise arise under the Imperial Act, it 
was not in force. No proclamation had been issued, as required by 
section I of the Navigation Act 1912 (Comth.), to bring it into opera-
tion. Street) J., felt bound to follow the decision in Australasian Steam 
Navigation Co. v. Smith and Others41 and also applied section 2 of 
the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Irnp.). Accordingly, section 117 
of the Navigation Act 1901 (N.S.!.ll.) was read subject to section 419 
(4) of the Imperial Act. Tl1e result was that the t<\las held lia-
ble. Since it was not established that her change of course could 
not possibly have contributed to the accident, the proviso to sec-
tion 419 (!~) could not be raised in defence. 
The above approach was the result of the narrow construction 
put by the courts on the powers of the colonial legislatures con-
ferred by the Imperial legislation. tllindeyer, J ., stated the Imperial 
strategy as follows: 42 
"rhe Merchant Shipping Act of 1854. by section 547 ... is not 
an authority to alter as far as colonial resJistered ships 
are concerned any of the provisions of the Act, but only 
to alter the provisions of the ,'\ct which relate to ships 
registered in such possession. The provisions of the r'\ct 
relating to ships registered in the colony are those made 
applicable specially to ships I'E-Jgistered in any British 
possession by the last part of section 109 of the Act, 
which, taken in conjunction with section 288 of the Act, 
clearly shows that the Imperial Legislature onlv contem-
plated a colonial legislature dealing with the provisions 
of the Act contained in part 3, which is concerned exclu-
sively with the hiring and employment of masters and 
seamen." 
5. lllider Powers 
Section 51~7 of the 1854 Act (Irnp.) was, with rninor modification, 
40. 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 57, s. 4 (1). 
41. (1885-6) 7 1\I.S.W.f~. 207, §Upra. 
1~2. Ibid., p. 236. 
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re-enacted as section 735 (1) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.). 
The narrow view continued to persist for almost twenty-six years 
after the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia! In .l:l.Y.!lli:l.. 
v. Palmer~3 three of the five High Court .Judges~4 probably for the 
first time, gave section 735 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 a 
much wider scope. This historic decision a bold judicial move to 
free the Commonwealth from some of the Imperial restraints of the 
past. The effect of the decision is that, by section 735, the legis-
lature of a British possession may, in measure, alter or 
Ghe provisions of the 1894 Act, including regulations made 
under,45 relating to ships registered in possession. As the 
Commonwealth was at that date regarded as a British possession, 46 
the powers exercisable under section 735 would apply throughout 
Australia and to registered in each of the States. The wide 
interpretation given to the section is much in the favour of the 
States as well. the decision, the Legislatures of the 
which are also regarded as British possessions. 47 have enjoyed 
freedom and confidence in initiating legislation to promote their 
shipping trade. 
Owing to the binding authmity of the High Court decision, 
State Supreme Courts are bound to uphold the validity nf local leg-
islation more extensively than before. This approach has been 
43. (1926) 38 C.L.R. 441. 
44. They are 1'\nox, C . .J., ibid. p. 449; Isaacs J., p. 452; and 
Starke J., p. 462. 
45. Ibid., p. 462, where Starke J. referred to the collision 
regulations enacted under s. 418 of the 1894 Act (Imp.). 
46. The Imperial Interpretation Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vic., c. 63) s. 
18 (2) defines "British possession" to "mean any part of Her 
Majesty's dominions ... and where of such dominions· 
are under both a central and local legislature, all parts 
under the central legislature .... " The Australian States, 
the Northern Territory and the A.C. T. are deemed to con-
stitute a single British possession to which ss. 735 and 736 
of the 1894 Act (Imp.) applied. In J_ohn Sharp & Sons Ltd. 
v. The Katherine Mackall (1924) 34 C.L.R. 420, the Common-
wealth has been held as a British possession within the two 
sections. 
l1l. See McKelvev v. Meagher (1906) 4 C.L.R. 265, pp. 285 and 
286; and also _McArthur v. lililliarns (1936) 55 C.L.R. 324, p. 342. 
ln.J1 v. Commissioner for Transport; Ex parte Cobb & Co. 
Ltd. [1963] Qd. R. 5l1l, the Full Court having considered the 
Interpmtation Act 1889 (Irnp.) held that Queensland is a 
British possession within the terms of s. 736. 
102 
highlighted by the reasonin~J of the threE judges of the Full Court 
of the Suprt.=)rne Court of New South l!Jales in Butler and .i\nother v. 
The Ship. 1+8 The "Palmers ton", belonginq to the plaintiffs, and the 
"Millimurnul", belonginq to the defendants, were involved in a collision 
off the coast of New South lJJales. It \Alas alleged that the misleading 
display of the trawling lights by the "Palmerston" had caused the 
collision. Maxwell, A.J., held that the "Millimumul" was alone to blame 
as the collision was due to her fault. The defendants appealed 
arJainst the decision, alleging that both vessels were to blame. Two 
of the grounds raised were as follows. Firstly, both were "coast-
trade vessels" within the meaning of the State Navigation Act 1901 
(N.S.W.). Secondly, the presumption of liability set out in section 
1+19 (lf) of the 1894 Act (Imp.) applied. As a result of the views 
expressed by the judges of the High Court in Hurne v. Palmer, 49 
the three Judges'
1 
of the Full Court rightly considered the decisions 
f W. d -J 50 d St t -.5J,_ h ·. l d 52 A t~-o meyer,,., an . ree ,.J,,,,o ave been overru e. s 11e 
Navigation Act 1901 (N.S.W.) had received the Royal approval, as 
required, it 1..vas held to be a valid E-Jxercise of the power of repeal 
or alteration conferred by section 735. The 1901 Act (N.S.lil.) there-
fan} applied to all locally-registered ships. The appellants could 
not rely on the repealed section 1+19 (4) of the 1894 i\ct (Imp.) as 
being in for'ce with regard to New South Wales ships. Section 117 of 
the 1901 Act (N.S.W.) was construed as it stood. As there was no 
evidence that the collisiDn had been occasionE~d by failure of the 
"Palmerston'' to observe the regulations made under the 1901 Act 
(N.S.W.), the appeal failed. 
lf8. (1930) 47 W.N. (N.S.W.) 66. 
L,9. (1926) 38 LL.F~. 441, ==· 
50. Australasian Steam Navigation Co. v. Smith and Othurs 
(1885-6) 7 N.S.W.R. 207, supra. 
51. Coal Cliff Collieries Ltd. \1. The Saros; Hazelwood Stearnshie 
Co. Ltd. \1. The Saros (1915) 33 tJJ.N. (N.S.W.) 3. 
52. /\ccordin~:Jly, both the above Supreme Court of 1\lmv South 
Wales decisions were not follDwecl in Butler anri Another v. 
(1930) 47 W.N. (N.S.W.) 66, ~· 
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The High Court decision in Hume v. Palmer53 represents a land-
mark in the development of Australian maritime law. Its significance 
lies in the po5ition of the tligh Court of /\ustralia which, for all 
practical purpmms, is the final Court of Appeal. 54 
III. COASTING TRADE 
1. Meaning (5 
Section 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act 18% (Imp.)J confers 
powers on the legislatun:;s of British possessions to regulate coast-
ing trade. The section is the authority on which the bulk of the 
present-day State enactments cJepend for their valicli ty. Unfortun-
ately, the expression "coasting trade" is not defined in any of the 
Imperial merchant shipping legislation. Dr. Lushington was credited 
with giving a logical explanation of what is not coasting trade. In 
The Agricola?6 the ship returned from Calcutta to London and dis-
charged all her cargo there. The ship then proceeded from London 
to Liverpool in ballast. It wa~• held that the ship, while prosecuting 
the voyage from London to Liverpool. was not employed on a coasting 
voyage. The reason was that, in the ordinary course of her trade, 
she was engaged in trading from Rio Janeiro and Calcutta to London 
57 h' d' '1 d . and Liverpool. In The Lloyds, the s 1p was or man y engage m 
foreign trade. At the time in question, in the course of a voyage, 
she carried a cargo from Liverpool to London. Because the ship was 
ordinarily engaged in foreign trade, it was held that the ship was 
not employed in coasting trade. The two decisions and the principle 
53. (1926) 38 C.L.R. 1441. 
54. In Kirmani v. Captain Cook Cruises FJty. Ltd.; Green, Third 
Party (No. 2) (1985) 59 A.L.J. 480, the Hi~Jh Court unanimously 
refused to grant an application under s. ll1 of the Common-
wealth Constitution for a certificate to appeal to the 
Privy CounciL 
55. It re-enacts the provision first introduced by the Merchant 
Shippinf:j (Colonial) Act 1869 (Imp.), (32 & 33 Vic. c. 11), s. l~, 
56. (1843) 2 Wrn. Rob. 10. The words "coasting trade'' in the 
Imperial legislation wero construed in this and other casBs 
for the purpose of determining whether the ship concerned 
would be exempted from pilotage. See also Davidson v. 
Mekiben (1821) 3 B. & A. 112. 
l_;7. (1863) 32 L.J. P & A. 197. Dr. Lushington dBlivered the 
jud~]rnent based on the principle lle hacJ formulated in The 
Agricola. Lord Alverstone, C.J., appliBd trm same principle 
in Phillips (app.) v. (resp.) (1906) 93 L.T. 63£~, 
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laid down by Dr. Lushington were consistently followed in The Wine-
59 
stead. 58 Bruce,J.,explained: 
"I think that the wDrds 'ships employed in the coasting 
trade' ... means employed for the time, at least, only in 
the coasting trade, and not in foreign trade." 
To come within the expression, a ship must principally or habitually 
and r·egularly be engaged in the coasting trade of the United 1-\ingdom. 
The meaning given by English judges must be applied in con-
struing the words "coasting trade of that British possession" in sec-
tion 736. According to case authorities and statute law, the term 
"British possession" includes an Australian State and also the Common-
wealth before she became a Dominion in 1942.60 The Parliament of 
the Commonwealth, while as a British possession and subject to the 
conditions laid down in section 736, was empowered to enact legis-
lation to regulate coastin~J trade. Since the Commonwealth embraces 
the State of Tasmania and a number of islands separated bv sea, the 
legislation she was competent to pass would extend to inter-State 
trade throughout Australia. In the case of a State, however, her 
seaward boundary is formed by thE! low-water mark. It is submitted 
that in respect of a State her coasting trade will involve maritime 
commer'Ce and carriage of goods ln extraterritorial waters. 61 It 
58. [1895] P. 170. 
59 . .1Qi.Q.., pp. 173-174. The WirmstearJ IAJas held not to be 
exempted from the compulsory employment of the pilot. This 
was consequent upon the finding that she was not employed 
in the coasting trade; see i'1el'chant Shipping f-\ct 1854 (Imp.), 
ss. 376 and 379. 
60. See para. 11 of the Schedul[! to the ~3tatute of Westminster 
Adoption Act 1942 (Comth.); the Interpretation Act 1889 
(U.K.),(52 & 53 Vic., c. 63), s. 18 (2). John Sharp & Sons Ltd. 
v. The Katherine 1"1ackall (1924) 34 C.L.R. 1+20, supra, where 
Australia 1rt1as helli to be a British possession. The inter-
pretation has been approved in Mcilwraith McEacharn Ltd. 
v. The Shell Cornpan~ of Australia (1945) 70 C.L.R. 175, p. 192, 
[:Je[ Latham, C::.J. 
51, R.O. Lumb, The Constit.utions of the Australian ~1tates (l+th 
ed. 197fi), g_p. cit., p. 83, footnote 1l1: "Moreover the 
Imperial Parliament can confer power of an extraterritorial 
nature. It has in fact done so with regmd to coasting 
trade in the Merchant Shippinq /\ct (1894)." See also B.A. 
Helmore "Validity of State Navigation Act~" (1953) 27 A.L. 
J., p. 17. 
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appears that a ship could tJfc~ engaged in the coa::iting tr·ade of a 
State, or of Australia, if she habitually and regularly pliE~d between 
the ports of a Statt-J, or bet\Aiet-Jn thr~ ports of Australia, repectivel\,t. 
There is no reason to hold that State leqislation will be rendered 
inapplicable to a "coastin~l trade" ship of a State simply because she 
occasionally traverses part of the course ordinarily used by foreign-
going or inter-State ships. 62 
The above rea~mning is borne out irl a general way by the 
decision in China Ocean Shipping Co. and Others v. _State of South 
Australia.G3 A port in~1tallation irl South Australia was darnsged by 
a ship. Under section 12Lf (1) of' the Habors Act 1936-1974 (S.A.), 
absolute liability was imposed on the shipowner and the agent. One 
of the issues raised was wtlt-Jther the Harbors Act (S.A.) was rendered 
invalid by section 736 of the '18% Act (Imp.). The High Court upheld 
the validity of the Harbors Act (S.A.). f-3arwick, C.J., went one step 
further. He held that the Hmbors Act (S.A.) did not "relate to the 
coasting trade of South f-\ustralia." 64 It provide!:> some authority 
for the view that State lr'!gislation dealing with pm'ts, harbours and 
navigation on State rivers i5 not concf'.;rned wi U1 coasting trade. 
Such legislation is therefme outside the scope of section 736. 
The term "coasting trade" i~3 used in a somewhat broad sense 
in the Navigation Act 1912-1973 (Cornth.). 65 section 7 (1) reads: 
"A ship will be rJeerned to be engaged in the coasting trade, 
within the meaning of this /\ct, if she takes on board 
passengers or cargo at any port in a State, or a Territ-
tory, to be carried to ... or delivered at, anv other port 
in the same State or Territory or in any other State or 
other such Teri'itorv .... '' 
62. That a State legislature ha~3 such powers is decided in 
The King \/. Turner; Ex parte Marine Board of Hobart 
(1927) 39 C.L.R. 412; NPwcastle and Hunter RivRr Steamship 
Co. v. Attornmt-l;eneral for the Commonwealth (1921) 29 
C.L.R. 357, infra. 
63. (1979-80) 27 A.L.R. 1. 
64. Ibid., p. 11. 
65. The purpose of this wide definition is related to the fed-
eral ~1ystem of licensing of coastal trade ships; see s. 
288 (1). 
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The provision appears to cm1er both types of coasting trade-namel',h 
intra-State and inter-State. The le:1tter is within the powers of the 
Commonwealth Parliament, while the former comes within the province 
of a State Parliament. 66 As will be seen shortly, the overlap of State 
and Commonwealth legislative powers is a perpetual source of con-
flict between State and Commonwealth legislation. Moreover, it is 
not easy for judges to draw a clear line of demarcation betwe£m 
State and Commonwealth coasting trade. 
2. Conformity to Conditions 
The special conditions to be met by State legislatures under 
section 736 of the 1894 Act (Imp.) have been noted. Moreover, the 
Colonial ;-\cts Confirmation Act 1894 (Imp.) did not extend to colonial 
enactments passed after 20th February, 1894. l 
Non-compliance witr1 those conditions can give rise to conse-
quences far more devastating than they were orisJinally supposed. 
In ...B.. v. Commissioner for Transport; Ex parte Cobb & Co. Ltd., 67 the 
prosecutors (i.e. Cobb & Co. Ltd.) had obtained ordees nisi against 
the Commissioner for Transport. He was required to show cause why 
writs of prohibition should not be issued to restrain him from giving 
effect to section 43 of the 5tate Transport /\ct 1960 ([Jld.).68 That 
section provided for the cancellation and suspension of permits 
concerning vehicles on roads. Undc?r different parts the Act dealt 
with road services, water transport and air transport. Tile prose-
cutors contended that the /\ct was invalid on two grounds. Firstly, 
contrary to the requirement of section 736 of the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1894 (Imp.), the 1960 Act (Qld.) contained no suspt:mliing clause. 
Secondly, Her Maj hod not publicly sinnified her pleasure there-
on. Full Court of Lhe Supreme Court of Queensland accepted 
the arguments. Part VIII of the Act (Qlli.) dealing with the coasting 
66. A full discussion of the relevant sections of the Common-
wealth of Australia Constitution Act '1900 (Imp.) and ttm 
case authorities will follow in due course. 
67. [1963] Qd. R. 547. 
68. 9 Eliz. II No. 48. 
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trade of GlueenslamJ was not serverable from the rest of the Act. 
The whole Act was held to be inoperative and im10lid. Thus the pro-
secutors were entitled to the relief they claimed. Soon after the 
High Court of l·\ustralia had granted special leave to appeal against 
the decision, the Transport La1111S Validation Act 1962 (Qld.) 69 was 
passed. In short, it has a twofold objective. It carves out and 
includes in the Schedule the provisions dealing ~;11ith matters of road 
and air transport. The 11excepted sections", which concern water 
transport or "coasting trade!! within ~'>ection 736 of the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) are placed in the third column of the Sched-
ule. The Transport Laws Validation Act 1962 (Qld.) expressly valid-
ates the first category rendering them operative with retrospectiv-' 
ity. The High Court rescinded the special leave to appeal. In deliv-
ering the judgment of a strong Court, Dixon, C.J., said (inter alia)/0 
"[T)hat Act [i.e. the Transport Laws Validation Act 1962] 
validates theAct [i.e. State Transport Act 1960] which 
the Supreme Court had thought was invalid, by reason 
of certain sections, and in tt1at \laUdation those sec-
tions are excepted. There can no doubt that the 
validation was complete, is retrospecth/8, and ... operates 
upon the rights of the parties in the present cas£::." 
Another consequence of invalidity due to non-compliance is high-
lighted in the Privy Council case of Western Transport Ptv. Ltd. v. 
Kropp,71 Two transport companies (W.T. and M.T.) were tile appellants 
in the actions brought against the Queensland State Government 
(Q.S.G.). W.T. had over a period of about three years paid Q.S.G. <3 
total of £449,238 6s. 1 Od. '1 in respect of a licence and a goods permit. 
M. T. had also paid Q.S.G. the sum of £138,579 14s. 6d. for a similar 
licence. The licencr~s were issued under the ~~~~~~~~~~ 
ies Acts, 1946 72to 1959 (Qld.), which were amended and consolidated bv 
the State Transport Act 1960 (Qld.). The goods permit was issued under 
the State Transport Act 1960 (Qld.). The~ State Transport Facilities Acts 
~ , 
69. 11 Eliz. II No. 24. 
70. Kropp v. Cobb & Co. Ltd. (1962) 36 A.L.J.F~ .• p. 205. This 
view was approved by the Privy Council in Western Trans-
port Pty. Ltd. v. Kropp (1961~) 38 A.L.J.R. 237, p. 241. 
71. (1964) 38 A.L.J.R. 237. 
72. 11 Geo. VI No. 17. 
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191-.6 to 1959 (Qlcl.), provided for the regulation and control of the 
carriage of goods within the State "by road, by air, and by water." 
We have seen the Statr:J /\ct 1960 (Qld.) ~ in different parts, 
dealt with transport by road, water and air. W. T. and M. T. were road 
transport contractors. They claimed that thev had, involuntarily 
and under compulsion, paid the two sums of rnonev to Q.S.G. Their 
claims were for the recovery of the monev. They alleged that the 
State Transport Facilities Acts, 191+6 to 1959 (Qld.),and the 
Transport Act 1960 (Qld.) were invalid. The basis of their claims was 
founded upon an examination of parts of the Acts not concerned 
with road transport but with water transport. They contended that 
those parts of the Acts relating to water transport were invalid 
because of non-compliance with section 736 of the Merchant Shippin~ 
6f.1. 1894 (Imp.). Thus the defect brought about the result that the 
whole of the provisions of the Acts, including the pro\/isions on road 
carriage, were invalid! Because of the Transport Lm'lls Validity Act 
1962 (Qld.) which - as we ha\/e seen - was given retrospective 
effect, the Privv Council disrnis!:>ed the appeals brought by W. T. and 
M.T. 
The last two cases illustrate the prohibitive nature of the 
conditions imposed by section 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act 189lf 
(Imp.) on Australian State Parliaments. One obvious proposition rnay 
be drawn from the judgments. Unless the requirements of section 
736 are met, no State Parliament competent to enact laws relating 
to marine transport in any form if it comes within the scope of 
coasting trade. It is immaterial whether the provisions in question 
take up tt1e entire Act or are included among the sections which 
deal with non-shipping matters. Short of rneetinsJ the requirements, 
validation legislation, howe\Jer widely-worded, does not alter the 
status of in\Jalid provisions on coastin~J trade?3 Moreover, it is 
clear that a State Act on coasting trade, IAJhich contains the 
73. It should lJe noted that the rransport I aws Validity Act 
1962 ([Jld.) only operated to validate legislation IAiith respect 
to road, rail and air transport. The provisions concerning 
water or marine transport wert-! outside its scope. 
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''suspending clause", can only be validly amended by an Act contain-
ing a similar clause. What .is the position if an Act containing the 
suspending clause is passed to amend a principal Act wl1ich does not 
have the clause? It is doubtful whether a principal Act, as amended, 
will operate with retrospective effect even though such intention 
is expressly stated in the amending Act.74 
3. An Analysis of the Status of Stat£:! Legislation 
So far we have dealt with the meaning of coastin~J trade in 
terms of geographical limits and the scope of the vo\jages under-
taken. Coasting trade includes the carriage of goods b\j sea, the 
management of ships, the seaworthiness requirements, the manning 
of ships b\l sufficient qualified personnel and also navigation, e.q. 
observance of collision regulations and safety measures. It is sub-
mitted that each State Parliament competent to pass legislation 
to regulate shipping and na\tigation solely within its territorial 
waters. 75 
ll.le shall consider the validit\} of a number of State ,1\cts, 
"''1hich, inter deal with coasting trade. It immaterial whether 
such trade is carried on between ports in the same State or in differ-
ent States. 
New South Wales. The Navigation Act 1901 (N.S.W.) 76 is the current 
principal Act. B\J Section 3, a "coast trade" ship is defined as a 
registered British ship enga~]ed in trading or going between tiAIO 
ports within the jurisdiction of New South Wales. The expression 
includes a registered steam tug. 
It has tJeen seen that, in Butler and Another v. The Ship, 77 
74. It is a pertinent question IAihether the wording of s. 736 
1.~ill empowel' the legislatures of British possessions to 
mnder operatiVEl, with retrospective effect, enactments 
which initially failed to satisf\j the conditions laid dm-Jn. 
75. Examples are State enactments regulating shipping trade 
and navigation in harbours, ports, rivers and canals within 
State jurisdiction. 
76. No. 60 of 1901. 
77. (1930) 47 W.N. (N.S.ul.) 66. 
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the Court of the Supr[CJme Court of New South lllales unanimouslv 
upheld the validity of the Navigation Act 1901. For the purpose of 
section 735 of the 1894 Act (Imp.), the Act (N.S.llJ.) was held to be a 
valid exercise of the power of repeal or alteration of Impel'ial 
legislation. The decision should, however, be confined to the facts 
of the case _78 
Though the areas covered bv sections 735 and 736 of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 189/t (Irnp.) rnav overlap in some wav, the two 
sections deal with different aspects of shipping. The conditions 
laid down for the exercise of the powers conferred also differ. 
Meeting the conditions for the purpose of section 735 does not 
empower the State Parliament to enact laws to regulate coasting 
trade for the purpose of section 736. With just two exceptions, 79 
all the other amending Acts of New South Wales contain no suspend-
ing clause. Such Acts which have received the Royal apprm/81 are 
effective under section 735 in changing the Imperial law. But thev 
are incapable of validating those provisions of the 1901 Act (N.S.W.) 
which applv to coasting trade. The Navigation (Amendment) Act 1908 
(N.S.W.) is the only Act with the suspending clause. It provides that 
sections 5 to 10 ''should not come into operation until her Majesty's 
78. There are a number of reported cases where persons 
affected bv colonial or state legislation had not chall-
enged its \!aliditv. In Bruer:~ v. Moore, Ex parte Moore 
(1911) St. R. Qd. 57, A'~; conviction of an offence under 
a certain regulation enacted under the Navigation Act 
1876 (Qld.) (41 Vic. No. 3) was quashed. There was no 
evidence that the services of a licensed pilot were avail-
able. In H. Smith Industries Ltd. v. Melbourne Harbour 
Trust Commissioners [1970] V.R. 406, it was held that by 
the Marine Act 1958 (No. 6302) (Vic.), s. 132 a tug going 
astern without giving a signal was deemed to be at fault. 
In re Medley (1902) 28 V.L.R. 475, on appeal to the Full 
Court of the Supreme Court, the conviction of the master 
for breach of the Marine Act 1890 (Sl, Vic. No. 1165) (Vic.), 
s. 1 B3 1111as quashed. The reason was that the particular 
offence charged was not statF!d. 
79. The Navigation (Amendment) Act 1908 (N.S.W.), and the 
Commercial Vessels Act (1\I.S.lJJ.) (No. '""1 of 1979), s. 16 of whd1 
amends C8rtain provisions of the 1\Javlgation Act 19fJ1 (I\J.S.l1L). 
1 1 1 
pleasure thereon has been publicly sh:Jnified .... " It is submittod that, 
t!xcept those provisions IAJhich rnay be~ validated undm' section 135, the re-
maining provisions of the 1901 Act (1\J.S.Ltl.) on coa~:;tir19 trade are invceJlid. 
The Commercial Ves~mls Act 1979 (N.S.uLf 1 not only contains 
the suspending clause, but \Alas also reser\/ed for and given the Royal 
approval. It is therofore a valid exercise bv thE: State Parliament 
of the poiAiers conferrecJ by both sections 735 and 736. 
C~ueenslami, The Navigation Act 1876 (Qld.)BZ ~vas reserved for 
Her r-'lajestv's Assent which was proclaimed on 20th Julv, 1877. Despite 
any non-compliance with section 547 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
1 SC)4 (lrnp.), the Queensland Act would be rendered operative LJy rea-
son of the Imperial Colonial /\cts Confirmation Act~" 1891.~3 The Nav-
igation /\cts, 1876 to 1930 ([~ld.), were amended by the Na\.ligstion 
/\menrJment Act 1939 (Qld.)~ 11 tile apply the unanimous decisirm of the 
Full Court of the Supreme Court of 1\Jew South Wales in Butler and 
Anothr~r v. The Sr1ip. 85 /\ccordinqly, it is submitteo Ltlat, since the 
Royal approval had been granted in each cCJse, the amendinsJ Acts 
IAJere operative under section 735 of tl1e Merchant Shipping Act 1894 
(Imp.). 
The consolidating enactment cur-rently in force is the Queens-
land Marim~ Act 1958?6 This principal Act and the Queensland l\.1m'ine 
Act Amendment Acts of 1963~7 1967~8 197;;B,9 1975 90and 197991 contain 
80. Similarly, the Sea-Carriage of Goods (Stato) 1~c~t~ (i\lo. 'lO 
of 1921) (N.S.LLl.) would be invalid in relation to coasting 
trade. 
81. No. 41 of 1979. 
B2. 41 Vic. No. 3. 
83. 56 & 57 .. c. 72, supra. 
134. 3 CJeo. VI 1\Jo. 26. 
85. (1930) 1,7 l1J.f\J. (N.S.W.) 66. 
86. 7 Eliz. I1 1\Jo. 37. 
87. No. of 1963. 
88. 1\io. 1 of 1967. 
B9. No. of 1972. 
90. No. 48 of 1975. 
91. No. 9 of 1979. 
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the suspending clause and wore given F<oyal appmval. There is 
no doubt as regards their validity under section 735 and 736 of the 
Imperial Act. 
Queensland is one of the three States that have their own 
legislation regulating the transport of goods by water. Section 3 
of the Sea-Carriage of GoorJs (State) Act 193092 provides that the 
rules scheduled to the Act shall apply to "the carriage of goods by 
sea in ships carrying goods from any port in the State of Queensland 
to any other port in the said State." However, the absence of the 
suspending clause, as required by sectioh 736, will render the Act 
invalid in its application to coasting trade. 
Victoria. The current principal enactment is the Marine Act 
19SB ?3 1 It consolidates the law relating to passengers, harbours and 
navigation. Virtually all the Victorian enactments/including the 
amending Acts,suffer the common defect of non-compliance 94with the 
requirements of s~)ctions. 735 and 736. Apart fr·om the absence of the 
suspending clause, and in place of the Royal assent, the proclamation 
of the Governor in Council is stated as the means of bringing the 
enactments into force. Some of the matters covered by the 1958 
Act (Vic.); which fall outside the scope of section 736, may neverthe-
less be within the competence of the Victorian Parliament. However, 
if those matters cannot be severed from the rest of the Act, the 
whole Act is void. This consequence is seen in the decision of the 
Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland in .!i v. Commissioner 
for Transport; Ex. parte Cobb & Co. Ltd.95 
South Australia. This State provides a classic example of close 
adherence to the Imperial legislative requirements. At the time when 
92. 21 Geo. \1 No. 18. 
93. No. 6302 of 1958. 
911. In each case s. 1 provides tt1at the Act or the provisions 
thereof will come into operation by proclamation of the 
Governor in Council published in Government Gazette. 
See Q.Jl. Acts, No. 8293 of 1972, No. 8723 of 1975 and No. 
9342 of 1979. 
95. [1963] Qd. R. 547. 
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the Merchant Shipeing Act 189~ (Imp.) \Alas enac:ted the principal Act 
in force t>\las the Marine Board and Navigation Act 1881 (S.A.).96 
amending Acts, 1906 97 and 192~ ~8 passed in the State after 18% 
contained the suspending clause and, having bf3en reserved. received 
the Royal assent t'llhich was proclaimed. Similarly, the Marine Art 
1936 (S.A.),99 the principal Act consolidating ttm law, and the :..:.;;;.;.;=:..:.::::.. 
1936-1975 (S.A.) incorporating the amendments, meet the require-
ments of sections 735 and 7 36. The Soutt1 Australian legislation along 
with Marine Act Amendment Act 1976 (S..t\) valid statute law. 
Western Australia. The Navigation Act 190~ (W.A.)~ including 
the amending Acts of 19073 and 1920,4 adopted a rather different form 
of wording to give effect to the enactments.\ They were stated to be 
enacted by "the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the 
advice and consent of the l,egislative Council and Legislative Assem-
bly of Western Australia .... " The date of presumably from 
His Majesty, was in case expressly stated. Following the dnc-
ision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales,5 
it is submitted that the Acts were an effective exercise of the 
96. 44 & ~5 Vic. No. 237. 
97. 6 Edw. VII No. 917. 
98. 15 Geo. V No. 1661. 
99. No. 2337 of 1936-7. 
1. No. 55 of 1976. S. 2 provides for the Act to come into 
operation on a day to be fixed by proclamation and also 
contains the suspending clause as requirod by s. 736 of 
the 1894 Act (Imp.). 
2. 4 Edw. VII No. 59. 
3. 7 Edw. VII No. 9.1 
4. 11 Geo. V No. 27. 
5. Butler and Anothor v. The ~)hip (1930) 47 !ll.N. (N.S.W.) 66. 
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power under section 735 of the 189i{ Act (Imp.). 
ThB _Western Australian l"1arine Act 19486 is the cunent prin-
cipal enactment. It retains the same form of wording as its pred-
ecessors. In addition, it contains the suspending clausB and mceived 
the Royal approval, which was proclaimed in the State. There is no 
doubt about the validity of this Act. Unfortunately the numerous 
amendments to the Act do not conform to the requirements of sec-
tions 735 and 736. Consequently, unless they can stand on their own, 
or the valid provisions are severable from the inoperative ones, 
they are totally invalid. The reason is that they are ultra \tires the 
powers of the State Parliament. Like Queensland and New South 
Wales, ttlis State chose to regulate by a separate Act the transport 
of goods by sea between ports within its territory. For non-confor-
mity to ttle requirements of section 736, ttle Soa-Carriage of Goods 
Act 1909 (W.A} will only be operative in relation to contracts of 
carriage within the ports and harbours of the State only. 
rasmania. The enactments passed during the twenty-five years 
after the 1894 Act (Imp.) related to marine boards, harbour trusts 
and a wide range of other shipping matters, including pilotage, which 
came wittlin their respective jurisdictions. !'-'lost of the provisions} 
together with those concerned with coasting trade,were later con-
solidated by the Marine Act 1921 (Tas.).8 Ttlis Act was assented to 
by the Governor, but had no suspending clause and was not reserved. 
Of the fourteen amendments to the Act passed between 1960 and 1974: 
only the Marine Act 1963 (Tas}D conformed to the requirements of 
section 735 anrJ 736. The Marine Act 1976 (Tas.)) 1 which is the 
6. 12 & 13 Geo. VI No. 72. 
7. 9 Eclw. VII No. 26. 
B. 12 Geo. V No. 60. 
9. For a list of such enactments, see Marine _Act 1976 (i\lo. 
18), Schedule V. 
10. No. 97 of 1963. 
11. No. 1!3 of 1976. 
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consolidating Act, deals, inter alia, with navi~Jation in Tasmanian 
waters and other related matters. The Act and all the amendments 
that follo\1)2 carry the suspending clause and also received the 
Royal assent. In an unprecedented move, the Act seeks to \Jalidate 
a list of fiFteen Acts which come within the scope of sections 735 
and 736 of the 1894 Act (Imp.). Section 197 reads: 
"Subject to this Act and in so far as it may be necessary 
to ensure the validity and operation of every f\ct set out 
in Schedule VI,. every such A.ct is validated as from its 
enactment and declared and dm!med to be and from such 
enactment to have been good and valid law subject only 
to any amendment or repeal I of any such Act by another 
Act (including this Act)." 
The fifteen Acts repealed in Schedule l are included in Sched-
ule VI. Section 197 clearly intemied to place beyond doubt 
the validity of the acts or functions purportedly carried out by the 
marine boards according to any of the Acts. 
4. Some Observations on the Scope of Sections 735 and 736 
The analysis shows that, to a large degree, the enactments 
of Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania have met the Imperial 
legislative stipulations. In the main, the enactments of Um other 
States suffer the defect of invalidity. There are tt.J\10 altL~rnative 
ways of dealing ~vith the embarrassing situation. A more tedious and 
painstaking approach fm· each of the States concerned to ident-
ify carefully all its legislation which deals with coasting trade or 
which falls within section 7.36. The State Parliament can then enact 
a \/alidation Act which conforms to the requirc-'!ments of the Imperial 
Act. Under the validation ,1\ct, the inoperative legislation is declar-
ed to be valid and effective, subject to any amendments made. 
Obviously, the more easy wav out is to Follow the example set by 
Tasmania] 3 To be effective, tt1e consoliclatinq Act should not only 
12. I.e. the Marine 1\ct (fas.) (No. 125 of 1977); MDrirm l\cts (Tas.) 
(I\Jo~1. llj and 38 of 1978); Marine Amendment l\ct (Tas.) (1\Jo. 36 
of '1980): Marine Amendm-ent t'-\ct (Tas.) (r\lo. H of 1981). 
13. If the purpose of the /\ct is to validate with retrospective 
effect certain legislation, it is questionable whether 
section 736 confers on State Parliament the power. See 
also the method used by South Australian Parliament in 
Marine Act Amendment Act (S.A.) (No. 62 of 1968), s. 4. 
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meet all the requirements of the Imperial Act but also contain the 
provisions of sections 2 (1) and 197, including an appropriate sched-
ule. 1t~ 
It clear that sections 735 and 736 have enabled Pach State 
to enact Its legislation which mav not necessarilv be in harmonv 
IAiith that of its neighbour. Where marked differences exist in the 
legislation of two or more adjacent States, the smooth flow of inter-
State coastal trade mav be seriouslv disrupted. The problems have 
long been recognized. Since 1971, the Department of Transport 
officers have been working 1-Vith State marine officials to produce 
a uniform code of shipping standards for commercial vessels.15 The 
object of the scheme could onlv be realized if the States indiv-
iduallv legislate to give statutorv effect to the code. However, it 
was felt that the proposed scheme could not be implemented unless 
the restrictions imposed bv the Imperial Parliament were removed by 
amending sections 735 and 736. Tl1e fears are well-founded if the 
proposed code deals with matters which fall outside the scope per-
mitted by those sections. One example is the implementation of 
shipping standards which differ from those laid down bv Imperial 
legislation. 
On the other hand, those two sections do not operate to pre-
clude a State Parliament from enacting harbour legislation. ln China 
Ocean Shipping Co. v. State of South Australia, 16 the question arose 
whether tt1e Harbors Act 1936 (S.A.) was repugnant to the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.). Sections 503 and 504 of the latter enable 
'14. See Ma!'ine Act (Tas.) (No. 18 of 1976). 
15. The project was undertaken by the Association of Australian 
Port and Marine Authorities. The understanding was that 
the Commonwealth and each of the States would give stat-
utorv effect to the code in respect of the vessels it con-
trols: Report on Australian Maritime Lngislation (June 1976), 
A.G.P.S., Canberra, p. 22. 
16. (1979-BQ)I27 A.L.R. 1. 
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a negligent party involved in a collision to apply to the court to 
limit his liability. Under the Harbors Act (S.A.), the liability of the 
owner and the agent of the ship is absolute, wr1ile the liability of 
the master based on his negligence. With respect to the scope of 
sections 735 and 736, Barwick, C.J., said: 17 
"The Harbors f\ct is neither a statute confirmed hv the 
Crown in Council nor did it relatr~ to coasting trade of 
South Australia. In any case, the Harbors Act does not 
purport to rep~~al, amend or in anv sense to supersede 
the provisions of Pt. VIII of the Act of 1891. or of that 
of 19DO .. Jn my opinion, the two statutes can stand to-
gether ... Claims founded on the provisions of the Harbors 
tvill be circumscribed by ss. 503 and 504 .... n 
Similarly, the Parliament of a State is competent to pass legislation 
to regulate shipping trade within its ports, canals and rivers. 
IV. CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE AND COMMONWEALTH LAWS 
1. Commonwealth Laws prior to adoption of Statute of 
Westminster 1931 (Imp.). 
It is necessary to trace the historical development of this 
part of the Commonwealth legislation. Until the adoption of the 
Statute of Westminster 1931 (Imp.), the Commonwealth though havinn 
a Dominion status was no more than a self-governing colony. 18 The 
"Merchant Shipping Act 18% was not a law which in its application 
to Australia the Parliament of the Commonwealth could affect. Nor 
could that Parliament make a law inconsistent with '' 19 The para-
mountcy of the Imperial legislation was ensured by the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act 1865 (Imp.).20 It nowhere provided in the Commomvealth 
of Australia Constitution .Act 1900 (Imp.) that sections 735 and 736 of 
the Imperial Act 1894 would cease to apply to the Commonwealth 
17. Ibid., 27 A.L.R., p. 11. 
18. Ibid., 27 A.L.R. ·1, p. 8, per Barwick, C.J. 
19. Asiatic Steam Navigation Co. LtrJ. \1. Commonwealth of 
Australia (1956) 30 A.L.J. 159, p. 162, f:"ler Dixon, C.J., 
McTiernan and Williams, J J. 
20. See R.D. Lumb and K.W. Ryan, The Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia (2nd ed. 1977), pp. 190 and 31l4. 
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after its formation. Hence before the adoption of the ===-"'~'­
Westminster 1931 (Imp.), the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament 
to make laws on merchant shipping and coasting trade were limi 
by sections 735 and 736. Although the Navigation Act 1912 (Comth.) 
was confirmed by His Majesty in Council, it contained no suspending 
clause and had not been reserved for His Majesty's pleasure as re-
quired by section 736. The result - as we have seen - is that the 
provisions on coasting trade or possibly, where such provisions were 
not severable, the entire Act itself would be void~1 Morem1er, it is 
arguable that, in a conflict between State and Commonwealth laws 
on the subject, the problem was not to be resoh1ed merely by the 
application of section 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution. The 
requirements of section 736 would also apply to determine the status 
of both State and Commonwealth laws. 
An important High Court of Australia decision, which st1ows 
that Commonwealth statutes were no more than colonial legislation 
and therefore operated on par with State enactments, is that in • 
Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand v. The Commonwealth.22 The 
master of a British ship registered in the United Kingdom requested 
J, the superintendent of the Mercantile Marine Office in Sydney, to 
carry out certain statutory duties. 'According to the provisions of 
the Merchant Shipping Acts, 1894 to 1906 (Imp.), discharge of the 
crew of the ship and engagement of a new crew had to be effected 
in J's presence. J refused to allow the discharge and engagements 
unless all the conditions,including the payment of fees imposed by 
the Navigation Act 1912-1920 (Comth.) and the regulations made 
thereund~rJ were met. The shipowner, as plaintiff, paid the fees 
under protest. This action was brought to recover the fees paid 
and to challenge the validity of the Commonwealth legislation. 
21. This point has been covered in the preceding pages. 
But see R.D. lumb, The Constitution of the Australian 
States (4th ed. 1976), op. cit., p. 93. 
22. Prior to the passing of the historic Statute of LtJestminster 
Adoption Act 1942 (Comth.), neither "the Merchant Shipping 
Act nor any other Imperial Act then in existence either 
widened or narrowed the scope of the Constitution Act:" 
Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand Ltd. and Another v. 
The Commom'-'ealth ar:td Another (1925) 36 C.L.R. 130, p. 151, 
per Isaacs~ J. 
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Judgment was for th(' plaintiff. The High Court held that the 
Navigation Act 1912-1920 (Cornth.) was a colonial law \lllithin the mean-
(Imp.). Consequently, any Commonwealth enactments, including sub-
sidiary legislation, which were repugnant to the provisions of the 
Merchant Shipping Acts ,1894 to 1906 (Imp.), were to the extent of 
such repugnancy void and inoperative. Despite the formation of the 
Commonwealth, the paramountcy of Imperial legislation is seen in the 
rejection of the argument t!lat the Act operatr~s as an 
implied repeal of the Colonial Laws Validity Act and the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1894. 11 23 
It was not until the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 
(Cornth.) was passed that "doubts as to the validity of certain Common.,. 
wealth legislation" were removed.Z4 Among the provisions stated in 
the preamble to operate with retrospective effect are sections 2 
and 5 of the ===-=..:.~==:..=..:~ 1931 (Imp.). Section 2 (1) prov-
ides that the 1865 (Imp.) shall not apply 
to any Commonwealth laws made after the commencement of the 
Statute of Westminster 1931 Omp.) by tfl8 Parliament of a Dominiun. By 
section 5, sections 735 and 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act (Imp.) 
shall not apply to the Commonwealth Parliament. Ttie Commonwealth's 
adoption of the Statute of Westminster' 1931 (Imp.) is stated to have 
effect "as from the commencement of the war between His Majesty 
the King and Germany." As the retrospectivity does not go back far' 
enough, uncertainty as regaf'ds the validity of the Navigation Act 
1912 (Comth.) might still remain. No difficulty, however, is encount-
ered in that respect. As we shall see shortly, several of the 
1912 Acts (Comth.), the 1912-20 Act (Cornth.), the 1912-25 Act 
(Comth.) and the 1912-35 Act (Comth.) had been r'eserved for His Maj-
esty's pleasure. The Royal Assent was recei\Jed and duly proclaimed. 
23. Ibid., pp. 140-141, per 1"\nox, C.J. 
24. Assented to on 9th October, 191,2. The Statute of West-
minster 1931 was passed by Great Bf'itain to implerm:mt the 
Balfour Declaration: .E-lonser v. (1968-1969) 122 
C.L.I~. 177, p. 189. 
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Another far-reaching consequence of the 1942 Act (Comth.) 
is the effect it has on the Imperial legislation expressed to apply 
to the Commonwealth, whether before, at the date of, or after, the 
Act. Enlarged constitutional powers are conferred by section 2 (2) 
on Australia as a Dominion?5 An enlightening decision relating to 
the matter under consideration is Bice v. Cunningham.26 C, a crew 
member of the British vessel Fresno City, was charged with desert-
ing the ship, in breach of section 221 (a) of the Merchant Shipping 
6\,ct 1894 (Imp.). The special magistrate who heard the case held that 
the section was not effecthte in South Australia on 13th January, 
1961, the date of the alleged offence. The case was brought on 
appeal to the Supreme Court of South Australia. For the offence 
of desertion committed by seamen, the Imperial provision and section 
100 of the Navigation Act 1958 (Comtt-1.) prescribed different penal-
tiFJs. One question raised was t'llhether section 221 (a) was still effec-
tive enactment with respect to that offence. The Commonwealth 
section 100 imposed a much lighter penalty than its Imperial counter-
part. Mayo,J., held that the Imperial provision, though still effec-
th/8 in Australia, had been amended, but not repealed, by the Comm-
onwealth section 100. His comments serve to clarify the position: 27 
"Any law made on the same topic after 9th October, 1942, 
would not be rendered void and inoperative by the Colon-
ial Laws Validity Act 1865 notwithstanding any such repug-
nancy. In so far as any law imposed by Imperial statute 
was part of the law of a Dominion, the Parliament of that 
Dominion could repeal or amend it." 
The decision is welcomed as a landmark in the struggle for greater 
freedom from Imperial restraints. It vindicates the nmv legislative 
competence of the Commonwealth Parliament to initiate and pursue 
an independent policy in shipping and navigation. The same, how-
ever, cannot be said in respect of the ·state legislatures. 28 
25. Mm·eover, by s. 4, no Imperial statute passed after ttle date 
of the 1942 Act "shall extend, or deemed to extend to a 
Dominion" as part of its law, unless it contains a decl~r­
ation required by that section. 
26. [1961] S.A.S.R. 208. 
27. fbid., p. 211. 
28. They are not affected by the Statute of l1Jestminster 
:..;.:;:;_~=c.:___:_= 1942 (Comtll.), being still subject to the 
~~=~=~~~=--~:..!;!.. 1865 (Imp.) and the '-'=~=-.c,_ 
Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.), 55. 735 and 736. 
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2. Sections 51 (i) and 98 of Commonwealth Constitution 
Sections 51 ili and 98 empower the Commonwealth Parliament to 
enact legislation to regulate trade, navigation and shipping. The 
scope of the powers conferred is examined in relation to the powers 
exercisable by State Parliaments. 
Narrow View. It is informative to analyse the construction and 
effect given by High Court Judges to the provisions of the pre-1942 
Commonwealth Acts. These Acts (Comth.) related, inter alia, to sea-
men's compensation, inter-State maritime trade and other shipping 
matters. It is noteworthy that such Acts depended for their validity 
on an effective exercise of the powers under the Commonwealth Con-
stitution and/or on meeting the requirements of section 735 or 736 of 
the 1894 Act (Imp.). 
29 In Australian Steamships Ltd. v. Malcolm, the spouse of a de-
ceased seaman brought an action for compensation under the Sea-
men's Compensation Act 1911 (Comth.) against the Australian Steamships 
Ltd. In 1914, the case on appeal was heard by the High Court of 
Australia. The defence raised was that the Seamen's Compensation 
Act 1911 (Comth.) was invalid on the ground that it was allegedly ultra 
vires the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament. Moreover, this 1911 
Act (Comth_.) did not satisfy any of the requirements of sections 735 
and 736 of the 1894 Act (Imp.). Its effect is dependent on a valid ex-
ercise of the powers under the Commonwealth Constitution. In de-
claring the ?eamen's Compensation Act 1911 (Comth.) to be valid, 
Gavan Duffy and Rich, J J., held tt1at section 98 had quite a different 
operation from section 5 (i). It included "a power to make laws with 
respect to navigation and shipping as ancillaf'y to such trade and 
commerce."
30 They continued: 
''It (section 98) authorises Parliament to makes laws with 
respect to shipping and the conduct and the management 
of ships as instrumenalities of trade and commerce, and 
to regulate the relations and reciprocal rights and oblig-
ations of those conducting the navigation of ships in the 
course of such commerce both among themselves and in 
relation to their employers on whose behalf the navigation 
is conducted." 
The scope of section 98, as determined, is considered in relation to 
29. (1914) 19 C.L.R. 298. In the District Court, judgment for 
£500 was given for the plaintiff. H1e appeal brought by 
thE~ dE~fpnrJants was dismi~=.;st::cl. 
30. p. 335. 
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section 51 (i) in the earlier case of The Owners of the S.S. Kalibia 
v. Alexander Wilson,31 IAJhictl came before the High Court of Australia 
in 1910. One of the two matters raised, on appeal from the Supreme 
Court of New South lllales, was whether the Seamen's Comoensation 
1909 (Comth.)"32 was valid. Section l~ (1) "provides that the Act 
applies in relation to the employment of seamen (ill on any ship reg-
istered in the Commonwealth when engaged in the coasting trade ... 
@2 on any ship (~tl8ther British or foreign) engaged in the coasting 
trade if the seamen have been shipped under articles of agreement 
entered into in Australia." In section 4 (1 ), the term "coasting trade" 
applied to all trade between Australlan ports. Any doubts as to its 
meaning were removed by section 4 (2). The subject matter of the 
Act therefore expressly included all coasting trade in Australia, 
hlhether intra-State or inter-State. Griffith, C.J., construed section 
51 (i) of the Constitution. His view l\Jas that the power to make laws 
with respect to trade and commerce with other countries and among 
the States did not authorise the Commonwealth Parliament to leg-
islate regarding the internal trade of a State. As to the relation-
ship of sections 98 and 51 (i) he said. 
"It is not, and cannot contended that sec. 98 of the 
Constitution, which declares that the POIAier in question 
extends to navigation and shipping, enlarges the ambit of 
the power, or does anything more than explain the meaning 
of the IA/Ords 1trade and commerce' as applied to matters 
within that ambit. 11 
The Seamen's Compensation Act 1909 (Comth.) contained both valid 
and invalid provisions. As the\} were inseverable, or Griffith, 
C.J., put it) since the Act with the inoperative portions omitted 
would be substantially different in subject matter from the original~'~ 
the entire Act was declared invalirJ. 35 This "se\/erability" test has 
31. (1910) 11 C.L.R. 689. 
32. No. 29 of 1909. It was not based on an exercise of the pow-
er given by the 1894 Act (Imp.), s. 735 or 736. 
33. , p. 697. Cf. the dissenting judgrner1t of Isaacs J., 
to the effl:~ct that s. 98 is "an enlargement of the main 
power, and is not men~ly an incidental power'': 
v. Tumer, Ex parte Thr] Marint'l Board of Hobart (1927) 
39 C.L.R. 411, p. 435. 
31~. This was the validit'l test he t1ad suggested in The Boot-
makf~rs' case (No. 2) 11 C.L.R. 1, p. 27. 
35. See, e.g. (1921) 29 C.L.F~ .• pp. 369-370; see abo R v. 
CommiSsioner for Tran~:;port; Ex. Parte Cobb & Co. Ltd. 
[1963] Qd. R. 5l,7, suprrl. 
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been applied by judges in a number of cases to determine the valid-
ity of statutes:6 
The Construction given to sections 51 (i) and 98 has been 
followed by the High Court of Australia in The Newcastle and Hunt-
er River Steamship Co. Ltd. and Others v. The Attorney-General for 
the Commonwealth and Another?7 A number of companies and per-
sons, as plaintiffs in the action,sought declarations that many sec-
tions of the Navigation Act 1912-1920 (Comth.) and its Schedules and 
the regulations made under it were invalid. The Bill was reserved 
by the Governor-General for the signification of his Majesty's plea-
sure, which is stated to have been received on 14th February, 1921. 
The validity of sections 14, 43, 135, 136, 288 and 293 and Schedules I 
and II of the Act (Comth.) and the Navigation (Manning and Accomm-
odation) Regulations 1921 (Comth.) was challenged. In general terms, 
these provisions and the regulations prescribed certain scales of 
manning and standards of accommodation for the ships concerned. 
They also prohibited ships from engaging in coasting trade without 
a licence, and imposed penalties for contravention. The plaintiffs 
argued that the Commonwealth Parliament had no power to enact 
the above provisions and regulations with respect to ships engaged 
solely in intra-State trade. Also, it was argued that the Common-
wealth Parliament could not make it obligatory for owners of such 
ships to obtain a licence to engage in intra-State trade. In the 
judgment delivered for the plaintiffs, the High Court gave a narrow 
interpretation to the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament. It 
only has specific powers to enact laws relating to inter-State· and 
foreign trade and commerce. The High Court is understood to have 
formulated a useful test as follows:38 
36. ~· in (1921) 29 C.L.R. 359, tt1e Nm1igation Act 1912-20 
(Comth.) was involved; in llle~.;tern Transport Pty. Ltd. v. 
Kropp (1964) 38 A.L.J.R. 237, the Transport Laws Valida-
tion Act 1962 (Qld.) was involved. 
37. (1921) 29 C.L.R. 357. The judgment of Gavan Duffy and 
Rich, J J., in Australian Steamships Ltd. v. Malcolm (1914) 
19 C.L.R. 298, p. 335, t.vas followed here. -
38. (1921) 29 C.l.R. p. 368, a unanimous judgment. 
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"The Constitution does not endow Parliament with a 
substantive power to deal with navigation and shipping 
at large. It only empowers it to deal with that subject 
in so far as it is relevant to inter-State and foreign 
trade and commerce ... the effect of sec. 98 is to include 
in tt1e power to make laws with respect to trade and 
commerce a power to make laws with respect to naviga-
tion and shipping ancillary or relevant to such trade 
and commerce." 
Clearly, the invafid provisions relating to ships engaged in inter-
State trade were so interwoven with the valid provisions as to ren-
der all of them invalid. Fortunately for the Commonwealth, this 
disaster was avoided by reason of section 2 (2) of the Navigation 
1912-1920 (Comth.). The High Court held that "no provision with-
in the power of Parliament 51hall fail by reason of such conjunction, 
but the enactment shall operate on so much of its subject matter as 
Parliament might lawfully have dealt with."39 
An interesting issue concerning the powers conferred by sec-
tion 51 Q2 was raised. In the 1<\ing v. Turner; Ex parte Marine Board 
of Hobart, 40 a collision occurred in the Derwent River between two 
steamships, which were owned and registered in Hobart. The ships 
were not engaged in inter-State or foreign trade or commerce. 
Shortly before the collision, the two ships had traversed part of 
the course ordinarily used by ships engaged in such trade or comm-
erce. The High Court of Australia had to decide whether the Court 
of Marine Inquiry established by the Navigation Act 1912-1925 (Comth.) 
had jurisdiction to inquire into the collision. An attempt was made 
on behalf of the Commonwealth to claim special powers under section 
51 (i). It was argued that by section 51 (i) the Commonwealth Parlia-
ment was empowered to erect a court with exclusive power to deal 
with shipping casualties. The establishment of the Marine Court of 
Inquiry under Part IX of the Naviqation Act 1912-1925 (Comth.) was 
39. Ibid., pp. 369-370. "severability"provisions are found in 
the following State enactments: Western Australian Marine 
Act 1948, s. 4; Queensland Marine Act 1958, s. 4; Navigation 
Acts Amendment Act 1939 ((~ld.), s. 77; Marine Act 1936-1975 
(S.A.), ss. 1l}6-147; and Marine Act 1958 (Vic.), s. 263. As the 
two principal Acts currently in force, viz. Marine Act 1976 
(Tas.) and Navigation Act 1901 (N.S.W.) do not contain 
useverability··'provisions, the possibility of their being held 
invalid cannot therefore be ruled out. 
l10. (1927) 39 C.L.R. 411. 
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alleged to be the exercise of the power~1 The arguments were 
rejected by five of the Judges who adopted the test formulated in 
Newcastle and Hunter River Steamship Co. v. Attorney-General for 
the Commonwealth~2 The test was applied to restrict the powers of 
the Commonwealth Parliament in two ways. Firstly, it is powerless to 
regulate the manning of ships not engaged in inter-State or foreign 
trade or commerce merely because they venture on the high seas 
or are in waters 'used by ships engaged in such trade or commerce. 
Secondly, it is "not at liberty" to establish a court to deal with a 
collision involving two vessels not engaged in inter-State or foreign 
trade or commerce. It is immaterial that at the time of the collision 
the two vessels were outside the course ordinarily used by ships 
engaged in such trade or commerce and short I y after the vessels 
had traversed part of such course. The Navigation Act 1912-25 
(Comth.) purported to enable the Court of Marine Inquiry to enquire 
into a casualty which had no relationship or genuine links with inter-
State or foreign trade or commerce .. To that extent, the provisions 
of the Navigation Act 1912-25 (Comth.) were held to be ultra vires 
the Constitution and therefore void~3 The constitutional importance 
of the decision is the "relationship" or "genuine links" test laid down 
for the validity of Commonwealth legislation in its application to 
intra-State trade. The fact that this Act (Comth.) had been reserved 
for Royal Assent which was proclaimed on 13th August, 1925, did not 
give Commonwealth legislation a wider operation. 
A second argument raised on behalf of the Commonwealth 
sought to rely on the wider powers allegedly conferred by the Merch-
ant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) It was contended that section 478 had 
41. Ibid., p. 424; under the Nm;igation Act 1912-1925, s. 2 (1) 
@. The Commonwealth claimed the power on the ground 
that the casualty occurred on the high seas or in waters 
used by ships engaged in trade or commerce with other 
countries or among the States. 
42. (1921) 29 C.L.R. 357, where a unanimous judgment was 
delivered. 
43. The((severability'1provision in the current Navigation Act 
1912-1973 (Comth.) was omitted as a result of the Act 
(1\Jo. 36 of 1958) (Comth.), s. 4. It appears that a principle 
of construction has been established. The High Court 
Judges t.vill make every endeavour to give eff~ct to provis-
ions of the Act which are within the powers of the Common-
wealth Parliament. 
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enabled the Commom.vealth ParHarnent to authorise the inquiries into 
the casualty. The High Court had no difficulty in rejecting the 
argument. Section 478 was construed as merely enabling the legis-
latures of British possessions to enlarge the territorial jurisdiction 
of their courts but not to alter the nature of their powers. It does 
not affoct the division of powers which the r.::ommonwealtt1 Constitution 
has made between the Commonwealth and each of the StatesY~ 
Broad ViEJW. We shall consider tiAJO cases which fall on the 
other side of the line. lJ.lhere the necessary element of, or the 
relationship with~5 inter-State or foreign trade or commerce is pres-
ent, the Court may go to great lengths in favour of the Commonwealth. 
A well-known example is found in Australian Coastal Shipping 
Commission v. D'RemJ!6 By the Australian Coastal Shipping Commiss-
"-"'-'-.:.....;...;.=::.. 1956 (Comth.), a body corporate (the A.C.S.M.) 1111as created. 
Its functions are to establish, maintain and operate shipping services 
which are limited to inter-State and m1erseas carriage and carriage 
to Territories. Section 36 (1) of the 1956 Act (Comth.) provides that 
the A.C.S.M. is not subject to taxation under the law of a State or 
Territory to which the Commonwealth is not subject. Apart from any 
question as to the scope of the application of section 36 (1), it is 
clear that, by section 109 of the Commomvealth Constitution. its oper-
ation must be to exempt the A.C.S.M. from liability to a State tax. 
There was no such exemption if section 36 (1) was found to be invalid. 
The question for the Court really was whetller section 36 (1) was 
within the powers of the Commonwealth ParHament. It noteworttw 
that tile Court has endorsed the construction previously given to 
section 98. The section has tJeen construed not as an independent 
grant of POl'ller but as a pmfl!er explanatorv of the power to legislate 
with respect to tradE~ and commerce l.'llith other countries or among 
4l~. The f'\ing \1. TurmCJr; Ex parte MarinE~ Board of Hobart 
(1927) 39 C.L.R. 1~11, pp. 425-426, per Knox, C.J., Gavan 
Duffy, Ricr1 and Stark, J J. 
1,5, For the formulation and earlier application of these 
essential links or factors, see supra. 
L,6. (1961-1962) 107 C.L.R. £,6. 
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the States.'~7 Five of the High Court Judgl=!S are clearlv of tht=J view 
"that the combination of s. 51 (i) witil s. 98 ~Jives the widest power 
to deal with the whole subject matter of navigation and shipping in 
relation to trade and commerce with other countries and among the 
States.''48 The powE!r is held to be wide enough to establish a govern-
ment shipping line, viz. a corporate agency of tho Commonwealth, for 
the purpose of such trade and commerce. lt held Lo be sufficient 
to enable the Commonwealth Parliament to protect the A.C.S.M. from 
the embarrassment of taxation by the various States. An importnnt 
test has been laid down in the case. The validity of a provision 
depends not on its motive but on its relevanu~ or connection with 
the purpose. 
Moreover, "the widest power" conferred to deal with the sub-
ject matter Pl"oper held to be extended by section 51 ()(_?(J<:L><)_ of 
the Commonwealth Constitution. The provision authorises the Parlia-
ment to make laws 1t.1it.h respect to matters incidental to the execu-
tion of any power vestecJ by the Commonwealth Constitution in the 
Parliament. This has been trnated as including not only what attends, 
or arises in, the exercise of legislative power but also what is incid-
ental to the subject rnatter covered by the other paragraphs of 
section 51.h9 In effect, the principle establi~;hed is this. A power 
to create implies a pm-Jer to protect from State taxation. Doubtless, 
the Court has given the relevant provisions of the Commonwealth 
Constitution a wide scope. 50 
There seems to be a general reluctance on the part of the 
High Court of Australia to hold Commonwealth laws invalid unless 
47. Ibid., p. SL1, per Dixon, C.J. . rh~::~ lJ\AinPrs of S.S. Kallbia 
v. Wilson (1910) 11 C.L.R. 689 and Australicm Steamships Ltd. 
v. Malcolm (1914) 19 C.L.R. 298. 
48. (1961-1962) 107 C.L.R. 46, p. 54. 
lf9. Ibid., p. 54, following the chc:cision in Le Mesurier \1. Connor 
(1929) 42 C.L.R. 481. 
50. See ibid., p. 55. The principle enunciated by Stone, C.J., 
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Pittman v. 
Home Owners' Loan Corporation (1939) 308 U.S. 21, p. 33, was 
adopted. 
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State rights are clearly infringed. In v. The Common-
wealtl-?,1 the ship Kakariki was lying wrecked in Port Phillip Bay. By 
section 13 of the Marine Act 1928 (Vic.), if a ship was sunk in any 
port in Victoria, two justices might in certain circumstances issue 
a warrant for the removal of the wreck. The costs of removal were 
recoverable from the owner. Certain provisions of the Navigation 
Act 1912-35 (Comth.) were also involved. This Act (Comth.) had been 
reserved for His ·Majesty's pleasure. The Royal Assent is stated to 
have been proclaimed on the 11th July, 1935. Under section 329 of 
the Act (Comth.), the Minister is empowered to require the owner 
of a wreck, which is on or near the coast of Australia, to remove it. 
The owner is liable to pay the costs of removing the wreck where 
he fails to comply with the requisition of the Minister. The questions 
raised were whether section 329 also applied and, if so, whether 
there was inconsistency between the two sections. It was the plain-
tiff's contention that the Commonwealth section, properly construed, 
would not apply to the case. The wreck, being in inland waters, was 
not "on or near the coast of Australia. 11 This was substantiated by 
an alternative argument. The Commonwealth Parliament had no power 
to legislate for inland waters because section 98 of the Constitution 
"is not an independent power but is only part of the, power conferred 
b 51 '(') "52 Y sec. _!_ •••• 
Despite the cogent arguments of the plaintiffs, the Judges 
showed an unwillingness to curtail the legislative adventurism of the 
Commonwealth Parliament. This attitude is seen in two ways. Firstly, 
the Court ruled that section 13 of the Marine Act 1928 (Vic.) was a 
valid exercise of the State Parliament's power and in full force. 
Secondly, section 329 of the Navigation Act 1912-1935 (Comth.) was 
not held to be ultra vires the Commonwealth Constitution and was 
therefore valid. In holding that there was no conflict between the 
51. (1937) 58 C.L.R. 618. This case, stated for the opinion of 
the High Court, was referred to the Full Court. 
52. ibid.,p.625. 
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two sections,53 the Court was kelwing the matter open to provide 
leewav for future developnmnts in the field. One approach, not pur-
sued bv the dPfendants, \Alas to argue that the wreck, though lving 
in inland waters, constituted an obstruction and a possible hazard 
to inter-State and foreisJn shipping and navigation. That, it is sub-
mitted, would enable the defendants to invoke "the widest power'' 
doctrine previouslv formulated by the High Court in determining thR 
scope of section 51 ill read with section 98.54 
Apart from the t11110 specific instances, there is established 
in Australian Constitutional Law what is known as the "covering the 
Field" test. It i~3 attributed to the work of the High Court based on 
its examination of section 109 in a number of cases. Where this test 
applies, it operates to exclude the State Parliaments from legislating 
on the subject. It is also referred to as the concept of inconsisten-
cv or1 the ground that, where an item in section 51 is fullv covered 
bv Commom~1ealth legislation, State legislation on the item, whether 
passed before or after the Commonwealth law, will be rendered 
invalid. Dixon, J., (as he then was) in Ex parte Mclean explains the 
operation of the test in these words:55 
"It depends upon the intention of the paramount legisla-
ture to express bv its enactment, completelv, exhaustivelv, 
1 
or exclusivelv, what shall be the law governing the partic-
ular conduct or matter to which its attention is directed. 
When a Federal statute discloses such an intention, it is 
inconsistent with it for the law of a State to govern the 
sarne conduct or matter." 
Thus, with regard to shipping matters and navigation, IAihich are the 
subject of concurrent jurisdiction under U1e Commonwealth legisla-
tion, the application of this test will substantiallv reduce the powers 
53. As to the meaning CJf "repugnancv", see The Union Steamship 
Co. of New Zealand ltd. and Another v. The Commonwealth 
and Anothr~r (1925) 36 C.L.R. 130 pp. 148·-150, per Isaacs,J.·, 
[lyde Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Cowbum (1926) 37 C.L.R. '~66, 
p. 478, per Knox, L~.J., and Gavan Duffy, J. See also Bailey, 
"Inconsistencv with Paramount Law" (1939-1~1) 2 Res Judicatae 
9. 
54. Australian Coastal Shipping Commission v. D'f~eilly (1961-1962) 
107 C.L.R. L16, p. )4, supra. 
55. (1930) 43 C.L.R. 472, p. 4B3. This test was applied inD'Sulli\1an 
v. Noarlunga Meat Ltd. (1954) 92 C.L.R 562; referred to in A 
Raptis & Son. (Regd.) v. State of Suuth Australia [1976] 15-
A.L.R. 223. 
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of the State Parliaments. 
3. Section 51 (~>.0_.l<) 
A rEJcent decision IAihich has unprecedented constitutional implic- • 
ations for both the State~; and the Commonwealth is Nmv South Wales 
\1. The Commonwealth.56 Tile Seas and Submerged Lands Act '1973 
(Comtll.) gave statutory effect to thE-! two Geneva ConvEmtions of 
1958. Tiley are the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Canting-· 
uous Zone, and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. The Act 
provided, inter alia, that the smmreirJnty in respect of the territor-
ial sea. its bed and subsoil was vested in and exercisable by the 
Crown in right of tl1e Cornrnoni!IJealth. The sovereignty regarding the 
"internal waters of Australia (that is to say, any waters of the sea 
on the landward side of the territorial sea) in so far as they extend 
from time to time, and in respect of tile sea-bed and sub-soil beneath 
those waters" 57 is similarly vested in and exercisable by the Crown. 
Tile Governor-General was empowered to determine the breadth of 
the territorial sea, and/or the • baseline from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea or any part thereof t'\las to be measured. Section 
14 of tile 1973 f\ct (Comttl.). recognised the rights of the States in 
respect of the waters of the sea of or within any bay, gulf, estuary, 
river, creek, inlet, port or harbour. In respect of such rights, a 
State had so\/ereignty both before and after F~)deration. Section 
15 excepted from the sm1ereignty of the Crov.Jn in right of the 
Commonwealth "wharves, jetties, piers, breakwaters, buildings, plat-
forms, pipelines ... cables or other structures or works." 
All the six Australian States brought actions in the High Court 
against the Commonwealth of Australia, seeking declarations that 
the Act was wholly or partially invalid. The plaintiff States argued 
that they had, prior to th£~ Fr-Jderation and continued to have after 
56. (19/6) 50 A.J.L.R. 21B. ThE'. case was argued before tile 
Full Court of the High Court: p. 219. 
57. Seas ar1d Submerged Lands Act (Cmnth.) (No. '161 nf 
1913), s. 1D. 
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Federation, sovereignty and legi~-1lative power over the territorial 
sea adjacent to their coasts up to a three-mile limit. Their claims 
included the sea-bed and the subsoil of the territorial sr~a. The 
High Court rejected the argument and held that the 1973 Act (Cornth.) 
was a valid exercise of the external affairs power conferred by 
section 51 (xxix) of the Commonwealth Constitution. This "external 
affairs" power is held to extend to the implementation of international 
conventions to which Australia a party. It can also extend to 
"matters or things external or situated outside Australia, or to persons 
outside Australia and their acti\/i ties." !\ colossal blow was dealt to 
the territorial claims of all the six States. The High Court has cat-
egorically held that ''the low-\illater mark constituted U1e relevant 
seaward boundary of their territor\,' for ttm exercise of sovereignty 
and legislative pm'ller.'' 58 
In manv respects, this decision has serious ramifications for 
the States. Apart from those areas, places and structures excepted 
bv sections 1£, and 15 of the 1973 Act (Comth.), the "external affairs" 
power mav enablo the Commonwealth to regulate and control coastal 
shipping. This power is exercisable over a broad expanse stretching 
from the low-water mark outwards round the whole of Australia, 
including tho territorial sea~9 H~Jnce the power to reDulate inter-
State and intra-State shipping bv t.vay of licensing, once beyond the · 
competence of the Commonwealth Parliament, would be exercisable 
under section 51 International shipping conventions, when 
ratified bv Australia. may be implemented and given statutorv effect 
to operato alongside each State coastline, bE!yond the low-water 
58. (1976) 50 A.J.L.R. 218, p. 219, the proposition has been laid 
down bv five of the Judges. But Barwick, C.J., and 
ulindyer, J., in Bonser v. La Maccha (1968-1969) 122 C.L.R. 
177 helcJ that a State Parliament is competent to make 
law~> having extraterritorial effect if those laws are for 
the peace, order and good government of the State. 
59. This term is now definod bv international agreement con-
tained in the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Continguous Zone, 1958, and the Geneva Convention on 
the Continental Shelf, 1958. Australia a signatorv to 
those two conventions: (1976) 50 A.L.J.R., p. 265. 
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mark. Naturallv, this avenue of po\llier, when stated in such broad 
terms, foreshadows the steadv decline of State shipping legislation. 
One disturbing realitv the States must learn to live with is the tight-
ening controls I.Aihich Commonwealth laws can impose on coastal and 
intra-State shipping. The reason is that section 92 of the Common-
wealth Constitution does not operate to guarantee the freedom of 
purelv intra-State trade. Moreover, it is arguable that State laws 
which purport to operate bevond the 101111-water mark would be invalid 
as the area is outside the jurisdiction of the State Parliarnents.60 
The crippling effects of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 
1973 (Comth.), as reinforced bv the High Court decision, are fore-
stalled bv an agreement61 made between the Commonwealth Govern-
ment 62 and each of the State Governments. Legislation in identical 
terms has been passed by all the six States gi\/ing statutory effect 
to the agreement?3 The object is to extend the legislati\/e powers 
of the States in relation to their respecti\/e coastal waters. This 
is achieved in an ingenious way. Firstlv, the Lerrn "coast,al waters 
of the State" is defined to include anv sea that is on the landward 
side of the territorial sea of Australia even Lhough it is not within 
60. Unless such laws are permitted to operate extraterritorial!\/ 
bv Imperial legislation. For example, the Mr::H'chant St1ipping 
Act 1894 (Imp.) s. t~78 which mav confer on a colonial tri-
bunal extraterritorial jurisdiction: The King v. Turner; 
Ex parte The Marine Board of Hobart (1927) 39 C.L.R. 411, 
p. 430. 
61. It was made at the request of the State Parliaments in 
pursuance of the Commonwealth Constitution, s. 51 (>:xxlliii). 
62. The Coastal Waters (State Title) Act (No. 77 of 1980) (Cornth.) 
was passed to extend tt1e legislative powers of the States 
in and in relation to coastal waters. By s. 7, the Common-
wealth Places (Application oF Laws) Act 1970-73 (Comth.) 
has effect in respect of anv place in the coastal waters of 
a State (which is defined in s. 3 a~1 a Cornmonwr~alth place) 
as if that place were within the limits of' a State. 
63. See Constituti_gnal POW§~S (Coastal Waters) Act (~Jo. 138 of 
1979) (1\J.S.W.), [;:onstitutional Powers (Coastal llJaters) Act 
(No. 1 of 1980) (Qld.), Constitutional Power's (Coastal Waters) 
Act (No. 68 of 1979) (S.J\.), Constitutional f:Jowers (Coastal 
Waters) Act (No. 62 of 1979) (Tas.), Constitutional Powers 
(Coastal lllaters) Act (No. 9366 of 1980) (Vic.), Constitutional 
Powers (Coastal lJJaters) Act (No. 91J of 1979) (l.LI.A.). 
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tho limits of the State or of a Territory? 11 Secondly, the legislative 
powers ~Jxercisable by each State extend to the making of - 65 
"(a) all such laws of the SLat8 as coulcJ be rnade by virtue of 
- those powers if the coastal waters of the State ... were 
within the limits of the State ... ; 
(b) laws of thEJ State having effect in or in relation to 
waters within the adjacent area in rrospect of the State, 
but beyond the outer lirni ts of the coastal waters of 
the State .... " 
The agrBernent provides a practical solution to t11e problems as long 
as the present policy of thE:l Commonwealth c;overnment remains un-
changed. But it doPs nnt give forcF~ or effect to any provision of 
a State law tu the extent of am; inconsistt:mcy with a Commonwealth 
law.66 Nowhere in thE! agreement, or the legislation giving, effect 
thereto, is the Commonwealth Parliament debarred from enacting 
laws to extend to those waters over which the States are currently 
conceded lesJislative jurisdictlor1. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The acquisition of the Dominion status by the Commonwealth 
under the Statute of LtJestrninstei' /-\doption Act 1942 (Comth.) carries 
witl-1 it full POiftJers to make laws having exti'aterritorial' operation. 
As the first classic L'!xercise of the nm"1 constitutional powers, the 
Navigation Amendmm1t Act 1979 (Cornth.) was passed~7 It repealed 
Part VIII and also secticms 221 to 222 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
'1894 (Imp.), which had applied to the Commonwealtt1 by paramount 
force. In the recent case of Kirmani v. Captain Cook Cruises Pty. 
Ltd.: Green, Thii'd Pdi't'l(,l'iS the validit\/ of the repeal of Part VIII of 
the 1894 f\ct (Imp.) was considered by seven Hiuh Court Judges. The 
judgments of Mason. f"lurphy, Brennan and Deane, J J., are of great 
consti Lutional significance. Thev held that section 1 01~ (3) of the 
64. In each /\cl., s :l (1) or Schedule pai'a. 3 (1). 
65. ItJid., ~J. 5 or Schedule pCJra. 5. 
66. Ibid., 7 (c) or SchedulE~ para. 7 (£2.. 
67. No. 98 of 1979. For rnore detuiled t.reatmr:mt of this Act, 
see Chapter Eight. 
6B. (19B5) 59 1'\.L.J. ?65. St:!e C:hapter Eight. 
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Navigation Amendment Act 1979 (Comth.) is not only a valid enactment 
but also has the effect of repealing Part VIII of the 1894 Act (Imp.) 
in its operation as part of the law of New South Wales. The injury, 
for which the action was brought, was negligently caused to the 
plaintiff, while being carried on a cruise in Sydney Harbour in a 
vessel belonging to the defendant comparw. It is remarkable that 
the Commonwealth Parliament is deemed to tmve had power to enact 
legislation which applies to shipping business conducted well within 
State waters. There was evidence that the passenger-carrying 
vessel only pro\/ided cruises wholly within Sydney Harbour and was 
not meant for sea-going. From the viewpoint of State constitutional 
powers, what is unacceptable is the construction put by three of 
the Judges69 on the concluding provision of section 2 (2) of the 
Statute of Westminster 1931 (Imp.). In their judgments. an Imperial 
law which applies to an Australian State "part of the law of the 
Dominion" and therefore within the power of the Commonwealth 
Parliament to amend or repeal. This reasoning - it submitted -
constitutes an encroachment upon the State le()i5latil;e pm11ers . 
. Another development of outstanding significance the enact-
ment of the Shipping ResJistraUon Act 1981 (Comth.)?0 It repealed 
Part I of tht:l iVJerchant Shieping f\ct 189l, (Imp.), which again had 
applied to the Australian States by paramount force?1 The absence 
in the case reports dealing with ship mort~Jages of any attempt to 
challenge the validity of the 1981 Act (Cornth.) is an indication of 
the weight of legal opinion regarding Its inviolable statui? 
69. See judgments of Mason J., (ibid.), p. 276; Brennan (ibid.), 
pp. 285-286; Deane J., (ibid.), pp. 298-299. Gibbs, C.J., 
however, \1\Jas of the \/iew that s. 10~ of tt1e 1979 Act 
(Comth.) was invalid in so far as it attempted to repeal 
the Merchant Shipping Act 189~, (Imp.), s. 503, in its oper-
ation as part of New South Wales law, ibid., p. 272. 
70. No.8 of 1981.i 
71. Ibid., ss. 3 (1) ancl ~. 
72. Gem-:Jral Credits (Fincmce2 Pty..:. Ltd. v. Registrar of Ship 
and Another [1982J 44 f\.L.R. S71 and Re NorU1 Bri~;bane 
Finance and Irmurances Pty. Ltd. (1983) B A.C.L.R. 274. rn 
both thesrc:J cases, the Shipping Registration Act 1981 
(Comth.) was involved. 
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State enactments, which have extraterritorial opE-]ration for 
the regulation of coasting tradP, continue to depend for their valicJ·· 
ity by meeting the requirements of sections 735 and 736 of the 1894 
Act (Imp.). It is not purely an academic question to ask how the 
currently velid State enactrmmts will be affecterJ if the, tt.AIO sections 
are repealed by CommonwealU1 legislation. It appears that, unless 
the repealing Act contains saving provisions such State enactments 
will cease to be operative. 
A partial solution to the problem faced by the States is pro-
vided by the constitutional powers (coastal waters) legis1ationJ3 It 
enables the enactments of each State to operate extraterritorially 
in its coastal waters. Subject to one exception, the expression 
"coastal waters of the State" means "the part or parts of the terri-
torial sea of Australia that is or are within the adjacent area of 
the State."74 However, in terms of the physical limits imposed by 
such legislation, State Parliaments can only enact laws to regulate 
intra-State trade. Thus State enactments can apply to ships trading 
bet"'1een ports within the same State even though they traverse the 
coastal waters of the State. Similarly they can apply to towage and 
salvage operations carried out within such waters. 
73. Com·Jtitutional Powers (Coastal ll.laters) Act (No. 138 of 
1979) (N.S.ll.l.), Constitutional F1m\lers (Coastal Waters) i\ct 
(No. 1 of 1980) (Qld.), Constitutional Powers (Coastal Waters) 
Act (No. 68 of 1979) (S.A.), Constitutional Powers (Coastal 
l!Jaters) /\ct (No. 62 of 1979) CTas.), Constitutional Powers 
(Coastal Waters) Act (No. 9366 of 1980) (Vic.), Constitutional 
F1owees (Coastal Waters) Ac.)! (No. 95 of 1979) (LtJ.A.). 
lll. In each Act, s. 3 (1) or Schedule para. 3 (1). 
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CHAPTER TV 
POLICY OF SHIP REGISTRATION ACTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The object is to trace the origin and growth of Britain's policy 
which was designed to establish an Empire-wide fleet of British ships! 
Various means, including penalties and economic benefits, were 
employed by British legislators to achieve their goals. In thn process 
of developing an exclusive "British ship" policy, the principles of 
equity were rendered inapplicable to dealings in ships and shares 
therein. The purpose was to prevent foreigners from acquiring an 
interest in British ships. The principles of equity were later rein-
stated as part of the law and have remained ever since. There 
evidence that the harm done, particularly to innocent victims, out-
weighed the advantages derived. It is interesting to consider how, 
for the purpose of raising finance from foreigners, two types of 
property in British ships or shares therein were created by the form-
ative legislation. They were the rights of registered owners and the 
rights of mortgagees. The distinction was a welcome modification of 
the strict "British ship" doctrine. 
It is questionable how far Britain has succeeded in entrenching 
the basic principles her merchant shipping legislation as a perman-
ent part of the Commonwealth law. The effects of the exercise will 
be evaluated. An analysis of the main provisions of the Shipping 
Registration Act 1981 (Comth.)2 and the case authorities will inclicate 
the extent to which the Commonwealth policy corresponds to 
ial counterpart. 
II. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 
1. Beginnings of Ship Registration 
Imper-
The statute (Imp.) of William III is the starting point for the 
concept of British ships. As from 25th March, 1696, the status of 
1. As to Acts which encouraged the in shipping, 
navigation and trade in the Empire, see the long title of 
the Act (1663) 15 Car. II, c. 7. Part of the preamble to the 
Act, (1823) 4 Geo. IV, c. '~1 rearJ: "Whereas the Wealth and 
Strength of this Kingdom, and the prosperity ond Safety 
of this Kingdom amJ every part of the Empire depend on 
the encouranement gh;en to Shipping and Navigation .... " 
2. No. S of-1981. 
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"English-built" ships as the qualification for trading in the American 
plantations was based on registration? . It 1,~1as introduced to exclude 
foreigm~r~:; from holding any share m interest in such ships and to 
pmvent foreign ships from passing off as "English-built" ships. The 
idea of ship registration as a tangible evidence of nationality and 
political link was consistently pursued by succeeding legi~;lators. BY 
f ' '· . ' d a statute (Imp.) o George III passed m '!786, reg1stratwn was rna o 
compulsory. It applied to stlips or vessels, having a deck or being of 
the burden of fifteen tons and above, which were owned by Her 
Majesty's subjects in Great Britain or any of the British colonies, 
plantations or territories.5 
One of the distinguishing marks was the port identity. EverY 
ship was assigned a home port in a British province or colony, where 
she was registered. The port \,vas the place with which she was usu-
ally associated in trade, or wrmre her master or ownt=n'~' usually resid-
ed.6 A definite link between the sllip and the port was f::J~>tablished 
in 1823. 7 By sEJction 10 the ;:;tatute (Imp.) of George IV, a ship was 
deemed to belon~1 to the port ltJller'EJ, or near \.'Jtiich, umJ of the owners 
took and subscribed the uath. This rpquirEJ.rnent rnad1~ it easier for' 
British authorities to ascertain tile whereabouts of clritish ships. But 
it was no safeguard aqainst foreign ships operating in British ports. 
For quick, visual identification, section 19 of the statute (Imp.) of 
George III required evei'Y ship, within one month of ller registration' 
to have her name and horne port painted in white or vellow letters on 
a conspicuous part of her stern. A heavy penalty was imposDd on trw 
owners or master who unla~-vfully altered, obliterated or concealed r•er 
' 8 f name or caused her to be descnbed tJv another name. No change o 
9 
name or home port was permitted except by !'egistering her n_.QVQ· 
3. (1696) 7 & 8 lJJilL III, c. 22, s. 17. 
4. (1786) 26 Geo. III, c. 60. 
5. Ibid., s. 3. 
6. Ibid., s. 5. 
7. 4 Geo. IV, c. 41. 
8. (1786) 26 Geo. III, c. 60, s. 19. 
9. (1823) l1 Geo. I\/, c. L11, ss. 22 and 26; (1825) 6 Geo. IV, c. 110, 
s. 211; (18l15) 8 & 9 Vic., r.. 89, ~>. 31. 
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It has tJecome a feature of modern legislation for a ship's name and 
horne port to be painted in bold letters on the hulL 
t'\s the svstem of registration depended on the precise identitv 
of each ship, stringent requirements had to be met in each case. l\n 
overriding consideration \Alas to prevent foreign-owned or foreign-
built ships from being registered and enjoving the substantial advan-
tages accorded to British ships. Bv a statute (Imp.) of George m10 
anv person applving for ship registration in Great Britain, C:Juernfey, 
or the of Man had to complv with prescribed procedures. 
Firstly, he was required to produce to the Registrar "a true and fair 
account" issued by the builder relating to the ship, tonne1ge and 
the first purchaser(s). Secondly, he had to take an oe1th that the 
ship, for which registration was being sought, was the same as that 
described in the builder's statement.11 It became clear that Um 
second method of identifying ships was not satisfactory. It placed 
too heavy a burden on the owners. Mor'eover, it 1111as often impossible 
for purchasers of secondhand ships to vouch that no alterations r1ad 
been made to them. A realistic approach to the problem was introd-
uced. It was mandatory for eveey ship, prior to re(Jistration, to be 
accurately examined and adrneasueed ir1 the presence of the master 
'1-· 
with regard to the particulars stated. i <:. The master was requiretj to 
sign the survey certificate issued the ~1urveyor' appointed bv the 
Commissioners of Majesty's Customs. For uniformity, the admeas-
urement for ascertainin~J tonnage was prescribed.13 
!"mother objpct of the survev work was to uncover tilE! use of 
anv foreign-made keel or bottom, as well as any unauthorized repairs 
effected in foreign ports]4 For the purpose of ship registration, 
the survey certificate had to be produced to the and Comp-
troller of Her Majesty's Customs. At each ship's horne port, a record 
10. (1786) 26 Geo. III, c. 60. 
11. Ibid., s. 20. 
12. Ibid., s. 12. method of checking the accuracv and 
correctness of thr:~ particulars had been con~~istentlv 
Follm'llBd: 4 Geo. IV, c. h1, s. 14; 8 & 9 Vic., c. 139, s. 15. 
13. l1 Geo. IV, c. L1l, ::i. 15; 8 & 9 Vic., c. 89, s. 16. 
1l;, 26 CJeo. III, c. 60, ss. 1 and 2. As to consequences where 
repairs were done in a foreign port, see infra. 
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of tlE!r history \Ilia~; kept. The ~wstem of rB[Jistration depended upon 
maintaining an accurate description of the ship. It meant that 
ish shipowners h;::Jd to comply with demanding and fastidious require-
ments. li.Jhere a ship was, for any reason,so altered as not to corTes-
pond with all the particulars in the 1egistration certificate, she had 
to be registered This requirement had to be met as a 
matter of urgencv on her return to her home port or any port in a 
British colony or territory}5 Failure on the part of her owners 
meant de-registration with serious consequences. 
2. Advantages of the System 
The system of ship registration was an important part of Britain's 
plan to expand overseas. Under the statute (Imp.) of 1786, no 
' 
though owned by British subjects,were entitled to the privileges or 
advantages of English-built ships, unless thev were wholly built in 
Great Britain or in one of Her lvlajesty's Dominions: 6 IVJoreover, an 
Fnglish-built ship would lose t1er privileges if the costs of the re-
building or repairs effected in a foreign port exceeded fifteen shill-
ings per ton. An excDption was allowed where the ship was so badly 
damaged that the done ~vere necessary to enable her to re-
turn safely to some port in Her r~ajesty's Dorninions.17 The 1786 stat-
ute (Imp.) was an immense boost to shipbuilding and ship-repairing 
industries in Beitain anu also the overseas settlements and colonies. 
For over half a century, this legi~_;lativo emphasis on British-built 
ships was consistently maintained. The extensive tonnage of British 
ships afloat paved the way for the realization of Britain's predeter-
mined goals. 
A British "ship may be considered as a floating island~18 and 
symbolised Dritish influonce19 wtlere\/er sl1e happened to bll. ThlJ 
15. (1823) L, Geo. c. 41, s. 26; (1B33) 3 & 4 Will. c. 55, s. 28. 
This principle was consistently to in sutJsequm1t 
legislation. 
16. 26 Geo. Ill, c. 60, s. 1. 1'\n exception applied to for·eign-
built ships which had been captured and condemned as 
prizes. Such ships were permitted to be registr~red. 
17. Ibid., s. 2; L, Goo. IV, c. '•1, s. G. 
18. Forbe~; v. ~~"-='~(1il2l,) 2 B. & C. L,4B, at p. 464, !2Eclf 
Holrod, J. 
19. Even though a Brlti::ih ship is not accurately descriLH0d 
in law a& part of the United l'\inor1orn: .B ... Y. Gordon-Finlayson 
[1941] 1 K.B. 171, Dt pp. 1/8-179. 
140 
ovccc!rall impact creat£~d on the colonial pr:~oples overseas bv the mag-
nitude of Britain's merchant navv often set the stage for acceptance 
of British traders and customs. This factor ~vas only one facet of 
a 11\/ell-designed Imperial policy. 
The statutorv requirement that a ship t<~~a~; to be registered at 
her usual trading port~or at a port close to her owners' rP.sidence, 
had far-reaching significance. It ensured a fair distribution of Brit-
ish ships throughout the overseas settlem(:Jnts and coloniE!S. It led 
to the establishment of new registries in many ports and places out-
side Great Britain. This growth is obvious fmm a study of the Imperial ' 
Acts passed bet\1\Jeen 1696 and 1894~0 
Dealings in ships, e. sales and mortgages, usually involved the 
use of bills of sale and the application of English law. The result was 
the dissemination of English maritime law and admiralty practice in 
Britain's vast overseas territories and colonies. Britain's maritime 
strength in having all llBr merchant ships, whert:wer registered, 
operating under tt1e same code t<~~hich applied thi'ougt1out the Empire. 
For examplD, the provisions on ship registration and ownership in Part 
_;.;;:;.;...:;..;..;..;...;,.....;;__;;_...;.;;;.!,...:....;~-A...;..· :::...c:::...t 18511 (Imp.P and Part I of the Merchant 
;;;.;..;.;;;.t._t_~L..;....;.c.;;;_:;_ 18% (lmp.)22 appliEld to tht=~ whole of Her Majesty\:; 
Dominions. Until rm:ently, a large majority of the provisions of the 
1894 f\ct applied, llv paramount force, to tile Commonwealth and the 
i.J.ustralian States EJs pm't Df thF~ir· lawl3 
Another aspect of tf-Hc! policy was the promotion of ernploymcmt 
of British subjects in Britain, her colonies and the plantations. It 
was first introduced by a statute (Imp.) of Charles r2'4 St1ips carry-
ing goods into or out of t'\sia, Afric<:~ or America were required to be 
navigated tJy mastors and three-fourths of the mariners, who were 
from those colonios or· plantations~5 In the rel~Jn of C~eorge III, what; 
2fl. See for example, (1fl33) 3 & I~ Will. IV. c. 55, s. 3 (18115) 8 
& 9 Vic., c. 89, s. 3: (18514) 17 & 18 Vic., c. HJ3, s. 30; (1894) 
57 & sa Vic.,c. 60, s. t1. 
21. s. 17. 
22. s. 91. 
23. On 26th January, 'l9B2, FJiJrt I of the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1B9lt was repealed in so far as its application to 
f~ustralia is concerned. See 
211. See (16£Q) 12 Car. II.c. 18, s. 2. 
25. (1696) 7 & f3 ltlill. III, c. 22, s. 2. 
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began for prestige or security reasons, as an exeption to the rule, 
was adopted by succeeding Parliaments as the norm. By the statute 
(Imp.) of 1794, ships carrying goods into many parts of Her Majesty's 
Dominions had to be manned and navigated in the same way. 26 A clear 
legislative bias towards job creation for British subjects is seen in 
many instances. Ships, including fishing boats, on any voyage with-
in the United Kingdom and between certain ports were required to 
have on board full complements of British masters and British marin-
ers. 
27 A few rigid exceptions were made. Foreign mariners, to the 
extent of one fourth of the total crew number, could be engaged in 
fishing boats as fishing instructors or in some such capacity.28 lllith 
regard to ships operating in certain places and outside the United 
Kingdom, the required proportion of British seamen had to be main-
tained for the whole voyage except in cases of emergency, e.g. sick-
ness, desertion or death?9 For many decades, continued legislative 
efforts were made in various ways to encourage British searnen:0 
improve the seafaring industry, and to provide for seamen's widows 
and children?1 
Several secondary goals were also achieved as part of the 
policy. Young and able men from the colonies and elsewhere were 
attracted into the fast-growing merchant navy. Further provisions 
were made to enable the recruits to qualify as British subjects by 
swearing allegiance to His Majesty_32 Interference with Britain's 
merchant shipping due to pirates~ 3 attacks by hostile vessels and 
26. (1794) 3h Geo. III, c. 68, s. 1. Under (1845) 8 & 9 Vic., c 88, 
s. 13, no ship would be admitted as British unless, inter 
alia, she was navigated during the whole of every ToYage 
by a master and three-fourths of the crew, who were Brit-
ish subjects. 
27. (1791,) 31, Geo. III, c. 68, s. 4. 
28. Ibid., s. 4. These exceptions were permitted on special 
grounds for the benefit of the fishing industry. 
29. Ibid., s. 5. 
30. See e. the long titlo of Act (1835) 5 & 6 Will. IV, c. 21~. 
31. (183/i) 4 & 5 Will. IV, c. 52, s. 2. 
32. E.g. 34 Geo. HI, c. 68, s. 6 defined who, and how a person, 
could qualify as a British master or mariner. 
33. Indirect referencf?s to such matters carl bf? gathered from 
Acts (17i14) 18 G£m. II. c. :lD m1d (1837) 7 Will. IV & 1 \lie., 
c. 88. 
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malicious damage to ships could be reacJily dealt v.1ith. 34 
It is unrealistic to ignore thf-J revenue-raising aspect of the 
system. One of the officials authorized to grant registration C(CJrtif-
icates in the colonies was the Collector and [omptroller of Her 
Majesty's Customs. The statute (Imp.) of George III, passed in 1786, 
appears to hm1e been the starting point for the revemJe-raising 
exercise. It may be recalled that in each case the registration cer-
tificate would only be issued after a bond was given by the master 
ami shipowner. The amount specified in the bond would be forfeited 
to' Her Majesty where any of the statuton; conditions attached to 
its issue was breached?5 By the -1845 Act (Imp.) the bonds to be~ given 
were liable to the same stamp duties as bonds given for duties of 
customs~ 6 
[ertain exceptions aside, stamp dutie~i and fees vv£~rF! payable 
on the registration or re-registration of a ship <3nd 011 the transfer 
of shares therein. A ship had to be n~-n~gistererj when she was tran-
sferred to another port for registration, her certiFicate was lost or 
mislaid, or any change IAJas made to the ship. ~)tatutory dh;ision of 
property in a ship into ~'>ixty-four ~3hanCJs~ 7 the compul~3ory use of 
bills of sale for transfer, mlCJ l1er mvnership by a maximum of thirty-
two persons,were clearly d('!Signed to generate stamp duties and feeJ.8 
Until legislation was sufficient! y cJmleloped to protect the interests 
of financiers, mortgage of :'hips or shares therein for the purpose 
of security took the torm Df transfer of the Pl'operty to mortgagees 
as in a normal sale~9 In practice, the mortgagees would be register-
ed as the new owners. 
34. See generally U1e lm1g titles Df the l\cts, (1827) 7 & B Geo. 
IV, c. 30 and (1837) 7 Will. I\/ & 1 Vic., c. 89. 
35. (1786) 26 L~EJO. III, c. 60, c3. 15. 
36. (1845) 8 & 9 Vic., c. 89, s. 25. 
37. However, any proportioll ~3mallm t.han 'I/6L1 part of a ship 
could tJB transferred witt1out stamp cluty: (182::1) '• Geo. I\/, 
c./+1, s. 30. 
38. (17136) 26 G8o. III, c. 60, s. 37. 
39. See infra. 
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One of the outstanding economic benefits Britain derived by 
implementing the concept of Britisll ships t,ias their immeasurable 
t:1Elrning capacity. The enormous freight re\Jenue served to finance 
Britain's Empire-building programme. 
However, the ship registration policv had it~3 undesirable con-
sequences. The substantial advantages conferred on British ships 
led to their capture and being held to ransom. In some cases, thev 
were used illegallv bv enemv captors as ''British ships". To deal with 
such problems, a statute (Imp.) of George IV was passed. It provided 
that a British ship which had been captured bv or become prize to an 
enemy, or sold to foreigners, would nm1er again be entitled to the 
privileges. The policy remained unchanged for over two decades. 40 
Moreover, the law encouraged British mariners to capture enemv 
ships. Captured enemv ships would be condemned in a court of 
admiraltv as prize of war. They could then be; rn~Jist(~rf]d so as to 
1,1 
augment the British merchant fleet. 
III. IDENTIFICATION OF SH POWNERS 
One of the elements underlyinq tt1e systrJm of reqistration was 
the disclosure of the m'llners of thr~ ship amJ their nationalitv. l his 
requirement was fir~ot introcJuced bv the statute (Imp.) of William III, 
passed in 1696. Before any ship could be registered, her owners had 
to take an oath t'llhlch IAIBS administered and attested bv the Governor 
or customs officer. It stated, inter the name of thE~ ship's 
master, the names and particulars of the ownr~rs, ami that no" foreigner 
directlv or indirectly llad anv share, part or interest therein." 112 
After registration, the oath \,\las delivered to the ship's master for 
the security of her nmfi~Jation. The object was to ensure that the 
identity of the shipm'IJners and their nationality could be well estab-
lished. However, by the late night.eenth centurv, duE~ to the dramatic 
lncrnase in the numbers of ships and shipowners at most of the ports, 
two additional forms of idfmtification wm'e intr·oduced. Firstly, when~ 
I10. (1823) h Geo. IV, c. 1~1, s. 8; (1845) 8 & 9 Vic.) c. 89, ~>. 9. 
L,1. As <3 policv matter, an important l=?xception \Alas m<Jde bv 
the British Parliament for such ships to tJe reEJistered 
at certain ports: (1786) 26 Geo. III, c. GO, s. 1; (1845) 13 & 9 
Vic., c 89, s. 33. 
42. 7 & 8 Ltlill. !II, c. ?2, s. 17. 
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a ship belonged to two or more owners or joint owners, one of the 
owners or joint owners who was resident within twenty miles of the 
registry was bound to take the oatrf.3 Even if none of them resided 
within the twenty-mile vicinity, the oath still had to be taken. If 
the requisite number of owners or joint ownm·s failed to attend and 
subscribe the oath, then an additional oath had to be taken by the 
same owner or joint owner~4 The penalty imposed for making a false 
oath was the same as for wilful and corrupt perjury~5 Secondly, the 
statute (Imp.) of George III reinforced the doctine of "owner" identif-
ication by introducing: a different oath format. Sworn statements 
had to be made relating to the names, occupations, residences amJ I 
the business associations of all tt1e owners. They included the nature 
and extent of the interest of owners in the ship, and information as 
to how and when they acquired British citizen~hip.46 This form of 
statutory oath was used for almost six decades. 
Under the Merchant Shipoing Act 1854 (Imp.), further require-
ments for identifying the owners had to be met. No person could be 
registered as owner of a ship, or any share therein, until he had 
made and subscribed a declaration in the prescribed form:L,/ For the 
purpose of personal identification, the declaration had to be made 
before the Registrar at the Port of Registry or, if the owner lived 
mpre than five miles away from the port, before any Registrar or 
Justice of the Peace.48 
In the seventeenth century. joint stock companies and bodies 
corporate began to replace individuals as owners of ships~9 Despite 
the Bubble l\ct 1720 (Imp.)SO which struck down unincorporated assoc-
iatioins, the courts continued to recognise the deed of settlement 
43. (1786) 26 Geo. III, c. 60, s. 1 D. 
44. Ibid., ss. 10 and 11. 
t~s. Ibid., s. 1~1. As to provision for recovery of penalties, 
see s. l1Z. 
46. Ibid., s. 10. 
47. See 17 & 18 Vic., c. 104, Schedule, Form B for individuals, 
and Form C l'or a body corporate. 
4fL Ibid., s. 38. 
L,9. H.A.J. Fore], Princieles of Cornnany Law (3rcJ Ed. 1982), para. 
107. 
50. 6 Geo.---r\1, c. 91. 
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companies. If the shares were only transferable with the approval 
of the trustees under the deed, a company \,'\Ji th objects beneficial 
to the community was considered by the jury to be outside the Act. 
As a joint stock company, it often attracted investments from many 
subscribers. Attempts, however, were made by merchants to obtain 
incorporation under the Bubble Repeal Act 1825 (lmp.),51 the Trading 
Companies Act 1834 (lmp.)52 and private Acts (Imp.). It \,'\las not until 
the Joint Stock Companies Registration and Regulation Act 1841~ (Imp.f3 
was passed that a general form of incorporation for trading compan-
ies by registration was provided. 
Section 31 of the statute (Imp.) of George n/4 made provision 
for the ownership of ships by joint stock companies and corporate 
bodies. With the permission of the Commissioners, a joint stock com-
pany could appoint as trustees three of its members to take the 
oath at the ship registry. They were required to state the name and 
description of the company to \,'\Jhich the ship belonged. In the case 
of a corporate body in the United Kingdom, the secretary or other 
officer would take the oath declaring the name and description of 
the corporate body which owned the ship.55 
The thrust of the doctrine of "owner" idrmtification was towards 
preventing foreigners from acquiring an interest in British ships. 
The case of The King of the Tl'\Jo Sicilies v. The Peninsular and Orien-
tal Steam-Packel Co.56 concerned allegations of contravention of a 
ship Registration Act (Imp.) of Queen Victoria.57 Two foreigr1ers wDre 
sent to England by a usurping Sicilian government to purchase a 
vessel from the defendant company. The ship was transferred by a 
bill of sale to two persons alleged to be trustees for the foreigners. 
When the rightful government was restored, the plaintiff filed a bill 
to restrain the defendant company from parting with the ship. It 
was alleged that the purchase money was taken from the royal treas-
ury ar1d that the defendant company had conspired with two foreign-
ers to evade the provisions of Um ship 1\egistra tion /Act. The compcmv 
51. 6 c;eo. IV, c. 91. 
'::.i2. !1 & 5 lJJill. IV, c. %. 
53. 7 & 8 Vic., c. 110. 
5l~, (1823) it Geo. IV, c. L11. 
55. Ibid.,..&-. 31. 
')6. (18L.9-1B5ll) 19 L.J. [h. (N.~).) MHJ. 
57. (1845) B & 9 \lie., c. B9, ~1~3. 5, 12 and 13 (1). This Act [~3 iJlso 
referred to as the ~Sh.lp Ro~Jistn/ AcL. 
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sought to sidestep the alle~1ations. It demurred that bv answering 
the blll thev t.vould expose themselves to pains and penalties tmder 
the ship Registration Act (Imp.) and to an indictment undE!r the Foreign 
Fnlistment Act (U.K.):s The demurrer was overruled. The allegations 
were seen as possiblE' acts of sabotage of the British shipping poHcv. 
W. v c 'd 59 Igrarn, . ., sm : 
"I am not prepared to sav no fraud has been committed 
upon the [ship registration] Act.''; 
The doctrine of "m'llner'' identification changed in scope. Its 
requirements were no longer confined to the disclosure of strictlv 
legal interest. The aim of the legislators was to make public anv 
person who had anvthing to do with the ownership or control of 
British ships. Under the statute (Imp.) of George m60 the word 
"propertv" was given a wide meaning. After 1st Januarv, 1795, no 
instrument contract or agreement for the transfer of propertv in 
anv ship would be valid for anv purpose, in law or in equitv. The 
mode of transfer prescribed bv legislation was bv bill of sale contain-
ing a recital of the registrv certificate.61 In Biddell v. Leeder and 
Pulham~2 an executorv agreement to transfer a share in a ship was 
held to be void because tt1e above requirement was not met. Bavlev 
J 'dp3 ., Sal . 
" ... the object of the Legislature was plainlv to extend 
the provision [i.e. section 14] to agreements to tran~:;fer 
as well as to actual transfers. Bv tile later, the propertv 
tvould immediatelv vest in tile transferee, bv the former 
... he would take an equitable interest until the complet-
ion of the sale; and in the meantime might have a material 
control and use of a ship. The object of the Lngislature 
would not be answered, unless it be madB publiclv known 
who has the equitable right to tr1e control and use of the 
ship. It is of importance to Government to have the means 
of ascertaining, at anv time, who hmte the powEH' over the 
use and dBstination of ships, and thE:! appointment of the 
masters." 
58. (1819) 59 Geo. III, c. 69, s. 7 (2}. 
rj9, (1849-1850) 19 L.J. Ch. (N.S.) L,88, p. 1,91. 
60. (1794) 31., G\'10. III, c. 68. 
61. !bid., 5. 1L~, 
62. (1823) 1 B. & C. 327. 
63. Ibid., 333. 
-
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Consistent with U1e basic object of the doctrine. the statute 
of George IV added a new disclosure requirement. Apart from one 
exception~l~ a bill of sale or other instrument by itself was not valid 
to pass thD property in any ship, or any share therein. The particu-
lars of the bill of sale or other instrument had to be endorst:ld on 
the ship's registration certificate.65 Otherwise persons would be 
content to have "the profits and management of ships, without having 
the legal ownership, and might remain unknown?6 It would be seen 
that the measures imposed arE! really part of a legislative design to 
create a special class of property in ships. 
An important issuB arose in The Queen on the Prosecution of 
The Pacific Steam Navigation Company v. Elias Arnauld and Thomas 
Powen.67 Some foreigners were members of a British companv incorpor-
ated by charter for the purpose of purchasing and emploving ships. 
The Court of Queen's Bench had to consider whether, by allowing the 
company to be resJistered as owner of British ships, the general pol-
icv and object of Britain's navigation laws would breached. One 
objection raised against the registration was that the statute (Imp.) 
of Victoria68 would prohibit foreigners from obtaining indirectly, as 
members of a corporation, those benefits from \Airlich ,as individuals 1 
they t.\lere debarred. Althou[lh a unanimous decision was given in 
favour of the company, the three judges cliffered in their reasoning. 
Weightman, J., hl~ld that. a corporation "may be a ship-owner", not 
"as a British subject, but as an excepted case}69 Coleridge, J., 
regarded the interest of the members of a corporation to be too 
remote. Lord Denman, C.J., took a realistic ar1d fairly broad view of 
the matter. He said: 
61>. I.e., where a ship was about to be rtJgisU~red 
65. fi Geo. I\/, c. '110, s. 36; othE~r formalities also had to be 
satisfied. 
67. (1814 16 L.J.[J.B. (N.S.) 50 . 
. , c. Wl. 
69. (1847) 16 L.J.Q.B. (N.S.) [;0, 53. 
70. Ibid., 55. HE~ was of the \Jif.:>W that if am; evil consequencu 
arD~3e it could be rerm'!dic~d by thE) legislaturr~ or by repeal 
Ing tllt=J lE:Jtters [.latent. 
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" .. the British corporation ls, as such, the soh~l owner of 
the 3hip, amJ a British subject \.Ali thin the meaning of the 
5th section, as far as such a term can be applicable to a 
corporation, nothwitt1standing some foreigners may indiv-
idually ha\Je ~>hares in the company ... The terms of the 23rd 
section, with respect to the condition of the bond to be 
giV(-'!fl upon obtaining the registry, as to for·eigners pur-
chasing or becoming entitled to any part or share of or 
interest in any ship or vessel, would be applicable to a 
case of purchas~c'! or transfer of property in thE~ ve~:;~ml 
itself ... and does not, it seems to us. bear materlalh; on thE~ 
present question." 
By holcling that the British corporation was the legal owner of the 
ship, Lord Denman was in fact subsuming the nationality and identity 
of its members under the principle of separate legal entitv?1 He 
did not consider that the object of the Registration Acts would \Aiarr-
ant the corporate veil to be pierced. That the principle has no app-
lication to partnersr1ips is clear from the Western Australian decision 
in ybascov. Dakas and Dakas?2 The Pearling Act 1912-1935 (W.A./3 
excluded fon~igners from engaging in the pearlin::.J industry, except as 
divers or pearl rJealers.The plaintiff in tile action was a foreigner. 
He sought a declaration that he was a partner with the defendar1ts 
and that he was entitled to a st1are of the net assets and profits of 
thtJ pear ling business. In giving judgment for the defendants, Walker, 
J., rigorously applied the policy of thc-J J\ct (W.A.) to the partnership. 
IV. EFFECTS ON PROPERTY 
We have considered the objects of the British system of ship 
7ll 
mgistration. The Act (Imp.) ~;vhich further implemented the Imperial 
policv was passed in 1786~5 It did not allow any property to exist, 
or to be acquired bv any British subjects, in a British ship unless it 
was conveyed in thE~ manner specified in section 17. 76 A serious over-
sight on the part of the legislature in framing the enactment was the 
total neglect in considering its effect upon the principles administered 
71. The doctrine was later endorsed by the House of Lords in 
tt1e wc~llknown case of v. Salomon & Co. Ltcl. [1897] 
A.C. 22. 
72. [19l!8] 51 W.A.L.R. 22. 
73. /-\ct No. L.S of 1912, as amendf~d. 
71,. See Hubbard v. Joilnstorm (1810) 3 Tmn1t 178, 212, 
["3; sBe abo (1696) l & B l.uill., c. 22, s. 17. 
75. (1786) 26 Geo. III, . GO. 
lllood 
76. ltJhene\mr pmpertv in any Bf'itish ship \Jvas transferrucl, 
the rr:!qistration cc~rti ficate of ttm ::'hip had tu tm trul v 
and ac;.curately cited in the bill uf sale. DttlB!'\.Vise thG 
bill of sale would be void. 
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by courts of equity. In short, the distinction between legal and 
equitable interest \1\Jas not attended to?7 Under the 1786 Act (Imp.), 
it was possible for a per~>or1 to obtain an cc!quitabl!3 title to <3 ship, 
giving him control m1er her, though insufficient for the purpose of 
being registered as owner. This gap in the law led to the setting up 
of trusts of various types in Her 1'1ajestv's Dominions. These trusts 
clandestinelv owned and operated British ships for the benefit of 
78 foreigners. The 1794 /\ct (Imp.), as \file have seen, was passed to rem-
. edv the situation.. It categorily provided that neither legal nor 
equitable interest should pass except in the manner prescribed. 79 
The provision regulated all propr·ietarv interests in ships, and clearlv 
stated that "there can be no such a thing as the equitable ownership 
of a ship." BD 
The far-reaching effects oF the svstem in His Majestv's Domin-
ions as produced by the policv of the two Acts are noteworthv. The 
non-recognition of equitable interests as a legal weapon to defeat 
attempts bv foreigners to acquire propertv1of wt1atever kind in Brit-
ish ships,had untmvard implications for British merchants. In Camden 
\1. AndersonP1 a partnership purchased a ship in the name Df one of 
its partners. His name alone appeared in the register as owner. An 
action involving an averment of interest in all the partners t~~Jas 
brought upon an insurance policv effected on the ship. The decision 
of the Court of King 1s Bench and the grounds therefor are somewhat 
startling. It was held that regif:>tration in the name of the person alone 
was conclusive of his title, both legal and equitablE!, to the exclusion 
of the others. It also meant tr1at the others had no insurable inter-
est as well! 
In Yallop, Ex parte~2 the principle was not onlv upheld but 
(1818) VI Dow 116, 131, Eldon, L.C. 
!H. 3l! GPO. III, c. 68. 
79. /\fter 1st Januarv, 1795, no transfer, ccmt;ract or agreement 
for txansfer of proper·tv in any ship would be valid in law 
or equitv unless it was made bv bill of sale or instrument 
ibn.writing containing a recital of the registry certificate: 
!..__lld.:., s . T 4. 
BO. Dixon \J.Ewart (1817) 3 MeL 322, 332; ~>ee also Thompson v. 
Srni th 1 !"!add. 395. 
B1. (1791!)-'3- Term Rep. 709. 
B2. (1BD8) 15 Ves. Jun. 60. 
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extended to the prejudice of certain creditors. A firm of two part-
ners, C and H, bought three-fourths of thB ship "Euphrates". They 
paid the shipowner by accepting bills of exchange. Although the 
shares were joint property and treated in the books as partnership 
property, thev were registered in c's name alone. The acceptances 
on account of the purchase-money were unpaid to the extent of 
£12,500. An important issue raised by the petition presented by a 
joint creditor of C and H was whetller the ship was partnership prop-
ertv. Despite the ship being dealt with bv trm partnership, tr1e court 
held that registration was evidence of c's property and had to be 
taken as such even among the partnership's creditors. The effect the 
decision had on equitable principles is better understood IAJhen one 
refers to the words of Eldon, L.C. He said: 83 
"These two Acts of Parliament (stat. 26 Geo. III c. 60; stat. 
34 Geo. III, c. 68) were drawn upon this policy; that it is 
for the public interest to secure evidence of the title to 
a ship from her origin to the moment in which you look back 
to her historv ... and lt is obvious, that, if...the doctrine of 
implied trust in this court to be appli£~d. the whole of 
tr1ese Acts may be defeated; as neutrals may have interest 
in a sr1ip, partly British-oiAJned; and the means of enforcing 
the Naviqation Laws depencl upon knowing from time to time 
who are the mvners, and, whethee the ship is British-owned 
and British-built. Upon that the Legislature IAiill not be 
content with anv other evidence than the registry ... They 
go so far as to declare, that nothwithstanding any transfer, 
any sale, or any contract, if the purpose is not executed 
in the modo and form prescribed by the Act, it shall be 
void to all intents and purposes." 
It is ob\Jious that the ttlrust of the t~vo early Acts \!lias to strike 
directly at ttle root of all trusts,whether thev arose by the acts 
of the parties or by operation of law, §.Ji· by an implied or msulting 
trust?4 The policy for excluding equitable doctrines equally extend-
ed to prevent tim principle of agency from operating. In "The 
----
• B5 the court rejected the argument that one Campbell, 
83. Ibid., 66. 
Bl1. Houqhton Expartfl; Grimble Exparte (1810) 17 Vr"!s. Jun. 251, 
253, Ql1I' Eldon, L.C. He confirmed that the legislative 
intention under the Act (3L! Geo. III, c. 68) was to exclude 
equitable interest in ships. 
85. (1820) 2 DocJs l120. 
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endorsed on the registration certificate as partner-owner, was in 
fact the agPnt of two other persons. Sir W. Scott said:86 
"But if this mode be permitted, of substituting the teusteB 
or agent for persons whose names are withdrawn from all 
notice, I do not see what is to hinder the whole policy of 
the law from being subverted by the ownership of foreigners 
by the substitution of names of British trustees and agents.'' 
The statute (Imp.) of George rv87 seemed to suggest a relaxing of 
legislative attitude towards equitable interests. The change, however, 
was apparnnt rather than real. For administrative expediency at the 
ship registries, the maximum number of legal owners at any givrm time 
was limited to thirty-two persons~8 It was feared that this provision 
could be so construed a:3 to disrec]ord totally the rights of th8 own-
er~> wt10, but for the maximum number allowed, would hm;e bmm regis-
tered as owners. The rights protected by the proviso were the "equit-
able title of minors, heirs, legatees, creditors or others excpeding 
that number" duly represented by any of the re[.JistBrecJ m111ners~9 If 
an equitable title arose in favour of a fon~ign creditor, he would be 
pro\/entecJ from being registered. But he l:vould be entitled to assign 
his interest or to thr~ proceeds of the sale thereof. 
Despite the above proviso in the 1823 Act (Imp.) the cuurts had 
been consistent in continuing to recognize registration as conclusi\/e 
of ownership. Thus, where the members of a trading partr1ership were 
interPsted in the ship, all their names had to appear on the register. 
The partnership name coulrJ be added although the eespective shares .• 
to which the partners were individually entitled, need not be stated. 
The above development was reached in 1838 in ttm case of v. 
Willis~10 This lopsided approach to property in British ships had given 
86. Ibid., £,23. 
87. (1823) '-! Geo. IV, c. 41. The same could be said in respecti\/e 
of all the subsequent legislation. 
88. Ibid., s. 31. This maximum number had continued unchanged 
under the Merchant Shipping Act 189l, (Imp.), s. 5 (i). 
sixty-four persons under tho Shipping Reqistl:'ation Act 1981 
(Comth.), s. 11 (1) (9_). 
89. (11J23) 4 Geo. IV, c. '-11, s. 31; (1825) 6 Geo. IV, c. 110, s. 32; 
(1833) 3 & 4 Will., c. 55, s. 33; (1f3l,5) 8 & 9 Vic. c. 89, s. 
(185L,) 17 & 18 Vic. c. 104, s. 37 (2). A declaration was required 
by s. 38 (5) tt1at no foreigner t1ad any legal or equitable 
interest in the ship or a·ny share therein.· 
90. (11338) 1 Beav. 354. 
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rise to problems in thE) middle of the nineteenth cer1tury. The system 
at times opened the door to fraud and injustices. 
The general attitude of the courts, as conditioned by legisla-
tive policy, was that they were unprepared to rectify or alter a regis-
ter. A person claiming title and seeking to replace another as legal 
owner had to discharge a heavy onus before the court would exercise 
its discretion~1 It is submitted that a system of law, devoid of equity 
as its conscience, would lead to undue rigidity, and prejudice unwary 
. 92 innocent merchants. In Follett v. Delany_, L.A. & Co. made an arrange-
ment with D to sell him a ship for the sum of £1,800. Althougr1 a lJill 
of sale was executed by L.A. & Co. in favour of D, it was not delivered 
to D because no part of the money was paid. uJithout the knowledge 
or consent of the vendors, D took away the bill of sale and had the 
ship registered in his own name. A few days later D returned the bill 
of sale, stating that the arrangement was not to be carri()d out. L.A. 
& Co., as plaintiffs, sought the court's assistance to have the ship 
restored to them. The judgment given to D based on a literal applic-
ation of section 37 of t11e Act (lrnp}3 was a flagrant \liolation of 
justice. What shocking is the dangerous precedent set in this case 
that there "should be no remedy whatever in respect of fraud. how-
ever gross, perpetrated with regard to ship:1."% Knight Bruce, V.C., 
appeared to have accepted the deff:lndant's argurnent?5 11 ftlP doctrine 
of courts of equity, that a vendor has a lien in the pmperty sold for 
unpaid purchase-money, has no application to the sale of ships." 
91. See .c..:..:.;;;__.;....;;_;;;;;.;..;.;::..=:.... (1820) 2 Dods 1+20, 424, per Sir W. Scott, 
supra. 
92. (181+8) 17 L.J. Ch. 254. 
93. (1845) 8 & 9 Vic., c. 89. 
94. (1 BL+8) 17 L.J. Ch. 25ll, p. 255, in argument on behalf of the 
plaintiffs. 
95. Ibid., p. 255. 
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Th1:1 stance taken by the courts towards registe!'mJ ti tlos to 
ships up to 1fi54 t·1ad changed little. In part, the defects of this 
body oF law \JIJere compounded by the refusal or unwillinsJness of tho 
courts to look behind the re~1ister. In The Hol'lock~6 the ac t.ion 
vJas brought bv W, as the registered owmCJr of a ship. Pursuant to a 
sale agn:ement, she had been transferred to W under a bill of sale 
by the pre\Jlous registered owner TW. JH, the defendant. alleged 
that he had nevee executed any bill of sale in fa\Jour of TW. Accord-
ing to him, if any bill of sale was registered, it was made and regis-
tered fraudulentlv, without his knol!liledge, consent and authority. 
fhe defendant, who had the management of the ship, had not rendered 
the accounts. Like the Court of Chancery, the Court of Admiralty 
followed the plain meaning of section 43 of the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1854 (Irnp.). It read: 
"No notice of any trust, expressed implied, or construc-
tive, shall be entered in the Regi~3ter Book, or receivable 
by the Reqistrar; ... the registered owner of any ship, or 
share therein, shall ha\Je power absolutely to dispose ... of 
such ship or share, and to give r~ffectual receipts for 
any money paid or advanced by way of consideration." 
Undoubtedly, the law of consumer pr·otection was on W's side because 
he was a LJona fide purchaser for value, vJithout notice of the fraud. 
The strength of lJJ's case lay predominantly in TW's registration, as 
legal owner and seller, and also in W's own registration as requinJd 
by the Act (Imp.). Applying the literal meaning of section 43, the 
court held that W had a "good legal and equitable title 11 • As LtJ's title 
was deemed "complete" in that sense. there was no basis on which 
the court could intervene on JH's behalf. The reasons given for the 
judgment for W further reinforced the legislative object. Sir Robert 
Phillimore said :97 
" .. .in no case would the court inquire into wheU1er a bill 
of sale, as is alleged in this case, transfc1rring shares has 
been registered in fraud ... but the question which I have to 
decide .. .is that assuming the purchaser in this case buying 
without notice of fraud. for a valuablE? consider'ation under 
this bill of sale, has become poss£-~ssed of those shares, and 
al§o ... has put his name upon the regi~:Jter in such a case it 
is not competent to the court ... to look tJehind the mgister 
for the purpose of dispossessing an innocent purchaser, 
whose name is on the nJgister." 
96. (1B77) 3 Mar. L.C. 421. 
97. Ibid., 8£2. 423-424. 
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A logical inference to be drawn regarding the system of ship regis-
tration is that a more recently registered ownm' was protected at 
the expense of those registered further back in time. Another unde-
sirable effect stemmed from the use of registration by the unscrup-
ulous as an instrument of fraud. 
H1e defects inherent in a policy-oriented system were later 
alleviated. The change carne when the British Parliament modified its 
dogmatic approach to registered titles~18 Consequently, the courts 
were able to exercise jurisdictions which involved looking behind the 
. t 99 reg1s er. 
V. PASSING OF PROPERTY 
It is self-evident that a class of property created by legisla-
tion can only be transferred in the way provided by the Parliament. 
1 The statute (Imp.) of George III was passed some seven years after 
the first settlement in New South Wales in 1788. Although in 1794 Port 
Jackson was not proclaimed a port for the purpose of registering 
ships, several sections of the statute (Imp.) were of general applic-
ation and would therefore apply to sl1ip transactions in the colony. 2 
The sections introduced certain Pl'OCE)dueal rE3quirernents to be 
met for the protection of the buyer's interests. By section 15, on 
transfer of property in a registered ship an endorsement had to be 
made on the registration certificate, and a copy of the endorsement 
delivered to authorized persons for registration. Non-compliance 
rendered the sale, contract or agreement for sale nvoid to all intents 
and purposes whatsoever." Where the ship was absent from port at 
the time when the change in property occurred, registration of the 
bill of sale and endorsement on the certificate had to be made within 
98.1g., when the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act 1862 
(Imp.), s. 3, was passed. See also Batthyany v. Bouch (1881) 
50 L.J.Q.B. 421. Corresponding provisions are enacted in 
the Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Comtt1.), s. 47. These 
matters are considered in due course. 
99. See Chapter Nine on Admiralty Jurisdiction. 
l. (1791!) 34 Geo. III, c. 68, supra. 
2. See e.g., ibid., ss. 11, 12, 11, and 15. 
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3 ten days after her return. 
In v. Charnock~' the Court of King's Bench held that, un-
the requisites imposed on the parties were rnet, no bill of sale 
or other instrument would be operative or effectual from any ante-
cedent time. The ground of the decision is seen as an aspect of the 
doctrine of disclosure which underlay the system of registration. 
"The public \lllould be best secured by holding that no interest shall 
pass from any owner in British ships to any other until the public 
has that information ... so essential to its commercial welfare. True 
to tt1e declared policy of the legislature, the Court of King's Bench 
gave effect to the wording of the Act (Imp.) in the literal sense. 
However, in the two later cases of Palmer v. Moxon 6 and ~ v. 
Dixorl, the Court of Common Pleas and the Court of Chancery, res-
pectively, took a somewhat different view of the 179l, Act (Imp.). Both 
the courts held that property in a ship passed by the bill of sale on 
its execution? Performance of the requisites as to registration and 
endorsement was construed as a condition subsequent. Accordingly, 
non-performance was held to defeat the interest which had vested 
3. to the port to which she belonged: ibid., s. 16. 
4. (1802) 2 East 399. 
5. Statement of Court of King's Bench in v. Charnock 
(1802) 2 East 399, referred to by f\'1aule, J., in Bovson v. 
Gibson (1847) 4 C.B. 121, 147. 
6. (1813) 2 M. & S. 43. The correctness of the decision in Moss 
v. Charnock (1802) 2 East 399 was endorsBd. But several of 
the judges, including Lord Ellenbmough, C.J., thought 
that "some of the expressions usmi went farther than the 
case required or the law warranted," ibid., 50 and 52. 
l. (1817) 3 Mer. 322. Lord ChancBllor Eldon held that endorse-
ment on the registration certificate within ten davs of 
the ship's return to port could be effected bv the seller 
despite his bankruptcy. His vi ow was that tho endorsement 
passed no property: ibid., 33h. 
8. This position)as adopted in the two cases_,was ~1tated by 
Maule, J., in Boyson v. Gibson (181,7) L1 C.B. 121, 147. 
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by the E'Jxecution of the bill of sale? Though such construction put 
upon the Act (Imp.) was in the main regarded as corn~ct, it was grossly 
out of line with the legislative objective. 
To rr~ctify the error - it is interesting to notEl that two 
succeeding Registration Acts (Imp.), i.e. tt1e Act passed in the reign 
of George I\/ 10 and the one passed in the reign of William IV: 1 aban-
doned the language of the 1791+ Act (Irnp.). In relation to a :3ingle 
buyer, the condition sub~mquent to be fulfilled by endorsement on 
the registration certificate was repealed. In enacting the two Acts, 
the legislature had adopted the same words as those which thEl Court 
of l<(ing's Bench in fv1oss v. Charnock 12 had used in the construction 
placed upon section 14 of the 179l! Act (Imp.). In making the title of 
a purchaser of a ship or am; share therein dependent on registration 
alone, the two Acts were promoting the principle of public record. 
Registration was a formal act which the purchaser could procure to 
be done by the public officers ~,,;ho were bound to make the entry on 
his application. The interests of the public l'IIDUld be better Sl")rved 
because the registration, when made. would be open Lo inspection by 
all. 
In the event of a shipowner's bankeuptcv, the competing claims 
of the purchaser and the a~3signees were determined according to 
whether or not the bill of sale was registered. In Boyson and Another 
v. Gibson and Others,13 a British ship eegisterecJ under the Act (Imp.) 
of William IV 1l, was conveyed by llt-Jr owner for valuable consideration 
to B. The bill of sale was executed before, but was not registered 
until after, the owner's bankruptcy occurrod. [t was hr~ld that, due 
9. [n Hubbard v. Johnstone (1810) 3 Taunt 178, it was held 
b1,1 five judges against two tr1at property in a ship would 
\/est in a purcha~;er instant! y on thr~ execution of a bill 
of sal£~. However, non-compliance lo\Jith the registration 
Acts was held to render the purchas£~r'::.> titlr~ defeasible. 
10. (1825) 6 Geo. IV, c. 110, ~>. 37. 
11. (1833) 3 & l, IJJill. I\/, c. ri'), s. 3h. 
12. (1802) 2 East 399, supra. 
13. (18~7) L, C.B. 121. 
1~. (1B33) 3 & l, l.LJill. I\/, c. r)5. 
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to B's delay in securing n:Jgistration, property in the ship had passed 
to her owner's assignees.15 Maule, J., said:16 
"The true effect of the enactments appears to be, that, 
until registration, every disposition tJy the act of the 
vendor, or of the law, is as effectual as if the unregistDred 
deed had not existed, and is not defeated by the subsequent 
registration - whether such intermediate disposition be 
ono \rl.!hich requires registration and is registered, or does 
not require it, and is not registered." 
The whole effect of the l\ct (Imp.) as to registration seems to be 
this: it is the registration, and not the executiCJn of the bill of sale, 
from ~vhich its operation commenced. Apparently, the registration, 
when made, ~vould operate on any interest or property right which 
the party making the transfer had at the time.17 This seemingly harsh 
decision could be further explained. Propertv rights in registered 
ships were of a statutory nature. Minor exccwtions aside, it has been 
an express legislative object to treat evei'\; business dealing affect-
ing titles or rights to ships as matters within the svstem. Often thE3 
underlving rules were too rigid to permit anv technical departure or 
procedural omission by purchasers. Moreover, under the svstem 
the registry officers were not empowered to take into consideration 
the special circumstances and/or the mF2rits of anv case so as to 
waive some of the statutory provisions. 
Besides being an element of policy, registration of a transfer 
by bill of sale constituted public notice. It behoved a pro~1pective 
purchaser to inspect first the register book at the ship's registra-
tion office. The register book would show at any given time whether 
am; transactions affectinsJ the ship had been ~:mtered. Thr:l absence 
of an entry was, however, no indication that no sale had in fact 
occurred. This ri~3k factor togett1Br with the unrestricted time per-
iod allowed for effecting a registration became a pitfall for British 
merchants and financiers. It would be easv for an unscrupulous 
15. The reason was that the ship did not pass to the purchaser 
as his property becausFJ it \J\Jas deemed to remain in the 
bankrupt's order and disposition. 
16. (1845) I~ C.B. 121, 1l1S. 
l7. Ibid., 11~8. 
1 8 
shipowrmr (S) to com>pire with another person {D) to defraud an inno-
cent buyer (B). For example, S could transfer by bill of sale or other 
im:;trument thE~ property to 0, who would cJeliberately postpone the 
registration. S could later execute another transfer of the same 
ship to B in such a way that 0 could secure registration ahead of B. 
Even in the absence of any conspiracy betl.veen S and 0, B would still 
be rJisaclvantaged. /\s .B had obtained no property in the ship, his 
personal claims against S might yield no satisfaction )f the latter 
was insolvent. The l'igid approach to registered titles coupled with 
the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Chancery to 
intervene18 were matters of grave concern. 
On the other hand, due to a purchaser's insolvency or failure 
to tender payment, a seller would be compelled to transfer his ship 
or shares therein to another person. The bill of sale or instrument 
executed in fm.1our of the first purchaser, who was guilty of default, 
could have been registered. A change in the legislative policy was 
necessary to protect tho rights of shipowners and Um position of 
bona fide purchasers for value. The eli fficultv was ingeniously remov-
ed. By section 39 of the 1825 Act (Irnp.)/9 subject to the intorval of 
thirty days apart~0 two or more tJills of sale or instruments relating 
to the same ship or· shares therein could be E::ntered In tt1e register. 
Within thirty days after the registration, an endorsement had to Lle 
made on the ship-registration certificate. Since a shipowner had 
possession of the ship.-rElDistration certi fie ate, the requirement 
enabled hirn to pass a good title to the proper purchaser. If, on the 
expiration of the thirty-day period, no such BnrJorsement was made, 
an endorsement could rnadu in favour of a subsequent purchaser, 
18. See the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment !\ct. 1862 (Imp.), 
s. 3 and §atthyan)L v. Bouch (1881) 50 L.J.Q.D. L121. 
19. (1825) 6 Geo. IV, c. 110. 
20. thirty days after the bill of sale or instrument was 
entered ln the re!::1ister, or after the ship's return to U18 port 
to wt1ich she belonged. 
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who produced the ship registration certificate to the Collector and 
21 Comptroller for the purpose. 
The above method of determining the order of priority was dis-
carded about two decades later. Under the Merchant Shipping Acts 
(Imp.) of 1854 and 1894, a different approach to the problems was 
adopted. The courts were given wider admiralty jurisdiction by leg-
islation to adjudicate upon competing claims to property in ships, and 
also other matters relating thereto.Z2 As a reforming measure, the 
1 
Parliaments in the United Kingdom and Australia tend to enlarge the', 
admiralty jurisdiction of the courts. 
The endorsement procedure seen as a furtherance of the 
legislative policy. As a logical extension of the register, the ship-
registration certificate was required to bear the personal particulars 
of the new owners. For reasons of security and entitlement to the 
privileges enjoyed by a British ship, the information was essential, 
'especially where the ship was plying outside her horne port~3 It is 
interesting to note that the doctrine of "owner" identification has 
been consistently adhered to under the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 
(Irnp.)24 and by the Commonwealth under the Shipping Registration Act 
1981 (Comth.l5 
21. (1825) 6 Geo. IV, c. 110, s. 39; (1833), L, Will. IV, c. 55, s. 36. 
Pro\/isions were introduced authorising endorsements to be 
made on the registration certificate at a port other than 
the one IAihere the ship was registered: s. 40 of the 1825/~ct 
(Imp.) and s. 37 of the 1833 Act (Imp.). 
22. To be considered in due course. 
23. Under the Merchant Shipping .L\ct 185L. (17 & 18 Vic., c. 104) 
when a change in ownership occurred, an endorsement on 
the registration certificate had to be made: s. L1S. 
24. (1894) 57 & 58 Vic., c. 60, s. 20. 
25. No. 8 of 1981, s. 24. 
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VI. MISCELLANEOUS EXCEPTIONS 
We have seen the system of registration which operated to vest 
in a purchaser the legal and equitable title to a ship or the stlares 
therein. The cases which fall outside its scope will be considered. 
1. Registration short of Ownership 
Despite the registration, a purchaser does not acquire any 
title unless the bill of sale is validly executed. This exception is an 
26 
aspect of the legislative policy, which is explainE~d in Orr v. Dickinson. 
As owner of the "Polly Hopkins" registered at Prince Ed1111ard's island, 
the plaintiff executed a certificate of !c1ale in statutory form, auth-
orising M'Claman to sell her for £1300.: By way of conditional sale, 
M'Claman executed a bill of sale of tt1e brig to D for £900. The F~egis­
trar at the li\Jerpool Customs House registered 0 as owner only after 
the amount had been changed to £1300. When the bill of sale 1111as 
executed, M'Claman had become insolvent. Moreover, the registration/ 
was mistakenly effected after notice of revocation of the power of 
attorney,previously given to M'Claman,was received. In the action 
brought against M'Claman and 0, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that 
. ---
no bona fide sale of the brig had taken place. Reft3rence was made. 
to section 81 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (Imp.) which required 
certain rules to be observed to as certificatr.c~s of sale. 
The court found that the power was not exercised according 
to the directions contained in the certificate. It took the view that 
the bill of sale, though purporting to be good so that the Registrar 
was obliged to register D as owmJr, was in fact a nullity. f\Jo prop-
erty in the vessel would therefore pass. The attempted exercise of the 
power was ultra vires. Wood, V.C., said: 27 
" ... I can find nothing in the principle of r1ational policy, 
which requires that registration shall fJive operation to 
that which is a nullity ... the registration was an irre!]Ular 
registration in every sense of the word; and that accord-
ing to the 12th rule of section 81, no sale having been made 
26. (1859) 28 L.J. Ch. (N.S.) 516. 
27. ., p. 520. 
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in conformity 1111ith the certificate of sale, th~::1 certificate 
ought to be cancelled." 
Entrv in the n::>gister is r~,o absolute guarantee of title. This 
fact and the absence of peovisions on the matter in the IVJerct1ant 
Shipping Act 1854 (Imp.) will not deter the court from holding that 
a person, who has no authmitv, cannot confer a valid title on another. 
In Holdernness v. Lamport~8 for valuable consideration ~JI-1 ~mid to 
the plaintiffs TH three ships, including the Flora M'Ivor. :JH having 
become bankrupt, his assignees claimed the ships on the ground thev 
were in his order and disposition. In Holdernness v. fie:mkin,29 a suit 
instituted bv TH, it was held that he was entitled to the ships as 
purchaser. Hmvever, the assignees had considered themselves entitled 
to the ships. Thev had allowed l.tJM to take the Flora M'Ivor in satis-
faction of a large sum of money owed bv JH. Consequentlv, WM became 
registered as owner of the ship and had possession of her. rhe judg-
ment given for TH shows that. on the facts of Um case, registration 
alone did not confer an indefE3asible title on a person. Moreover, the 
contention that, without fr·aucJ or crlminalitv, the name of uJfVl had 
been entered on the register hacj no m1erriding force. In ordr::n'ing 
that the ship and her possession be restored to TH, the court was 
in fact exercising some new powc~r. f~ornilly, i'1.H., said:30 
"There must, howm;er, be jurisdiction somewhere to enable 
the rightful owner to obtain a transfer of the ship on the 
registrv, and possession of the pmpertv ... But if the [Act] 
does not provide a rerm~dv, the jurisdiction muf>t rest in 
this court." 
HlB above rule equally applitcJd where <m unauthorise:d sale was made 
overseas bv the ship's master who happened to have the same name 
as the shipowner. Both their names appeared on the rogistration 
certificate. Good faith and valuable consideration of Um buyer, 
followed by the necessary registration in his name ,tr,~ero insufficient. 
31 This was because of tht:~ fraud and forgr~rv committE!d bv tilE! ~milcH'. 
28. (1860-1861) 30 L.J. Ch. (1\l.S.) 489. 
29, (1860) 28 BF]O\/. 180; 29 Law J., Rep. (N.S.) Chane. 753. 
30. (1860-1861) 30 L.J. Ch. (N.S.) 1~89, p. '~90. 
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ThE:J court also intervened in other dealings which preser1ted a prima 
facie appearance of fraud. For example, in Armstrong v. Arrm:;trorlg 
(No. 1)32 between the (jate of the bill of sale relating to certain shares 
in a ship and the entry of the transfer in the register, the purchaser 
hacJ notice that the vendor was not the owner. Actually those shares 
were re~Jistered in the name of the venc1or wr10 held them as trustee. 
An interim injunction \Alas granted to restrain the purchaser from 
dealing with the shares until the hearing of the case. 
lhe effect of a person's name remaining on the register was 
considered from the viewpoint of his liability for ship repairs. In 
Young v. Alexander and DunlJar,33 a ship was sold. For the period 
of one month, the buyer omitted to deliver to the ship registry a 
copy of the endorsement of transfer on the registration certificate. 
By the statute of George m-~4 non-compli<mce with the statutory 
requirement would render tile salE~ or contract "to be utterly null 
and void to all intents and pueposes IAihatsoevE!r ." lllhile the sellers, 
who were sued, were legal owners on the face of the register, re-
pairs were done on tt1e ship. The court ingeniously ~::~ot round the 
difficulty of disregarrJing the legal title of thr~ sellE:rs by relying on 
a common Jaw rule. Lord EllenborousJh, C.J., gave judgment for tt1e 
defendants on the gmund that, as the repairs were m·dered by the 
buyer, there was "no privity of interest between him and the defend-
ants.''35 
The above decision supports the inference tt1at registration was 
not always conclusive of the personal liability of the shipowner. 
Legal and equitable interests in, or rigt·,ts to, ships or shams therein 
were the concern of the system of registration. F~egistration certif-
icates had no relevance to matters outside the system. Thus in a 
common law action against a shipowner to recover repair costs or 
collision damage, the plaintiff had to establish the former's owner-
ship by evidence other than the eegistration of the ship in his name. 
32. (1854) 21 Beav. 71. 
33. (1806) 8 Ea~Jt 10. 
34. (17%) 34 Geo. III, c. 68, s. 15, !his eequirr:!ment was 
discardE~d in (1823) 4 [)FJD. IV, c. 41, and subsequent Acts (Imp). 
35. (1806) 8 East 10, 13. 
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This point was borne out in f\no ther \1. __ .......;..._--=~ 
Smith, Banks, lilatson and RudtJr .36 The plaintiff brought an action in 
tort for damage negligently caused to his boat by the brig. On the 
brig's certificate of registration, t.he names of the six defendants 
~".Jere stated as her owners. In a surprising decision, Mansfield, C.J., 
held that the registration certificate "obtained on the affidavit of 
two owners was insufficient to charge the rest." He ordered a non-
suit against all of them. 
2. Other Modes of Acquiring Title or Rights 
It is obvious that registration as provided by ttle Acts is not 
ttle only method of obtaining a legal title or right to a ship or the 
shares therein. We shall examine the exceptions and the grounds 
therefor. 
Ships belonging to HfJr. JV!ajesty, thousJh used solely for trading 
purposes, are not registered in the usual way. E:xct;pt otherwise 
provided, section 741 of the Merchant Shipping /-\ct 1B94 (Imp.) renders 
the Act inapplicable to Her Majesty's ships. In rBlation to Her Majes-
ty's ships and ships owned by Her GmiEWnrnents. thr3 concept of regis-
tration was implemented principally to secure the benefit;,, of the 
limitation of liability. Tile 189h Act (Imp.) operates gem~L'ally in her 
Majesty's Dominions. ! In New South Wales, the first Australian 
colony?7 and later the Cornrnonwealth, 38 tJm Crm.vn was under a liabil-
ity to compensate victims of tortious rlarnage. Section 80 (1) of the 
"Her Majesty rnay by Order in Council rnak~:~ regulations with 
respect to the manner in which Gmternrnent ships rnav be 
registered as Bri ti,>h ~>hips for the purpose uf thEl !'1erchant 
Shipping Acts, and these Acts ... ei tr1er generally or a~> res-
pects any special class of Government ships, shc:Jll apply to 
c;overnment ships registered in accordance wi til those reg-
ulations as if they were registered in ttle manner provided by 
thos(~ Acts." 
36. (1B13) 4 Taunt 803; 128 E.R. 51!7. 
37. See Farnell v. Boliltman ('1887) 12 /\pp. Cas. 643; under the 
(1B76) _l\ct 39 Vic. No. 38 (N.S.W.) the colonial ~~overnment 
was suabll~ in tort. 
38. Claims Against Thr~ ComrnonwDalth Act (Comth.) (No. 21 of 
1902) which was replaced by Judiciary Act (Comth.), (No. 6 
of 1903), Part IX, ss. 56-57. 
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Pursuant to section 80 (1), an OrcJer in Council \Alas enacted.39 It 
prescribt:1d the manner in which ships belonginD to the Government of 
the Commonwealth might be registr:!red. Under the Order, the perman-
ent Head of the Department in respect of which the ship should be 
registered was the person appointed to carry out the duty and exer-
cise rights arising under the 1894 Act (Imp.). In the Commonwealth of 
Australia v. Asiatic Steam Navigation Company Ltd.~0 The "River 
Loddon", a trading ship owned by the Australian Government, neglig-
ently collided with the steamship Shadzmla. The foemer ship was re~J­
istered under the Order in accordance with section 80 (1) of the 1906 
Act (Imp.), and the collision arose without the r::Jctual fault or prhlity 
of her owners. In this action, the High Court of Australia had to 
determine whether section 503 of the 1894 1-\ct (Imp.) applied to limit 
the liability of the Commonwealth as plaintiffs. The judgment of 
raylor, J., for the plaintiffs was affiemed on appeal.l~1 Dixon, C.J., 
McTiernan and Williams, J J., said:42 
"The purpose of the words [i.e. of section 80 of the 1906 
Act] is to say that although tt1e Government ship is not 
registered in conformity tAJith the Act, the pmvisions of 
the Act shall apply to it as if it werE!, that is to say as 
if its registration is in pursuance of an artier in council 
... What seems to be its concern [i.e. section 80] is to undo 
the effects of s. 741 where there is an order in council 
and registration of a Government ship and to undo it noth-
withstanding that registration is not in accord with the 
Act of 189LI." 
There are two broad categories of casE:~s where title to property in 
ships or shares therein is not based on the Registration /l.cts. These 
situations arise as a result of the opef'ation of la1111. Title to the 
property is vested in the personal representatives on the death, or 
in the trustee-in-bankruptcy on the bankruptcy, of the shipowner. 
In d!:~livering the judgment in Robinson v. Macdonnell, Lord Ellenboro ugh 
39. S.R. & 0., No. 1391 of 1924, p. 658. 
40. f1955] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 503. 
!41. See (1955-1956) 96 C.L.R. 397. 
t42. Ibid., p. 420. 
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said: 43 
"In these cases, a title may be transmitted without any 
of the forms required by the statutes .... " 
For further exceptions, it is worth considering whether any 
rights could accrue to a non-registered owner. In ?utton v. Buck, t.J4 
the plaintiff bought and paid for a ship stranded on the English coast. 
The transfer was void by the Imperial Acts on the ground that it was 
not regular and not registered. However, possession of the ship had 
been delivered to the plaintiff. Mansfield, C.J., held that, despite 
the non-registration, the plaintiff's possession enabled him to main-
tain an action of trover against another person taking possession of 
the wreck. 
Long uninterrupted possession, aided by other considerations, 
may operate to cure a defective title. In The "Molly",L,S the ship 
owned by a British subject was captured by a Frenchman. After pro-
ceedings alleged to have been renularly conducted before the Conseil 
Prises at Paris, she was bought by a Spanish proprietor. At the 
time when the ship was captured, Spain was in a state of neutrality. 
Later she signed a treaty of peace witfl Britain. The ship, while in 
the River Thames, was seized under a warrant of arrest issued by the 
High Court of Admiralty. Judgment was given for the Spainish prop-
rietor primarily on the ground that he had had uninterrupted poss-
ession of her for ten years. Although the law fixf~d no particular 
period of time after which possession should not be disturbed, W. 
Scott took the view that it was highly reasonable that there should 
in practice be some such limitation. He said:L16 
''[A] title which may have been originally faulty, must of 
necessity become unimpeachable by great lapse of time. 
It to be remembered, likewise, that t11is title stands 
upon a sale to a neutral, and is upon that account to be 
treated with a greater degree of tenderness." 
43. 5 Maule & Selw. 228, p. 239; follov.1ed by Dallas, C.J., in Monk-
house, Wright and Fairbairh v. Hay (1820) 8 Price 256, 279. 
It was there held that the Reqistry Acts requiring ships to 
be re~Jistered in the owner's name did not affect the prov-
Jsmns s. 11 of chapter 19 of 21 Jac. 1, as regards the 
effects of reputed ownership of goods and chattels. The 
Registry Acts referred to were 26 Geo. III, c. 60 and 3LI Geo. 
III, c. 68. 
44. (1810) 2 Taunt 302; 127 E.R. 1094. 
'~5. (1814) r-Dodds 39LI; 165 E.R. BSL1. 
46. Ibid .. 395. 
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VI I . t'lORTGAGE 
1. Earh1 Law 
It may be recalled that the statute (Imp.) of William III required 
English-owned ~3hips to be registered before they were entitled to 
trade in Her Majesty's plantations in America.l1? The statute con-
tained no provision for ship mortgage. This shortcoming, however, 
did not deter shipowners and financiers from entering into legally 
enforceable transactions. Financiors and creditors could take advan-
tage of section 21. Before tv.1o witnesses, their names could be 
endorsed as purchasers on the ship-registration certificate. Undoubt-
edly the mortgage deed would provide that on discharge of the debt 
the ship was to be re-transferred to her original owners. Similarly 
in an equitable mortgage, when the debt was paid to the creditor, he 
coulc1 be compelled in a court of equity to re-assign his interest in 
the ship to her owner:•8 The immense benefits enjoyed by English-
registered ships49 and the substantial encouragement for navigation 
given tJy the British Parliament?0 \.vould attract foreign capital into 
the country. No law prohibited money being furnished by foreigners 
for purchasing ships to be registered officially in the names of 
English subjects. By express provisions in agreemm1ts and the oper-
ation of implied trusts, the ships bought were deemed to be the prop-
erty of foreigners! 1 Alternatively, the agreements could provide that 
the ships were fully mortgaged to them for loans advanced. By 
different contrivances and arrangements, foreigners would indirectly 
47. (1696) 7 & 8 Will. III, c. s. 17. 
48. E.g. in Gardner v. Czenove and Another (1856) 26 L.J. (N.S.) 
V, it 1111as held that, although ttl8 assignment was absolute 
in terms, it was intendecl as security; see also The Union 
Bank of London v. Lenanton (1878) 47 L.J. (N.S.) 409. 
49. 
50. See e.g. (17B7) 27 Geo. III, c. 19; (1794) 34 Geo. III, c. 68; 
(1834) 4 & 5 Will. IV, c. 52; (1835) 5 & 6 Will. 1\/, c. 24. 
51. The principle of implied tru!':-;t applies to both rr:!al prop~::rty 
and personalty: Ebrand v. Dancer (1680) 2 Ch. Cas. 26: Ex 
parte Hou~Jhton (1810) 17 Ves. 253. In fact the Statute Of 
Frauds 1677 (Imp.) 29 Car. II, c. 3 did not apply to the cee-
atior1 or the oper·ation of implied or resulting trusts. There-
fore it was unnecessary that there should be anv evidr~nce 
in writing of the intention of the person prmliding t.hf:o 
purchase-money. The paymont giving risH to such trusts 
could t:l.a proved by parol. 
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acquire the use, benefit and control of English-rBgisterE:~d ships. 52 
The 1696 Act (Imp.) left many [.Japs in the law. Dften ships and 
shares thBrein could be so encumbered in favour of different crBd-
itors as to bB worthless. There were no prescribed forms or instru-
ments to be used when ships or shares therein were used as mortgage 
security. 
The 1786 Act (Imp.) was a l1old legislative move to meet the 
problems. It c'lias designerJ with two distinct aims in mind. Firstly, 
the Imperial Parliament pursued the policy of requiring shipowners, 
who applied for a registration certificate, to disclose by oath, inter 
alia, their entir·e interests in the ship. The oath also declared that 
"no other person or persons whatsoever has or have any right, title, 
interest, share or propei'ty therein."53 This SE:1ction placed on the 
applicants an onus of making sure that they were the absolute owners. 
Thus before taking the oath(l• shipowners IA/ould have to obtain from 
mortgagees full release of their rights and claims against the ship 
or shares therein. This statutory process guaranteed the existence 
of an unencumbered title to a ship or the shares therein. After the 
registration, however, there was nothing to prevent shipowners from 
using the property as security for loans. 
Secondly, the legislature sought to exclude foreigners from 
holding shares or having a proprietary interest in British ships. 
This legislative goal has remained an outstanding feature of tile 
system of registration down to the present day?5 In the early phase, 
the legislators were so committed to the national policy that no dis-
tinction was drawn between the rights and interests of mortgagees 
and those of shipowners. Probably one fear was that foreign 
52. One real danger was that the ship being in the possession, 
order and disposition of reputed English owners could be 
subject to the payment of debts wt1en they became bankrupt: 
(1623) 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, s. 11. 
53. 26 Geo. m, c. 60, s. 10. 
54. As to penalty for taking oath falsely, ~:Jee ibid., s. til. 
55. (1854) 17 & 18 Vic., c. 104, s. 18; (1894) 57 & 58 Vic., c. 60, 
s. 1. 
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mortgagees could have the use, benefit, control or management of 
the ship, or· part thereof, particularly in tirne of war. Sr,Jen in this 
light, the purpose of section 15 clear?6 It prmJlded that if a for-
eigner or any person for "his usB or benefit shall purchase or ottler-
wise become entitled to the whole, or any part or share of or any 
interest in such ship" the registration certificate had to be delivered 
up to the authorised person. The wording seemed wide enough to 
include any contractual ricJhts, lRgal interest and title acquired by 
foreigners. Apparently, it would extc-Jnd to rights derived by for-
eigners as beneficiaries umJer a will or as intestate successors. It 
is, however, evident that not <:1l1 types of' intr:Jrest that could be 
croated over a British ship or shares therein in favour of foreigners 
could be effectively excluded. 
Where a foreigner's inU:c~rest in, or right to, anv British ship 
arose when the sr1ip was in port, the shipowners had se\/en days in 
which to deliver up the registration cc~rtificate. Obviously,if such 
interest or rights were created when the ship was on the high seas 
or at a foreign port, the time per·iod allowed woulrJ be longer. Within 
the statutory period of seven days, or· a longer period allowed, it 
was possible for a mortgage tu be creatBd in favour of a foreigner 
and also discharged. It would LJe reasonable to presume that the 
legislature did not consider that object \AIOUld be defeated by such 
short-term transactions. In practice, shipowners and financiers had 
little difficulty in circumventing section 15. r"'. sale or mortgage 
agreement could be entered into l<Jitll the date left blank. To avoid 
interfering with the use of the ship, v.Jhich would arise \/\)hen tt1e reg-
istration certificate was dolivered up, a creditor would insert a suit-
able date in the agreement only whEHl the shipmvm~r defaulted. 57 
The shares or interests in\/oh;ed would then be put up for sale, usu-
ally to British subjects. In this way, foreigners could actually 
acquire, but \,\Jere prohibited frDm retaining, property in British 
ships. Since foreigners were t:mti th.1d to be paid out of the proceeds 
of ttlEl sale, their financial interests WG~re generally secured. 
56. 26 Geo. III, c. 60. 
57. There would be an umJerstancling to thi~3 effect between 
the two parties. 
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It may recalled that for the purpose of determining competing 
claims preference \1\}as given for registered title over equitatJle inter-
ests.58 However the Court of Chancery oxercised its l:vicJe juri~>dic­
tinn to protect equitable mortgagees from Um effects of the bank-
ruptcy legislation of James r.59 In a ship while 
at sea was mortgaged. Hardwicke, L.C., hr~ld that it would be outside 
the scope of the statute of James I if the mortgagee took all t".he 
steps in his pm'ller to obtain possession of the bill of sale?1 Tho 
doctrine of possession bv equitable mortgagees was similarly applied 
' h 1 . h . ' d h 62 m t e ate e1g teenth century. Thus m E<$ parte Batson ar1 Ot ers, 
G and C assigned to L & Co. thr~ ship Nautilus, together with deeds, 
as security for the repavment of \Jarious sums of money. Under a 
second mortgage, L & Co. assigned the ship to P & Co. Bankruptcy 
commission lfJas issued in (Jctotmr, 1783, a~)ainst G and C and L & Co. 
In April, 1781,, FJ & Co. took possession of the ship. Thurlow. L.C., 
gave judgment for P & Co. on the ground that their possession had 
taken the ship out of the statute of Jarnr:)s [. 
We have seen that the 17% f\c tF) 3 ~>'llas passE-Jcj to extend the 
policy maintaining public records of all transactions affecting 
British ships in Her Majesty's Dominions. No tram3fer of propertv in 
any ship, whether as rnortga~1e security or or,herwise, was valid in 
law or equity unless the statutory conditions laid down were satis-
fied. 6" The object was to ensure that dealings affecting British 
ships, the interests created ttlDrein and the persons entitled to them, 
appeared on official records.65 It was part of the doctrine of dis-
closure strictly implementE:Jd by the British Parliament. In :;..:.:;.:;.=~ v. 
Rolleston, Thurlow, L.C., said:66 
58. Yallop, Ex parte (18Ufl) 15 Ves. Jun. 60, 66, =-'-"""' 
59. (1623) 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, s. 11. 
60. (1751) 2 Ves. Sen. 272. 
61. Following the decision in Bmwn v. Heal~hcott=? (1746) 1 Atk. 
160. The view was expres~oed that the case would be decided 
differently if under tr1e circumstances tilE! ship was allowed 
to come back and qo on another voyage. 
62. (1791) 3 Bro. C.C. 363. 
63. 3ll Geo. III, c. 68. 
64. Ibid., s. 11,, 
65. s-:-15. 
66. (1/92) 3 Bro. C.C. 571, 576. 
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"It has bcc!en long quite settled, that if the requisites in 
the Navigation or Ship ResJisti'\/ have not been complied 
with, the assertion of any equitable right or title to the 
vessel will be utterly unavailing." 
Unfortunately, in solving some pressing problems, thE~ Act had 
given rise to new ones. Tim confidc:mcE? of chartt:1rers and financial 
institutions in dealing with ~;hipownt?rs IPJas short-li\~ed. Often the 
information shown on public records concerning dealings in ships was 
not up-to-date. Unscrupulous shipowners could mortgagE~ or transfer 
the same ship to different per~3ons by executing a number of bills of 
sale. Naturally not all the purchasers were able to meet the statut-
ory requirements at the same time, sh1ce the registration CE!rti ficate 
would only be available for endorsement on the ship's return.67 Pur-
chasers and mortgagees who t'llere victims of fraud would seek redress 
from the courts. Unfortunately, tht:? situation had been complicated 
by a number of unjust decisions. fhe "court will not interfere in such 
instances, even where the other parLie~c; havEl been guilty of fraud." 68 
2. Modern Aspects of Ship Security 
For the first time in history, legislation wa~1 introduct:Jd to pro-
vide expressly for ship mortgages. In keepiflfJ with the policy, the 
Act (Imp.) of George IV passed in 1823 69 rc:)quirerJ disclosure of every 
mortgage. The transaction, tvlmn duly entm'!:!d in thl~ register book 
and endorsed on the registration certificate the Collector and 
Comptroller, would protect the mortgageE! against tt1o subsequent 
bankruptcy of the shipowners or mortgagors. In essence, the provis-
ion was a remarkable breakthrough after· thietm:~n clecades of legis-
lative effort. It made a logical distinction between the rights of 
shipowners and those of mortgagees. The statutory protection con-
ferred on mortgagees paved the way for new sources of finance for 
shipowners. It appeared that fore1gners could De registered merely as 
mortgagees. If our view is correct, the change in legislative attitude 
67. There was some authority for thE~ view that a bill of salr:2 
relating to a ship at sea passed the absolute property. 
However, it li\lould be divested in the e\tent that the pre-
requisites prescribed by the Act were not met on the ship's 
return: IVJestair v. Gillespie (180£~-1805) 11 Ves. Jun. 622; 
Dixon v. (1817) 3 Mer. 322, supra. 
68. Thornns v. Leake 1 Mad. Rep., 3cFi seg.; cited with 
approval in HibbBrt \1. f~ollf'lSton (1792) 3 Bro. C.C. 571, 576; 
Folletty. Delanv (1848) 17 L.J. Ch. 25£,, p. 255, 
69.4 Geo. III, c. 1.1. s. 37. 
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would enable many shipowners to benefit from foreign investments. 
1'-'loreover, under the provision, ships and shares therein could be 
assigned as security to trustees who were empowered to sell the same 
and pay the proceeds to creditors. To British shipowners throughout 
the Empire, tile new approach signalled the beginning of a new era of 
owning and operating ships. 
Some major problems were presented by the competing claims 
which arose from the mortgage of the same ship or shares therein to 
different creditors. It had been totally left out of legislative purview 
whether they IJ\Iere to rank [lari passu or in some other order of pref-
erence. A determined effort was made by the 1825 Act (Imp]0 to fill 
the gaps in the law. The new provisions were in line with, and in a 
\May strengthened the doctrine of disclosure. While mvners of ships 
or shares therein were at liberty to mortgage them any number of 
times they wished, the mechanisms for protecting the rights of 
creditors were clearly spelt out. Al~m. as a matter of fair play, it 
was possible for intending purchasers and financiers to obtain from 
public records information about transactions affecting a ship or 
any shares therein. These factors seemed to havt=J motivated thE~ 
legislators in enacting the peovisions. 
By section 38, transfer of property in a ship was effected by 
the entry in the register book of the particulars of the relevant 
bill of sale. A transferee as mortgage£~ was protected "as against 
all and every person and persons whatsoever, and to all intents and 
purposes." However, the propertv transferred would be divested in 
favour of subsequent mortgages who obtained an indorsement on the 
registration certificate as provided.71 Accordingly, where an entry 
was rnade in the register book, thirty days had to elapse before entry 
of the particulars of another bill of sale could IJe madE!. If the first 
entry was mBde when the ship was away from her horne port. the per-
iod of thirty days would count from the dav of her return. The same 
70.6 G~Jo. IV, c. 110. 
71. ltJid., s 39. A similar view was previously put forward !Jy 
Lord Eldon in Dixon v. (1817) 3 Mer., 322, 333, supra. 
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rule as to entrv applied to subsequent transfers. Suppose that at 
a niven time t1J\io entries concerning tho sarno ship were made in 
favour of two differont persons. Issues as to prioritv 11\lere dt=!ter-
mined bv an objecthte procedure. llJhere an entrv was made when the 
ship was at sea, the Collector anrJ Comptroller was required to make 
the endorsement on the registration certificate when it was produced 
to him within thirty davs of the ship's return to port. In the case 
of an entrv made when the ship was at port, the endorsement could 
be made within thirtv davs thereof. If, within either of those periods, 
the registration certificate was not produced, the Collector and Comp-
troller was obliged to make an endorsement on the certificate in 
favour of the person who first produced it. As between two compet-
ing mortgagees, the order of prioritv was determined according to 
the time when the endorsement, as a public act, was made on the 
registration certificate. Bv the pro\/iso, the Commissioners of Her 
Majestv's Customs were empowered to grant a time extension where 
the certificate was prml8d to hav(~ been lost, mislaid or detained.72 
In Ex parte Jones?3 the scopo of section 39 was considered. 
Two mortgages were created over tho shipE5. ThB later mortgage 
contained a recital of and was subject to the r:larlier one. it was 
the court's \Jiew that U1e period of thirty days did not applv to the. 
second mortgage. The reason s~i\/en was that, since the second mor-
tgage was not in competition with thr::! first, it could be entered in 
the register book regardless of the statutory pel:'iod. 
fhe endorsement provision was also applied in resolving conflict 
between the equitable rights of mortgagees and the legal rights of 
7[; 
shipowners in bankruptcv. In CarnpbG!l \1. Thompson, a rnnrtgagr~e 
ornittGd to procure an endorsement of tile bill of sale particulars on 
the registration certificate as required by the statute of William Iv~5 
After the expiration of thirty days, the shipowner became bankrupt. 
The plaintiff, as mortgagee, sought to restrain the assignees in 
bankruptcv from sellinsJ the ~;t1ares. The motion, however, \,\las refused 
72. (182 15) 6 CJeo. IV, c. 110. s. 39. 
13. (1832) 2 c. & J. 513. 
71~. (181~2) 2 f-lare 140. 
75. (1833) 3 & 4 lJJill. IV, c., 55, s. 36; i.e~. within 30 days after 
ship's return to port. 
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on the ground that there t~1as no equitv to re~;train the sale. Sir 
James Wigram, L.C., held tt1at on the shipowner's bar1kruptcy thrc: 
legal title passed to the assignees. This 1.r11as because under the 
rule of the law the shares were deemed to be sutJject to the order 
and disposition of ttm bankrupt. 
It noteworthy trlat the modern aspects of mortgage law had 
been worked out. By the 1833 Act (Imp.) further prominence was given 
to tile acts of the Collectors and comptroller~;. and to the records 
kept by them at the ship registries. 1\Jo bill of sale was valid to pass 
property in a ship or any share therein unless it was actually pro-
duced to the Collector and Comptroller, and the particulars of the 
mortgagor and mortgagee were entered in the register book?6 These 
requirements emphasised the thrust of the policy requiring public 
disclosure of dealings affecting ships. The Collector and Comptroller 
of every port was given new power to endorse bill of sale particulars 
on the registration certificate of a ship, although she was registered 
in another port?7 Inquirers were authorised to examine and take 
copies of anv oath or declaration made by shipowners and anv entrv 
made in the register books. Moreover, true copie~' of such oath or 
declaration and entry rnade in the register books were admissible as 
"d . t d" 78 ev1 once m cour . procee. mgs. 
The statutory provisions completed vital links between the 
registration svstern as a l'\lhole and tile law of evidence. This devel-
opment gave the role of the Collectors and Comptrollers and the 
records maintained bv ttlem an enhanced importance. 
Once the framework of the mortgage law was workod out, the 
anarchronisms were quickly shed. lhe courts were able to develop 
appropriate rules to give effect to the rigl1ts of mmtgagees. In 
Cato 11. Irving?9 cJ ship \Alas registered in Liverpool ir1 the names of 
A and B as owners of different shares. In October, 1849, /'\ (~Xecuted 
76. ' s. 3l;. 
77. Ibid., s. 37; the practice was continued bv succeedin~J leg-
islation for some time. 
78. Ibid., s. t,o; (1845) 8 & 9 \lie., c. 89, s. Lf3. Similar provisions 
hmm been faithfully reproduced in (H35L;) 17 & 18 Vic., c. 104, 
s. '107; (18%) 57 & 58 Vic., c. 60, ss. GLt and 717. 
79. (1851-18?2) 21 L.J. Ch. (N.S.) 675. 
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c:J power of attornev authorising B to sell his shares. Bv a mortgage 
deed, which was regi~>tered in Liverpool, /\ mortgaged his shares in 
the ship and freight to C in November. Under the power of attornev 
as to A's shares, B sold the ship in Svdnev to D 1,vho was ignorant of 
the earlier mortgage. The old re[Jistration certificate was niven up 
and the ship was registered de novo in D's name at Svdney. ltJhen 
the ship laden with cargo put into the London Docks in Februarv 
1851, both C and D took possession of her, claiming rights in thB ship 
and freight. Parker, V .C., held that the earlier mortgage "was good 
against'' D who had purchased tt1e ship subject to the rights of C, as 
mortgagee. The case authorities were applied to the effect that 
mortgagees who take possession before the conclusion of a vovage 
are entitled to the freight thBn accruing. In giving judgment for 
C, he said:80 
"I consider that a mortgagee who tak~:1s possession before 
the cargo is delivered comes within the eule... Tho declar-
ation must be, that the plaintiffs are entithJd to fortv-
eight sixtv-fourth parts of the ship and fortv-eight sixty-
fourth parts of net freight (after allowin~J to Murnin his 
expenses) to an amount not exceeding the sum due to [C] 
for principal, interests, and costs." 
The decision nevertheless brings to light; some glaring defects in the 
legislation. The ease with which a ship could be transferred out of 
a British registry to another registry, could in somE~ cases defeat 
the rights of pre-existing rnortgagm3s.81 In cases where the old reg-
istration certificate had been given up, thE:; rule conferring priority 
according to the date of endorsement made or1 tl18 certificate would 
work hardship and injustice.82 Tho I'EJgistration svstern and its admin-
istering officials could not monitor the me thad used tJy shipowners 
at any given time to dispose of their ship or shares therein. Undoubt-
edly, the principle of the decision in Coto v. Irving 83 was correct. 
Unfortunately, in view of the deceitful act~l of the shipowner, the 
case authoritv \,\JOuld opEJn tt1e door to fraud against o\mrseas mort-
gageEJs and purchasers. 
80. Ibid., pp. 676-677; Dixon v. =~:.:....(1817) 3 IVJer. 322 cited in 
support of s claim. 
81. Sel:J, tl(Jwever, Act (181/)) 8 & 9 Vic., c. 89, s. 39, which afforded 
soml'l protection. 
82. It is questionable whether an endorsement on a l'egistration 
certi fie ate before it was delhiE!rod up \AFOuld be Vdlid where 
the ~;t1fP wa~1 at the same time I'()~Jistmed de novo at a diff-
erent port. 
B). (1851-1B52) 21 L.J. Ch. (N.S.) 675, suprB. 
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The Merchant Shipping Act (lrnp.) 1854 was passed to deal with 
the problems identified above. A nurnbee of improvements were made 
to the rPgistration system. Each of the reghtries was constituted 
the sole authoritative repository of all thE~ documents and informa-
tion relating to transactions affecting ships n:gistered there. A 
registration certificate after issue was not available for inspection 
at the ship's registry as to any possible endorsement. A different 
method for fixing the order of priority among competing claimants 
was introduced. Accordingly, l'\lhere two or more mortgages of the 
same ship or shares therein were executed, their order of ranking 
would depend on the date of re~Jistration~4 The rJates vvhen the 
mortgages were executed were irrelevant. 85 A historic extension of 
the role of the registries was the introduction and use of mortgage 
and sale certificates. ,A. person, who intBnded to sell or mortgage 
his ship or sl1ares therein outside the country, where she was regis-
tered, could apply to the Registrar for the issue of a relevant cer-
tificate~6 The certificate was in statutory form, containing infor-
mation essential for the protection of o\Jerseas mort~Jagees and pur-
chasers.87 A mortgage, ~tvhen duh; endorsed on tl1e certificate by a 
Registrar or British consular officer accor·ding to the terms and dir-
ections stated, was protected in the same way as a mortgage duly 
registered in the ship's registry. For ttm purpose of the order of 
ranking, the date of endorsement was regarded as the date of regis-
tration~8 Thus the same rule as to the OI'dm· of priority applied to 
"certificate endorsed'' mortgage and "registered" mortgage.89 
8ff. 17 & 18 Vic., c. 104, s. 69. An important policy provision 
is found in s. 70, which provided that a mortgagee t<\las not 
deemed to be the owner of the ship or anv share therein. 
85. (185l1) 17 & 18 Vic., c. 104, s. 69; re-enactt~d as Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.), s. 33. See Shipping F~egistration 
J~ct 1981 (Cornth.), s. 39. 
86. Ibid., ss. 76 and 77; re-enacted in 18% Act, ss. 39 and 40; 
no corresponding pro\Jisions in 1981 Act (Comth.). 
87. , ss. 78 and 79; re-enacted in 1894 Act, s. 41 and 112. 
No corresponding pro\Jt~>ions in 1981 Act (Comth.). 
88. !bid., s. 80 (5); re-enacted in ibid., s. L,3 (5). No correspond-
ing provision in 1981 Act (Comth.). 
89. Ibid., s. 80 (6). Protection against the mortgagor's bank-
ruptcy is conforrecl by ~1. 80 Cl+): re-enactecj in 1894 Act, s. 43 
(/+). For position under the 1981 Act (Comth.), see F~!J North 
Bribarill--Finance and Irmun;;~nc8s Ptv. Ltd. (1983) B A.C.L.R. 
274. 
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fhe extended facilities provided for creating mortgages in no 
way detracted from the strict requirements of the Act (Imp.). There 
had never been a departure from the cardinal doctrine of excluding 
foreigners from owning British ships or any shares therein. 90 Judic-
ial enforcement of the statutory formalities, which were essential to 
the validity of every mortgage, greatly served to implement the 
doctrine. In The Liverpool Bor·ou~1h Bank v. Turner91 the bank required 
Lamont to furnish security for an overdraft. Lamont and his assoc-
iates agreed in writing to assir:Jn their ship to the bank as security. 
No other steps were taken bv the bank which continued to make fur-
ther advances to them. The shipowners having become bankrupt, the 
ship was sold and the proceeds remained in the hands of the assign-
ees in bankruptcy. Judgment was given against the bank, as plain-
tiffs, which claimed the proceeds in part discharge of the debt. In 
dismissing the appeal, Lord Chancellor Campbell referred to the 
legislative intention and policy as follows: 92 
"It is the duty of the Courts of justice to try to get at 
the real intention of the legislature, by carefullv attend-
ing to the whole scope of the statute to be construc3d. · 
Looking to the great peculiaritv of the forms of transfer 
and mortgage here required, and the purposes which they 
were to serve, I cannot doubt that the legislature intended 
that these and no other forms were to be used. A disclosure 
of the true and actual owners of every British ship is con-
sidered to be of utmost importance with a \/iew to the comm-
ercial privileges ... md still more with a view to the proper 
use and honour of the British flag." 
It is possible to detect an underlying reason for the legislative in-
sistence on total compliance with the procedures laid down. Obser-
vance of tile formalities by the parties to a mortgage transaction was 
a pragmatic way of securing information. It was crucial to the proper 
administration of the svstem. Thus accurate records of all mortgages, 
whenover effected, would enable tr1e registry officials to identify 
the ships and their owners. This factor sufficientlv explains the 
special nature and legal effect of every entry made by a F~egistrar. 
90. Ibid., s. 70; re-enacted in 1894 Act, s. 34. See ~)h~pping · 
Registration .Act 1981 (Comth.),s. l,Q. 
91. (1860-1861) 30 L.J. Ch. (N.S.) 379. 
92. Ibid., p. 381. 
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That r.his obj!e:ctive had been translated intD action is seen in a 
number of cases. In Chasteauneuf v. Capevron and ArJ.Qther?3 it was 
held that a Registrar had no power to erase an er1try. Moreover, a 
mortgage when dischargnd by an entry could not be revived by a 
memorandum on the register that the receipt was issued by mistake.94 
The sanction imposed fDr non-observance \i\IBS postponement of the 
rights of a mortgagee. Thus a legal mortgage, executed in statutory 
form and registered, has priority m;er an equitable mort~]age pre-
\tiously made. It is immaterial that, at the time of the legal mortgage, 
the mortgagee is aware of the pre-existing mortgage • 95 
The i"lerchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) virtually re-enacts the 
mortgage provisions of its predecessorjl6 thus reinforcing the legis-
lative policy on a permanent basis. In many respects, the system of 
mortgage developed over almost seven decades second to none. 
While pre\/enting foreigners from tJecoming legal owners of British 
ships or any shares therein, the system has the inherent ad\/antage 
of ulitising foreirJn capital to finance Britain's maritime programme. 
It set the pattern for Australian legislation97 and the legislation of 
other Commonwealth countries98 on the subject. In a number of ways, 
the International Con\/ention for the Unification of certain Rules 
99 . 
relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 1967, has taken cogmzance 
of the rules of English maritime law. 
93. (1882) 7 App. Cas. 127 (P.C.). 
94. Bell \/. Blyth (1868) 4 Cl1. App. 136; 
& E 6. 
95. Coombes v. Mansfield (1855) 3 Drew 193; Black v. Lllilliams 
[1895] 1 Ch. 408. S. 69 of the 1854 Act (Irnp.) had no applica-
tion where the mortgages concerned were not registt:]red. 
96, Ib.e 1'11Jerchant. Shipping Act 18914, s. 57. has restored the 
elements of fair play and equity. Hmy are essential in all 
commercial dealinqs where ships and shar·es therein are 
invol\/ed. For corresponding pro\/ision, see Sl1ipping Regis-
tration f\ct 1981 (Cornth.), s. 47. 
97. Shippinn Registration Act 1981 (Comth.), ss. 38-l!4, as amended 
by ~hipping RerJistration Amendment Act 191:V! (Comth.), ss. 15-17. 
98 . .E.:..9.:_ Merchant Shipping Act (Cap. 172), Singapore Statutes, 
Re\/ised Edn. 1970, ss. 416 and 416A-l,16F; Merchant Shipping 
Ordinance. 1952 (Malaysia), as amended, s~~. /f1-47. 
99. Signed in Brussels on 27th Mav, 1967; see Articles 1 and 6. 
Australia, howe\/er, is not a signatory to this Convention: 
Register of Texts of Con\/entions and Other Instruments 
concE~i·ninFJ International frad8 Law (1971), \/ol. 1. p. 268. 
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VI I I. REGISTRATION OF SHIPS IN AUSTRALIA 
1. Application of Imperial Laws 
By reference to statute~; and case authorities in chronological 
order, we have examined how the underlying principlos of the regis-
tration systom were formulated. Our task here is twofold. First, it 
is essential to ascertain thB stage of development attained by 
lish maritime law at the time when it was substantially imported into 
Australian colonies. Secont1, ther£} must be proof as to the probable 
date or dates when British ship registries were first established in 
Australian ports and capital cities. CltcJarly the existence of agree-
ments relating to the sale or mortgage of British ships made in the 
early days of colonial settlement is insufficient for our purpose. 
Replies to queries made show that the first two register books 
at Port Jackson in New South Wales have been lost. Information 
derived from correspondencE~] on the subject of ship registration in-
dicates thst "Lynx", the thirteenth vessel, was registered at Port 
Jackson in 1szl It was probable that Port Jackson had the First 
ship registry established und£3r the 1823 Act (Imp.)~ 
According to the Melbourne records, the first ship to be regis-
tered in 1839 was "Gem". It is presumBd that the re~Jistration was 
made under the Act. (Imp.) of 1833. 11 
In Queensland, official records show that the earliest vessel 
"Caernan!Dn 11 was allocated tt1e number 32670 at the Port of Morton 
Bay, registered in 1847, and issued with the n'!gistration certificate 
1. l1Jith the Department of Business and Ctmsumer Affairs, 
Bureau of Customs, Canberra. The reply dated 16th 
November, 1981, bearing the reference C. 81-095 was given 
by Mr. A.W. Mitchell for the Assistant Secretary, Inspection 
and Controls. It provides the source material as to wtlen 
British ship registries were first set up in the Australian 
colonies. 
2. Enclosed with Mr. A.W. MitcrJBll's reply 1-vere photocopies 
of letters by Mr. P.C. Mowle and Mr. "Wareing" dealing with 
the registration of British ships in the early days of Port 
Jackson and Port Adelaide. 
3. 4 C3eo. IV, c. 41 titled "An Act for the registering of Vess-
els''. But one cannot be absolutely certain. 
4. 3 & 4 l1Jills., c. 55 titled "An Act for the registering of 
British Vessels". 
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in H358.J The registration procedure was laid down in the Act (Imp.) 
of 1B4.f It seems, however, that the earliest availablt:: register 
entry made at Brisbane was that of the vessel "Sagitta" in 1898. If 
is corrt:!ct, 
) (Imp.). 
must have been registered under the 1894 l-\ct 
In Soutt1 t'\ustralia, according to records from the Port of 
Adelaide, "Victoria" was the first vessel to be wgistl'lred in 1838. 
However, information from the Board of Trade in London shows that 
the Port of Adelaide was pmclaimed a "Port of British Registry" in 
1855~ and the "Verona" was the first vessel registered there in 1855. 
In Hobart, the registry of British ships was first establi~>hed 
in 1850. Branch offices were later set up at Devnnport and Burnie. 9 
It was not until 1856 that the registry of British ships was 
established at the Port of Freemantle in Western Australia. The 
data for the years 1976 to 1980 made available by the Bureau of Cus-
toms at the Port of Frernantl~~ 10 show an irregular rise in the number 
of ship registrations. 
5. The information concerning the names of ships and the 
dates of registration 111.1as supplied in response to question-
naires addressed to the Department of Business and Con-
sumer Affairs, Bureau of Customs, Canberra. 
6. B & 9 Vic., c. 89, titled 11An Act for the registering of 
British Vessels" ss. 'I 10 and 11. It is quite possible that 
the certificate was issued pursuant to the Merchant Shipp-
ing Act 1854 (Imp.), Part II. 
7. 57 & 58 \/ic., c. 60, Part I. 
8. The letter was dated 2Lfth August, 1967, and signed by a 
11Wareing'' on behalf of the British Board of Trade. The 
year 1855) seems to be correct or close to being cor-
rect. In The Empress (1856) Swab. 160, the facts, as report-
ed, show that a ship originally registered in Sunderland, 
Durcham, was, after an unlm'llful sale, regh>tered at Port 
Adelaide in 1853, or thereabout. 
9. The information was gathered by pnrsonal enquiries at the 
Customs building, Hobart, where the British ship registry 
~'lias housed. 
10. Based on reply given in answer to questionnaire sent CJUt. 
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Ships registered at Port of Fremantle 
Year Number of Ships r Gross Tonnage 
I Regis tererJ I 
1980 70 I 3, 723.56 I 
1979 49 13,457.08 
1978 50 1,605.39 
1977 53 3,392. 75 
1976 25 2,525.14 
The ships registered in the various rogistries around Australia 
IAJere all British vessels which were entitled under the 1854 Act (Imp.) 
to fly the British flag.11 Later under the 1894 Act (Imp.)~ 2 the red 
ensign was usually worn by British merchant ships. The above develop-
ments marked the successful implementation of the Imperial policy in 
the Australian colonies. 
2. New Regime 
The Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Comth.)13 enacted by the 
Commonwealth Parliament came into force on 26th ~January, 1982~ 4 It 
gives effect to the Australian shipping policv and introduces a some-
what different pattern of owning and operating ships under the new 
. 15 
svstem. By reason of the powers conferred under the 1981 Act (Cornth.) 
and in pursuance of section L1 of the Acts Interpretation f\ct 1901 
(Comth.) 16 the Shipping Registration Regulations 1981 (Comth.)17 wore 
enacted. 
Section 4 of the 1981 Act (Comth.) repealed the Imperial law in 
~'art I of the Mercr1ant Shipping f\ct 1894 (Imp.) which had extended to 
Australia as part of her law. r'\s it contains no saving provision, the 
r·epealed law would include the subsidiary legislation made under Part 
I. The 1981 Act (Comth.) totaih; replaced the Bl'itish ship registration 
legislation which had been administered in Australia for almost 150 
years. 
11. 17 & 18 Vic., c. 104, s. HB (1). 
12. 57 & 58 Vic., c. 60, s. 73 (1) and (2). 
13. No. 8 of 1981. 
14. Proclamation, Commonw·ealth of Australia Gazette, No. G. 51, 
22mJ December, 1982; see also s. 2 of the Act. 
15. S. 3 (1) definr~s "this Act" to include the rE'!gulations; see also 
5. 36 (1). 
16. No. 2 of 1901. 
17. Notification of such statutory rulos appeared in the Cornmon-
wealth of Australia Gazette, No. 265, 18th December, 1981. 
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Expression was given to the predominant philosophy of the Comm-
onwealth Act when the Australian Register of Ships was finally estab-
lished. This was the long- cherished goal of the Commonwealth Govern-
ment. The main facets of the policy supporting the move have been 
outlined in a "Transport Australia" publication18 as follows: 
"Establishment of the Australian Register means that Aust-
ralian ships will no longer be registered as British - as they 
have been under the British Merchant Shipping Act ... The 
Government sees the measure as an important development 
of Australia's status as an independent nation. The rights 
of a country to determine for the grant of its nationality 
to ships is fundamental to its national sovereignty. The 
provisions of Australia's Shipping Registration Act are part 
of this country's obligations under the Geneva Convention 
on the High Seas 1958, to which Australia is a signatory." 
The statements of policy amplify the political and national sentiments 
rather than economic considerations. As of 26th January, 1982, all 
registered merchant ships will be flying the Australian Red Ensign. 
The other ships registered in Australia have the option of flying either 
the Australian National Flag or the Australian Red Ensign~ 9 As they 
are Australian ships and no longer fly the British flag, Britain may see 
thB transition as an opportunity to withdraw her protection foe 
Australian ships in international waters. As a sovereign nation, Aus-
tralia rnay have much to lose if, in the eyes of the world, she is incap-
able, by reason of the weakness of her naval force or otherwise, of 
protecting the ships flying her colours.20 
One major outcome of the transition is noteworthy. Ships regis-
tered undBr the old regime would depend on Britain's policy, her for-
eign trade relations and the goodwill of international community towards 
her. The Commonwealth Government is invested with full control over 
matters of shipping policy and the regulation of ships registered un-
der the 1981 Act (Comth.). Moreover, the success of the new registra-
tion system and the performance of Australian ships as a commercial 
18. Australian Register of Ships (1981), Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1981, p. 1. 
19. 1981 Act (Comth.), s. 30. At the time of registration, applic-
ation must be made for entitlement to fly the National Flag 
or the Red Ensign. 
20. Every countrv is under an obligation to protect her ships 
from capture by enemies and piratical attacks. 
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venture will be evaluated by a number of factors. The acceptance by 
local and foreign cargo shippers and consignees of the services pro-
vided is a crucial criterion. It in turn depends on whether the inter-
national conventions relating to the carriage of goods by sea. a satis-
factory standard of seaworthiness and other safety requirements ha\te 
been adopted as part of Australian law.21 The registration system 
must also satisfy the insurers as to the absence of "high-risk" or "bad 
moral" hazards. In other words, insurance policies issu8(j for goods 
carried on Australian ships must not, as a rule, give rise to additional 
premiums or be subject to onerous terms. 
3. Relationship between Ship and the Flag State 
Section 15 of the Genm1a Convention on the High Seas 1958 22 
reads: 
" ... There must exist a genuinE! link bBtweBn the State and 
ship; in particular, the State must pffectively exercise 
its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and 
social matters over ships flying )ts flag.'' 
The phrases "genuine link" and "jurisdiction and control" are not defined 
in the Convention. From the philosophy of the Shipping Registration 
1981 (Comth.), it is possible to gather the meaning which the Comrn-
onwealth Par·liament has given to them. What clear is this: the 
administration for over eleven decades of British ship Registration 
Acts in Australia had failed to convince her legislators that strict 
adherence to the British policy was in Australia's best interests. In 
laying down the requirements For the nationality of Australian ships, 
the Commonwealth Parliament adopted a halfway position between a 
"flag of convenience" approach 23 and the stl'ict British concept. Thus 
in marked departure from the British policy, the '1981 /'let (Comth.) pro-
vides for the registration of ocean··going ships where more than fifty 
per cent of the shares in them are owned bv AustraLian nation-
als?4 It appears that by sections 9 and 1l+ (b) foreign-owned ships on 
21. See supra. 
22. Australia became a signatory on 14th May, '1963; see E.D. Brown, 
The Legal Regime of Hvdrospace (1971), p. 212. 
23. Examples of countries offering flags of convenience am Sing-
apore, Panama, Liberia, Cyprus, Hunduras and Somalia. See 
B.A. Boczek, Flags of Convenience: l\r1 Intemational Legal 
Studv, (1962), p. 2. 
2t4. See s. 8 (1) (c). 
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demise charter to Australia-based operators mav also be registered~5 
The legislation providing for ship registration in such circumstances 
reflects .Australia's policv. Her concept of "genuine link" [s not based 
solelv on ownership or on the nationalitv of the shipowners, but mainlv 
on effective control exercisable through residence. The approach has 
two distinct advantages. By allowing foreigners who are non-residents 
to own up to forty-nine per cent of the shares in her ocean-going 
ships, Australia is maintaining an open-door policy to attract foreign 
investments. In the unfortunate event of a war or hostilitv breaking 
out betiAJeen Australia and the country of the minoritv owners, the 
majoritv interests will give the Australian Government sufficient con-
trol over the use of the ships. 
Also, "genuine link" mav connote the plwsical relations between the 
owners or operators of ships and Australia. Thus ships under twelve 
metres in length, whether whollv owned or solelv operated bv Austral-
ian residents, are eligible for registration. This point is made clear bv 
section 4 of the Shipping Registration Amendment Act 1984 (Comth.). 
It has limited the scope of section 9 of the 1981 Act (Comth.). Since 
the amendment, ships on demise charter can no longer be registered 
where the charterer being an Australian citizen is not ordinarily 
resident in Australia?6 The same prohibition applies where the chart-
erer being a corporate body does not have the principal place of bus-
. . A t 1' 27 10ess 10 us ra 1a. 
Jurisdiction and control over Australian ships are exercised 
through Commonwealth legislation?8 However, with regard to the 
application of State criminal laws to acts committed on ships, the con-
sequence of the Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Comth.) noteworthy. 
25. It does not apply IAJhere the ship concerned is registered 
under the law of a foreign country: s. 17. 
26. S. 9 (2) (a), as amended bv Act (Comth.) (No. '16 of 1984), s. 4. 
27. S. 9 (2) (Q), as amended. 
28. See e.g. the 1\Javigation r'\ct 1912-197:1 (Comth.), Shipping 
Registration Act 1981 (Comth.), Protection of the Sea (Civil 
Liability) Act 1981 (Comth.), J;rotection of the Sea (Powers 
of Intervention) Act 1981 (Comth.), Protection nf the Sea 
(Shipping Le\/\f Collection) Act 1981 (Comth .), etc. 
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This aspect of jurisdiction rJealing with criminal matters is considered 
bv reference to two cases. 
In Uteri v. The Queen~9 two Australian citizens were charged in 
the District Court of Western Australia with the thefts of cravfish 
and the tackle. The offences were alleged to hm1e been committed on 
the vessel 71Providence" at the time IAthen she was on the high seas, 
about twentv-two miles from the Australian coast. This fact tvas rec-
ognised as sufficient to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the 
Adrniraltv of England. Dne of the defences unsuccessfullv raised bv 
the appellants was this. No offence had been committed since neither 
the criminal law of Western Australia nor that of the United Kingdom 
was in force at the spot where the offences were committed. The Prh!V 
Council dismissed the appeal brought bv the appellants. It is notewor-
thv that the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia and the 
passing of the Statute of LJJestminster Adoption Act 1942 (Comth.)30 had 
not prevented English criminal legislation from applving to certain 
ships on the high seas. The vessel "Providence" was owned bv two 
Australian citizens and licensed under the tJJestern Australian i"larine 
Act 1948-1973. But it was not registered under the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1894 (Imp.). The Privv Council held that non-registration under 
section 2 of the Act (Imp.) did not prevent her from being treated as 
a British ship since t1er Australian owners were British subjects?1 
Their Lordships held that the Theft Act '1968 (U.K.) applied to persons 
in British ships on the high seas, which were within the jurisdiction of 
32 the Admiraltv. 
29. [1977] 1 Llovd's Rep. 105 (P.C.). A similar case where the 
Theft Act 1968 (U.K.), s. 1, was held to applv The Queen 
v. Shea [1978] 1 S.A.S.R. 591. The theft was committed on 
board a fishing vessel, owned bv Australian citizens, some fi\/e 
or six miles off the coast of South Australia. 
30. No. 56 of 1942. 
31. The British Nationality Act 19l+8 (Imp.), s. 1, defines the term 
"British subjects" to include persons who are Australian cit-
izens bv naturalization. 
32. See also Adrniraltv [Jffences (Colonial) Act 18L19 (12 & 13 Vic., 
c. 96) and _Admiral tv Offences (Colonial) Act 1860 (23 & 211 Vic., 
c. 122), which continue to remain in force in relation to 
Australian States. 
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The above approach was preceded bv the Tasmanian case of Will-
iam Holyman & Sons v. Eyles.33 Morris, C.J., treated as the applicable 
3L, A . law tile Protection of Animals Act (U.K.), and not the Cruelty to rn-
mals Prevention Act 1925 (Tas.)~5 The offence of crueltv to animals 
was committed on board a ship owned bv a Tasmanian cornpanv while 
she was crossing the Bass Strait. 
So long as English Criminal law continued to applv to offences 
committed on or from ships registered in Australia, jurisdiction and 
control remained with the British Parliament. The above decisions 
were in part due to the limited operation of Australian State laws. In 
New South Wales v. The Commonwealth,36 the majoritv of the High Court 
Judges held that the low-water mark constituted the seaward boundarv 
of the States for the exercise of sovereigntv and legislative power. 
The State Parliaments were therefore incompetent to pass criminal laws 
which operated bevond such territorial limits. 
The Crimes at Sea Act (Comth.)37 defines certain ships as "Austra-
lian ships". Its object is to extend State laws to acts committed on or 
from ships operating outside the low-water mark. Subject to certain 
links being established, the criminal laws in force in a Stnte or Terr-
itorv will then applv to offences committed on or from such shipJ.8 It 
is submit ted that in passing the 1979 Act (Comth .) and the State com-
plementarv legislation,39 the Commonwealth and State Parliaments are 
33. [1947] Tas. S.R. 11. 
34. (1911) 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 27. 
35. 16 Ceo. V No. 30. 
36. (1976) 50 A.L.J.R. 218, supra. 
37. No. 17 of 1979. 
38. Ibid., s. 6 (1 ). 
39. It includes the Crimes (Offences at Sea) Act (N.S.W) (No. 1 L,5 
of 1980), Crimes (Offences at Sea) Act (S.A.) (No. 5 of 1980), 
Crimes (Offences at Sea) Act (Tas.) (No. 69 of 1979), Crimes 
(Offences at Sea) Act (Vic.) (No. 9229 of 1978), and Crimes 
(Offences at Sea) Act (W.A.) (No. 96 of 1979). There are also 
two enactments which extend the operation of State criminal 
laws to offshore waters: Offshore Waters Jurisdiction Act 
(Tas.) (1\Jo. 34 of 1976) and Offshore (Application of Laws) 
Act (l.LJ.A.) (No. 72 of 1977). See also C. Saunders, "Maritime 
Crime" (1979-1980) 12 M.U.L.R. 158 
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actualh; exercising jurisdiction and control based on one of two 
grounds. They are the registration of the ship in Australia or em ex-
ternal territory ancl the ship's link with Australia or an external Ter-
't . t f h t' 140 n ·ory m erms o er opera 1ons. 
·1· . I ''1 h t h' In rea tty, pnor to 26tl Januarv, 1982, t ere was no suc1 t mg 
as ''Australian ship". Ships registered in Australia under the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) were British ship~_; which flew either the Union 
Jack or the colours prescribed~2 The relationship between ships reg-
istered in Australia and the flag State, in terms of section 15 of the 
Geneva Convention 1958, was forged when the ?hipping Registration 
Act 1981 (Comth.) was passed. Bv section 3 (1) (Ql of the Navigation 
Amendment Act 1981 (Comth.),43 the definition of "British ship" in 
section 6 of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) has been deleted. It 
marks a vital departure from the "British ship" concept IAihich had been 
part of the Imperial policy in Australia for over fifteen decades. 
Among the steps taken in line with Australia's status as an independ-
ent sovet'eign Nation are the ratification and adoption of a large 
L1l, 
number of international shipping conventions. 
4. Centralised Register 
In a number of wavs, the Australian re~Jistration svstem differs 
markedly from its British counterpart. Instead of having a ship regis-
try located in each port or capital citv of the State, including the 
Northern Territory, the Commonwealth Government has centralised all 
registration functions in Canberra.45 The Shipping Registration Act 
1981 (Comth.) pro\;ides for the establishment ar1d maintenance of a 
single Australian Register of Ships. Although in each capital citv there 
41. Date when the Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Comth.) came 
into force in Australia, supra. 
42. s. 73. 
l!3. No. 10 of 1981. 
4l~, See 1\lavigation Act /\mendment Act 1979 (Comth.), Schedules 
1-V.t 
45. Shipping Registration rJffice, ~.Juite 17, Level 4, Wales Centre, 
Akuna Street, Canberra Citv, A.C.T. 2601. 
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is a branch office~6 its purpose is not to register ships or ship mort-
gages but to channel shipping documents to the Shipping Registration 
Office at Canberra,and also to provide information to the public. 
As a transitional measure, the 1981 Act (Comth.) provided for 
automatic' registration of certain ships. By section 86, every ship 
entitled to be registered and was, immediately before the date when 
the Act came into force~7 registered under the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1894 (Imp.) at a port in Australia is deemed on and from U1at date 
to be registered under the 1981 Act (Comth.). An owner of a ship which, 
though not required to be registered, was registered under the pre-
vious law may not wish his ship to remain on the Australian Register. 
He may put an end to the registration here and transfer the ship to 
another registry outside Australia. 
46. (i) N.S.W. 186 Kent Street, 
Sydnev, N.S.LIJ. 2000. 
(ii) Vic. 
(iii) Qld. 
(iv) S.A. 
(v) Tas. 
(vi) W.A. 
(vii) N.T. 
44 Market Street, 
Melbourne7 Vic. 3000. 
Ground Floor, 
Commonwealth Centre Building, 
294 Adelaide Street, 
Brisbane, Qld. 4000. 
27 North Parade, 
Port Adelaide, S.A. 5015. 
2nd Floor, 
Gladstone House, 2/'>. Gladstone Street, 
Hobart, Tas. 7000. 
2nd Floor, 
State Housing Commission Building, 
42 Queen Street, 
Freemantle, W.A. 6160. 
C.M.L. Building, 
59 Smith Street, 
Darwin, N.T. 5791+. 
'•7. On 26th January, 1982, as stated in the Commonwealth of 
Australia Gazette, No. G. 51, 22nd December, 1981; see also 
the 1981 Act (Comth.), s. 2. 
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The following statistical table48. shows the transactions completed at the Shipping Registration 
Office at Canberra during the space of one calendar year. 
1 JULY 1982 to 30 JUNE 1983 
July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June Total 
New Registrations 3rt 42 25 34 42 36 35 39 41 40 64 48 485 
Transfers of Ownership 18 32 17 27 35 35 27 32 28 51 40 39 381 
Closure of Registration - - 2 11 6 - 1 9 6 3 3 19 60 
Transfers from British to 101 39 24 142 49 66 37 37 79 47 53 46 720 Australian Registration 
L,B. Obtained from the Registrar of Ships, Shipping Registration Office, Canberra. 
_. 
<.0 
0 
The total number of ships registered in Australia and the breakdown figure for each of the 
States including the Northern Territory as at June 30, 1983 are as follows: 
Location Type of Ship State Total 
Chartered Commercial Government Fishing Pleasure 
New South Wales 2 217 1 325 1187 1732 
Victoria 106 19 125 316 567 
Queensland 2 101 30 564 461 1158 
Western Australia 4 97 4 416 278 799 
South Australia 0 35 9 207 161 412 
Tasmania 0 79 3 180 147 409 
Northern Territory 0 9 2 73 96 180 
Totals by Type 9 644 68 1890 2646 5257 
A ship must be registered with one of a list of twenty-une home 
ports furnished by the Registrar of Ships.49 Unfortunately, as none of 
the home ports have a ship registry the vital link between them and 
the ships, which characterised the British system, is missing. It is 
reasonable to presume that the Commonwealth Government's policy in 
establishing a branch office in each State and the Northern Territory 
is to serve the interests of people dealing with ships registered with 
home ports in the State or the Northern Territory. If this reasoning 
is correct, it is necessary for every branch office to maintain an 
accurate and up-to-date record of all dealings affecting ships in the 
State or Territory. Otherwise prospective purchasers will still have 
to inspect the centralised Register in Canberra. Unnecessary delay, 
expense and inconvenience will invariably result. At present, it 
appears that a branch office has only part of the Register of Ships 
containing particulars relating to ships with home ports in the State 
or Territory where the branch office is located. However, the infor-
mation provided in the relm!Bnt part of the Register of Ships is sev-
eral weeks bet1ind time. 
One facet of the centralised svstem of registration may be a 
pitfall for unwary ship purchasers and financiers. This problem is high-
lighted by the facts of and decision in General Credits {Finance) Ptv. 
Ltd. v. Registrar of Ships and Another. 50 The Registrar received two 
applications, one from the plaintiff on 15th July, 1982, and the other 
from F Pty. Ltd. on 13th July, 1982, for registration as owner of the 
vessel Whitsunday Wanderer. The Registrar informed the plaintiff's 
solicitors that their application suffered from a degree of informality. 
On 11th October, 1982, the plaintiff's solicitors were informed of the 
Registrar's 'intention to register the vessel in the name of F as owner. 
The plaintiff obtained an injunction on 12th October, 1982, restraining 
the Registrar from registering F's application as shipowner and from 
registering a mortgage of the ship in favour of L Pty. Ltd. Despite 
the injunction, the registration was effected and a registration cer-
tificate under the 1981 Act (Comth.) was issued on 13th October, 1982. 
There was evidence that the Registrar was unav,1are of the court order 
made on the previous day. The court did not attribute to him any blame 
49. This list is found on page 4 of the undated Instructions issued 
to each of the branch offices. 
50. (1982) 44 A.L.R. 571. 
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for his ignorance of the order. Rather it appeared to have condoned 
the bureaucratic practice at the central telex office, some three 
kilometres from the Registrar's office, as the cause of the delay in 
forwarding to him the telex messages received. What remarkable is 
that some responsibility was "thought to rest" on the plaintiff's solic-
itors for delay in advising the r~egistrar by phone regarding the issue 
of the court order. 
Moreover, for all prospective purchasers and competing claimants 
the decision has crucial implications. First, the limitations of the 
restraining order are noteworthy. Such an "order operates in personam 
and then only upon service.'81 Obviously, where the order is obtained 
in a State Supreme Court outside Canberra, its service on the Regis-
trar will necessarily take time. The facts of the case suggest that 
service of the order on a branch office located in a capital city is 
insufficient. The nature of the order such that it does not of "its 
own force ... expunge the relevant entry from the Register of Ships." 52 
Second, the court considered sections 59 and 60 of the Shipping Regis-
tration Act 1981 (Corntt1.). Section 59 empowers the court to order the 
rectification of the Register. Under section 60 the Registrar may alter 
the Register, in circumstances where a clerical or obvious mistake 
occurs, by expunging the registration which has already been made. 
McPherson, J., was of the view that the matter did not come within the 
scope of section 60. His refusal to order the rectification of the 
register plainly based on the principle of "integrity of the regis-
ter'', 53 propounded by the learned editor·s of IVJacLachlan on Merchant 
Shipping. 54 It is arguable that each capital city or major port should 
have a ship registry set up to carry out the full range of functions, 
as hlas the case under the Merchant Shipping Act 18% (Imp.). Such a move. 
will remove many of the difficulties currently encountered. 
51. [bid., p. 573. 
52. Ibid., p. 573. 
53. Ibid., p. 574. 
54. G St. C:lair Pilcher and O.L. Bateson (lLh ed. 1932), p. 62. 
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Despite the differences considered, there are many matters of 
principle and practice which are common to the Australian and British 
systems. In General Credits (Finance) Pty. Ltd. v. Registrar of Ships 
and Another?5 McPherson, J., aptly highligr1ted several basic similarit-
ies. He held that a registered title to or mortgage of a ship has 
priority which displaces the rules of common law or equity. His decis-
ion is based on his conception that the Shipping Registration Act 1981 
(Comth.) is, in manv respects, modelled on the Merchant Shipping Act 
18%. He ably explained the reasons in the following terms: 56 
"It not, in my opinion, possible to compare the provisions 
of the two enactments without concluding that the draftsman 
of the recent Act deliberately adopted the form of many of 
the provisions of the earlier statute with the intention that 
they should be construed in the light of existing decisions on 
similar provisions of the Imperial Act. The conclusion that 
follows is that, in establishing an Australian Register of Ships 
and a process of registration therein, the legislative inten-
tion was to impute to them a purpose, function, and effect 
similar· to those of the Imperial legislation. 11 
The Australian registration system also shares in common several 
ott1er features with its British counterpart. A ship or share in a ship, 
which ls registrable or registered under the Shipping Registration Act 
1981 (Comth.) or the Merchant Sr1ipping i\ct 1894 (Imp.), can only be 
transfnrred by a statutory bill of sale!7 Both the Australian State 
and British Parliamm1ts have adopted in their non-shipping legislation 
a similar definition of the term 11bill of sale". In each case, it express-
ly excludes from its scope "tl'ansfm's oe assignments of anv ship or 
vessel, or any share thereof.'' 58 Undoubtedly, the exception does not 
55. (1982) 44 A.L.R. 571. He followed the principles laid down in 
English and Canadian decisions: pp. 574-5. 
56. Ibid., p. 575. 
57. See the 1981 Act (Comth.), s. 36 (1) and tile 189'• Act (Imp.) 
5. 24. 
58. Bills of Sale t\ct 1878 (lt1 & l,2 Vic., c. 31), s. t~, For corres-
ponding prm1isions in Australian State enactments, see Bills 
of Sale Act (N.S .lll.) (No. 10 of 1898), s. 3; Bills of ~)ale ar~ 
llther Instruments Act 1955 ([Jld.) (4 Eliz. II No. 16), s. 6 (1) 
(viii) (c); BiHs of Sale Act 1886-1972 (S.A.), s. 2; Bills of Sale 
/\ct. 1900 (Tas.) (61+ Vic. No. 70), s. 4 (1); Instruments Act (Vic.) 
(No. 6279 of 1958), s. 32; Bills of Sale Act (W.A.) (No. 45 of 
1899), s. 5. Tht:J exclusion embraces an unfinished ship 
together with tho building materials ready to be used, and 
also the articles requirr~d for navigatinD a ship; Re ~:ioftley, 
Ex. parte Hodgkin (1875) L.R. 20 Eq. 746 and ColLman \1. Cham-
tmrlain (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 328. 
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cover boats or small pleasure craft. The current significance attached to the registration certif-
icate and to the Australian Register of Ships as a public record has its origin in English maritime 
law. Another important aspect underlying both systems is the application of a similar statutory 
principle to determine the priority of competing mortgage claims~9 
5. Mortgage of Ship or any Share therein 
An important part of the Registrar's work is the registration of ship mortgages and also entry 
of discharge of the same. The figures below show the extent to which ships and shares therein are 
used as securitv under the Shipping Registration 1981 Act (Comth.). In so far as the Register and all 
the entries made therein are open to public inspection, the policy of the old law is actuallv being fol-
lowed -
Number of Entries: 1st July 1982 to 30th June 1983. 60 
Transactions Jul. Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June Total 
Mortgages 25 32 9 24 19 46 18 23 31 24 35 23 309 
Discharge of 9 14 7 18 10 15 31 13 14 20 23 18 192 Morgages 
59. Discussed in the pages immediately following. 
60. Statistics obtained from the Registrar of Ships, Shipping Registration Office, Canberra. 
The 1981 Act (Comth.) confers on the rer.Tlstered mortgageu of thE~ ship 
or shares therein a number of important statutory rights, The prmJis-
ions are modelled on those of the Imperial Act 18%. 
Section 39 provides the r·ulEl for fixing the ardor of priori tv 
where two or more mortgages have been effected in respect of the same 
ship or shares therein. Under such circumstances 
"the priority among the mortgages is in accordance with the 
order of registration of the mortgages, irrespective of the 
dates upon which tr10y were rnade or executed and nothwith-
standing any express, implied or constructive notice." 
The "prioritv" rule based on the mortgage being actuallv registored 
first at the registry located in Canberra may often prove to be a trap 
for the unwary ship financiers or creditors. In the usual event of a 
mortgage being executed outside Canberra, e.g. in any of the State 
capitals, the lapse of even a few days prior to tr1e registration will 
make it a risk for a person to accept a ship or shares therein as secur-
itv. It is possible for a dishonest st1ipowner or holder of stlares in a 
ship to create, in a couplfJ of hours, several mortgages in favour of 
different persons. Personal or telex enquiries, tt1ough made early by 
prospective creditors at the registry at Canberra, mav disclose no 
entry of any mortgage. It crucial for each mortgagee to lodge the 
mortgage instruments personally at the registry aheE1d of those of a 
subsequent mortgage. Tile delay irwolvtc?d in sending the instruments 
for registration through one of the branch offices will result in the 
loss of priority. It will be recalled that under the Merchant f3hipping 
Acts (lmp}1 registries were conveniently located in most ports and State 
--
capitals. Problems of the type envisaged above seldom arose. 
One gap in the Shipping F~egistration Act 1981 (Cornth .) is that it 
rJoes not contain a pro\/ision similar to section 30 of thr~ Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.). lhe section gives the court a discretionary 
power, alia, to make an order which prohibits, for a limited time, 
any dealing with thB ship or anv sharr.-:J therein. This gap in the law 
61. 1854 (Imp.), Part II. and 1894 (Imp.), Part I. 
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does not prevent a person, who is interested in a ship, including a mar- : 
tgagee, from relying on section 75 UJ.D of the Commonwealth Constitu-
tion read in conjunction with the Judiciary Act 1903-1973 (Cornth.). 
However, tl1is procedure, which leads to the issue of the order of in-
junction, is often ineffective because of the delay involved.62 
The risk of a mortgage being postponed as a result of the fraud 
of the mortgagor or delay in effecting registration has been removed 
by section 18 of the Shipping Registration Amendment Act 1984 (Comth.). 
By the amended section 47A (1) of the 1981 Act (Comth.), a person 
claiming an interest in a ship or the shares therein under an unregis-
tered instrument may lodge with the Registrar a caveat in the pres-
cribed form. The effect is to forbid the entry in the Register of any i 
instrument relating to any dealing affecting the interest until the 
caveator is notified of the intended dealing. 
A mortgage of a ship or whatever shares in a ship, which is reg-
istered under the 1981 Act (Comth.), is protected in a number of ways. 
It is relevant to consider first the anomalies that existed until 
recently. Under the old companies legislation in Australia, a charge 
created over a ship or any share therein belonging to a company had 
to be registered. ~~or example, under the repealed Companies Act 1962 
(Tas.), the charge had to be registered as required by section 100 (1). 63 
Otherwise it would be void as against the liquidator and any creditor 
of the company. In addition, the same charge was required under the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) to be registered at the ship's registrJ4 
whict1 could be located at a different State. There was uncertainty as 
to how inconsistency relating to the priority accorded to the char·ge 
62. See General Credits (Finance) Pty. Ltd. v. Registrar of Ships 
and Another (1982) L,4 A.L.R. 571, supra. 
63. No. 66 of 1962. For similar provision, see s. 100 (1) in the 
following State legislation (repealed): Companies Act (N.S.W.) 
(No. 71 of 1961); Companies Act (Qld.) (No. 55 of 1961); Companies 
(S.A.) (No. 56 of 1962); Companies Act (Vic.) (No. 6839 of 
1961); and Companies Act (W.A.) (No. 82 of 1961). 
64. See ss. 33 and 36. In the United Kingdom, dual registration 
continues to be the requirement. Under the Companies Act 1948 
(11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38), s. 95, a char~Je, including a mortgage, on a 
company-owned ship or any share therein must be registered. 
Registration is also necessary where the company acquires a 
ship or any share therein subject to a Pr'e-existing chaPge: M. 
Thomas and D. Steel, Tt1e Merchant Shipping Acts (7th ed. 1976}, 
para. 63. 
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or mortgage under the two Acts 'Alas to be resolved. Moreover, diffic-
ulty would also arise where a mortgage, though registered under the 
Imperial Act, was not registered as a charge under the Companies Act 
1962 (Tas.). The courts' IAJould in all probability apply section 2 of the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp.). Thus an Imperial law which applies 
to an Australian State by paramount force will render a State law null 
and void to the extent of its repugnancy. 
The situation has been remedied by the current uniform compani~?s 
legislation65 and a decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland. Section 
200 (1 )66 sets out the various types of assets over which registrable 
charges may be created by a company. To simplify matters, it expressly 
excludes "a ship registered in an official register kept under a law in 
force" in a State or Territory relating to title to ships. In Re North 
Brisbane Finance and Insurances Pty. Ltd.~7 on 12th February, 1982, a 
company as owner of the ship, ;Jandshoe, granted a mortgage of the 
same. The mortgage in the form required by section 38 of the Shipping 
Registration Act 1981 (Comth.) was duly registered on 23rd March, 1982. 
It was, however, not registered as a charge pursuant to section 100 
of the Companies Act 1961-1980 (Qld.). Under section 100 (1), the con-
sequence of non-registration was that the charge was invalidated "in 
so far as it confers a security interest, not only against the liquidator 
... but also against a secured creditor' of the company prior to the wind-
ing up .... " 68 The 1961-1980 Act (Qld.) was repealed when the Companies 
(Application of Laws) Act 1981 (Qld.) 69 and the Companies (Queeensland) 
65. In December 1978, the Commonwealth and the States entered 
into an agreement to provide for a co-op£:Jrative scheme for 
laws relating to companies and their administration. Pursuant 
to the agreement set out in the Schedule to the National 
Companies and Securities Act (Comth.) (No. 173 of 1979), similar 
companies legislation was enacted by each of the State 
FJarliaments. 
66. See e.g. Companies (Tasmania) Code, 1982. 
67. (1983) 8 A.C.L.R. 274. 
68. Ibid., p. 275. 
69. No. 110 of 1981. 
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Code 1981 came into force on 1st Julv, 1982. However, bv section 30 
(9) of the Companies (Application of Laws) Act 1981 (Qld.), certain pro-
visions oF the 1961-1980 Act (Qld.), including section 100, continued to 
remain in force. McPherson, J., correctlv held that the Shipping Reg-
istration .t\ct 1981 (Cornth.) fulfils the description of "a laiAJ in force 
in the State relating to title to ships." He accepted the argument 
for the mortgagee that section 100 of the 1961-1980 Act (Qld.)>either 
alone or in conjunction witt-1 section 30 (9) of the 1981 Act (Qld.), was 
inconsistent with the Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Comth.). Bv sec-
tion 109 of the Commom'llealth Constitution, where a State Act is 
inconsistent with a Commonwealth Act, the former shall, to the extent 
of its repugnancv, rendered null and of no effect. Accordinglv, 
non-registration under section 100 of the 1961-1980 Act (Qld.) read in 
conjunction with section 39 (9) of the 1981 Act (Qld.) cjid not affect 
the validitv of the mortgage as against the comparw liquidator. 
1"1cPherson, J., gave a broad interpretation to several provisions 
of the Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Cornth.). It much in line with 
the object of both Australian and British legislation to protect the 
interests of creditors. The purpose, no doubt, is to continue the 
ancient policv of encouraging the wealthv and financial institutions 
to accept mortgages of ships or shares tt1erein as sufficient securitv 
for their loans and investments. He construed the rights of mortgagees 
in the following words: 70 
"Section 40 of the Act in substance confers on the mortgagee 
of a ship the status of the holder of a statutorv charge bv 
wav of sec uri tv ... It is in that context that s. 41 confers on the 
ship's mortgagee a power atJsolutelv to dispose of the ship 
and to give effectual receipts in respect of the disposal.'' 
In the light of the facts of the case, the construction given is of 
special importance to mortgagees. The reason that the $hippins 
Registration Act 1981 (Comth.), unlike the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 
(Imp.), 71 contains no pro\/ision protecting mortgagees against the 
consequences of the bankruptcv or liquidation of ship mortgagors. 
Section 15 of the Shipping Registration Amendment Act 1984 
70. (1983) 8 A.C.L.R. 27'•· p. 277. 
71. See s. 36. 
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(Comth.) has increased the protection for subsequent ship mortgaoees. 
By section 41 (2),72 as amended, a mortgagee of a ship or any share 
therein shall not dispose of it unless he has first notified the 
Registrar of his intention to do so. The Registrar is duty-bound to 
transmit forthwith the information to each subsequent mortgagee.73 
In principle and practice, the object is sound. A subsequent mortgagee 
may have the opportunity to purchase the ship or any share therein, 
and take over the rights of the first mortgagee. Moreover, exercise 
by the first mortgagee of the absolute power to dispose of the ship 
may result in the ship being transferred out of the Australian Register 
and put out of the reach of the subsequent mortgagm~s. On receipt 
from the Registrar of the information, a subsequent mortgagee may 
decide on the appropriate course of action, 74 including l:.oking out a 
warrant of arrest for the ship. The new provisions, which have no 
counterpart in the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Irnp.\serve to enhance 
the value of subsequent mortgages. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In one essential respect, the Commonwealth policy differs from 
its Imperial counterpart. The Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Comth.) 
has implemented the concept of effective control based on the ship-
owners' residence in Australia as the genuine link between Australian 
ships and the Commonwealth. In terms of international trade relations 
the Commonwealth approach prm1ides certain advantages. By allowing 
foreigners to become minority shareholders of f\usl:.ralian ships, the 
law seeks to draw foreign investments into the country. The limited 
foreign ownership will, in the main, ensure the availability of suffic-
ient cargo for shipment by Australian ships on voyages around the 
world. 
Apart from the above difference, the Shipping Registration Act 
1981 (Comth.) was, in substance, drafted according to the philosophy 
of the Imperial Act. For example, the owner' of an /-\ustralian ship 
72. Sl1ippinq Registration f\ct 198 i (Comth.). 
73. Ibici., s. l!l (3), as amended. 
74. It appears that, by lodging a caveat undor s. 47A (1), as 
amended, a subsequent mortgagee is unable to provent the 
first mortgagee from disposing of the ship to enable her 
to be registered in a foreign registry. 
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und1:1r tt1e 1981 .1\ct (C:omth.)7r) likE! the owner of a British ship under 
the Imperial .l\ct?6 enjoys total immunity in certain cases of loss of, 
or damage to, fJoods. Another aspect of the policy concerns re\Jenue-
raising as a long-term object. .1\ nmAJ schedule of fees for registration 
of ships, mortgages, transfers and other services relating to the 
Register has been introductJd. T7 The fees recehJBd will cover about 
ninety-four per cent of the costs presentlv incurred by the Common-
wealth Government in the maintenance and operation of the ship 
registry?8 It expected that, wtl8n the numbers of Australian ships 
increase in the foreseeable future, the rmiBnue from the fees and 
stamp duties will be substantial. 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Commonwealth legis-
lators have, in large measure, adopted the main ingredients of the 
Imperial ship registration policy. 
75. See Navigation Act '1912-73 (C:omth.), s. 338, as amended bv 
the Navigation Amendment Act 1979 (Comth.), s. 65 (1). 
7G. S. 502. 
77. See the Shipping Regis_tratlon Regulations (Amendments) (Comth.)' 
(No. 273 of 1984), which also repealed the Tt1ird Schedule · 
to the Shipping Registration Regulations (Comth.)(No. 363' of 1981). 
78. See Marine Notict=J (No. 13 of 1985) dated 13th September, 1985, 
from the Department of Transport, Canberra. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PROBLEMS OF MARINE POLLUTION BY OIL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Om~ of the serious hazarcls of marine trr:msportation is oil spills. 
The notorious "Torrey Cam;on" disaster off the coa~:;t of Corm<11al1 in 
Englancl in March, 1967. is in manv wavs the worst case of oil pollution 
in modern times. Over 80,000 tormes of crude oil were released1. Apart' 
from that incident, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution has 
reported another twentv-two cases of pollution in which central gov-
ernments wem involvedf' In The "Amoco Cadiz", which grounded off 
the French coast in March, 1978, the damagps claimed came to £2,360, 
478-14. Probablv the Elevi \1 /Roseline has given rise to the largest 
sin~Jle claim for pollution damage, £3,626, 353.97? 
In Victoria alone from Februarv, 1975, to Januarv, 1978, about 
fiftv oil spills t<\Jere reported, of '"IIIlich ov~::Jr half the number occurred 
during bunkering operations~ Beti.AJ<'!£m March, 197D, and March, 1978, 
of the thirteen oil spills in Australian IA!aters, outside Victoria, one 
was a fairlv major disaster. It included the spillage of over 15,000 
tonnes from a Greek tanker "Princess /\nne Marien, 300 miles off ttw 
coast of l.Llestern Australia.5 
In May 1978, the SupremrcJ Court of New South Wales impost~d a 
$10,000 fine on the master of the vessel Stolt Sheaf, the highest fine 
recm'ded for thE! State. Slattf:~ry, J., was reported as saving: 
"I am nevertheless satisfied that extensive pollution can-
not be regarded lightly." 
The court decided that the discharge 1ruas "sufficientlv serious to 
merit a very solid deterrent fimL 11 6 That even prior to 1974 oil pollu-
tion had been viewed as fast: rPaching dangerous proportions 
1. H1e "Torrev Canyon", April 1967 (Crnnd. 32l12), paras. 3 and 4, 
H.M.S.O., London. 
2. Eighth Report, DctobE~r 1981 (CmmL 8358), pp. 72-73, H.M.S.O., 
London. 
3. Ibid., p. 73. 
!1. Hansarcl, Victorian LEJDislativB 1\ssEmlbh[, 12th April, 1978, pp. 
1425-1429, Victoria. 
5. Rt::!port on Puwention and Contml nf Clil Pollution in Marine 
Erl\/ironrnent, Parliamentary Papnr i\lo. 270/1977 (Comth.), 5th 
r~eport, /\l7FJS, Canberra, Appendix IX. 
-6. Ibid., paT'Ia. 100. 
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refler:ted in the legislation of three States. The penal tv imposed for 
discharge of oil in breach of statutory provisions has been sharply 
raised from $2,000 to $r:io,ooo? !'\part from curbing negligent and, in 
some instances, intentional spills, heavv penalties are necessitated in 
part bv long-term considerations of protection to marine life and the 
physical environment. 
No research on tr1e subject complete llllithout a sufficient 
understanding the nature and type of damage brought to light after 
very extensive public enquiries. i4.ccording to a Commonwealth parlia-
mentary paper, 8 
"Major oil spills have a clear and obvious deleterious 
effect on the marine environment and on the communities of 
plants and animals living there ... the results may affect the 
survival of an important species or alter the balance in the 
food chain ... The most obvious environmental effect of oil is 
usually the coating of large numbers of seabirds, nearly all 
of which die ... The second harmful effect of oil is related to 
its inherent toxicity ... The harmful danger to fish lies in the 
damaging effect oil spills mav have on near-shore nursery 
grounds ... Oil spills in Botany Bay may have caused contamina-
tion of ovsters VIJith economic loss to grm-~mrs ... The presence 
of oil or tar globules on a beach can have a serious impact 
on local communities through the loss of, or temporary damage 
to, recreation resources. This can lead to severe financial 
losses particularly in holiday areas .... " 
To the above-mentioned hazards are added new elements, e.g. the 
immense costs of clean-up operations, the effects of the chemicals 
used and the imminent risks of uncontrolablB fire risks. In Australia, 
there have been several notorious occurrences of oil spills into sea-
water, resulting in fire destruction of ships and property. 9 The dBter-
iorating situations are compounded by the use in Australian watElrs 
7. E.g. the Prevention of Oil Pollution of Navigable l!Jaters 
(Amendment) Act (N.S.l!J.), 1\Jo. 59 of 1973, s. 7 C (1)) Pre-
\Jention of Pollution of Waters by Oil Act Amendment Act 
(S.A.), No. 87 of 1972, ~;. 3; see also Dalgety Australia Ltd. v. 
Griffith [1980] 24 S.A.S.R. 21~9, p. 252, per Mitche.ll J.; Preven-
tion Df Pollution of lJJaters by llil Act Amendment Act (W.A.), 
No. 82 of 1973, s. 4. Under CommonW!'Jalth leqlslation and 
international conventions, a $50,000 penalty is becoming 
common, infra. 
8. Parliamentary Paper No. 270/1977 (Comth.), 5th Report, 
cit., pp, 7-10. 
9. E.g. Eastern Asia Navigation c_:o. Ltd. v. FremantlE• Harbour 
Trlist Commissioners and the Commonwealth of Australia (1950) 
83 C.L.R. 3~3. Oil on surface of water at Fremantle was 
ignited.- Another case with more disastrous conseqmmces 
occurring at Sydney Harbour was ~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. LtrJ. [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.). 
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of larger tankers to carry oil between oil wulls, refineries, tlCJrminal 
installations and storage depots. 
The frequent occurrerlCElS of oil spills mc~rit an examination of 
the protection of persons whose intere5ts or property is damnifiod. 
It is our aim to consider, among otl1er things, the effects which oil-
pollution damage and the recent legislation10 on the subject have on 
the development of maritime law. The c>xtr'!nt to which interests and 
rights under maritime law may be acl\;erselv affected by sucl1 legisla-
tion will be evaluated. In thcl analy~_;is, we shall consi.der the means 
available for recovering damage:.J for lo~:;s or damaf]e caused as a rElsult 
of unlawful interference or wronf]ful acts. Throughout, emphasis is 
placed on the ways in which maritime law principles may be applied to 
supplement the new remedies introducBd by legislation ,and redress the 
pollution damage suffered. 
For our purpose, it is necessary to examine a number of areas. 
The remedies availablE! at common law and its lirni tations form a conven-
ient starting point. As regards State lBgislation, the penalties imposed 
for breach and the strict civil liability imposed are considm'ed with 
the view to bringing them into line with maritime law. In the long term, 
it may be expedient for the wide-ran•~ing rm=Jasures and thE! "strict-
liability" remedies introduced tl\1 Cornrnumvealth legislation to be treat-
ed as an extBnsion of maritimE~ law. 
I L C0l"1P'10N LAW H.EMED I ES 
1. Nuisance 
It is vital to ascertain how far an action based on public nuis-
ance mav provide satisfactory remE!diJ. The object i~1 to consider wheth-
er better alternatives can be found in maritime law. We are fortun-
atE! to have had a nurnb~r of h~ading authorities11 where the principlE!S 
of common law are applied to oil spills from ships. The judgments show 
an initial reluctance on thf~ part of judges to E!xtemi the principles to 
pollution damage. This ~3eernin~.]ly Indifferent attitucl~c~ may be explained 
on thB ground that Australian and British judges view the worsening 
10. Including State and Cornrnom ... Jnalth. 
11. High Court of Australi<-J and Pri\N Council clf:Jci~~ions, infra. 
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pollution disasters as the concern of logi~jlatures and the world comm-
unity. 
The first case dealing ~vith the hazards of oil spills to come be-
fore the High Court of Australia is Eastern Asia Navigation Co. Ltd. 
v. Fremantle Harbour Trust Commissioners and the Commonwealth of 
Australia)2 In January, 1%5, the S.S. Panamanian, while berthed at 
Fremantle Harbour, in accordance with the directions of the harbour 
master, was extensively damaged bv fire. By the National Security 
(General) Regulations 19l.5 made by the Commonwealth, the neighbour-
ing berths were committed to the commanders of the allied forces. 
These berths were occupied by submarines and mother ships of allied 
navies. Quantities of oil or inflammable liquid accumulated on the 
waters of the harbour close to where the S.S. Panamanian was berthed. 
The oil or inflammable liquid was discharged or escaped from the sub-
marines and other vessels of ltJC3l' in those parts of the harbour occu-
pied by Commonwealth. LtJhile the S.S. Panamani8n was loading 
flour, a piece of hessian was seen to be smouldering on the ship's 
deck. An employee of the loadinq stevedore stamped on the smoulder-
ing hessian ar1d then threw it into the water. It was caught on the 
wharf timber above the water. lili thin a couple of minutes, a hu~JG 
flame shot up, badl\,1 damaging the ship and dBstro\,ling ·1 ,000 feet of 
wharf. Dwyer, C.J., trial judge of the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia, dismissed the action in nuisance brought bv the owm~rs of 
the S.S. Panamanian against the Harbour Trust and the Commonwealth: 3 
The owners appealed against the dc!cision. It was alleged that the 
harbour in U1e vicinit\/ of the ship was in a dangerous condition and 
that the accumulation of oil constituted a continuing nui~1ance. The 
defences accepted by all tllree High Court of f\ustralia judges, who 
dismissed the appeal, were these. First. the Harbour Trust did not 
cause 8nd had no power to, and could not bv any reasonable precau-
tions, prevent or avoid the accumuldtions. Second, it neithBr caused 
nor permitted the oil to come on the ~3ur of the harbour or to 
accumulate. Thit·d, the ship's mastE!r knew of thn oil accumulations ancJ 
voluntarily took the risk of dama~JB to the \Jessel arising from the 
12. (1950-1951) 83 C.L.R. 353. 
13. (1949) 51 lJJJ\.L.R. 9ll. 
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iunition of oil. Fourth, the irnmecJiate cause of the fire wc:1s the new 
and intervening act of a third party who thrf:JW tho burning hessian 
over the ship's side.1l1 The necDS~3ity of allowing the ships and sub-
marines of allied navies to use part of the harbour resulting in the 
accumulation of oil and the war preparations strengthenod the defen-
ces put forward. Lathan, C.J., hE~ld that thcl Harbour Trust was not in 
the position of an insurer, indicating that no strict liability was 
imposed) 5 He accepted the evidence that it had done everything 
possible to reduce the danger arising from floating oil. What was suc-
cessfully pleaded in essence was the absence of fault on the part of 
the defendants. It i~3 submitted thC:Jt this ground on which the Higll 
Court dismissed the appeal has seriousl v restricted the scope of pub-
lic nuisance as a remedv for pollution damage. 
Another aspect of the appeal by the shipowners concerned the 
liability of the Commonwealth. It tvas held that, despite the National 
Security (Lieneral) Regulations. the Commonwealth had not assumed 
"actual possession and control" of that part of the hmbour used by 
war ships of allied navies. The appeal was unanimously dismissl::d by 
the three Judges on that ground. The Court is seen as drm.Ning a fine 
distinction between actual possession or control and the right there-
to. It is submitted that the decisive factor' was that t/1e Commonwealth 
had the right to immEJdiate possossion and control. In effBct ttlis right 
was exercised by ttle Comrnnni.Neal th as the occupier when it allowed 
that part of the harbour to lm re~Jularly usecj ships and submarines 
from which the oil and inflamrnablEJ liquid escaped. The Commom'llealth 
should therefore have been held liable for particular or special damage 
suffered by tfH3 appellant shipowner~:; based on public nuisance. More-
over, bv requirin~1 "actual po~;sossion and control" as an essential ele-
ment, the Court had further roducEJd the irnpor·tance Df this action. 
Probably the only course of act;ion open to ttl(:! shipowners was to sue 
the allied governments which operated those st1ips and submarirms. 
But it is not free from difficulties. 
14. (1950) 83 C.L.F~. 353, p. 36B. 
15. See Professor G.llJ. Keeton, "The Lessons of thr-? Torrey 
Canyon" (1968) C.L.P., pp. 97 seq. 
205 
Another obstacle that stands in tho \11./a\f of public nuisance as 
a remedy for pollution damage has been brought to light in 
----
.:...::::.=::.:..:.:...:;;:.;;;_:._.;:;.;:.::::...; v. Southport Corporation.16 The House of Lords laid 
cJown certain limits to actions to recover damages for public nuisance. 
In December, 1950, thr:} Inverpol, a small tanker with a cargo of 850 
tons of oil was on a \lovage to Preston. She) shipped verv heavy seas 
and her steering mechanism became erratic. In the estuarv of the 
River Ribble, she ran aground and was in "imminent danger of breaking 
her back." The safety of the ship and lives of crew on board \Alas at 
stake. In those circumstances, the master decided to discharge con-
siderable quantities of the cargo of oil to lighten the ship. rhe oil 
discharged was carried by wind and the tide to the premises of the 
respondents, the Southport Corporation. Thev incurred t1eavv 
expenses in cleaning up their premisE~s. t'\lhich comprised the fort:!shore 
and the marine lake in Southport. They sued the appellants, owners 
of the Inverpool, and her master. to reco\ier tile expenses. The pro-
ceedings against the appellant shipm'\lners, based on their vicarious 
liability for the acts of the master as servant, included an action for 
the special damage suffered. 
Devlin, J., the trial jud!=Je, for the first time had to re\lie~ttl the 
principles applicable to the claims based on the facts alleged by the 
respondents. Although in the vast majority of cast.~s nuisanct:1 gener-
ally emanates from the neighbourirl~l propi'H'tv of a defendant, he rec-
ognizes that this fact is not a prerequisito to a cause of action.17 
His vi tal contribution lies in broadening the range u f premises from 
vvhich nuisance may ariSE'J. /\nother r:?xtension rnade to it is the result 
of t1is emphasis that it is not neces~mrv that tt1e nui~;ance should em-
anate from a location directly adjacent to the plaintiff's property. 
16. [1956] A.C. 218. 
17. Lorcj l~adc li ffe cHd not consider decisions in Jonr:~s v. Llanrust 
U.D.C. [19111 1 Ch. 393 and Smith v. C1rBat l1Jestr:~rn Rv. Co. 
(1925) 135 L. T. 112 as hmtinsJ any bearing on the circumstances 
of the case involving jettison of oH at sea and uncertain 
action of winds and waves: [1956] f\.C. 218. p. 2112. It appears 
that to establish a cause of action in nuisance! it is insuff-
icient merely to show oil ornanating from a ship m· chattol: 
ibid. p. 225. 
206 
The test is one of phvsical proximitv. HFl said: 18 
" ... I can see no reason whv, if lr:1nd or water belonging to 
the public, or waste land is misused bv the defenrJant, or 
if the defendant as a licenst:~e or trespasser misuses some-
one's land, he should not be liable for the creation of a 
nuisance in the same wav as an adjoining occupier wouhj be 
... The channel ~11hich leads through the Ribble estuary to the 
port of Preston is admittedly a public navigable river, and 
the nuisance in this case emanated from there. I do not 
think it matters that the nm;igable river does not adjoin 
the property of the plaintiffs. An action for a public nuis-
ance of this type cannot in principle depend upon contig-
uity to the hight\J'a\f; it must depend upon ~Aihether the plain-
tiff's propertv is sufficiently proximate to the highway to 
be affected by the misuse of it." 
Moreover, the analogv from trEJffic on lEJnd was applied to the navigB-
blo wEJterwav or estuary where the oil discharge occurred. By law, it 
is established that persons 11\lhose propertv adjoins the highwav can-
not complain of damage done by users of the high~AJay unless it is done 
negligentlv.19 
De 11Iin; J. 's doubts were justified. The law does not permit a 
person, on grounds of necessity, to discharge a cargo of oil onto 
another per!.:;on's property for the purpCJse of saving the ship. How-
ever, the House of Lords upheld Devlin J>3 decision that the discharge 
of oil in the interest of the crew's safetv afforded a sufficient answer 
to the claim based Drl public nuisance. The necessity to save human 
lives, which belon~J to a different scale of values, is certainly an 
overriding consideration?D In many ca:::jes of Wrt')cks or shipping dis-
ast8I's in11olving oil tankers, there is no doubt that similar· action to 
discharge the oil will be taken. As a strong persuasive authority,' the 
House of Lords decision will most: likely be followed in f\ustralia. 
18. [1956] i\.C. 218, p. 225. The remmning of Devlin, J., was 
approved by their Lord~:Jhips. 
19. Goodvvvn ([:Joodwirl) v. Chevoloy (1859) 28 L.J. Ex. 298; Tillet 11. 
Ward (1882) 10 Q.B.D. 17, and Gayler & Pope Ltd. \/. Davies & 
Son Ltd. (192h] 2 K.B. 75 I'Elferred to as authorities on the 
point. Lord Radcliffe, hm<\lever, shared the viE;w of Denning, 
L.J .. (Court of /~ppeal) that thB shipownerf3 were not respon-
sible for a private nuisance in any ordinary sEmse: Ibid., 
p. 242. -
ZfJ. [1956] A.C. i:'18, pp. 227 ancJ 228. 
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Unless strinqent criteria are applied, it will ~JhJe the deft':!nce an un-
duly wide scopE!. The! unjust consequence is the sacrifice of the rights 
of innocent property oiAmers and third parties adversely affected by 
the discharge. 
It seems to be part of a predetDrmined drama when each succ-
eeding decision only serves to reduce further the efficacy of this 
nspecial damage" remedy. Its eh:o,mr:mts were again examined, this time 
by the Privy Council, in relation to an extensive fire damage due to 
an oil spill in a Sydney wharf. In Overseas Tankshlp (UJ\.) Ltd. \t. The 
Miller Steamship Co. Ptv. and Another ,21 the respondents (Rs) had two 
ships undergoing repairs at a Sydne\; wharf (No. 1 ). ThFJ IAiharf owners 
used oxv-aceytylene torches to carry out the repairs, causing pieces 
of red-hot metal to fly into the sea. At a nearby wharf (No. 2), The 
Wagon !Yiound,. cl1artered to the appellant (A Ltd.) by demise, was taking 
in bunkering oil. The engineers of Jlm Waqon !YloumJ carelessly allowed 
a large quantity of that oil to 0\/t~rflow from the 3hip into the l\later. 
It drifted to and accumulated round vJharf 1\Jo. 1 and Rs' two \Jessels. 
In the early hours of 1st Nm1ernber, 19'J1, the oil on water caught fire 
and spread rapidly. Extensive damage wc-:1s caused to 1.\/harf No. 1 and 
two vessels. Rs sought to hold /\ Ltd. liable for damages, suing 
tl'3rnatively in nuisance and negligence. The fin3 l\las believed to have 
been started wt1en a hot metal piecf" hdJ on sorm'! inflammable material 
which in turn ignited thf] oil on water. 
Walsh, J., in the ~)upreme Court of Nc;w SDuth Wales22 had held 
that A Ltd., by pollutin~l the harbour l'llaters with oil, llad cmnrnitted'· a 
"wrongful" act constituting a public nuisance. Judgment was given for 
As un the ground that as a l't1Sult of the nuisance they had suffen::!d 
damage over and abovr-J that suffeeed by the public. Moreover, he 
held that liability in mJisance clid not depPnd on foreseeal1ility. !\ 
Ltd. appealed to the Privy Council against. ltlalsh J. 1 ~.i decbion based 
on nuisance:?. 
In dBli\/F3ring the judgment, Lord Rr!id affirrnBd Ltlalst1 J;s dHcision 
21. l1967] A.C. 617 (P.C:.). 
22. [1963] 1 Lloyd's r~ep. ll02. 
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to the extent that A Ltd. had comrnittr:!d a public nuisance. Pdthough 
negligencE3 is not held to be one of the necessary elements in dr~ter­
mining liability for nuisance, ''it is admitted that fault is essential-
in this case the negligent discharge of the oiL"23 In their Lordships' 
judgment, the forseeability test must be satisfied in cases of pollu-
tion. Thus it is not sufficient that the damage caused to Rs' vess-
els was the direct result of the nuisancrJ if that damage is "in the 
relevant sense unforeseeable". 24 In this case, it was found as a fact 
that the damage or injury, which could be reasonably fon:Jseen, was 
physical pollution, not injury by fire. The Privy Council reversed the 
decision of the Supreme Court of New South ltlales. 25 
Undoubtedly, the restrictive foreseeability test applied by thf') 
Privy Council is a serious setback to the potential of the "special 
damaDe 11 action. It dashed the hopes raised by Walsh, J. in his judg-
ment. A large oil spill can have wide-ranging consequences. These 
include reduction of earnings of the tourist industry, damage to sea-
birds, loss of amenity, e.g. the aDsthetic and psvchological aspects, 
acJ\Jerse effects on the livelihood of fishermen and the costs of clean-
up. Often the costs of dealing with an oil pollution incident are not 
proportionate to the value of the oil spillt::!d! The important question 
is this. Will all these forrns of damage or loss come vvitt1in the fore-
seeability rule, even though fire damage is not? 
The "special damagEJ" action has one clistinct ad\Jantage over an 
action for the tort of negligence. Lllt1ere a plaintiff proves that he 
has suffered damage or loss different in nature from that suffered 
by the general public, he is able to succeed. Subject to proof of the 
forseeable consequence, there is the ri[Jht to recover purely pecun-
iarv loss which actually suffered.26 
23. [1967] A.C. 617, p. 639. 
24. Ibid., p. 640. 
25. For- the judgment, see [1963] 1 Lloyd's F(ep. L1D2. 
26. P.F.P. Higgins, Flernents of Torts in Australia (1970), pp. 360 
-361. Thf.:l position is the same under English lmv: Winfield 
and Jolowicz on Tort (11th eel. 1979), pp. 35L~-355. 
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Thr~n~ are, hoWE?Ver, a number of difficulties facing claimants. 
Since tho action seeking compensation is of a personal nature, it has 
to be brought against the polluter himself and/or the employer who 
is vicariously liable. Often such persons are not resident in the 
country where the damage occurs and tend to evade the sen1ice of 
court process. Few shipping agents tl\lill continue to act for theie 
foreign peincipals or co-operate with the claimants. This fact makes 
it difficult for the actions to succeed. Another complexity, mav be 
added to the situation. The pDlluter, who mav be a ship's engineer, 
and the employer, which is a limited companv operating as a charterer, 
will generallv not have the resources to meet large claims. It is like-
tv that these defendants do not carrv insurance policies to co\Jer 
such contingencies. In due course, we will consider what possible 
answers to these problems mm; be found in maritime law. 
2. Negligence 
The efficacy of the tort of negligence is now considered. In 
Eastern Asia Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Fremantle Harbour Trust Commiss-
ioners and the Commonwealth of Australiaf7 the Harbour Trust, as a 
public bodv, and the Commonwealth were sued in negligence. It was 
proved that tt1e wooden structures of the wharves, includin[.:J the tim-
ber of the wharf where the S.S. Panamanian was berthed, were impreg-
nated with oil. Also from time to time there were large quantities of 
oil on the water. The Harbour Trust as the authoritv in control \Alas 
aware of these factors.Z8 Evidence showed that it had taken all rea-
sonable measures to deal with the oil and to prevent fire hazards. 
Moreover, it was held tr1at, since the oil ~vas not specially inflammable 
and its presence wns obvious to t11e ship's master, the Harbour Trust 
27. (1950-1951) 83 C.L.R. 353. On 1~>t November, 1943, The Edendale 
caught fire close to where the S.S. Panamanian was berthed. 
It wa~i believed to have been caused bv the presence of o.il 
on water: ibid., pp. 378-379. 
28. In fact, the "reports showed bevond question that the harbour 
authorities and the naval authorities considered that the oil 
which appeared irregulorlv and in large quantities on the sur-
face of the harbour was a real fire danger": £!.!ilr Latham, 
C.J., ibid., p. 380. 
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ltvas not liable for failing to prevent damage to shipping or to gi\le 
warning of the presonce of oil. 
The duty and the standard of care to be exercised by Australian 
port and harbour authorities at common law are far from satisfactor~;. 
In the crmtext of modern-day le\lel of shipping activities and maritime 
commerce, the Higtl Court decision has serious implications. It means 
that users of port and harbour facilities are not protected by the 
tort of negligence where damage or loss is caused by oil on the water 
or an outbreak of fire. The users include cargo-owners, stevedores, 
shipowners and ship operators. Marine underwriters, who need to 
reduce their lm1sBs by 1..vay of subrogation, are among those ad\lersely 
affected where the tort remedy does not avail them. Moreo\ler, others, '! 
whose property is polluted by oil carried by the action of t-.Jinds and 
currents from port and harbour waters, will have no redress. 
In another respect, the High Court decision is unsatisfactory. 
The plaintiff shipowners also failed in their negli~Jence suit against the 
Commonwealth. In the opinion of the High Court Judges, the evidence 
presented was insufficient to establish any negligent act or omission 
by any person for whose conduct thl'3 Commonwealth was responsible. 
It is submitted that the standard of proof eequired is grossly incon-
sistent with the current policy, both national and world-t'liide, to re-
duce oil spills. Ttle difficulty in adducing sufficient evidence 1,vould 
also stand in the way should tile plaintiffs decide to SUI:! in nngligence 
the owners of the ships from which the oil was discharged. 
That the judicial system is slow to remedy c!efe:Jct~:; in law is ev-
idenced by the case of Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Southport Corpora-
tion: 29 rhis House of Lords dt~cision was clelivered c::Jbout five years 
after the High Court of Australia decision. It merely continued the 
tnmd of requiring plaintiffs, as victims of pollution damage, to meet 
a sommvhat harsh burden of proof. The stranding of the Inverpol l'lias 
itself presumptivt~ of negligent navioation, calling for an explanation. 
But both Delvin, J., and the House of Lords accepted the master'~; 
29. [1956] A.C. 218. 
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explanation that it was due to a clefect in the ship's steering mechan-
ism. There was no onus on him to prove further that the defect was 
not due to his fault. Their Lordships saw no basis to distinguish be-
tween the burden of proof in oil-pollution cases and ordinary neglig-
ence suits. Under English lmv, at arw rate, the principle laid down 
by the House of Lords in Woods v. Duncan30 determines the onus to 
be discharged by a defendant. Thus, if he "can satisfy that he per-
sonally was not negligent, he does not have to explain how the accid-
ent occurred. ".31 One criticism to be levelled against this approach 
is failure by judges to take into account the e\Jer increasing hazards 
and mounting clean-up costs. If the tort of negligence is to be rele-
vant in redressing wrongs caused by oil pollution, the courts have to 
take into account the crises and re-define the duty of care.32 It is 
suggested that, where stranding or a spillage is shown to be due to 
defects in a ship, it should be incumbent upon the master to prove 
that they are not attributed to his fault. 
This tort suffered another very serious setback in the case of 
The Wagon Mound (No. 1 )~3 The Privv Council upheld the decision of 
the trial judge Kinsella. Although the fire damage to the wharf and 
equipment was the direct result of the escape of oil, it was held to 
be outside the foreseeability test and therefore too remote. It was 
held that the demise charterers (0 Ltd.) of the ship could not reason-
ablv be expected to have known that oil on water would catch fire. 
Fortunatelv, the devastating effects of the decision, which was 
binding on Australian courts, were removed five years later in the 
case of Trm llJagon Mound (No. 2)?4 Except that the two ships damaged 
bv fire belonged to different parties, thEJ cause of the action arose 
basicallv out of the same facts as in )he ltlagon Mound (No. 1). The 
shipowners (1"1. Ltd.) appealed against llJalsh J.'s decision based 
30. [191+61 A.C. 401. 
31. Per Devlin, J. whose judgment is reported: [1956] A.C. 218, 
p. 232. 
32. As to the dutv of care to bE~ observed in relation to the 
magnitude of the risk, SfJB Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 
(11th ed. 1979), Qe. rjt., pp. 91-92; f~.F.V. Houston, Salmond on 
the Law of Torts, {17th r~d. 1973), pp. 226, 
33. [1961] A.C. 388. 
---34. [1967] A.C. 617. 
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m"" 11egugence, given in the Suprmne Court of New South llJales. In 
Wagon Mound (No. 2), findinus different from those in The lJJagon Mound 
(No. 1) were arrived at. The former show that "some risk of fire 
would have been present in the mind of a reasonable man in the shoes 
of the ship's chief engineer. 11 35 It interesting to note that in allow-
ing the appeal of M Ltd., the Privy Council re-defined the meaning of 
"foreseeable11 and "reasonablv foreseeable'' in the light of the hazards 
posed bv oil spillage. In delivering the Privv Council jucjgment, Lord 
Reid said:36 
" ... the onlv question is whetht=Jr a reasonable man having the 
knowledge and experience to be expected of the chief engin-
eer of the Wagon Mound would have known that there was a 
real risk of the oil on the water catching fire in some wav: 
if it did, serious damage or other propertv was not onlv fore-
seeable but verv likelv ... The most that can be said to justify 
inaction that he would have knm"1n that this could only 
happen in very exceptional circumstances ... If it is clear that 
a reasonable man woulcl have realised or foi'eseen and pre-
vented the risk, tt1en it rnust follow that the appellant [1. 
0 Ltd.] is liable in damag8s.'' 
The reasoning in this case has given rise to fresh hopes. Apparently, 
judges are coming to grips with the fact that the static principles of 
common law are not meeting the problems created tJy the frequent 
movement of nil in bulk across national and internatinnal ~vaters. 
Their Lnrdships emphasised that in the light of previous occurrences 
it is possible to ignite oil on water. F~ecogniUon of this highlv dang-
erous propensity of oil on water is onlv the first stage of the judic-
ial process. For the tort of neuligEmce to be a viable remedy, the un-
derlying concepts must tJe adapted to the current de\Jeloprnents. i\Jew 
criteria will have to be lvorked out to protect the rights of ttlose ad-
versely affected by pollution. 
The stress placed on the devBloprnent of this tort is in line with 
the present tendency of common law "not only to move further and 
furtht-Jr away from strict liability but more and more to assimilate 
nuisance and negligence." 37 The modern trend is so geared towards a 
35. ItJid., p. 641. 
36. Ibid., pp. 643-644. 
37. Clerk and Lindsell on Tmts (111th ed. 1975), para. 1409. 
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more comprehensive action in negligence that it is questionable whe-
ther the action in nuisance can be separated from negligence.38 
A move in that direction is seen in the recent case of 
"Amoco Cadiz"39 decided by a United States District Court. "corn-
plex, multidistf'ict litigation" was occasioned by the grounding of an 
oil tanker and the consequent spillage of its cargo of oil in March 
1978, off the French coast. Before the grounding incident, a West 
German salvage tug owned and operated by Bugsier had attempted to 
assist her. Actions for pollution damage and clean-up costs were 
brought in the United States by a host of plaintiffs, e.g. the French 
Government, government departments, municipalities and private indiv-
iduals. grounding was largely attributed to the failure of the 
tanker's steering gear when she encountered rough seas and severe 
winds. The thoroughness with which the various causes of the disas-
ter were investigated shows the enlightened approach L1\f American 
courts to the problems of pollution. It is interesting to note how in 
upgrading the tort remedy the court succeeded in attributing fault to 
the conduct of se\leral of the parties sued. 
Firstly, the Spanish shipyard, was held liable in part for the 
pollution damage. The court found that the design and construction 
faults of the steering gear had contributed to the grounding. There 
was evidence that the American Bureau of Shipping CABS) had certified 
that thf~ steering gear complied with all applicable t'ules. It is note-
worthy that such certification did not absolve /-\E from liability for 
its own negligence. Secondly, AIOC had complete control over the op-
eration, management and repair of the tanker and also the selection 
and training of its crew. It was hehj to be negligent in failing to 
ensure that the vessel, particularly her steering gear, was in a sea-
worth\/ condition and adequately maintained in proper repair. More-
over, the crew's inability to re-establish control after the steering 
gear breakdown was due to AIOC's failure to instruct and train them 
38. M.A. Millner, Negligence in Mmlern Law (1967 ed.), pp. 180-190. 
39. [198l,] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 304. Tile action 1,~as brought by the French 
Government in the United Status. 
214 
to cope with the situation in an emergency. As a pragmatist reformer, 
IIIJcGarr, J., pushed the duty of care one stage further. AIOC was found 
negligent in operating the tanker without an alternative steering 
mechanism or other means of controlling the rudder "in the event of 
complete failure of the hydraulic steering systern."40 AIOC's negligence 
in the respects stated was held to be the proximate cause of the 
grounding of the tanker and the resulting pollution damage. 
Thirdly, ATC, as registered owner of the tanker, \tvas held to be 
liable For AIDC's negligence, and also for its failure to ensure the 
seaworthiness of the vessel and supervise the crew training on board. 
ATC's liability was without limitation 41 since it was unable to prove 
that it was free from privity and knowledge as regards the negligence 
which proximately caused the grounding of the vessel. 
Two other aspects of the decision merit consideration. Bugsier, 
which attempted to salvage the tanker, was also sued in negligence bv 
the French departments for the pollution damage and clean-up costs. 
It may be observed that while developing this tort as a viable remedy, 
the learned judge was careful not to find fault with the way the sal-
vage operations were carried out. The inference is that the duty of 
care expected of salvors is less onerous than that required of the 
parties considered above. This important differentiation is consistent 
with the public policy of encouraging salvage efforts. In his view, 
Captain l.Lieinert's unwise towing strategy, which was an act of misjudg-
ment, did not constitute "culpable negligence" under the circumstan-
ces.42 
l\n amusing line of defence was adopted bv AE, AIDC and ATC and 
another. It asserted counter-claims and third-party claims against 
40. Ibid., p. 338. 
41. Under the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage 1969 which wm'i part of French law but "not 
a United States law": ibid., p. 337. This Convention and its 
Protocol are given the force of law in Australia under the 
f"Jrotection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act (Comth.) (No. 31 of 
1981). 
l1Z. [1981,] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 304, p. 316. Cf. The Jade (The Escher-
sheirn) [1976] 1 A 11 E.R. 1,41 (C.A.) where the salvors' applica-
tion to haVE) the writs in the two actions against them set 
aside 1.vas dismissed. 
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the French Government, government departments and municipalities 
for their negligence in failing to prevent or contain the oil spill. 
McGarr, J., had no difficultv in rejecting these claims as "unfounded 
in law and in fact". He explained the grounds in these words:L13 
11No duty which France mav have had to its citizens can run 
to the benefit of [AE, AIOC, ATC, etc.]. No action or lack 
of action on France's part could r:e8Ult in a right accruing 
to [AE, AIOC, ATC, etc.] to sue for lack of planning or in-
effectual clean-up efforts." 
A polluter is, however, not liable for damage occasioned by any inept 
clean-up efforts which have in fact aggravated the harm. 
The principles laid down in this case, if followed by Australian 
courts, could constitute the initial step in building up a body of law 
to redress the wrongs inflicted by polluters. The tort of negligence 
does not as vet furnish answers to manv of the pressing problems. 
Some examples are ghten. Firstly, it is uncertain how far the foresee-
abilitv test laid down in The Wagon Mound (No. 2) will enable pollution dam-
age and clean-up costs to be recovered.44 Should the same rule as to 
remoteness of damage applv to claims for pollution damage? Secondly, 
with regard to contributory negligence, there rnust be specific rulings 
made as to the nature or extent of the pollution threat that justifies 
preventive steps to tJe taken. If the I'f'Jasoning is acceptable it foll-
ows that the~ law must enable the costs of such preventive measures, 
if properly taken, to be recovered~' 5 Thirdly, apart from the clean-
up costs and the expenses incurred in prevEmting damage, the loss 
suffered in most cases, e. by peml diver·s, motel operators, is 
purely financial. It is questionable, whether on grounds of policy, 
Australian courts are prepared to allow such claims to be recovered 
43. Ibid., p. 339. 
44. It should be borne in mind that the Privy Council decision in 
this case only concerns liability for fim damage: [1967] A.C., 
pp. 640, 61+4. 
'•5. The 11Arnoco Cadiz" [198'•] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 304, p. 339, r-.e.r F. 
McGarr, J. 
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in tort.46 Fifthlv, a judgment obt<iiJl£]d in a peesonal action mav be of 
little practical value where the defendant as a natural person or 
limited companv is insolvent. The use of the Mareva injunction mav 
be effective in preventing a defendant from promptly disposing of the 
h f . h f h t' . . d" . lll s ips or trans errmg t em out o t e cour s JUriS tctiDn. 
3. Strict Liabilitv 
We shall now consider whether the rule in Rvlands v. Fletcher 
can be taken advantage of in actions for pollution damage. This 
"strict liability" tort appears to have great potential since negligence 
or fault is not an element. In Eastern Asia Navigation Co. Ltd. v. 
Fremantle Trust Commissioners48 reliance was placed, inter alia, on the 
rule. The owners of the S.S. Panamanian contended that the Common-
wealth or the Harbour Trust accumulated dieselene, or allowed it to 
be accumulated in ships, and that the fire damage caused was the 
consequence of its escape. Since it has been recognised that bunk-
ering oil or dieselene is a dangerous substance due to its tendencv 
to ignite, one of the requirements of the tort was thus satisfied. All 
the other elements, including the r~scape and damage as a consequence1 
thereof, were present, except one. Both Latham, C.J., and Kitto, J., 
held that the rule had no application. Bringing fuel oil to a berth in 
a harbour and there dealing with it as fuel for cJil-burning vessels 
were held as an accepted incident of an urdinarv purpose, to which 
the berth was reascmablv applied. The action failed on the ground 
that carrving fuel oil on ships into tmrths was somehow recognised 
as a natural use thereof. Sea lanes, both national and international, 
could be placed in the same categorv as berths. It mCJ\f implv that 
for allow-
ing oil to escape from a ship or tanker while proceeding along one 
1~6. The High Court of Australia pronouncements in 
.,;;;;;;..;;;;.;:.;;;.;;:.;..;....= 
U\ustralia) Pty. Ltd. \J. H1e Dn:dge "Willemstad" (1977) 51 A.L.J. 
R. 270 indicate that the path of change is not an easv one. 
See the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Rivtow Marine 
Ltd. v. Washington Iron lllorks (1973) L10 D.L.r~. (3d.) SL,O. 
47. See F.O. Rose, "The MenNa Injunction Attachment in Person-
am- Part I" [198111 L.M.C.L.Q. 1. 
48. (195Ll-1951) 83 C.L.R. 353. 
49. (1866) L.R. 1 Ex. 265. This "strict-liabilitv" rule was not con-
sidered in The Wagon ~'1ound [1961] A.C. 388, p. Lt27. 
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of the lanes orcJinarily used by such \JessrJls. There is another obsta-
cle that stands in the way. It has IJElerl said that it must be an escape 
from the defendant's land and not an escape from a ship/0 Moreover, 
oil is carried on ships either as fuel or as can~o in bulk. It is incon-
ceivable for a court to rule that it i~3 a non-natural use of a wharf, 
berth or sea-lane on the grouncJ that the ship involved has on board 
a large quantity of oiL 
It is unlikely that under Austrc3lian and Ent:Jlish laws this tort 
will, in the foreseeable future, dm;elop into an adequate remedy for 
pollution damage due to oil spills from ships. 
4. Reforms 
It has been observed that actionr; at common law are inadequate 
in many ways. They suffer the grm;e limitation of treating human in-
dividuals as being solely responsilJle for the consequences of oil 
spills. Since the pollution is targ(~ly ship-sourced, though human 
agency is present, the mechanical approach of common law is not a 
viable proposition. 
It is submitted that the probh~m~:> should be dealt with by the 
application and. wherever nece~1sary, the extension of maritime law 
principles. The present tendency of the law to assimilate nuisance 
and negligence has been notecJ. Provided the ~ipillage occurs from a 
ship, pollution damage, whether actiunable in nuisance OI' negligence, 
should rnnder the ship liable as a 11. lead in tt1is rjirection feat-
which was part of the ship's cargo was pumped overboard. Damage 
was caused to lobsters. The Canadian Exchequer Court held that the 
remoter consequences of jettisoning oil from a ship amounted to "darn-
age done by a ship". f.\n action in was pennitted VJiU1in section 6 
of the ~~~~~~~~~ 
50. Miller Steamship Co. LtcJ. \J. Q\~erseas Tanksl1ie (U.K.) [1963] 1 
Lloyd's F~ep. 402, p. l1Z6. Howmmr, the authorities hav~:> estc:lb-
lished that it is unnecessary for the defendant to IlENE-) any 
property interest in the land: Benning \J. lllon~J (1969) 122 C.LJ~. 
249, p. 2%, per Windeyer, J. 
51. [1935] l• D.L.R. 628. 
52. 24 Vic., c. 10, infra. It is submitted that "damage" within s. 6 
should include a claim for special damages suffered by a plain-
tiff in cases of public nuisance. 
218 
Support for this trend has carne from a fl3CFJnt decision of the 
English Court .A,ppc::al in The Jade~3 A collision which occurred some 
fiftv miles off the Spanish coast had totallv disabled the ship Erokwit. 
tug Rotesand tmved the Erokwit and beached her. Both the ship 
and her cargo, including a quantitv of insecticide, became total losses. 
The insecticide was washed into tho sea. The Spanish government all-
eged on behalf of fishermen that the pollution of the sea had caused 
great damage to their interests. It claimed heavv damages against 
the Erokwit owners and against the salvors. When the proceedings 
were still pending, the Erokwit m.vners and the cargo owners brought 
actions rem in the Admiralty Court in England against the salvors. 
The damges claimed bv the Erokwit own£Jr-s against the salvors for 
negligence included an indemnity against anv liabilitv to tile Spanish 
government. Brandon J. 's dismissal of the salvors' application to 
str-ike out the Erokwit owners' claim for indemnity was upheld. The 
English Court of Appeal held that under section 1 (1) (.Q) of tt1e Admin-
istration of Justice Act 1956 (U.K .)5ti the Erokwit owners and the cargo 
owners were entitled to pursue the claim in rem against the tug Rote-
sand. In their Lordships' judgments, the tug Rotesand was the active 
-- 55 
cause of the damage. Cairns, L.J .• applied the principle of Lord Bowen 
who had stated: "'Damage done bv a ship' means done by those in 
charge of a ship, with the ship as the noxious instrument." 56 The 
reasoning of Scarrnan, L.J., and Sir Gordon Willmer, J., is promising. It 
shows positive signs that in England the right to sue in Dml is being 
extended to cover pollution damc.lge. According to them, if the pollu-
tion had resulted from the beaching of the Erokwit, tler owners were 
entitled to include in the action brought under section 1 (1) (g) a 
claim consequential loss arising from tJmir potF.mtial liabilitv in 
53. (The Escher~;heim) [1976] 1 A11 E.R. 441 (C.A.). 
54. It read: "The Admiralty juri~3diction of the High Court shall 
be as follow~>. that is to sav, judscJiction to hear and deter-
mine anv of the following questions or claims ... (d) anv claim 
for damage done bv a ship .... " It has been replaced b\f a sim-
ilar provision in the Suereme Court 1-\ct 1981 (U.!\.) (c. 54), s. 
20 (2) (e). 
55. [1976] 1 A11 E.R. L!41, p. 449, 
56. rhe 
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the Spanish procmJdings for pollutlon.57 In effect, the decision takes 
cognizance of the rights of third parties to institute proceedings in 
.t.l2!Il for pollution damage caused by neg1igence in salvage work. It is 
a short step to recognizing similar right~> where the spillage arises 
from a collision. It is envisaged that the ship, which is at fault,will 
be helcJ liable in admiralty actions in ~to the owners of the other 
ship and the pollution-damage claimants. 
One difficulty with common law actions is the task of identifying 
the persons responsible.58 There can be the disAppointment thAt the 
persons, including limited companies operating as demise charterers, 
against whom judgment is obtained may turn out to have no financial 
resources. On the other hand, little difficulty is encountered in 
tracing a spillage to a particular ship as the source. Proceedings in 
!.:.§!.!}. offer several outstanding advantages over personal actions at 
common law. The ship or tanker, when arrested and successfully pro-
ceeded against, will constitute a valuable asset for the payment of 
claims. Moreover, where "sister ship" or "surrogate ship" actions are 
permittEld, subject to certain conditions being satisfied, the claims 
may be pursued against other ships which are under demise charter 
to, or owned by, the same company or person. lJJhere a ship is arrost-
ed, her owners will have to put up security or provide satisfactory 
guarantee before she is released. There is no way by which her own-
ers could meanwhile defeat the object of the proceedings by means of 
collusive dealings to put her out of the claimants' reach. 
If the rights to recover' compensation for pollution damage are 
to be subsumed under maritime Jaw, one important issue has to be 
resolved. It is true that to succeed in the action negligence 
or fault will still ha\/e to proved as in an action for collision damage. 
57. [1976] 1 A11 E.R. 1;41, p. '~4.3. In trm trial court, llowever, 
Brandon, J., held that tile Administration of Justice Act 1956 
(U.K.), s. 1 (1) W.} (i.e. "any claim for damage received by a ship") 
co\/ered consequential as weJl as direct loss: [197!1] .3 A 11 E.R. 
307, p . .315. 
58. This because, apart from the registered owners, a number of 
other persons may hrwe possession and use of the ship. 
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It is crucial that the forseeabilitv rule should be re-defined so as to 
incorporate all loss or damagE~ wt·1ich, in the ocdinarv course of evEmts, 
has resulted from the spillagn. Suet\ notorious incidents as the 
ev Canvon, the f\moco Cadiz, the E1eni V/Roseline,59 could provide 
judges with suitable material to formulate an appropriate forseeabilitv 
test to applv to pollution damage. Although clean-up costs should 
invariablv be included, it is questionable how far expenses and liabil·· 
ities incurred in taking preventive measures should be recoverable.fiO 
At present, there are no J\uf:;tralian case authorities dealing with 
these claims under maritime law. 
The proposed reform~~ seem to be in line with the object of the 
International Convention rccllating to the Limitation of the Liabilitv of 
Owners of Sea-going Ships, 1957.61 Article 1 paragraph 1 CQ) cm1ers 
damage to propertv or infrigement of mw risJhts caused bv the act, 
neglect or default of anv person on board the ship in tJ1e navigation 
or the managemont of the ship and so forth. It is arguable that the 
wording is wide enough to confer the bRnefit of limitation of liabilitv 
on shipowners for pollution damage. In order to come IAiithin the pro-
vision, it is not m=Jcessarv for the spillage to have come from, or boen 
caused bv, a ship. It mav have corne fmm a fuel storage tank situated 
at a wharf. This can occur in consequencE! of a negligent collision 
caused bv a ship. lhe PDllution damage is nevertheless attributed to 
62 the act, ne~Jlect or default of a person or persom1 on board the ship 
to proceeded against. In terms of liability and in the acJmiralty 
action in [g!!J. the ship and the per~mn Dl' persons at fault are treated 
as one partv~3 This reasoning is logical when two inter-related fac-
tors are borne in mind. Firstlv. the act or neglect ~vhich causes the 
59. For the incidents invol\Jed, see ~· 
60. State and Commonwealth legislation to doal with the current 
gaps in common law will be considerod in due course. 
61. As regards its operation as la1"1 in 1\ustralia, see Chapter 
Eight. 
62. Article 6 paras. 2 and 3. 
63. This ser:!ms to be the ttn·ust of the provisiuns in Article 6. 
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spillage must be that of a person or persons on board the ship. Sec-
ondh;, thR act or neglect must t1ave occurr£:~d in the working, employ-
ment or some operation of the ship. The philosoplw behind the 1957 
Convention is the protection of all those pt=Jrsons who own, charter, 
manage or operate ships, or work on them. 
Once it is accepted that pollution damage is ljamage done by a 
ship or within the admiralty jurisdiction of the court, then the costs 
of cleaning up and preventive measures taken should also be limited. 
It appears that at present there is no law in Australia that limits such 
liability although it may be recognised to have been incurred at common 
law. It is desirable to amend the law along the lines of the United 
Kingdom's legislation~4 The amendment should provide that the costs 
of cleaning up and preventive measures as well as further damage 
caused are damage or loss within the meaning of Article 1 paragraph 
1 (g) of the 1957 Convention. 
The subsumption of claims for pollution damage under maritime 
law principles will also provide a fUl'thRr benefit to shipowners and 
others invoh;ed. Under maritime law, the owners of a ship, which is 
arrested in an admiralty action in .r.m:n, can escape personal liability 
by not entering an appearance. This course of action has the result 
of limiting their liability by abandoning the 65 
The changes proposed may prove to be of benefit to the parties 
im;olved in pollution-damage suits. 
64. Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 (U.K.) (c. ~)9), s. 15 (2), 
as amended by the Merchant Shieping Act_ 1979 (U.K.) (c. 39), 
Schedule 5 para. 6 (2). 
65. The Dictator [1892] P. 304; The Dupleix [1912] P. 8, infra. 
Cf. Draft Admiralty Bill 1985, clause 31 (1). It appears that, 
if this clause implemented as law, such a rnr!thod of limit-
ing liability may not avail. This is the case where the defend-
ant, as tho mlevant person in relation to the maritime claim, 
is peesonally liable on the judgment. 
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III. STATE CONTROL OF OIL POLLUTION 
1. Explanatorv Note 
The State Parliaments have passed two tvpes of legislation to 
control and minimise the harmful consequences of pollution. 66 
LLJe shall first look at the penal nature of the measures introd-
uced bv the first tvpe. After their· effects have been analvsed, we 
shall consider the possibilitv of extending the principles of maritime 
law as part of the control mechanisms. The purpose is to achieve 
greater efficiencv and prm1ide adequate redress for pollution damage. 
The second tvpe of legislation is characterised bv a different 
approach~7 Although penalties are imposed for non-compliance, the 
legislation also provides for a wide range of actions and measures to 
be taken. Ar1 attempt is m<:lde to evaluate them and, wherever possi-
ble, compare them with certain common law r~}medies. Our object is to 
examine whether in the exercise of the v.Jide statutorv powers bv pub-
lic bodies and government officials thf'l rights ar1d interests of third 
parties as recogr1ised bv maritime law are adverselv affected. LLJe 
shall then be able to consider the reforms. 
It is interesting to note that, in d£~aling with pollution problems, 
a number of States have had c::m earlv leacl over the Commonwealth. 68 
The State enactments, which are fairlv similar, give effect to the 
66. Prevention of Oil Pollution of Navigable Watees Act (N.S.W.) 
(No. 48 of 1960), as amended bv f\ct (No. 59 of 1973); Pollution 
of Waters bv Oil Act (Qld.) (No. 33 of >1973); Prevention of 
Pollution of lllaters bv Oil Act (S.A.) (No. 34 of 1961), as amen-
ded bv i\cts (No. 51 of 1969, No. 87 of 1972 and No. 24 of 1979); 
Oil Pollution /-\ct (Tas.) (l'~o. 15 of 1961), as amended bv Act 
(No. L1l of 1%4); C'Ji:1\Jigable Waters (llil Pollution) Act (Vic.) 
(No. 6705 of 196CJ), ac'J arnrc>nded tJv Acts (No. 7890 of 1969, No. 
8334 of 1972 ;:md No. 8816 of 1975); Prevention of Polluticm of 
Waters bv Oil Act (l1J.A.) (No. 33 of 1960), as amended bv Acts 
(No. Hi of 1967 and No. 82 of 1973). 
67. It creates new civil liabilitv which i~> discussed in due course. 
68. The Pollution of tl1e SmJ lN Oil Act (Comth.) (No. 11 of 1960) 
was not brought into op~:ration ur1til 1st October 1962. See 
Commonwealth of Austrolia Gazrltte No. 81, 27th Sept. 1962. 
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kernel provisions of the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954.69 A State enactment will only 
apply within the State jurisdiction defined as "the sea lying within 
the territorial limits, tt1e ports and tidal river~s, and the inland nav-
igable waters" of the State~0 However, it extends to a discharge or 
escape of oil or any mixture containing oil anywhere which may result 
in "any part of such oil or rnixtur~e" entering any waters within the 
jurisdiction. The words "any part of such oil or mixture'', when lit-
erally construed, may mean that neither the extent of dilution nor the 
lapse of time taken for the pollutants to come within a State juris-
diction could constitute a defence. At the outset, the nature of the 
liability imposed by the Acts for contravention should be borne in 
mind. The \.\lords used in the Acts, ~ "guilty of an offence", 
"charged", "penalty" etc. suggest the criminality of every prohibited or: 
unlawful discharge. However, in Alphacel Ltd. v. Woodward?1 where 
section 2 (1) of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951 (U.K.) was 
involved, the House of Lords held that the offence created was in the 
nature of a public nuisance and not strictly criminal. 
A reference to Commonwealth legislation should be made at this 
juncture. Under section 10 (1) of the Protection of the Sea (Power.§. 
of Intervention) Act 1981 (Comth.)?Z the wide-ranging measures that 
69. In Maritime Services Board of New South Wales v. Posiden 
Navigation Incorporated; Maritime Services Board of New 
South Wales v. Liberian Cross Transports Incorporated {1972] 
1 N.S.W.L.R. 72, Yeldham, J., observed: "However, because the 
Pre\;ention of Oil Pollution of Navigable lllaters Act 1960, was 
not, nor were the amendments of 1973, passed to give effect 
to any International Convention, it is not permissible to have 
regard to the terms of any such Convention in construing 
either s. 7 E (3) of s. 8 (1):" ibid., 82. See, however, Pollution 
of Waters by Oil Act 1960 (Qld.) (repealed), s. 3 (1). 
70. Act (N.S.W.) (No. 48 of 1960), s. 4 (1); Act (S.A.) (No. 34 of 1961), 
s. 3 (1); Act (Vic.) (No. 6705 of 1960), s. 4 (1); Act (W.A.) (No. 33 
of 1960), s. 3 (1); cf. Act (Tas.) (No. 15 of 1961) s. 2, and Act 
(Qld.) (No. 33 of 1973), s. 7 (1). 
71. (1972] A.C. 824. 
72. Act No. 33. S. 8 (5), however, reserves to the Commonwealth 
the exercise of other legal powers. 
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mav be takEm do not extend to intra-State trading ships and Austral-
ian fishing vessels which are not proceeding on an overspas vovage. 
The ProtPction of the Sea (Civil LiatJility) Act 1981 (Comtr1.),73 lvhich 
gives effect to the 1969 Convention and the Protocol, onlv applies to 
ships actually carrving oil in bulk as cargo?'~ As the State enact-
ments are not displaceJ,5 they operatf3 alongside and in some cases 
supplement the Commonwealth legislation. : 
2. Persons liable 
What is unsatisfactory is the lack of consistency under the 
State Acts as to who may be liable to be convicted when a discharge 
occurs from a ship. The simplistic approach adopted by the New South 
Wales Act is that both "the owner and the master"76 shall be guilty 
of an offence. It possible that the unclear wording mav result in 
both being separately charged and pr:maliserJ for a single contraven-
tion. One can see the staggering crudeness of such interpretation 
where a ship, from which a disct1arge occurs, is owned and captained 
by the same person. One example of harsh judicial response to public 
policy is Found in the English case of .:...==.:...;;;::.."-'===-=-.:......:..;:.:;--"'-"-""=='-''-=;;;:.!. 
v. Department of Trade and Industry?? Section 1 (1) 
of the Oil in Navigable Waters l\ct 1955 (U.K.), as amended, \1\Jas invol-
ved. It read: "If any oil to which this section applies discharged 
from a British ship ... the owner or master of the ship ... shall be guilty 
of an offence under this section". The House of Lords held that the 
word 11or" in section 1 (1) was used conjunctivelv. amJ not in an alter-
native and exclusionarv sense. In affirming the Court of Appeal de-
cision, the House of Lords helrJ that the owner and master could each 
73. Act No. 31, which gives effect to the International Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969. 
74. Ibid., Article 1 para. 1. 
76. Act (N.S.ll.l.) (No. 48 of 1960), s. 6 (a). With the exception of 
Victoria, Act (No. 6705 of 1960), s.-6 (Q) and Tasmania, Act 
(No. 15 of 1961), s. 3 the other three States l1ave Ident-
ical provision . 
77. (1974] 2 . E.R. 97. 
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be convicted of an offence. 
Unless the continued use of "ttm owner ami the master 11 is inten-
ded as a legislative policy t.o lmpuso vicarious liatlilitv, the expression 
disregards all other persons 1-\lho mav ha\Je caused the discharge. 
Firstlv, the bunkering aspects of ~3hip management are under the 
charge of the ship's engineers appointed accDrcting to the require-
ments of 1aw?B It is difficult to see why thf~\/ should br~ immune from 
prosecution. Secondlv, a ship undE~r a demise chartf.?r is in the poss-
ession and control of the charterer. All tht-} crew members on board 
are deemed to be his empl0\,18es. ?9 In ~.;uch circumstances, it is grosslv 
unjust for the owner to be made a scapegoat. A reasonable ground 
for imposing statutorv liability on a person as an owner is \,vhere the 
ship, on a demise charter to an Australian national or an Australian-
incorporated company, is registered under the Shipping Registration 
Act 1981 (Comth.). However, the Act rJoes not render it compulsory 
that a foreign or Australian-owned ship undBr a demise charter 
must be registered in the charterer 1 ~:; narne~0 Apart From the incon-
\Jenience and registration feos entailed, few shipowners favour such 
a course of dealing. Tt1irdly, tlmre is a furtl1er shortcoming with n:J-
gard to the use of tt1e word "owner". In exercising his rights under 
the mortgage agreemPnt, a mortga[Jee of a ship may seize her and put 
her to commercial use to gm1erate income. 1\n oil clischarge or escape 
mav occur after a mortgagee has t.aken possPssion of tt1e ship. 
The Tasmanian Act81 is cmcliterJ t.vith thE! r::Jarliest foresight of 
envisaging tile shortcominsJs. It h<:3s cml::iistt:mtly adopted as the def-
inition of 11owner'11 the same rrmanir1g as in the 1'-'larine Act~2 An owner 
"includes tt1e charterer and any person having the pos:mssion of such 
78. As to certificatfls of competency for \Jarious grades of engin-
eers, see Ne:wigation Act 1912 (Cornth.), s. 15. 
79. See R. P. Colin\Jaux, Cnrriage bv ~)ea, (12tll r~d. 1971 ), I!Ol. I, 
para. 321, and the catiB authorities cited. 
80. 19El1 (Cornttl.), ss. 9 nne! 14 (Q), supra. 
81. /\ct (Tas.) (No. 15 of 1961), s. 2. 
82. ,1\ct (las.) (No. 18 of 1976), s. '• (1). 
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vessel and any agent for a \Jessel, \A.Ihich is or· has come within the 
jurisdiction of a board or trust, if such agent is the public or recog-
83 
nised agent for the Dwner of such vessel'. The wide meaning given 
to the expression will extend to all charterers. demise and non-demise, 
mortagees in possession aml in some cases agents. 
The inclusion of "agent11 in the definition shows cognizance of 
shipping practice~4 as an agent is usually stationed in an overseas 
port to manage the ship's business. particularly in her owners' ab-
sence. In the South Australian case of Oalgety (Australia) Ltd. v. 
Griffith (No. 2)85 the appellants, a limited company, pleaded guilty to 
a charge under section 5 of the Pollution of Waters by Oil Act 1961-
1979 (S.A.). They were the agent for tho ship, ~ Afrodite, l'lltlich 
discharged a fairly large quantity of oil into the waters of St. \linc-
ent's Gulf near Port Stanvac. In allowing the fine of $10,000 to be 
reduced to $7,000, despite the wide meaning given to "agent", Matheson, 
J., appears to t1ave been ir1fluenced by two factual findings. The 
spillage was probably caused by thB inadvertence of a cmw member 
and the appellants were not shown to be responsible for the ship's 
management. It is submitted that if the two factors had been fulh; 
pleaded in defence before t.t1e magistrate, the case could have been 
dismissed. 
It appears that the position of an agent will depend on the mearl-
ing of the term, the responsibility attributed to him by the /\ct and 
the actual authority given to him. This view is reflected in r~oods \;. 
James Patrick & Co. Ptv. Ltd.86 The defendant l>\J'as prosecuted under 
section 6 (a) of the Victorian Navigable Waters (Oil Pollution) Act 1960. 
The pro\lision renders, inter the agent of a ship, which discharges oil; 
83. The word ''master" is defined in Act (N.S.W.) (No. 1~8 of 1960), 
s. 4 (1). For definition of "owrmr", see also Act (S.A.) (No. 
31+ of 1961), s. 3, as amended by Act (No. 51 of 1969), s. 2; 
Act (LLJ.A.) (No. 33 of 1960), s. 3 (1), as amr::!nded by Act (No. 
82 of 1973), s. 3 (b). 
81+. i\ct (S.A.) (No. 34 of 1961), s. 5,as arner1derJ by ~\ct (No. 21~ of 
1979), s. 5 (1) and (Z); an agent of tt1e ship is jointly and 
se\Jerally liable for a discharge. 
85. [1980] 26 S.A.S.R. 257. 
86. [1963] \/.R. 331+. 
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into waters lrJithin the jurisdiction, guilty of an offence. The magis-
trate dismissed the information. He found that the lrJords "agent of 
a p11 meant a general agent and that the defenrJant's authority was 
limited to ttle arranging of berthing of the ship and matters incid-
ental thereto. In the Supreme Court, Adam, J., dismissed an order to 
. th . t t I d . . H 'd 87 rev1ew e mag1s ra e s ec1~:>10n. e sat : 
"I think the only conclusion open on the evidence was that 
the defendant was not an agent of an unlimited authority, 
and in fact did not possess the authority which was essen-
tial to make him 1 agent of the ship' for the purposes of the 
Act." 
Adam J.'s dismissal of the order is supportable on the ground that the 
agent lacked the elements of possession and contl'Dl. 
A situation can arise where a discharge occurs from a ship while 
it is being salved. In carrying out salvage work, salvors have certain 
rights of custody and control in respect of the ship and cargo. Their 
action or operation could have caused an oil discharge or escape from 
the ship. Unless they are deemed to ha\te had possession at the mat-
erial timeBB when the discharge occurs, they cannot be convicted un-
der the Tasmanian AcU39 A similar consideration applies to ordinary 
charterers and ship mortgagees, who do not have possession of the 
ship. 
91 
The legislatun~s of VictorirfJO and Queensland have regarded 
marine pollution as such a serious matter that they have extended the 
dragnet. For example, it is conceivable that a discharge from ship 
"X" during transfer operation may have occurred due to an act or omi-
ssion committed on ship "Y" or in connection with a transfer apparatus. 
In Tucker v. Ri\/erside Coal Transport Pty. LtrJ., £:1X parte Tucker;2 
the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland construed the 
ambit of sections 9 and 10 (2) of the Act. It was h~:)lrJ that in respect 
87. [1969) V.R. 33L., pp. 337-338. In effE!Ct, Matheson, J., endorsed 
the reasoning of Adam, J. : [1980] 26 S.A.~.l.R., pp. 259-260. 
88. !\s to the possBssory licm of ~;alvors, see Chapter Seven. 
89. The provision has been referred to pre\/iously. 
90. /\ct (Vic.) (No. 6705 of 1960), ss. 6 amJ 6A, as amended. 
91. Act (Qld.) (No. 33 of 1973), ss. 9 anrJ 10. 
92. [1982] Qd. R. 181. 
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of discharge from ship "X" a person or persons may be charged 
under section 9, while the shipowners and the master of ship "y" and 
the person in charge of the apparatus rnay also be charged under 
section 10 (2). If, in such circumstances, the discharge from an app-
aratus is caused by an act or omission committed on a ship the owners 
and the master will also be chargeable. 
For the purpose of the person to whom notice may be given in 
93 
cases of pollution, the Environmental Protection Act (W.A.) has adopt-
ed an interesting and compn~hensive definition. Section 76 (1) rJefines 
the "owner of the source" to include "the O\Ainer, charterer or master 
of any ship and any person having an estate, right, or interest in 
any property from which waste is discharged .... " It submitted that 
the owner of a cargo of oil l.'llhich leaks and the salvor of a stranded 
vessel from which pollutants escape into the water would also be 
within the definition. The State enactments control pollution by im-
posing penalties on the person who causes or permits the unlawful 
discharge.94 In this respect they differ from tile prevention of oil 
pollution Acts. Nevertheless, it is plausible that, in respect of a 
single discharge, the actual offender may be found guilty under one 
Act while the owner, charterer or master of the ship may be found 
guilty under another Act. 
3. Defences 
Under the State enactments, the penalty of $A50,000 may be im-
posed for an unlawful discharge.95 The statutory defencns are espec-
ially important. 
It is a defence for a person charged 
93. Act (No. 63 of 1971 ). 
94. See ~·, Environmental Pmtection Act (W.A.), No. 63 of 1971, 
s. 80; Environmental Protection Act (Vic.), No. 8056, s. 20; 
· Environmental Protection Act (Tas.), No. 34 of 1 s. 16. 
Where any conflict arises between the provisions Df thf.! en-
vironmental protection Act and thDse of the prevention of 
oil pollution /\ct, the fDrmer shall prevail in Western 
Australia: 1971 Act, s. 7 (1); the position is the opposite 
in Tasmania: 1973 Act, s. 3 (2). 
95. The Commonwl:alth Parliament has raised the penalty to $10,000 
in the case of corporaUJ owners: Protection of the Sea (Dis-
charge of Oil from Ships) Act 1981, ss. 12 (2) (c) and 14 (2) (c); 
and Protection of ttm Sea (Civil Liability) f\cC19111, s. 22 (3)(c). 
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to prmJe that -
nthe discharge of oil ... was necessary for the purpose of sec-
uring the of the ::;hip, or of preventing damage to the 
ship or cargo or of saving life, and was a reasonable step in 
the circumstances."96 
It is clear that an accidental or negligent discharge is not protected. 
the terms are used as follows: 97 
"It apparent that 1 discharge' is wider in its meaning than 
'escape' and 'leakage'. Bv definition it includes escape, but 
there are some discharges ... which are not termed escapes. 
In the same wav all leakages are escapes, and hence constit-
ute discharges, but clearlv many instances of discharge or 
escape do not amount to a leakage." 
For this defence to apply, two conditions must be satisfied - namely, 
the necessity for the deliberate release of the oil and the reasona-
bleness of such an act. The wording of the provision shows that the 
step or measure taken must be of a preventh;e nature. 
The first condition may occur where a ship springs a leak or 
has developed a defect in her steering gear or engines. To prevent 
the ship sinking, stranding or breaking up or lives being lost, the 
master mav order the ship's fuel oil or cargo of oil to be released 
into the sea. There may be situations where the jettison could con-
stitute a general average sacrifice in shipping law. But for the pur-
pose of the first condition, it is not necessary that the discharge 
must be for the benefit of the sl1ip, the freight and the cargo. The 
statutory defence98 based on what is reasonably nec~Jssary in the 
circumstances will usuallv not constitute a general average act?9 In 
an admiralty action in against a ship by a cargo-owner, it is no . 
96. This rJefEmce is identical under all six State Acts, viz.: Act 
(N.S.W.) (1\lo. 48 of 1960), s. 7 (1) (a); Act (Qld.) (No. 33 of 1973), 
s. 12 (1) (i'J); Act .!\.) (1\lo. 34 of 1961), s. 6 (1) (a); f'\ct (Tas.) 
(No. 15 of 1961), s. 3; Act (Vic.) (No. 6705 of 1960), s. 7 (1) (a), 
and Act (W.A.) (1\lo. 33 of 1960), s. 6 (1) (a). -
97. [1976] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 359, pp. 364-365. 
98. Southport Corporation v. Fsso Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1956] 
A.C. pp. 227-228, (House of Lords) where it was held that at 
common law a P£:Jrson is justified in discharging oil into an 
estuary to save li\;es but not property. 
99. For meaning Df this term at common law and under the York-
/\ntwerp f~ules 1974, see Chapter Nine. 
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dl:.:Jfence for her owner to prove that thP cargo of oil or part there-
of was discharged in order to save the ship, cargo or even life; In 
the action the shipowner will, hmvever, be protected if the cargo is 
regarded as dangerous good~ or where he can avail himself of an 
appropriate exception clause in a charterparty. 
Escape - l'llhen justificable. It is a defence for the person 
charged to prove that -
"the oil. .. escaped in consequence of damage to the ship and 
that all reasonable steps were taken after the occurence 
of the damage for stopping or reducing the escape of the oil 
.... rr3 ;, 
The availability of this defence depends on several conditions being 
proved. Firstly, there must be damage sustained by the ship (or tank-
er), e.g. due to a collision or a severe storm. Probably the damage 
could have been intentionally caused by saboteurs or pirates. It is 
submitted that the defence will also apply where the damage, giving 
rise to the escape, has occurred in the absence of fault or negligence 
on the part of the shipowner, his servants~ or agents, e.g. salvors. 
Secondly, the requirement that all reasonable steps be taken 
for preventing or reducing the escape may have serious implications. 
In some cases, it may constitute abandoning the ship, sacrificing the 
freight and destroying the cargo of oil together with other goods 
carried. Thus in the notorious Torrey Canyon incident, attempts to 
save her or tow her out to the mid-Atlantic failed. When s~1e was 
later bombed and set afire to minimise the effects of further oil-slicks, 
1. lt is submitted that a justifiable discharge of the cargo under 
a State enactment will not constitute a deviation to save life 
within the meaning of Hague Rulc-Js, Article IV rule 4. 
2. See Hague Rules, Article IV rule 6. 
3. This defence is identical in the legislation of ttm~e States, 
viz., Act (N.S.W.) (No. 1~8 of 1960), s. 7 (1) (b); Act (Qld.) (No. 33 
Of 1973), s. 12 (1) (b) (i), and Act (Vic.) (Ncl:"""6705 of 1960). s. 7 
(1) (b) (i). In the other legislation, to establish the defence 
additional ingredients must be proved. 
t~, lf our submission is correct, then this aspect uf the defence 
differs from the exception in Hague Rules, Article IV rule 2 (a). 
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the damage had already been done. More than fifty per cent of the 
entire cargo of crude oil had escaped into the sea. In view of the 
extensive damage done, the question is whether she should not have 
been destroyed by incendiary bombs earlier.5 Precisely how soon 
should demolition by fire to contain the pollution be undertaken? 
Obviously a number of difficulties will arise. \/oluntarv destruc-
tion of a ship or cargo in order to avail the shipowner, master or 
demise charterer the statutory defence will result in a breach of the 
principles of maritime law. Few underwriters will be prepared to issue 
insurance policies to cover losses arising in such circumstances. 
Leakage - when justifiable. This defence applies where the es-
cape arises -
"in consequence of leakage which could not have been avoided, 
foreseen and anticipated and that all reasonable steps were 
taken for prompt discovery of the leakage and after such dis-
coverv for stopping or reducing the escape of the oil or mix-
ture."b 
In a number of cases, the meaning of "leakage11 was discussed and ex-
plained. In Nicholson v. Fremantle Port Authority, Wolff, C.J., con-
sidered that "leakage" in section 6 (1) (b) of the Act (W.A.) "is used in 
the sense of 'running awav' or 'escape' of oil through a hole or 
crack."7 A decision which deals with a similar provision but a differ-
ent problem is Tucker v. Fraser, Ex parte Tucker~ There oil was 
being pumped from a fuel lighter into a ship's fuel tanker. It shot 
through the air-vent onto the deck and into the Brisbane River. The 
projection was caused bv an air lock in the fuel tank, due possibly 
to the ship's movements during cargo loading operations. The Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of Queer1sland held t~hat the discharge ir1 
the circumstances was not a "leakage" within sectior1 12 (1)@ QJ) 
5. See repof't, April 1967 (Cmnd. 32lt2), QE.. , paras. 3 and 4. 
6. Act (N.S.ilJ.) (No. lt8 of 1960), s. 7 (1) (b) @; Act (Qld.) (No. 33 
of 1973), s. 12 (1) (Q) Act (S.A.) (No. 34 of 1961), s. 6 (1) 
(!2); Act (Tas.) (No. 15 of 1961), s. ll (1) (b); Act (Vic.) (No. 6705 
of 1960), s. 7 (1) CQ) (ii), and Act (W.A.) cNu. 33 of 1960), s. 6 (1) 
(b). 
7. [1969] W.A.R. 27, p. 31. 
8. [1974] CJd. R. 147. 
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of the Queensland Act. Wanstall, ~J.P.J., emphasised the qualitios of 
passivitv and stealthiness which the word "leakage" reflects in its 
natural meaning. D.M. Camptmll, J., ~vas of the view U1at "leakage 
should not limited to an escapEJ from a hole or fissure"but that it 
"cDuld conceivably occur because of defective coupling." 9 
The word "leakage" was given a wider meaning in the New South 
Wales case of Glover v. McDougall. 1 D The ship 11 Lisa Miller" was taking 
in bunkers at the Port of Svrlnev. Oil began to sprav in a rose fash-
ion out of the top of the flange, eunning out of the ship into the 
water. Yeldam, J., applied a twofold criterion in determining whether 
the escape was a leakage. The components were (i) escape through 
an opening not intended or permitted for the purpose, and (ii) escape 
in the form of a mere trid:le. 
The second requirement to be satisfied is tt1at the leakage "could 
not have been avoided, foreseen or anticipated." It approximates in 
several wavs to the exception of act of C3od at common law. Wanstall, 
S.P.J., in v. Fraser, Ex parte Tucker11 stressed that "a tribun-
al of fact ought not be satisfied that a given leakage could not have 
been foreseen or avoided unless the evidence enables it to find and 
identifv the probable cause of the leakage." In the discussions on the 
meaning of "leakages", the references to the manner of escape, e.g. 
"a mere trickle", "some elmnent of gradualness''. "stealUw escape'', etc: 
show difficulty rather than the impossibilitv of avoiding the leak-
ages. Tile third requirement is the taking of all reasonable steps for 
prompt discoverv of tile leakage and for stopping and reducing the 
escape. 
It is helpful to compare this defence Vllith some of the exceptions 
available under the law of carriage bv sea. At common law, the sea-
worthiness of the ship at the tirne of sailing and at each stage of the 
vovage is an absolute undertaking to be met bv the shipowner. "It 
appears, then that the shipowner undertakes responsibility for any 
9. Ibid., p. 151. 
10. [1976] 2 N.S.W.L.R .. 359, supra. 
11. [19741 Qd. r~ .• p. 1so. 
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defects in the ship, or her machinery or equipment, even for defects 
not discoverable by careful examination."12 One may reasonably assume 
that, where a charterer has to pay for the bunkers during the chart-
er and they escape from the ship's engines or Fuel tank, the implied 
warranty is breached. The fact that a shipowner is successful in 
establishing the defence under a State Act is therefore of no conse-
quence under common law. lJJhere a shipowner a common carrier, he 
is under a strict liability in respect of any loss of or damage to the 
goods carried. He is answerable even where he can show that he has 
taken every possible care for the safe carriage of the goods. Two 
of the exceptions to this strict liability are the act of God and the 
Queen's enemies. Viscount Sumner explained the nature of these ex-
ceptions in F.C. Bradley & Sons. Ltd. v. Federal Steam Navigation Com-
pam), Ltd.13 He said:14 
"tJJhen the common law makes the ship bear the risks of the 
voyage and all that may happen to the cargo in the course 
of it, but excepts the act of God, the King's enemies ... the 
scheme is evident. Neither party can wholly nuard against 
the act of God and the King's enemies, so the loss lies where 
it falls." 
A leaka~~e wholly attributed to an act of God or the King's enemies 
could well meet trm first and second requirements. The same reason-
ing seems to apply whether the shipowner is a common carrier or a 
Hague Rules carrier.15 But if it is possible for him to stop or reduce 
U1e escape of oil, ~- by deviating to a nearby port or by obtaining 
salvage assistance, and he fails to do so, lle will be found guilty un-
der a State enactment. However, his conviction no bar to his reli-
ance on the two exceptions in an admiralty action against his ship 
brought by the cargo owners. 
An escape may have come from oil shipped in large drums or con-
tainers provided by canJo owners. It is a principle of law that a ship-
owner, whether as a common canior or Hague r~ules carrier, not 
12. R. Colinvaux, 
3, para. 107. 
13. (1927) 27 Ll. L. Rep. 395. 
14. Ibid., p. 399. 
15. Hagufl Rules, Article IV rule 2 (Q) anc1 (f), i.e. act of God and 
act of public enemies, respectively. 
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pr£::vented from takin~j on board for carriage goorJs which are known 
to be in a leaky condition. To suc::ce~:~d, the plaintiff has to prove not 
merely negligonce on the part of the shipowner but also the extent 
of damage sustained as a result of that negligence.16 It is quite like-
ly that, because of the difficulty in meeting the burden of proof, the 
exception of "insufficiency of packing" 11 will apply in favour of the 
shipowner. On the other hand, a shipmvner, who fails to prevent a 
discharge after becoming aware of the leaky condition of the cargo 
or defects in the container used, cannot avail himself of the defence 
under a State enactment. 
l~o Position under Maritime Law 
It has been seen that the State enactments follow a mechanical 
approach. They impose several PEmalties for pollution offences on the 
shipowners, masters and, in some cases, on other persons. The penal 
liability imposed personal and vicarious. The spillage may hm;e 
occurred when the ship is tile possession and control of persons other 
than the nwrmrs. Such persons include the demise charterer, the salvor 1 
carrying out salvage work, the mortgagee in possession and the ship-
wright when testing the ship at sea. Each of these persons recog-
nised by law as having certain interests in the ship. It is therefore 
logical to treat the ship as the offending instrument. It is submitted 
that the State enactments should be amended to enable the approp-
riate authorities to enforce tile penalties by instituting proceedings 
in rem against the ship. 
It is noteworthy tllat the liefences provided by the Acts do not 
necessarily correspond to ttmse that may be raised in actions in ~­
A cargo of all rnay be disd1arDed in such circumstances as to constit-
ute a defence under the f.\cts. But the cargo-owner is not Dn that 
ground pre\Jfmted from succeeding in a damage claim in maritime law. 
Even if tile circumstances of tllB dischargE~ constitute both a statu-
tory defence and a general averag£3 act, the owner of the cargo 
16. Silver \J. ;;;;;_;;;_;;;c_;;;;;_~.:..::;..;;..~;,..... [1930] 1 K.B. lt16 (L:.A.), p. 435, £f:)J' 
reserved jud~JmenL. 
1/. Hague Rule~;. Article IV rule 2 (n). 
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jettisoned should be entitlr~d to institute an action in !Jl!!L against 
the ship:s Again, Article IV rule 4 of the Hague r~ules19 exom3rates 
the shipowner as carrier from liabiUtv for loss or damage arising from 
a de\/iation to sa\/e life or propfJrtv at sea. Tl1is EJxception does not 
extend to a discharge of oil deemed necE~ssary for the safetv of the 
ship or life in circumstances thst would constitute a defence under 
the Acts. 
Under the State enactments, it is a condition of the defence 
that all reasonable steps must have been taken to stop or reduce the 
escape. It is questionable whether the expenses incurred in prevent-
ing or reducing the cargo loss under the circumstances would constit-
ute general average expenditurl0 The words "all reasonable steps11 
will include emploving sal\/ors to stop or reduce the cargo loss. Their 
work, when proved successful. will give rise to salvage reward secured 
bv a maritime lien on the cargo sa\/ed.Z1 Thus although under.' the State 
enactments a shipowner may not be found guilty, lle could be held 
civilly liable to a cm,go-owner for the loss sustained. In such a case, 
it is submitted that the cargo-owner who has to pav salvage is entit-
lBd to be reimbursed by bringing an action in rem against the ~•hip. 
5. New Civil Liability 
The State enactments have created new statutory torts which 
give, rise to civil liabilitv. Tile costs incurred in taking preventi\/e 
measures and removing or reducing the pollution are recoverable. In 
a number of ways, the ~1tatutory toets extend bevond the scope of 
common law torts. Except where a defence to a charge is established, 
a single discharge or escape may result in a stinging penalty and also 
a civil liability being imposed. We shall consider the nature of the 
civil liability cmated, its enforcement, the powers exercisable in terms 
18. This can be done under the Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.) 20 
(2) (g) re-enacting the Administration of Justi~ 8ct 1956 (lJ.I'\.), 
(repealed), s. 1 (1) (q). Australian courts should be able to 
entertain the action when the new Admiralty Act (Comth.) is 
enacted. 
19. Scheduled to Sea-Carriage of Goods Act 1924-73 (Comth.). 
20. For definition, see R. Colinaux, Carvor's Carringe by :1ea (12th 
ed. 1971), op. cit.,paras. 900, et. seq; York-/\ntwerp f-{ules 1974, 
Hule A. 
21. As to the conditions to be rnet, see Chapter Eiqht. 
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uf the measun::s that may be taken and Um compEmsation payable for· 
pollution damage. 
Prevention or Mitigation of Pollution. A statutory tort is deemed 
to have been committed every time an unlawful dischargt:.~ of oil occ-
urs. Under the prevention of pollution legislation, the authority con-
cerned may in its discretion take appropriate action. It mav: 
"(a) remove oil from any waters ... ; 
(b) disperse or destroy the oil...or any part of it; 
(c) prevent the oil discharged or any part of it from reach-
ing or polluting any waters ... ; 22 (d) mitigate any pollution caused by trJe oil discharged." 
At common law, an owner of land or mmtables is entitled to defend or 
protect his property physically against any unlawful intrusion or dis-
possession. A good example is the privilege of abatement or the ac-
tual removal of the offending object it~Jelf~3 This riEjht is ordinarily 
direct(~d against an act of pri\/ate nuisance, . the branches of 
trees fmm an adjoining property encroaching o\/er thl~ land of the 
person exercising the right~ 11 It extends to acts of wilful trespass. 
Legal costs may be awarded in actions successfully instituted by a 
property owner to restrain the wrongful acts. However, there dCJes 
not seem to be any authority which enables him to recover costs and 
expenses incurred in exercising self-help. 
TCJ implement legislative policy effecti\/ely, thE! right created 
by this statutory tort has to be wider in scope than the limited 
remedy at common law. Moreover, the liability imposed by the statu-
tory tort is strict. Where any expense or other liability is incurred 
by the Authority concerned, it is recoverable as a debt frmn thG owner 
22. Act (Qld.) No. 33 of 1973, s. 13 (1). Except in Tasmania, a 
similar provision has been in operation in the other four 
States since 1960 or 1961: Act (N.S.W.) (No. /48 of 1960), s. 8 
(1); Act (S.A.) (No. 3/4 of 1961), s. 7 (1); Act (Vic.) (No. 6705 of 
1960), s. 8 (1); and Act (lll.A.) (No. 33 of 19GO), s. 7 (1). 
Zl1. Ibid., p. 195. 
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Dr' master of the ship or the pprson in charge of the apparatus~5 
What appears to be harsh is that the m'liner or master is rendered 
civilh1 liable for the statutory torts committed by others. These 
include. the pilot, the ship's engineer, the charterer, the salvor, the 
ship repairer, the mortgagee in possession and the company respon-
sible for the ship's monagement. The remedy differs in essence from 
the quasi-contractual ri~Jht of reimbursement. At common law~6 a 
person who has incurred expenses or liability on behalf of another 
person may~ in certain circumstances) be able to recover an amount 
commensurate with the benefits conferred on the latter.Z7 Under the 
State enactments, the expense and liability are recoverable icrespec-
tive of whether or not any benefits are in fact conferred on the 
polluter. Moreover, the clean-up operations undertaken rnay,or may 
not,reduce his ultimate liability to pollution-damage victims. 
It is submitteci that the Authority's right is in the nature of a 
statu ton; indemnity. Its scope is considered in Maritime Services 
Board of New South Wales (N.S.B.) v. Posiden Navigation Incorporateq 
(P.N.I.); Maritime Services Board of New South Wales v. Liberian Cross 
Transports Incorporated (L.C.T.I.)~8 There the question was raised 
as to what expenses and costs incurred were recoverable. Claims 
1A1ere brought against two companies under the Prevention of Oil Poll-
ution of Navigable LtJater~j Act 1960 (N.S.W.), as amended. In March, 
1977, oil was disct1aeged into the waters of Port Jackson from the ship 
"Stolt Sheaf'' owned by P.N.I. In September, 1980, there was a further 
discharge of oil into the same waters from the oil tanker "World 
25. Act (N.S.W.) (No. 48 of 1960), s. 8 (2); J\ct (Qld.) (i\lo. 33 of 1973), 
s. 13 (2); i.\.ct (Vic.) (No. 6705 of 1960), s. 8 (1) and (2); Act (W.A.) 
(No. 33 of 1960), s. 7 (2) and (3): and Act (S.A.) (No. 34 of 1961), 
s. 7 (2) and (3). The last-mentioned /\ct furt11er provides that 
the rights of the Board or am; other person to recover darn-
ages at common law in respect of the consequence of such 
discharge shall not be affected: s. 7 (3). Moreov~:"Jr, under the 
Pre\/ention of Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters Amendment 
/.\.ct 1973 (N.S.Lu.), ss. 70 (a) and (b) and 7E (3) (a) and (b) and 
PoTiution of Waters by Oil Act 1973 (Qld.), ss. 23 (3) (a)-and (b) 
and 24 (3) (a) and (b), the expense or liability tncuned by tt1e 
Board ancJ the Minister, respectively. constitutes a debt which 
gives rise to a charge on the ship. The ship may be detained 
until paynmnt is made or satisfactory security for the payment 
is provided. 
26. Where a contract exists, a person rnav, by way of indemnity) 
recover the full amount ~Jxpended on armther's behalf irres-
pective of the benefit conferred. 
27. This pr-inciple of reimbursement is clearly stated lw R. Goff 
and G. Jones, Thc...J LEJw of Restitution (1966 ed.), pp. 221-222. 
28. [1972] 1 N.S.LlJ.L.R. 72. 
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=.:..:.=;;;;.;;;..:.~:.;..;..;.;;;;.:...:.;;:_ owned by L.C.T.I. M.S.B., the plaintiff, in purported 
performance of its powers under soctions 7 E (3) and 8 (2) of the Act 
(N.S.l!.l.), as amended, causE!d such things to be done as it thought 
proper to remove and reduce the effects of the pollution. The char-
ges disputed by P.N.l. wen~ those for labour ($25,895) payable to P.N.L 's 
employees for their occupations and usual work, and for the plant 
($7,826). The items disputed by L.C.T.I. were labour costs ($35,283) 
(comprising salaries and wages paid to permanent staff. payroll tax, 
workers1 compensation, insurance, leave entitlements. administration 
charges, etc.) and plant charges ($12,726). 
In each action, the defendants argued that they were only lia-
ble for moneys M.S.B. had paid out to others whether as "expenses 
and liabilities" or as "costs and expenses". They denied liability in 
relation to wages for permanent employees who might have been div-
erted from other tasks to clean up the oil and for thB use of the 
plaintiff's plant and equipments. Despite differences in the wording 
of section 8 ("costs and expenses incurred") and section 7 E C''expon-
StJS or other liabilities"), it was l1eld that they should each be con-
strued in the same li\lay. The somowhat ambiguous expressions employr]d 
prompted Yeldham, J., to apply the mischief rule in construing the t:wo 
sections. Its merit lies in thE! an~~wer, which Parliament l1as pf'esurn-
ably provided, to ttl8 dofect and mischief for which common lai.At has no 
remedy. Ir1 both situations, judgment was given for tho plaintiff in 
respect of the claims in qu£:;stion. One natural reaction lJ\,1 :3hipownm·s 
and others affected to the extensive powers ~iiven to the Ministl?r or 
the Authority concf:!rned, coupled with the outcome of U1is case, is a 
feeling of grave economic injustice, distrust and frustration. !he 
unpleasant side effects of the lo~Ji~:;lation which, if ltlft unchecked, 
could erupt into an unmanageable crisis, wBre alle\Jiatmi by Geldham, 
J. Clear limits wPre set to the scope of' the statutmv ind£:Jmnity. In 
explaining the effects of ttw intE!rpretation on both parties, he said: 29 
"That broad approach rejects the fine EJistinctions betweon 
cases wher(~ the M.S.B. has employed others to do the work 
and where it has done it with its own rnen and facilities. This 
conclusion does not mean ... that the Board is fcJrltitled to make 
a profit from its clean-up operations or to make a 'cormner-
cial charge' for the work done. But it dons rnean that it is 
er1titled to calculate the actual costs to it of usin~J its own 
ernplm;ens, including O\Jerheads and administrati\/e charges, 
as w~ll as the actual cost to it of using its own plant, and 
anv necessary overheads involved in the latter." 
The analysis shows the grE~at lEmgths to which the statutory indemnity 
29. Ibid., p. 91. 
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can go. Clearly the law in the present state is unsatisfactory and 
unconscionably harsh. This is largely due to the imposition of new 
~:ltatutory liabilities without re~Jard for the effects of claims that 
may be pursued in another branch of the law. 
For example, in respect of one spillage, a shipowner and the 
master may each be subject to an indemnity bill under a State Act, 
a pollution-damage claim and a penalty. As in the New South Wales 
case, the indemnity bill from the Authority may consist of the wages 
paid to a large staff, payroll tax and other charges. The expense 
and extent of the measures taken and the location where they are 
carried out are at the sole discretion of the Authority. Those clean-up 
measures may benefit the public or the district in general but may 
not serve to remove the damage caused to property owners and other 
persons.30 A common law action in negligence and/or nuisance may 
later instituted against the same polluters. 
It desirable to streamline this aspect of the law by bringing 
it within the ambit of maritime law. 
Notice issued by f"linister or Authority. Rather wide powers are 
given to the Minister or the Authority concerned to deal with an 
11occurring" or "likely" discharge?1 The notice addressed to the ship-
owner may require certain action to be taken in relation to the ship, 
her cargo, or both. The requirements mav, inter alia, prohibit the 
removal of the ship, her cargo or the discharge of oil from ller~2 
30. For tables which outline data on clean-up and damage costs 
for over 150 spills, see Combating Oil Spills (Some Economic 
Aspects) (1982 ed.), O.E.C.D., pp. 123-140. 
31. The statutory measures provided may be seen as a valuable 
supplement to a court injunction. As to the ri~1ht of a plain-
tiff to apply for an injunction to pre\fent an oil spillage 
which would ruin his business, see J. Gibson, "lJil Pol1ution and 
the Common Law" [1979] h L.M.C.L.Q. 498. 
32. Act (N.S.W.) (No. 59 of 1973), s. 7 A (1) and (3); Act (Qld.) (1\lo. 33 
of 1973), s. 20 (1) and (3); Act (S.A.) (1\Jo. 24 of 1979), s. 7 A (1) 
(d) anrJ (k), and to a losser extent /\ct (Vic.) (No. 6705 of 1960), 
s. 8 A (1), as amended. 
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Undoubtedly, the t'liide powers given under the legislation of the four 
States t'l!ill impinsJe upon the rights of third partiE:Js under maritime 
law. Their exercise has become a neiAJ factor to bE! taken into account. 
It will ir1terfere with or put an end to salvage op£~rations33 or any 
towage work under way. In the absence of express contractual pro-
visions, it is questionable as to what rights a salvor or the tug m'l!ner 
will have under Australian la~4 The orders contained in the notice 
may render impossible the performance of all or some of the provis-
ions in the charterparty or bill of lading contracts. H1ey will inter-
fere with tho scheduled operations of the ship, cause delay in cargo 
delivery and result in serious economic loss. These occurrences have 
implications in maritime law. 
Three different situations should be considered. In each case, 
the ~:;hip involved may be an oil tanker or just a cargo vessel carry-
ing on board a quantity of oil in drums and containers. 
Firstly, the "occurring" or "likely'' disdl8rge, which is discovered 
when the ship sails into Australian State territorial waters, could 
have resulted from a collision which occurred during the voyage. Bill 
of lading holders 35and the non-demise charterer36 will institute pro-
ceedings in ~ against the ship. The outcome of the actions will 
depend on whether negligence on the part of the shipowner as the 
cause is established and also on the availability of any exemption 
clause. 
Secondly, in the absm1ce of any collision or encounter witt1 sev-
ere weather conditions at sea the. "occurring11 or "likely" discharge 
should be viewed as a serious matter. It is immatorial that the problem 
33. As to interference with the rigt1ts of a salvor in possess-
ion, see noto by M.K. in (1970) J.B.L., pp. 161-162. 
34. A~l against ship or tanker' for the sr:Jrvict:s rendered. 
35. See Admiralty Court Act 1861 (Imp.), 24 Vic., c. 10, s. 6; Sue.: 
rerne Court /\ct 1981 (U.K.), s. 20 (2) (92 and (h). It is submitted 
that the st1ipowner is answerable for am; loss or damage dir-
ectly attributed to the measures taken. This is the case where 
the measures are taken following the collision whicll is due to 
tt1e fault of the shipowm~r. 
36. Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.I'\.), s. 20 (2) (h), re-rmacting Admin-
istration of Justice Act 1956 (U.K.), s. 1 (1) (b). When the new 
Admiralty /.\ct (Cornth.) is enacted, Australian courts will have 
the jurisdiction to entertain the claim. 
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in itself does not cause physical damage to the goods carried or in-
terfere with the working of the ship or her machinery. There is the 
likelihood that the smooth flmi\1 of maritime tradE~ will be interrupted 
when a ship in such condition is involved. It is submitted that, to 
protect the rights and interests under maritime law, the term "unsea-
worthiness" should be re-defined. It should extend to non-compliance 
with legislation, whether in a home or foreign port, dealing with pollu-
tion. For example, a ship that is not in possession of a valid ship 
construction certificate or not surveyed periodically as required un-
der Division 12 of Part IV of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) should 
37 be regarded as unseaworthy. The facts of the Scots case of 1 he 
"Mihalis'JB indicate that discharge of oil in contravention of the ill-
land Count~ Council Act 1974 (Scot.) could result in the loss of char-
ter hire. Aerial surveillance of the waters around Shetland showed 
that them was oil about a mile long in the wake of The "Michalis". It 
was much broader than the normal wake of a ship. Neither the ter-
minal operators nor the charterers intended to take any action to 
stop the ship from entering the harbour and loading the cargo. The 
harbour authority advised the ship's agents that they would exercise 
the powers under the Act (Scot.) and refuse to allow the ship to berth. 
It also threatened to issue a special order. The charterers cancelled 
the charter. 
It is clear that the ship is not ''operation-worthy". Maritime law 
should provide redress for loss or damage suffered in such circum-
stances. 
Thirdly, the ''occurring" or "likely" discharge could be due to the 
defective condition of the drums or containers in which the cargo is 
put on board by the shipper. Loss will invariably be caused to the 
shipowner as carrier if the ship is held up or prevented from berthing 
because of leakago from the cargo. It is submitted tllat the cargo-
owner is liable to the sllipowner for the loss caused. Although the 
37. As amended by 1\la\ligation (Protection of tile Sea) Amend-
ment Act (Comth.) (No. 40 of 1983), s. 6. This Division applies 
to ships carrying or using oil. 
38. [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 525 (Court of Sr~ssion OutrJr Hou~m). 
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cargo carried is maritime property, the courts have no statutory jur-
isdiction to entertain an admiralty action solely against the 
cargo~9 Moreover, the shipowner, as carrier, is not protected under 
the Hague Rules 40 or the Brussels Protocol 1968. It is necessary to 
include in the charterpartv or bill of lading an indemnity clause. To 
remove the anomaly, amendments to the Hague Rules and the admiralty 
law are necessary. 
A statutory notice is enforceable in two wavs. i'Jon-compliance 
constitutes an offence rendering the shipowner liable to a penalty 
of $50,000. In addition, the Minister or f.\uthoritv mav "cause such 
things to be done" as seem proper to prevent or reduce the pollution 
41 
of any waters, coast or reef of the State. A deterrent aspect of 
the exercise is the fearsome costs of the clean-up or preventive mea-
sures chargeable to the shipowm~r. The nature of this statutory in-
demnity has been considered. In 1\lew South Wales, Queensland, South 
Australia and Victoria, the right to enforce this indemnity is subject 
to two logical exceptionsl!2 The first applies to the need to save 
life at sea. Thus the receipt of the notice. a ship can 
respond to an S.O.S. signal and undertake salvage work or take a ship 
on tow. It is esser1tial that the object is to sa\Je life, even though 
property will also be salved in the process. fhe second exception 
applies where cornpiiance with the notice 
mechanical breakdown, stranding or the 
impossible. Apart from 
of the ship, compliance 
39. Except where there is a maritime lien on the cargo, e.g. in 
favour of a salvor. ln The Andaline (1886) 12 P.D. 1, it was 
held that seamen t~ho had a maritime lien on the freight could 
arrest the cargo for the purpose of enforcing the lien. 
40. The Hamburg Rules, t1owever, contain a provision rendering 
the shipper liable to the carrier in certain situations: Part 
III Article 12, see United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law Yearbook, vol. IX (1978), p. 214. 
41. Act (N.S.W.) (No. 59 of 1973), s. 7 E (2); Act (Qld.) (No. 33 of 
1973), s. 2l+ (2); and Act (Vic.) (No. 6705 of 1960), ~>. 27 (2). Under 
these provisions which apply to tankers, the authority to take 
the appropriate action i~> not dependent on the rmn.rnmplianco 
with any notice. 
42, /\ct (N.S.W.) (No. 59 of 1973), s. 7 D Cl•) (a) and (b); Act (Qld.) 
(No. 33 of 1973), s. 23 (4) (a) and (b); Act (Vic.) (T\Io. 6705 of' 
1960), s. 25 (a) and (b); amfAct (S~A.) (No. ZL1 of 1979, s. 7 d (1) 
{a) and (b). 
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mav bl~ rondered impossible lJV legal process. This mav occur where 
the ship is under arrest in an admiral tv action in commenced bv 
the mortgagees, salvors or other claimants. If our reasoning is carr-
plaintiffs should take advantage of the situation bv instituting an 
admiraltv action in rem 
To the disadvantaged position of those acJverselv affec is 
added another difficulty·. Section 29 of the Queensland Act43 reads: 
"No proceedings in the nature of an application for an in-
junction shall lie in anv court in respect of an action or 
notice given bv a prescribed authoritv or bv the Minister 
or his agent purportedlv under the authoritv of this Act." 
It seems that damages in tort mav be recovered bv the shipmvner, 
charterer, salvor or cargo-owner where the statutorv powers are 
abused or exercised in bad faith. The tortious acts are probablv 
committed on behalf of tho Authoritv or the Mini~>ter im10lving the 
use of ships and other equipment. It is submitted that the claimants 
should be allowed to institute actions in !.:.§.!..!!against the ships and 
other equipment involved .44 
6. Compensation for Third Parties 
Pollution damage from oil tankers. Before the Protection of 
the Sea (Civil Liabilitv) Act 1981 (Cornth.) carne into force, New South 
Wales, Queensland and \/ictoria had enacted legislation to deal with 
discharge from tankers carrving oil in bulk:1s The statutorv tort cre-
ated imposes strict civil liability on the owner and the master of the 
tanker for pollution damage. Apart from certain E~xceptions, it is 
noteworthv that, for the first time, third partlos are given protection 
~\!here their propertv is damaged or actuallv threatened bv an impend-
ding damage bv contamination. Thus a "person who suffers of or 
damage to anv propertv or incurs expense or liabilitv in preventing 
or mitigating such loss or damage" is entitled to recover ~~ 6 Unfortun-
atelv, the rernedv falls short of allowing non-propertv owners, e.g. 
fishermen, tourist opnrators or wage earners, to r·ecover for loss of 
1;3. Act (CJlcl.) (No. 33 of 1973). 
44. Unfurtunatelv, the law does not permit such action to be 
brought against government ships or propertv. ~)ee Ctlaptc)r 
Nine. 
45. Act (N.S.W.) (No. 59 of 1973), s. 7 E; Act CWcl.) (No. 33 of 1973), 
ss. 24 and 25; Act (Vic.) (No. 6075 of 1960), ~-;. 27. 
l16 • . Act (Qlj:L..) (No. 33 of 1973), s. 25; Act (\lie.) (No. 6705 of 1960), 
s. 27 (3) (i) and (iiJ2; and Act (N.S.W.) (No. 59 of 1973), s. 8 f\ ('1). 
Apparentlv s. 8 A (1) of the lnst-mentiomHJ Act enables 
t;hird parties to reco\Jer compensation for damage caused bv 
clisdwrge fmm l1oth ships and tankers. 
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profits or earnings caused by an oil slick. In addition to these short-
comings, the Acts do not authorise victims of pollution damage to 
detain the tankers concerned until their claims are satisfied or to 
institute in rem proceedings against them. 
However, the State provisions referred to above are largely, 
if not entirely, superseded by provisions of the Protection of the Sea 
(Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Comth.). 
IV. COMMONWEALTH LEGISLATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTIONS 
Prior to the Protection of tr1e Sea (Powers of Intervention) Act 
1981 (Comth.) being enacted, the Commonwealth Parliament adhered to 
the philosophy of controlling oil pollution by merely imposing penal-
ties. Effect was given to the International Convention for the Pre-
vention of Pollution by Oil 1954. Thus the owner and the master of a 
ship registered in Australia would each be guilty of an offence where a 
discharge occurred in breach of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil Act 
1960 (Comth.)~7 The inefficacy and harshness of such measures have 
already been noted. 
1. Protection of the Sea (Powers of Intervention) Act 1981 (Comth) 
It gives effect to the International Convention relating to In-
tervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution Casualties 1969.48 By 
section 8 (1), the Minister has wide powers to take the necessary ac-
tion on the high seas to prevent, reduce or eliminate the danger of 
oil pollution. 
"Convention" and "non-convention measures". The measures that 
may be taken under the Act (Comth.) in relation to the ship or ships 
involved in a maritime casualty may impinge upon maritime law in a 
number of ways. 
The "convention" measures include the following: 
47. This Act together with the 1965 and 1972 amending Acts 
(Comth.) was repealed by the Erotection of the Sea (Discharge 
of Oil from ships) Act (Cornth.) (No. 32 of 1981), s. 3. 
48. And also to the 1973 Protocol. See s. 9, s. 10 and Schedule II. 
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(1) moving the ship or part of the ship to another place; 
(2) removal of cargo from the ship; 
(3) salvage of the ship, part of the ship or am; of the ship's cargo; 
(l1) sinking or destruction of Uu~ ship or pai't of the ship; 
(5) sinking, destruction or discharge into the sea any of the ship's 
cargo; 
(6) taking over control of the ship or part of the shipf'9 or 
(7) the issue of directions under section 11 to the shipowner, the 
master or the salvor in PDSS(~ssiorl of the ship. 
It vital to consider how far maritime rights or interests may 
be infringed by the measures which rnav be taken. The sinking or de-
struction of the ship will put an end to the maritime liens 50 which 
have attached thereto and to the Sf3curitv in favour of the ship 
mortgagees. A salvor may lose his reward in respect of the salvage 
or towage services51 rendered bnfore the "convention" measures were 
taken. The category of persons adversely affected include maritime 
lienees. the unpaid crew members, . the m:lcessaries men, the 
ship mortgagees, the bill of lading holders and the shipowners. What 
is remarkable is that the ministerial dir·pctions may require the ship-
owner~>. the master or the sal\mr in possession of the ship to carrv 
out sorne of the wide-ranging measures listed above. It is question-
able whether these persons could t:Jscape liabiLt tv for tt1e damage or 
loss caused as a result of complying with the ministerial directions:2 
There is no provision in the /\ct (Comth.) or the Convention which pro-
tects them from liability.r)3 It i:> doubtful whc'lther the shipowners and 
the master, if found liable, will be able to limit their liability. 
There are ~HNeral ways in which the Minister and others acting 
under his authori tv may be hGlld anscvm·able for tortious interference 
49. s. 8 (2). 
50. See Chapter Eight. 
51. . under the Um;d's Standard Fnf'm, whore the services 
are eendererJ on the basis uf "No Cure, No Pav'', a salvor will 
get nothing if no property i~> savt-Jd. 
52. As tu liabilitv for cJarnag~) hlJVOnd \;'llhc'lt is reasonably necess-
ary, see the 1969 Convention, l\rticles V, VI ancJ VII. 
1)3. lt is submitted that an amt-mdrnent should be made which gives 
full immunit\f to thE shipowm~r, ttm rnat3ter; the salvor and the 
ship involved. 
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with the rights, or wrongful damage to the property, of third parties. 
The case of Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food54 underlines the readiness of the House of Lords to apply the 
doctrine of extended vires to a Minister of the Crmvn entrusted 
by statute with a broad, subjective discretionary power. The doctrine 
is undoubtedly part of the administrative law of Australia?5 Lord 
Upjohn lucidly explained that, B\len though the adjective "unfettered" 
was actually used in a provision conferring the:; powc-1r of discretion 
on the Minister, it can do nothing to unfetter the control which the 
judiciary have over the executive. He continued in these terms: 
11 exercising their powers the [executiv~:3] must act law-
fully and that a matter to be determined by looking at 
the Act and its scope and object in conferring a discretion 
upon the Minister rather than by the use of adjectives.n'J6 
The measures taken or directions issued by the Minister may held 
to be unlawful on grounds of simple or extended vires. Claim-
ants, whose interests or property is injured in such circumstances, 
are entitled to recover damages which are not subject to limitation 
of liability. Moreover, the Convention expressly prohibits unnecess-
ary interference with the rights and intc~rests of the "flag State, 
third States and of any person, physical or cor'porate concerned''.57 
It does not prejudice any right or "deprive any of the Parties or any 
interested physical or corporate person of any remedy otherwise 
applicable~58 In carrying out U1e unlawful action, a ship could have 
been used as an instrument of intBrference, damage or destruction. 
There is no reason why proceedinrJS !:.§!.!!! should not be allowed to 
be brought. arJainst the ship. But, on statutory grounds, this course 
54. [19681 A.C. 997. Basically, the question at issue concerned 
the nature and extent of a Minister's statutory duty in 
deciding t.-Jhether to reft:Jr to a committee a complaint made 
by those persons adver~;el v affected by the scheme. 
55. It is applicable on a number of grounrJs, including abuse and 
failul'e to exercis(CJ discretionCJry power: S.D. Hotop, =="'-
and Materials on Review of f-\dministrative Action (1979 , 
pp. 280-356: H. lJJhitmore and f"l. Aronl~on, Review of Adminis-
tl'ative Action (1978), pp. 199-2l~Z. 
56. [1968] /\;C. 997, p. 1059. 
57. Article V para. 2. 
58. Article VII. 
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of action mav nDt always be Dpen to the claimants. 59 
Moreover, at common law, negligBnce in the exercise of statu-
tory functions can give rise to liabilitv. Maritime interests and rights 
are entitled tD similar protection. In Caledonian Collieries Ltd. v. 
Spiers?0 Dixon, C.J., and McTiE!rnan. Kitto and Tavlor, J J., referred 
to the application of the well-settled principle. Thev said: 61 
" ... when statutorv powers are conferred thGV must be exer-
cised with reasonable care, so that if those who exercise 
them could by reasonable precaution have prevented an 
injurv which has bmm occasioned, and was likely· to be occas-
ioned, by their exercise, damages for negligence may be re-
covered." 
It is submitted that those, who are damnified as a result of the neg-
ligence of the Minister or t1is agents in taking the "convention" meas-
tJres or issuing the directions, are entitled to damages. 
An 11excess damage" remedy is provided bv the Convention. Com-
pensation is pavable to the extent of the damage caused by measures 
which exceed those reasonably nece~;sarv to achieve the goals statt1d 
in Ar·ticle 1?2 It is a strict requirnment of the Com1ention that the 
measures taken must be proportionate, to the harm actually inflicted 
or threatened by the pollution. There is no doubt that the onus of 
proving non-observance of this requirement 
63 
ants. 
on the maritime claim-
It has been noted that the statutory powers of ir1tervention, 
wllen exercised, will generallv result in injur'y to maritime interests 
and property. In actions for compensation, the plaintiffs IAiill be those 
whose claims are recognised in maritime law. Included among them are 
59. As to in l:'em proceedings against Crown ships and car!='JO, see 
NavigaUonAct 1912-73 (Comth.), s. 1~05 A, 
60. (1957) 97 C.L.R. 202. 
61. Ibid., p. 220. The decision in Birch v . ..;......__..;_......;..;.:.-.........;;;..;;;...;;._::.:..;;;..;...;;;;..;.. 
(1969) 119 C.L.R. 652 another example. An action for negli-
gence was held to lie against a statutorv authoritv for damage 
negligently caused ln the course of exercising functions con-
Ferred on it for the ben~:::fit of the public. For English auth-
orities where the principle is applied, see Dutton v. Bog nor 
Reqis United Building Co. Ltd. and f-\nother: [1972} 1 All E.R. 
1;62; David Geddis v. PropritJtor~j of the Bann l~eser\Joir (1878) 
3 App. Cas. LL30. 
62. See Article VI. 
63. FDr specific guidelines, se~::; Artich~ V para. 3. 
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the assinnees of ship mortgages, freight and crew's wagPs and also 
the insurers who sue as subrogees. It is true that where the multi-
party actions succeed, the Commonwealth as a Party to the Conven-
tion will have the resources to satisfy the judgments. But the total 
amount payable as compensation will usually be limited to the value 
of the re::! and cargo wrongfully destroyed. A difficulty is envisaged 
IAJhere the amount is insufficient to meet in full the claims of the 
maritime lienees, the mortgagees and tt1e other creditors. The amount: 
recoverable represents the value of res and the cargo destroyed. 
It is submitted that the competing claims should be paid according to 
the order of priority that would have applied 64 if no sinking or des-
truction had taken place. 
In two important ways, the "non-convention" measures and direc-
tions authorised in section 10 differ from trmse considered above. 
Subject to certain exceptions~') the section applies in relation to any 
ship in internal waters or in the Australian coastal sea66 and any Aus-
tralian ship on the high seas. H18 statutory powers are exercisable 
where oil is escaping or escaped from a ship or the Minister is 
satisfied that oil is likely to escape fmm such a ship. As regards 
Australian ships on the high seas, measures may be taken or directions 
issued either under ttm Convention m' under section 10, or possibly 
under both. The non-convention powers under section 10 are er 
to exercise and,in a number of 1<11ays)give the administering Authority 
wider leeway than the "convention" powers. This fact will render it 
more difficult for maritime interests and property owners who are 
damnified by unlawful intervention or negligent acts to succeed in 
their claims. 
Recovery of expenses. The expense or liability incurred in tak-
ing the measures under sections 8 and 10 67 constitutes a debt. It is 
64. The matter is discussed in Chapter Seven. 
65. They are trading ships proceeding on an intra-State voyagE', 
fishing vessels proceeding on a non-overseas voyage and plea-
sure craft: s. 10 (6). 
66. Defined in s. 11J (fJ). See also the meaning of "Australian 
waters" in Protection of the SBa f[i\/il Liability) t'\ct 1981 
(Comth.), s. 22 (4). 
67. Protection of the Sea (Pmvers of Int£-:Jrvention) Act 1981 (CDmth). 
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due to the Commom'llealth by the shipowner or, VII here two or more 
ships are involved, by the owners of those ships jointly and severally .68 
fhis right of recovery is subject to a number of important exceptions~9 
The shipowner or shipowners are exonerated ~vhere it is proved that 
the incident -
"(a) resulted f'rorn an act of war, hostilities, civil \.var, in-
surrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, 
inevitable and irresistible character; 
(b) was caused by an act or omission done by a third party 
\IIIith intent to cause damage; or 
(c) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful 
act of any government, or other authority, responsible 
for the maintenance of lights 7Dor other navigable aids 
in the exercise of its functions in relation to those 
lights or aids." 
The first part of paragraph (a) runs on traditional lines and includes 
a number of the Hague Rules E"xceptions in /\rticle IV rule 2. Ttmse 
are "(e) Act of war", "(f) Act of public enemies" and "(!s_) Rfots and civil 
- - 72 
commotions".71 Though similar to an act of God, the exception "nat-
ural phenomenon .. .irresistible character" is different from it in other 
respects. A later criterion adopted in Greenock Corporation v. Cale-
donian Ry ?3 is whether or not human foresi~Jht and pr'udence could 
reasonably recognise the possibility of such an m1ent. The learned 
authors of l!.linfield and Jolowicz on Tort have correctly stated that 
68. Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Cornth.), s. 20 
(1). 
69. In the absence of actual fault or privity on the st1ipowner's 
part, the amount recoverable under s. 20 (1) limited; see 
s. 20 (3) and Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Regul.Q.:. 
tions (Comth.) (Statutory Rules No. 222 of 1983), reg. 11. See 
also Chapter Ei~Jht. 
70. See Lighthouses Act (Comth.) 1911; Merchant Shipping Act 1B9t. 
(Irnp.), Part XI. 
71. The meaning ancJ scope of these exceptions are well explained 
in R. Colinvaux, Carver's Carriage by Sf-Ja (12th ed. 1971), pp. 
Z48-2l~9. 
72. HaguP Rules, Article IV rule 2 (rJ). 
73. [1917] A.C. S56. The House of Lords criticisecJ the defence 
in Nichols v. 1'-'larslanrJ (1875) L.R. 10 Ex. 255, in 1r11hich doubts 
wrJrB raised as to the finding of facts by the jurv. 
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"the essence of an act of God is not so much a phenomenon ... sometimes 
attributed to a positive intervention of the forces of nature, but a 
process of nature not due to the act of man .... "7lt It therefore differs 
from the statutory exception IAihich, inter must be "of irrest.ible 
character". The element of inevitability or irresistibility implies that 
the occurrence must be of such an exceptional nature that it is tot-
ally impossible to avoi.d or overcome. 
For the exception in paragraph (b) to apply, two conditions must 
be satisfied. The person wholly responsible is "a third party" and the 
act or omission done "with intent to cause damage". It appears 
that the object is to protect shipm.Jners who, in shipping operations, 
have to rely on the services of a variety of persons, engineers, 
ship repairers, refuellers and stevdores. They may have been engaged 
as employees, agents or independent contractors. It is submitted that 
for the purpose of the meaning of paragraph (b) each of these per-
sons is regarded "a third party" when acting in breach of his author-
ity, viz. in committing an act or omission with a criminal intent. An 
example may be drawn from the English Court of Appeal decision in the 
.;;;;.;..;"""'--"'c;;;;.;;;=.;;;;;. case?5 The principlo, when applied, will rosult in the loss 
of a person's status as an agent or servant IAihen perpetrating a crim-
inal act. There goods were shipped under bills of lading which incor-
porated the Hague Rules. Thev were delivered damaged by sea-water. 
This occurred as a result of the theft the storm valve cover plate 
by the shipowners' stevedores during the loading and unloading of 
other cargo at Sudan. The English Court of Appeal allowed the ship-
owners' appeal against the trial court judgment for the cargo claim-
ants. In holding that a thief would not come within the meaning of 
"ser\/antu or "agent'' in Article IV rule 2 (g2, Sellers, L.J., said: 76 
"The thief was not in fact the servant of the appellants 
and could only be regarded as one - or more correctlv as 
an agent of the shipowners in so far as he was perform-
ing a task for and on their bet1a l f. In de a ling with t11e ship's 
structure the thief was not acting or puPporting to act for 
the shipowners and ought not in such circumstances be held 
to be their agent. 
74.W.V.H. Rugers, Winfield and Jolowicz (11th od. 1979), cit., 
p, [117. 
75. l.eesh River Tea Company l.td. and Other~:; v. British India S.N. 
[1966] 2 Llovd's f~EJp. 195. 
76. Ibid., p_,__200. 
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It is interesting to note that a similar approach is adopted in 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (U.K.) which has incorporated 
tile Brussels Protocol 1968:7 In certain situations, a servant or agent 
of the carrier is not enti tied to rely on the defences and limits of 
liability under the Rules scheduled to the Act (U.K). They occur where 
it is proved that the damaged resulted from "an act or omission of the 
servant or agent done with intent to cause cJamage or recklessly and 
with knowledge that damage would probably result." 78 It is submitted 
that thn person, t,:ho commits such an act or omission, ~vill forfeit his status 
as a servant or agent and be relegated to the position of a third pai'ty. 
One undesirable consequence is the inci'eased tendency of shiP-
owners to invoke the exception by unjustly putting the blame on their 
employees and agents. 
The "negligence or other wrongful act of any government" in 
paragraph (c) would embrace any unlawful measures as well as neglig-
ence committed in taking those measui'es. It should cm1er a case 
where the expenses are incurred as a result of a spillage from a 
vessel damaged in a collision due entirely to the fault of a ship owned 
by the Australian Government or a foreign govePnment. LLJhat is harsh 
that this exception is unavailable to a shipowner where he Is pers-
onally or vicariouslv guilty of contributorv negligence. 
Next comes the method of recovering the expenses incurred in 
taking the rneasUl'es. Pavment of the expenses due by the shipowner 
or shipowners as a debt to the Commonwealth is enforceable in two 
wavs. Firstly, the amount pavable is secured by "a charge" imposed 
on the ship or sllips involved?9 The charge is nowhere definc~d in the 
Act (Comth.) and cannot be presumed to bR <:1 maritimE:~ Lien. The pro-
visions creating the charrJe do not authorise tile Commonwealth as 
chargee to disposfJ of the res. It is clear that under the Colonial 
Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 (Irnp.)80 no action [g!!1_ can be institutr:;cJ 
77. Still not given statutorv efft:1ct as municipal law in many of 
the British Commonwealth countries. 
78. Article IV rule 4. 
79. Protoction of the Sea (Civil Liabilitv) Act 1981 (Comttl.), s. 22 
(1). 
80. 53 & SL1 Vic., c. 27; see also the Admiralty Court /\ct 1861 
(Imp.), 24 V{c., c. 10, infra. See, llowever, Draft Admiralty [3ill 
1985, clause 37 (1) and (5). 
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81 to enfoece tl18 chaege. S£:Jcondh;, the ship or ships in question mav 
be rjetained bv a person authorised by the Minister until the amount 
due is paid or satisfactory security for the payment has been furn-
ished. It submitted that the chaege coupled with the power of 
detention is in the nature of a quasi-maritime claim. It appears that 
the ship's other creditors, mortgagees and maritime lienees, may 
be adversely affected. lJJhen the ship, which subject to the charge 
and under detention, is sold, ttl8 issue will arise as to the order in 
which ttm various claims are to be paid. 
2. Protection of the SeCl (Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Comth.). 
ttJe have seen how the gaps left bv common law have, to a limited 
extent, been filled bv legislation in three States. 
A number of problems, however, still remain. State Parliaments 
have no jurisdiction m1er ships proc8eding on inter-State or overseas 
voyages. State legislation provides no redress for damage caused by 
pollution in Australian waters82 and on the high seas. The crippling 
statutory penalties often leave shipowners with little or no assets to 
rneet their civil liability. This includes property damage or loss caused 
to third parties and the exorbitant clean-up costs. Apart from the 
burden of proving negligence and other elements to be met by claim-
ants in order to succeed, there is the anomaly that at common law 
purely financial loss is usually not recoverable~) 
It was to deal with these difficulties that the Comrnom'llfjalUI 
Parliament; gave statutory effect to the International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, and thE~ Protocol. The 
provision of a resource fund or other financial secueity to meet 
pollution-damage claims and the costs of preventive measures is a 
tribute to the ingenuity of the Convention fonnulators. 
We shall e\Jaluate t,hB effects of this Convention on maritimE! laiAJ. 
Firstly, it imposes strict liability for oil-pollution damage on 
81. The me<minq of "charge'' is considered in Chapter Nine. 
82. 1981 Act (Comth.), s. 22 (It); 1969 Convention, Article II. 
83. :1uera, except of cours<", in Llfl action For public nuisance, 
where special or particular damage it1 proved. 
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the .shipO\J\Iner personally. 1\t the timn l:vh£m the spillagEJ occurs, the 
ship may bo under a dernisP charter or in trJB possession of a mort-
gagee or salvor. The \!\lord "owner" is narrowly defined to mean, 
inter a regh1tered owner <md, where the ship is State-owned, the 
81~ 
company registered as the ship's operator. In the absence of an 
agreement, the shipowner is not entitlecl at common law to be rPim-
bursed in respect of the strict civil liability for any pollution damagn 
caused. This seems to be the situation 1111here the spillage has 
occurred without any negligence or default in the operation, manage-
ment or navigation of the ship while she is in the pos~mssion of a 
demise charterer, salvor or mortgagee. 
Paragraph 5 of Article III of the Convention does not "prejudice 
any right of recourse of the owner against third parties." It is uncer-
tain whether, umler this prmtision, a demise charterer and other per-
sons in possession will, e\/f~n in tt1e absence of negligence or default, 
be subject to the "convontion" liability. Moreover, thB shipownor's 
personal action or L'ight of recourse. if maintainable, against a demise 
charterer, mortgagee or salvor rnay yield onl v partial or, in some cas-
es, no satisfaction. It is submitted that under the Colonial Cour·ts of 
f.\drniralty Act 1B90 (Imp.) th(~ shipowner is unable to bring an action 
in I:illD. against a ship belonging to the demise charterer, salvor or 
mortgagee~5 
Secondly, under the Convention compensation is only payable for 
pollution damage, including the costs of preventive measures and fur-
ther loss or damage caused by such measures. The expression "pollu-
tion damage" is defined as loss or damage caused outside the oil-carry-
ing ship by contamination resulting from the spillage of oil from the 
ship~6 This narrow definition has creatrd a serious gap in the law. 
8t,. Article 1, para. 3. 
85. Australian courts have no jurisdiction to entertain any 
action in rem where the claim is brought for reimbursement or 
indemnity orto enforce the "convention" right of recourse. 
The shipowner is, howe\Jer, personally answerable for the 
expense or other liability as provided under the Protection of 
the Sea (Civil l lability) Act 1981 (Comth.), s. 20, and is liable to 
compensate third parties for pollution damage caused. 
86. 1969 ComiBntion, Article 1 para. 6. 
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Suppose that an oil spill occurs from a ship, anct large carpet~> of oil 
are being carried on top of thG; waves towards a holida\t rBsDrt and 
fishing town. If, before any pollution damagc1 caused, t11r>. oil cat-
ches fire which spn~ads rapidly and causes damage to thE! intRr(~~~ts 
and property of third parties, it questionable \>\Jhether any claim 
can be lwought under the Convc'!ntion. It arguable that loss or darn-
age by fire is not pollution clama~~e caused by c6ntaminatil1n.87 On the 
ott1er hand, if an outbreak of occLH's follmving a spillage as a 
result of IA/rongful damage by a ship, tt1ircl partiE~s L<tJhose properties 
are destroyed should be able to institutE~ proceedings in lJ2!!1. a(~ainst 
the ship COnCCc}rfled. 
Thirdly, the Convention supplemr:mts the protection provided by 
maritime law. The pollution damage may have resulted from the negli-
gence of the salvors88 or from a collision due to the fault of another 
ship. Under the Convention, the plaintiffs can claim compensation 
from the owner the ship from which the pollution occurs. But thr:JY 
are disentitled from taking admiralty action in rern against the ship~9 
' ---
The Convention, howevEc;r, rJoes not prt:1\i(~nt the plaintiffs and the 
shipmvner from institutinsJ Pt'oceedinqs in <:~gainst the other wrong-
doing ship or the salvage ship as an i nstrurnent of mischief. Since 
thR liability of the shipm'llnee is lirnitecl ur1dt:!r tho Convention?0 it i~> 
submitted that by bringing a further action against the othF:lr wrong-
doing ship or sah!Bge ve~1sE::l. the plaintiff~• have a better chance of 
. t' . f' 1191 recovermg cmnpensa 1on m · u . 
87. Devastation by fire did occur in The lJJanon l"lound [1961] A.C. 
388 and Eastern Asia Navigation Co. ltd. \1. f-remantle Har-
bour Trust Commi~1sioners and the Commonwealth of Austra-
lia (1950-1951) 83 C.L.R. 353, supra. 
88. Ttle Jade [1976] 1 t'\ll [.F~. f1L,1 (CJ\.), 5 
.::.:..;;::;...:....;;;;; 
89. Particularly where a fund has been instituted in accm·rjancB 
L'llith Article VI para. 1. 
90. Article \/ paras. 1 2. 
91. It is suggestod that vlctim~3 pollution damage could re-
co\/er from the polluter um]er the Con\/ention and, as to 
the balance, frorn the other wnmgrJoing sr1ip. Since no dis-
charge occurs from thE~ lattf,or, th[c! admiralty action in rem 
aqainst her falls Dutside the ConvE:mtion; ::;oe Article 1\i.-
2 5 
Fourthly, in several ways cEClrtain ri~Jhts <.md inten;sts protected 
by maritime law are ad\Jer~3ely affectPd by the Conw:Jntion. P;Jragraph 
8 of Article V reads: 
"Claims in respect of expt-.:nses reasonably incurred or sac-
rifices reasonably rnade by the owner voluntarily to prevent 
or minimise pollution damage shall rank equally with other 
claims against the fund." 
When applied to salvage law, the provision has vital implications. A 
sal\;or engaged by the shipowner may have succeeded in saving an oil-
carrying ship together with the cargo. He is entitled to be paid out 
of the resource fund or other financial security provided. But since 
his services are rendered under the Convention and not under mari-
time law, it is doubtful that his claim will be protected by a maritime 
Hen?2 In one sense, the Convention has altered the meaning in which 
the word "salvage" is used. Wherr:l pollution damage is prevented or 
minimised through the destruction or sinking of the tanker or her 
cargo, the salvor is nevertheless entitled to remuneration?3 It would 
appear that under the Convention the only salvorial services that can 
be rendered are contractual in nature. The Convention lays dmvn its 
own criteria for remunerating the services rendered. 
What is not clear concerns the position of a \tolunteer salvor 
who succeeds in salving the ship and the cargo of oil while she is un-
der a demise charter. It is submitted that his rights under maritime 
law have not been superseded by the Convention. The sah1age award 
should in the first place be computed, inter alia, according to the 
value of the ~ and the cargo sal\/ed without reference to the pollu-
tion damage averted. Moreover, since by saving the ship and her 
cargo he has also prevented pollution damage, it is ar~Juable that remun- · 
eration should also be paid as expenses under paragraph 8 of Article 
92. Article VI para. 1, when complied with, has the effect of 
extinguishing a salvor's rights under maritirm3 law. A salvor 
acting under directions may lose his right to salvasJe award 
on the ground that his work is not \/oluntary: D.W. Abecassis, 
"Some Topical Considerations in the Event of a Casualty to 
an Oil Tanker" [1979] t, L.M.C.L.Q. 449, p. 455. 
93. Such expenses when rE3asDnably incurred are claimatJle under 
Article V para. 8. 
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V. However, paragraph I of 1\rticle \II ~mems to operate to his dis-
advantage. Where the shipowner has complied with the provisions, a 
person having a pollution-damage claim disentitled from exercising 
am; right against other assets of the st1ipowners. It is suggested 
that the expenses incurred bv the shipowner under paragraph 8 of 
Article V for reducing or prc~venting pollution damage are different 
from pollution-damagr0 claim~:l~4 Even if courts reach a different de-
cision on this issue, his salvage claim in respect of the cargo sa\/ed 
should be allowed especially where it is not owned bv the shipowner? 5 
There is another way in which the maritime rights and interests 
of third parties in relation to the ship and the cargo mav be pre-
judiced. Subject to the conditions in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 
VI being met, claims for sacrifices made are treated equally "with 
other claims" against the resource fund. Paragraph 8 of Article V 
seems to suggest that a shipowner mav \loluntarilv sink or destroy 
his ship together with tho cargo to pmvent or reduce pollution dam-
age. If thE:: interpretation corn~ct, the resource fund established 
by the shipowner' may be rerJuc~~d in !lis favour in proportion to the 
\Jalue of tt1e claims on behalf of the ship and the cargo sacrificed.96 
Unfortunately, there is nothirlC:J in the Convention which pro\/ides that 
the amounts so reduced \Nill be held bv the shipowner for the benefit 
of the maritime lienees, ::Jtlip mortgagees an(j other claimants. In this 
respect, the Convention tl'f:!ats ~vit.t1 paf'tiality victims of pollution 
damage at thrl expense of financif""rs, merchants and traders who 
have acquired rights and interests under maritime law. 
3. Levy on Ships 97 
The increasing expfm~:;n of maintaining the stockpile of materials 
and equipments and providing su Pficient personnel to combat pollution 
necessitated the setting up of a fund by Commonwealth legislation. 
94. Thi:; reasoninq i:o not weakened by the equal ranking of ttle 
claims. 
95. In such circumstance~3, At'ticle VI has no i':Jpplication. 
96. Article V pma. l~, 
97. Lr~VIJ was first initiated by the Pollution of the ~)r:Ja by Dil 
(Shipping Levy) /\ct (Comth.) (No. 132 of 1972) and the Pollu-
tion of the Sea by CJil (::!hif?ping Le\ly CollBction) Act (Cornth.) 
(1\lo. 133 of 19 72). For t11ro purpose of streamlining leg isla-
tion titles on the subject, they were repc'!aled and n~placed 
tJV two Acts bearing tim word~:; "Protection of the Sea" as 
part oTtheir citation. 
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As section 55 of the Commonwealth of /\ustralia Constitution Act 1900 
(Imp.) prohibits an Act imposing taxation from also dealing with the 
collection of levy, t\;\JO "non-convention" 1\cts wen~ passed. Subject 
to certain exceptions, the Protection of the Sea (Shipping Levy) Act 
1981 (Comth.)?8 applies to all ships (including those laid up) tvhose ton-
nage excm:Jds 100 tons, with at least ten tonnes of oil in bulk on 
board while such ships are in any Australian port. Legislators consid-
er that pollution threat posed by smaller ships and ships with less 
than ten tonnes of oil on board to be insufficiently serious. The levv. 
imposed at quarterly intervals, was raised from one cent per ton of 
the ship's tonnage in 1972 to four cents. It is subject to the minimum 
of twenty-five dollars payable per ship. Section 4 establishes the 
nexus between this Act and the Protection of th£J Sea (Shipping Levy 
Collection) Act (Comth.Y9 for the purpose of implementing the levy. 
The Commonwr:Jalth Parliament has adopted tile curious presumption 
that the levy for a quarter is payable ~=.~enerally by all sr1ips in Aust-
ralian ports. The pn:sumption is rBbuttable by proof that during the 
quartGr when the ship was in an Australian port she did not ha\/e on 
board ten tonnes of oil or more ir1 bulk or she was there only for one 
of the purposes specified in section 5. 
The sllipownGr' and the master arE! under a joint and several 
obligation to pay the levy .1 Non-payment constitutes a tort which 
has serious consequencE:?s. The Collector may in a personal action 
recover from them thf-? levv a~, a debt. dtH3 to the Commonwealth. 
Besides, he mav enter upon the ~1hip and distrain goods or E-Jquipment 
belonging to the ship, and detain ttlern until the levy is paid~ Such 
rights seem to constitute an extension of the common law remedy of 
distress. At common law, a distrainor is only entitled to keep the 
3 
chattel for the purpmm of cm'rcing payment. If he sells or deals 
98. /\ct (No. 314), ss. h and 8. 
99. Act (No. 35 of 1981). 
1. Ibid., s. 9. 
2. ILJid., :3. 11 (1). 
3. ClE~rk & Undsell on Tmt.s (1hth ed. 1975), paras. 1250-1251. 
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with it in any unaut.hmised \Aiay, it becomes an atHJSP of the distress 
ancJ a trespass.4 It appear·s that where an intending distrainor 
impedfJd and pre\mnted from making a distress, he has a risJht of action 
for the damagp caused.5 The Act (Comth.) does not appear to confer on the 
Collector thB right to distrain and detain goods carrimj on board 
the ship where they belong to third parties. However, follm\/ing the 
trend set by other statutes. section 11 (2) empowers the Collector to 
sell the qoods or equipment lawfully di~.trained if thB levy remains 
unpaid for three days after the distress. The proceeds of will 
used to pay the levy and all reasonable expenses incurred, and the 
surplus. if any, will be handed over to the owner or master of the 
ship. Where there is default in paying the levy, the ship involved may 
also be detained until payment has been made.6 In so far as the rights 
are exercisable tJy the Collector in relation to the ship and the cargo, 
they are in the nature of a quasi -maritime claim. 1t is desirable to 
amend the law so as to enable the Collector to enforce the levy by 
way of an action in ~ against the ship or possibly a sister or surr-
ogate ship. 
V. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FUND 
It is clear that the compensation payEJble undE'!r the Internation-
al Convention on Liability for Pollution Dama~1e, 1969, is inadequate. 
Another glaring sho['tcoming of the regime is tt1at oil importers are 
favoured at the expense of shipowners and the victims of oil pollution 
damage. To wit11 such anomalim; and to ensure that shipowners 
are given relief as re~v:mis the financial burdens imposed, another 
International Convention vvas formulat8d and arJopted to supplement 
the procedin~J one? 
In terms of its interni::ltional status, the International ComJl~n­
tion on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 had entered into forc8 m1 16th October, 
1978. f'\s an "insurance" convention, it would raise the amount of com-
pensation available for oil-pollution damage to approximately $A 51.8 
I~ In some circumstances, it may amount to an abandonrnrmt of 
the distress; Smith v. Wrigt1t (1861) 6 H. & N. 821. 
5. Clerk & Limhmll on Torts, cit., para. 1272. 
6. Protection of the Sea (ShippinD Le\/\f Collection) i\ct 1981 
(Comth.), s. 12 (1). By s. 12 (3), the levy payable includes UlE! 
amount payable under s. 8 as levy in eespect of the ship. 
See al§O Draft Admiralty Bill 1985, Clause 37 (5). 
7. See A.H.E. Popp, "Liability and Compensation for Pollution 
Damage caused by ships revisited - Report on an important 
international ConfBrence" [1985] 1 L.M.C.L.Q. 118. 
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million~ Whether .Australia will become a ~>iqnatnry tn this Convention 
with the vimv to its implermmtatiun as law LJopends largely on the 
extent of risk she is pmpared to assume. 
In two respects. the 1971 Convention will have a bearing on mar-
itime law. Firstly, the obli[~atlons of the Fund9 towards the shipowner 
or his guarantor will depend on the former's observance of the pro-
visions of the maritime conventions or regulations listed in paragraph 
3 Df .Article V and the amendments. The Fund may be t<\lhoUv or 
partially exonerated if it is proved that)as a result of the shipowner's 
actual fault or privity) the ship concerned did not comply with certain 
requirements, the International Coml8ntion on Load Lines, 
19661.0 In addition, the incident or damage must have been caused 
wholly or partially bv the non-compliance. The Convention is confined 
to ships actually carrying in bulk.11 When implemented as law, it 
may ensure that the seaworthiness of tankers is maintained and crew 
members are properly and sufficientlv trained to cope with emergen-
cies. The availability of supplomentary benefits to shipowners, who 
comply with the seaworthiness requirements and collision regulations, 
is sound in policy and practice. It will operate to reduce tt1e incid-
ents involving the loss of valuable maritime interests and rights. 
Secondly. paragraph 2 of Article 9 expresslv reserves to the 
Fund the right of recourse or subrogation against unspecified person~s. 
The right is statecl to be not "less favourable than that of an insurer 
8 . .According tD information provided by Commonwealth Depart-
ment of Transport, Canberra. 
9. To be established as a legal person: t\rticle II para. 2. 
10. Thf:] International Convention for the Safety of Life at ~3ea 
1960 is included. This Convention has been replaced bv the 
19/ll Convention of the same title. See Navigation .Act 191 Z-
73 (Comth.), s. 187.1\ and Naviqation .Amendment .Act 1T/9 
(Cornth.), s. 93 and Schedule III. 
11. The word "ship" in .Article .I para. 2 is given the same meaning 
as in t.he International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage, 1969, .Article I para. I. 
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of the person to IAJhnm compen~;ation or incJemrnt\1 has bPlm pald." A 
fairlv '...\Jide scopr~ is gi\1en to this right. Its effective enforcement 
is onlv possible in rnanv cases if proceE~dings i_!2 rem can be brought 
against the wrongdoing ship m the salving tug at fault. However, the 
amount mav not br~ recovered in full. The owner of the ship or sal-
ving tug mav be ablE~ to limit his liabllitv,12 and there mav be other 
competing claims IAJith a higher order of priori tv .13 
V. CONCLUSION 
The legislation, particularly Commonwealth, shows a strong bias 
towards victims of pollution damage at the expl=]nse of \Ji tal interests 
and rights recognised under maritime law. Steps should be taken to 
ensure a balanced development and administration of the laws relating 
to pollution-damage claims and claims under maritime law. It is sugg-
ested that the anti-pollution lE?gislation should be treated as an out-
growth of maritime law. 
In a numbr~r of instances, the new remedies based on internat-
ional com!8ntions are either not applicable or inadequate. The gaps 
in the law mav be filled bv Commonwealth legislation. The foreseeab-
ilitv test should be amended to enable claimants to recover compen-
sation for pollution damage, reasonable costs of preventive measures 
taken and clean-up costs, if reasonablv ir1curTed. It should be poss-
ible for claims for purelv financial loss, whether based on particular 
damage in public nuisance or on the t:ort of negligence, to be instit-
uted against the ship. Tt1ese amendments, when made, will provide 
answers to manv of the current problems. 
It is felt that the personal penalties imposed for ship-sourced 
pollution are grosslv bia:_;ed against the shipowner and several other' 
persons. No account is takr:>n of situations where the spillage occurs 
while the ship is in the possessior1 and control of third parties, e.g. 
the salvor, the mortgagee and tl1e rJemise chartr~rer. It is desirable 
to amend the law to enable prmalties and pollution-damage claims 
under the State enactments to be brou~ht against the ship and the 
cargo of oil from which the discharge comes. 
12. See Chapter Eight;. 
13. This a~JPect is cm;ered in Chapter Sr!ven. 
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We have S£)en that under Commomvealth l£:gis1ation expenses 
incurred in taking preventh1e rneasur·es and the levv t1ue will, in each 
case, give rise to a charge on the ship. On grounds of consistencv, 
it is submitted that the charge and the pollution-damage claims should 
similarlv be enforceable bv proceedings in rem against the ship and 
the cargo of oil. Naturally, IMhere a "convention" fund or other fin-
ancial securitv is prmtided and the proceedin~1s have ber:"!n brought 
onlv for pollution damage; 4 the rel£CJase of the ship or othElr Property 
belonging to the shipowner will be Oidm·ed. 
One aspect of the law i::; ln urgent need of fonn. Lue have noted 
that the \AJide-ranging measure~• a 1'1inistm· is empo\"lered to take under 
the Protection, of the Sea (Pm~IGI:'s of Intervention) Act 1981 (Cornth.). 
Thev include issuing directions to the shipowner, the master and the 
. . . 15 
salvor m possossmn of the sh1p. !t L3 submitted that these pt:~rsons 
and their st1ips involved should be fullv exoneratt:Jd frorn liability 
where,in complying with tt1FJ directions,loss or damage i~3 causEJd to 
third parties. 
14. Article VI para. I. 
15. Ss. 9 (2) (~). 1D (tJ) and 11. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CLAIMS AGAINST SHIPOWNERS 
I. THE PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter analyses the historical and juridical developments 
of three categories of claims, which concern injuries sustained by sea-
men, cargo loss or rJamage anrJ necessaries and services provided to 
ships. ThfJ task involves an nvaluation of the remedies open to claim-
ants. 
II. INJURIES TO SEAMEN 
1. The Old Law 
For many decades, the hardships suffered by seamEm in the coui'se 
of their employment went unmitigated. They were largely due to two 
causes, namely, the defective condition of the ships used and the in-
difference of the courts and the legislatures. The legal history is 
traced from the early authorities. 
As late as 1853, little attention was given to the well-being and 
safety of seamen. In the historic case of Couch v. Steel; the ques-
tion as to the duty of care of a shipowner towards seamen was raised 
for the first time. The plaintiff served as a common seaman on board 
the defendant's (a British) vessel. As the vessel was leaky and unsea-
worthy, the plaintiff became wet and fell ill. The decision was a 
shocking experience for seamen. In the action, all tt1roe judges of 
the Queen's Bench gave judgment for the defendant shipowner. They 
held that from the shipowner-seaman relationship the law did not im-
ply any t'llarranty of seaworthiness. To succeed in an action for dam-
ages, a seaman harJ to prove that the contract of employment exprnss-
ly provided that Um ship was seaworthy. Alternativuly, he had to 
prove that the shipmvner was 1"raudulent in that he knew the unsea-
"'" 
worthy condition of tile ship and failed to disclose it at the time when 
I 
the employment contract was made. 
The early rule that seaworthiness would not be implied in an 
ordinary employment contract was extended to the gear and equipment 
1. (1854) 3 EL& Bl. 402, one of the earliost English authorities 
on U1e subject. 
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used on board. In Rogers. v. Louti~ the plaintiff was a seaman on 
board a vessel of which tho defendant was master and part-owner. 
When the seaman was unfurling a sail, the foot-rope of the cross-jack-
yard, being defective, broke. He fell to the deck and sustainmj ser-
ious injuries. The action against the defendant failed on three 
grounds. 
Firstly, the scope of the rule in Couch v. Steel was not defined. 
It was capable of being applied to exom3rate shipowners from liabilitv 
for manv forms of injury sustained bv seamen in the course of their 
employment. No attempt was made to distinguish one form of unsea-
worthiness from another. In essence, the rule meant substantial im-
munity for shipowners as the term "unseaworthiness" connotes a wide 
category of major defects in the ship. It operated to the serious 
disadvantage of seamen. 
Secondly, the burden of proof imposed on the plaintiff was un-
duly harsh. He had to satisfy the court that the defendant was 
aware that the rope was defective or that his attention had been 
drawn to that fact. It had the twofold effect of negating a ship-
owner's duty of care towards his emplm;ees and transferring to his 
employees his personal obligation to provide a seawocthy ship and 
maintain her in good condition. As seamen in practice had little to do 
with the pucct1ase of ship's stores, repairs and the overall equipment, 
one seriously questions the rationality of cequiring seamen to dis-
charge this burden. 
Thirdly, to the already disadvantageous situation, in which in-
jured seamen were placed, was added another difficulty. Boucatt, J., 
'd3 Sal : 
"If the men had found any rope to be in a condition danger-
ous to life, it ~.».Jas their dutv to tell the captain plainlv 
of the fact and that they would not go upon it, and they 
lvould have been justified in not doing sD." 
Boucatt J.'s statement, if treated as a general rule, would render the 
hazards of the seafaring industrv unbearable. It implied that a sea-
man had voluntarily agreed to run the risk of serious injuries or even 
2. (1881) S.A.L.R. 4. Boucaut, J., of tilE) Supreme Court (S.A.) 
followed the decision in Couch v. Steele. 
3. Ibid., p. 5. 
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death for not discovering beforehand and reporting to the master any 
defect in the equipment, and refusing to use it. A seaman, on the 
other hand, could incur penalties and forfeiture of his wages for in-
subordination through his refusal to obey instructions. 
The legal handicaps of injured seamen worsened. Towards the 
end of the nineteenU1 century, the courts carne close to holding that 
seamen had agreed to run the risks of injuries inherent in their call-
ing.4 In terms of the condition of work premises on board the ship 
and the duty of care exercisable by the shipowner, seamen were in 
no better position than outsiders. In Mclachlan v. Service,5 the 
plaintiff, who was employed in loading a vessel after dark, fell down 
an open and unlighted hatchwav, and sustained severe injuries. It 
was held that the circumstances which might enable a stranger or vis-
itor to recover damages for injury sustained on board did not entitle 
a tvorkman on board to recover against the shipowner.6 l.tlith refer-
ence to the class of workers, Barry, A.C.J., said: 7 
11 
•• .it consists of persons whose employment is of such nat-
ure that danger may considered as included in the con-
tract of service, and expressly bargained for. A greater 
degree of caution is required on their part, because a less 
degree of precaution or protection against injury is en-
joined on the part of the employer." 
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analysis that 
seamen and other workers who suffered injuries or died while 1-vorking 
on board a ship could not, as a general rule, recover any damages. 
It is probable that the bleak prospect of seamen and the seafaring 
industry was in part due to exploitation by shipowners and the 
indifference to the early legislators. There were fears that liability to 
pay damages would encourage self-inflicted injuries and death, thus 
imposing financial burdens on shipowners. The unenlightened decisions, 
with all their harshness and injustices, are ne\/ertheless seen as <m 
inseparable part of the development of modern maritime law. 
4. It seems that the Common La\tJ Courts: came dangeruu~>ly close 
to saying that shipmi\lnet'S, when sued, could rely on the maxim 
volenti non fit injuria 
5. (1871) 2 V.L.I~. 198. 
6. Reliance was placed on the principles laid down in the well-
known case of Indemaur v. Dames, L.R.1.C.P. 274 and L.R.2. 
C.P. 311. 
7. (1871) 2-V.L.R. 198, pp. 199-200. 
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2. Interaction of Common Law 
The similarity between t'llorking conditions on board a ship and 
those in a factory or mine led the Common Law Courts to adopt and 
apply identical pl'inciples. In Bartonshill Coal Co_. v. Reid,!:l a \,vorkman 
was killed through the overturning of a cagE'!. The accident was caus-
ed wt1en the engineman failed to stop thE:! ascending cage at the plat-
form. The cage was allowed to be sent with great force up against 
the scaffolding. Lord Cranworth expressed the employer's responsib-
ility in the following terms: 9 
"When a master employs his servant in a work of dan~}er, he 
is bound to exercise due care in order to have his tackle 
and machinery in a safe and proper condition, so as to pro-
tect the sen; ant against unnecessary risks." 
The extent of an employer's responsibility as laid down at common law 
was directly applied in Searle v. Lindsay and Another! 0 It concerned 
an action against shipowners for an injury caused to thc3 plaintiff, 
an engineer on board their vessel, tJy a defective tackle. Tt'\lo of the 
three judges applied this common law principlt-J l1in:!ctly to govern the 
shipowner-seaman relatiom3hip. In treating land-based mnployees and 
seamen as being subject to the same law, the court had disapproved 
the earlier rule imposing a heavier burden of proof to be mot by sea-
men in their claims for damages. Thus for tho first time, seamen rm-
joyed the same rmneclies for injuries as thr'lir counterparts on JaneL 
Tt1e efficacy of such remedies would depend on the ambit of the prin-
ciple. In the House of Lords case of \!]ilsons ar1rJ ClyrJe Coal Co. Ltd. 
v. English, Lord Maugham, after discussing thB authorities, enuncia-
ted thB threefold duty as follows: 11 
" ... there was a duty on the employer to take reasonable 
care and to use reasonable skill, firstly to provide and main-
tain proper machinery, plant, appliances, and works; Sf:!cond-
ly, to select properly skilled pRrsons to manage and super-
intend the persons; and thirdly to provide a proper system 
of working." 
The above duty areas are zealously regarded as bein~J in tile province 
of the employer. It follows that although a shipmvner rnay engage 
agents or other persons to do the work, tm i:3 rmnethr:!less personally 
B. (1858) Macq. 266, approved by the House of Lords in Wilsons 
& Clvde Coal Company Ltd. v. English [1938] A.C. 1)7. 
9. (1858) 3 Macq. 266, cited witt-1 approval by Byles, J., in 
Searle v. Lindsay (1861) 11 C.B. (N.S.) /128, 439. 
10. (1861) 11 C.B. (N.S.) L128. The application of common law duty 
of the master to a seaman was later dpproved tJy the High 
Court of Australia: (1%2) C.L.F<. 624, p. 637. 
11. [1938] A.C. 57, 86. 
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answerable for breach of anv aspect of the non-delegable dutv. More-
over, as against seamen, as emplovees, it cannot be asserted that 
thev hm1e accepted the risk of injurv due to non-performance by ship-
owners of am; aspect of their dutv. 
An Australian case of outstanding significance is Huddart 
Parker Ltd. v. Cotter: 2 The mattE!r was not resolved until after two 
trials before the Supr·eme Court of New South Wale~> and several 
appeals to the Full Court of the Supreme Court and the High Court of 
Australia. While the ship S.S. Zealandia on which C was employed as 
fireman was about thirtv miles off the coast of Victoria, something 
happened to one of her boilers. When a steel stay in boiler No. 7 
broke, part of it and the attached nut fell into a combustion chamber. 
A hole resulted through which water flowed into one of the furnaces. 
Watnr accumulated in a dangerous volume. The engine-room staff 
dealt with the emergencv b\J pullinD the fires from the high furnaces 
on the stokehold floor where they 1"1ere extingui~3hed with water. The 
door of the central furnace was opened to release the \Aiater which 
gushed out flooding the floor and filling tile stoke hold with steam. 
While attempting to avoid thn watnr, the respondent (C) was scalded 
by falling on the stokehold floor EJS a result of colliding with another 
fireman. 
In the second trial, the court accepted the evidence given for 
C by two witnesses as regards the dangerouslv corroded condition 
throughout the whole length of the broken sta\f. The corrosion was 
of such long standing that it rnust have been apparent to any skilled 
person who examined the stay with due earn before the accident. The 
jury returned a verdict for C for £2,800. On further appeal to the 
High Court, the \/erdict was upheld, thus re\/ersing ttle decision of 
the Full Court of the Supreme Court. McTiernan, J., said: 13 
"Accordingly, I think there was e\/idonce justif\fing the 
finding that the appellant broke its duty to maintain the 
boiler properly. This was the 'personal negligence' of the 
appellant .... " 
12. (1942) 66 C.L.R. 624. 
13. Ibid:• p. 642; see also, ibid., p. 6t~1. 
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This decision is seen as an epoch-making event for injured seamen 
who seek damages at common law. Unfortunately, ttle burden of prmJ-
ing the shipowner's negligence, the weak financial position of seamen 
and the necessity of testifying personally in court are factors which 
deter most plaintiff seamen from instituting proceedings. 
To obtain a balanced \liew, one has to move back into the 
and consider the dE1\Ielopment from a different angle. In replacing 
the anachronistic which largely negatived the rights of injured 
seamen, the common also introduced doctrine of common em-
ployment. For many decades, its operation had gra\le consequences 
for damage suits by seamen. 
In Searle v. Lindsay and Another, decided in 1861, the injuries 
suffered by the third engineer were caused by the neglect of the 
ship's chief engineer. Judgment was unanimously given for the ship-
owners. Byles, J., fully endorsed the opinion of Lord Cransworth: 14 
"The law of considers that person who under-
takes the service undertakes it knowing tt1at he is liable 
to injury as well as from accidents that cannot be guard-
ed against as from neglect or mismanagement on the part 
of those 1.<11ho are engaged with him in the common occupa-
tion." 
fhe force behind the doctrine was probably the strong economic pre-
ssure exerted by employers. In accepting the stipulated remuneration , 
servants were deemed to have voluntarily agreed to run the risks of 
Injury or dama~J8 by fellow-workers. 
The doctrine was of sufficiently wide scope to defeat claims for 
damages for the cJeatt1s of seamen due to the nesJligence of the ship's 
master. In \/. The Pinkney & Sons Steamship Co. Ltq.,15 
the deceased was one of a crew of six Emgaged on a vessel proceed-
ing from London to Cardiff. AI though ttle had on board ttw 
stanchions and they were not put into the apertures so as to 
make the bulwarks of about four-and-a-half fDet high. The deceased 
was engaged in securing a tarpaulin ovt:1r a hatch. Owing to a violent 
lurch of the vessel, t1e lost hi~:; hold and footiflg, and fell overboard 
through an opening in the bulwarks. Thr'l accident would not 
14. (1861) 11 C.Et (N.~1.) t,zs. /438-ll39. 
15. [1894] A.C. 222. 
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have happened if the rails had been fixed. At the trial, the jury 
returned a verdict for the plaintiff for £175. On appeal, the Court 
of Appeal set aside the judgment. The House of Lords, affirming the 
Court of Appeal decision, held that the deceased's representatives 
had no claim for damages against shipowners. Under the doctrine, a 
ship's master was regarded as being in common employment with the 
deceased. The decision was wide enough to protect shipowners and 
demise charterers from liabilitv for injuries, damage and death caused 
by the negligence or omission of anv shipowner's servant on board. 
Probably the doctrine could extend to almost arw injurv suffered by 
an emplovee. The mishap due to a fellow Bmplovee's negligBnce or 
default might occur in navigation, ship management, carsJo stowage 
or anv of the ship operations. 
In the High Court case; 6 McTiernan, J., cited with approval the 
opinion of Lord Wright who said: 
"It mav be difficult in some cases to distinguish on the 
facts between the employers' failure to provide and main-
tain and the fellow servants' nes1ligence in the respects in-
dicatecl." 
It is clear that, so long as the spheres of operation of the non-dele-
gable duty of shipowners and the doctrine of common employment were 
imprecise, problems would remain. 
3. Statutorv Intervention 
It will be recalled that before the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury the general framm'llork for safE:!ty in navigation mainly around 
Australian waters had been laid bv t.t1e colonial legislatures. Among 
the measures introduced was the prohibition to send a ship out to 
sea in an unseaworthy state which would endanger lif[~. Breach of the 
safety provisions would result in prmalties brJin~J imposed on shipown-
ers and the ship being detained. One glaring cJefect of the colonial 
shipping legislation is that it fell drastically short of placing ship-
owners and masters undRr a personal obligation towards seamen to 
ensure the seaworthine~3s of the ship. This anomaly had for many 
decades stood out as a gross injustice in that seamen,who were injured 
or· killed as a result of the unsea\11/Drthiness of the ship_.,would have 
16. Hudclart v. Cotter (1%2) 66 C.L.R. 6ZI1, p. 61,0. 
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no remedies. In contrast, a shipper or charterer whose goods were 
damaged through the ship's unseaworthv condition could recover clam-
ages. 
The breaktt1rough carne when the sDrious gap was filled bv sec-
tion 5 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1876 (Imp.).17 It imported into 
everv contract of service between the shipowner and a seaman an 
implied obligation. This meant that -
"[the shipowner] tt1e master and everv agent chargl~d t'llitll 
the loading of the ship, or the preparing thereof for sea, 
or the sending thereof to sea, shall use all reasonable means 
to insure the seaworthiness of the ship at the time when 
the voyage commences, and to keep her in a seaworthy con-
dition for the vovage during the same." 
Tt1e provision was viewed as "the charter of British seamen's rights". 
With one exception, it was not adopted bv most of the Australian 
States until several decades later. The Victorian Marine Act. 1890 
was the first to enact the provision in section 103. Unfortunatelv 
the unenlightened approach of the Supreme Court of Victoria anrJ 
the wrong construction put on the section had thwarted the legisla-
ture's intention. In Kilpatrick v. HudcJart, Parker & Co. Ltct; 8 a 
steamer owned by the defendant companv foundered. T11e deceased 
serving on board as engineer was drol!llfled. In thE) trial, judgment was 
given for the deceased's representative on the finding that the ship 
was sent out to sea in an unseaworthy state. On appeal, a new trial 
was ordered on the [']round that the verdict was against the weight 
of evidence. In ordering the new trial, Madden, C.J., held inter 
that the statutory certificate as to seaworthiness given under the 
1890 Act (Vic.) was conclusive as regards the state and condition of 
the ship at the timB it was given. In fact, he nwerted to the pre-
1890 position. He held that the ccc)rtificate was conclusive as to the 
ship 1s seaworthiness unless the owner or his agent had concealed the 
defect or neglected to providt? a£)ainst obvious defects calculatecl to 
endanger the ship. In so far as the decision failed to emphasise the 
non-delegable nature of the statutory obligation imposed on shipown-
ers, the masters nnd the agents, it was totally unsatisfactory. 
17. 39 & MJ Vic., c. 80. 
18. (1895) 21 V.L.l~. 125. 
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The hazards which attended employees engaged in the shipping 
industry were common knowledge. An example of colonial legislation 
aimed at alleviating the hardships of seamen due to injuries is the 
f-mployers' Liability Act 1886 (N.S.W.).19 By section l1, a labourer, who 
was injured while employed in loading or discharging a ship alongside 
a wharf, could bring an action against his employer. Later by section 
6 of the 1893 amending Act :~0 the right of action was extended to a 
seaman injured in similar operations. ln Ex. parte Aucher}1 the 
plaintiff, while on a voyage from New Zealand to Sydney and carrying 
out the orders of the mate, sustained a broken leg and serious injuries 
to it. All three judges of the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 
the Judge in Chambers by dismissing the appeal. The provision only 
allowed a seaman to bring the action in respect of injuries received 
when the ship "is moored or at anchor receiving or discharging cargo." 
1876\(Imp.) was later consolidated as part of the Merchant Shipping 
1894 (Imp.). Now that it has become a peemanent feature of sea-
men's employment contracts, it is \Jital to ascertain its sphere of 
operation. 
By section 261, Part II of the 1894 Act (lrnp]2 applied to sea-
going ships registered out of the United Kingdom and to the owners, 
masters and crews. 
Paragraph of section 261 included ships employed in trading 
between any port in ttH::1 United Kingdorn and any port not situate in 
19. 50 Vic. No. 8. 
20. 56 Vic. No. 6. 
21. (1896) 17 N.S.W.R. 435. Another example of ttm illogical 
tinction rnade between searnen and other workers is found in 
Hanson v. 1\.S.N. Co. (1884) W.N. (N.S.W.) 75. The plaintiff 
sailor, who was injured by the negligence oF certain employ-
ees of the defendant company, was held not to be entitled 
to sue under the Employers' Liability Act (46 Vic. No. 6). H1e 
court held. alia, that a sailor was not a workman within 
s. 9 of the Act. Moreover, it \riJas at am; rate unfairly pres-
umed tt1at in passing thr::! Merchant Seamen's Laws Consolida-
tion Act (27 Vic. No. 13) the legislature had intended seamen 
to be treatecj differently. 
22. Until its lJy Merchant Shipping Act 1970, (U.K.), s. 100 and 
Schedule 5. 
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the Uritish possession or country in which the ship was registered. 
It followed that virtually all agreements with crews in colonial or for-
eign ports, which came within paragraph (c), had to be in the form 
required by and subject to the Act. The statutory form of agreement 
did not apply wl1ere seamen were engaged in a British possession, gJ;h 
an Australian State, where the ship was registered. 
Subject to two exceptions, section 458 (1) of the 1894 Act (Imp.) 
imports into every agreement with seaman the obligation of the ship-
owner, the master and the loading agent as to the seaworthiness of 
the ship. As it operates "nothwithstanding any agreement to the con-
trary" effect is to nullify any clause which in any way reduces or 
excludes the non-delegable obligation. It ensures that the rights and 
interests of seamen are protected despite the subtle means used by 
shipowners. 
Section 458 (2), which concerns the two exceptions, reads: 
"Nothing in this section -
(a) shall subject the owner of a ship to any liability by 
reason of the ship being sent to sea in an unseaworthy 
state where, owing to special circumstances, the sending 
of the ship in such a state was reasonable and justif-
iable; or 
(b) shall apply to any ship employed exclusively in trading 
or going from place to place in any river or inland water 
of which the whole or part is in any British possession." 
The onus of proving that a particular voyage comes under exception 
or (b) on the shipowner, master or the loading agent. Cases of 
"special circumstances" under (a) would include taking a ship out of 
enemy control or territory, seeking or providing help in an emergency, 
sending far out to sea for destruction a ship carrying dangerous 
chemicals or a leaky cargo of oil, and so on. It is submitted that, 
unless the service contract otherwise provides, a seaman has to bear, 
without the right of recourse, the injury or damage suffered due to 
the ship's unseaworthiness. The rhmrs and lakes within exception (b) 
are generallv located on tile landward sidt? of a British possession, 
an Australian State. Consequently, the ships or boats used or1 
such waters are by thc~ir design not suited for navigation in the open 
seas. Obviously, one underlying reason for exception (b) i~5 to allow 
tile local legislature regulate tt1e servicE! contracts of seamen employ-
ed on such vessels. 
-
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An improved version of the Impel'ial SE-Jction 458 (1) has been I'e-
produced in section 59 of the Navigation Act.1912-73 (Comth.). Its 
object is to confel' wider protection on seamen and apprentices than 
its Imperial counterpart. With the exception of employment on a river 
or bay ship, a ship cannot be taken to sea with a seaman as crew mem-
ber unless a service agreement has t1een entered into in the manner 
required. The wording of section 59 (a) is such that the personal ob-
ligation imposed on shipowners is mandatory and is not dependent on 
the existence of a formal service agreement. Its scope is broadened 
by section 60 (1) of the Act (Comth.). A ship is deemed to have been 
taken or sent to sea if she has been got under way for the purpose 
of going to sea, plying or running, or proceeding on a voyage. Like 
its Imperial counterpart, the implied obligation as to seaworthiness 
does not extend to seamen engaged on vessels used on inland rivers 
and lakes. 
In Australia, an authoritati\Je pronouncement relating to the 
relationship between thB threefold duty of care owed by employers 
at common law and the obligation implied by statute was made by the 
High Court. In Huddart Parker Ltd. \/. Cotter~·) the Navigation Act 
1912-1935 (Comth.) appliBd to the voyage by ship during whict1 a seaman 
was injured. It was held that where the injury was caused by defec-
tive equipment amounting to unseaworthiness, the plaintiff could not 
set up against the owner any contractual duty of care implied at 
common law, but must rely on t11e obligation as to seaworthiness 
implied under section 59. The dissenting judgment of McTiernan, J., 
is more favourable to seamen. It was his firm tJelief that the statut-
ory obligation was intended to supplement, and not to supersede, the 
duty implied at common law. He said: 21~ 
"This section [i.e. 59] does not, in my opinion, derogate 
from the common law rights of a seaman. It adds to his 
rights and ensures greater protection for him." 
According to Williams, J., with whom Rich, J., agreed, the person-
al obligation imposed by section 59 is not that of an insurer. It is 
one requiring due care to be used so that "the plaintiff must prove 
not only that the defective condition of the stay (equipment, machin-
ery, r:!tc.) made the ship unseaworthy but also the failure to discmter 
23. (1942) 66 C.L.R. 624. 
24. Ibid., p. 637. 
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the defect before the vm;age be!]an was due to negligence."25 Except 
that it is not an absolute warrantv, the statutorv obligation is to be 
construed in a manner similar to the common law warranty in favour 
of shippers. The criterion to be used is the same. If the defect, 
which renders the ship unfit for the due and safe carrying of the 
goods or crew, cannot be readily rectified during the voyage, it will 
constitute unseaworthiness~6 
Williams and Rich, J J., went. further than was necessary in 
stating that the obligations imposed by section 59 and at common law 
were not intended to co-exist~7 In their vie~AJ after its enactment, 
no additional contractual duty of care could be implied at common 
law against a shipowner in the same field as that occupied by the 
statutory obligation. It is submitted that the \Jiew is not tenable on 
two grounds. Firstly, there is the well recognized presumption used 
in interpreting statutes. In the absencE! of clear indication in the 
statute, it will not be so construed as to take away rights implied at 
common law. The wording of section 59 does not justify the view in 
question. Secondly, the likelihood of injury to seamen, as a foresee-
able occurrence, unless proper equipment and competent workmates 
are provided by an employer, will give rise to a duty of care at comm-
on law independently of contract. A seaman, who is injured as a re-
sult of his employer's breach of ~1uch duty, is entitled to recover in 
tort. 
4. Abolition of Doctrine of Common Emplovment 
Lord Wright made an astute remark that tt1e doctrine which was 
hinted at in connection with a butcher's cart "has roamed in its app-
lication to colliers, seamen ... and indeed every ::--,phere of activity." 28 
The doctrine had given rise to serious complications in Australia, as 
a Federation, due largely to the lack of uniformity of the State laws. 
In Huddart Parker Ltd. v. Cotter.Z9 the seaman who was employed at 
25. Ibid., p. 665. 
26. Gilroy, Sons & Co. v. Price & Co. [1893] A.C. 56 and Ingram & 
Ro\(le Ltd. v. _Services Maritimes du Treport [1913] 1 1\.8. 538, 
p. 543, reversed on another point in [1914] 1 K.B. 541. 
27. (1942) 66 C.L.R. 637, p. 653. 
28. Ldilsons and Cl\(de Coal Co. v. English [193f3] A.C. 57, p. 80. 
29. Supra_. For decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court 
uf New :Iouth Wales, see Cotter v. Huddart f:Jarker Ltd. (1941) 
L,2 S.R. (N.S.lJJ.) 33. -
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Sydney was injured while the ship was in Victorian waters. On the 
presumption that his injuries werE~ negligently caused by a fellow-wor-
ker, both the Supreme Court of New South Wales and thD High Court 
had misgivings as to what law should apply to the claim. The employ-
ment contract being made in Sydney was subject to the Workers1 CDm-
pensation Act 1926-1938 (N.S.W.),30 section of 65 of which abolished the 
doctrine of common employment. For the appellant company it was 
vigorously argued that \/ictDrian law should apply. Firstly, the 
ship, being registered in Melbourne, would be subject to the law of 
the country to which she belonged. Secondly, the injuries arose when 
the ship L'~Jas in Victorian waters. Victorian law retained the doc-
trine to the extent that it was a defence in an action founded on the 
breach of the duty of an employer to his employee at common law.31 
A further argument raised by the appellant company was not altogeth-
er devoid of substance. As the employment contract made in Sydney 
was, as to its form and content, governed by section 46 of the Nav-
igation Act 1912-1935 (Comth.), the relations between the shipowner 
and a seaman should be governed exclusively by Commonwealth law. 
The common law of the Commonwealth incDrporating the doctrine of 
common employment was alle~jed to have been imported into 
the contract. This contention, if accepted, woulll also constrcute a 
defence. To resolve the difficulty, Williams, J., invoked what is known 
!I • th f' ld" . . l 'd 32 as covenng e Ie prmc1p e. He sa1 : · 
"But having regard to the comprehensive scDpe of the Nav-
igation Act, to express terms, and to the inconvenience--
and confusion that would arise if seamen serving on inter-
state ships were subject or not subject to the doctrine of 
common employment...it appears to me that the Commonwealth 
Parliament, when it enacted Div. 8, evinced a clear inten-
tion that as between itself and the States its legislation 
should thel'eafter completely, exhaustively and exclusively 
occupy the legislative field with respect to the rights and 
liabilities attaching to agreements entered into between 
30. Act No. 15, as amended. 
31. (1942) 66 C.L.F<. 624, pp. 638-639. 
32. Ibid., p. 656. McTiernan, J., gave the dissentin~J judgment and 
upheld the verdict of the trial court for thE~ plaintiff. It 
is submitted that his \/iew was correct that the evidence jus-
tified a finding of negligence within the employer's province. 
The appeal was allowed tJy Williams and Hich, J J., who set 
aside the verdict of the trial judge for the injured seaman. 
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masters and seamen of ships subject to the Act, so that 
anv subsequent State legislation which purported to affect 
the obligations of the contract at common law as tt1ev then 
existed would be inconsistent with the Commonwealth law 
under sec. 109 of the Constitution and would be to the ex-
tent invalid." 
The need for High Court Judges to applv the principle and the uncer-
tainty as well as confusion posed bv the doctrine are stron~~ factors 
which led to its abolition by the Naviqation Act Amendment Act. 1958 
(Comth.). For the first time, seamen engaged on ships proceeding on 
inter-State or overseas voyages were affordRd wider protection. 
Thus where injury or damage is negligentlv caused to any seaman bv 
another person in common emplovment with the formf::r, the Rmplover 
is liable in damages. Where the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) app-
lies, the doctrine can no longer avail a shipowner as defence in actions 
for damages based on vicarious liabilitv. Naturally the same protec-
tion is enjoyed bv seamen employed undFJr intra-State service con-
tracts where under the Proper law the doctrine has been abolished. 
5. Redress foe Personal Injuries under /\dmiralty Law 
I he Commom<Jealth Navigation Ac~ and the State navigation leg-
islation have left out of their scope claims for injuries suffered by sea-
men. The reasons are found in the incidents of colonial history. 
Claims a~Jainst st1ipowners can be pursued by proceedinrds 2.§L:" 
.sonam or !:.§.I.D_. The latter are often instituted by claimants under 
the maritime laws of many British Comrnm1wealth countries. When the 
ship IMithin the court's jurisdiction she can be arrested, even 
though her owners or agents are resident in anothee countey. 
In one important respect, Australia is different from Great 
Britain or Singapore. The admiralty jurisdiction exercisable by the 
State Supreme Couets and the High Court is derived largely from Im-
perial statutes, viz. the Admiralt~ Court Act 1861 ancJ Colonial Courts 
of f.\dmiralty f.\ct 189U.33 It is, therefore, relevant to consider the 
sort of injuries suffered by seamen that will oive rise to admiraltv 
actions in !:.!ill]. 
The 1861 Act reads: 
"7. The High Comt of Admiralty shall tla\Je jurisdiction over 
any Claim for Darnaqe done by anv ship ... 
35. The Jurisdiction conferred by this Act on the High Court 
of Admiralty may be exercised either bv Proceedings in 
IQ!.!.! or by Proceedin~-JS in personam." -
- ·- _.;;;...;;..:;..:::.;...;.::;.;.;.:, 
33. 24 Vic., c. 1D;and 53 & Sl1 Vic., c. 27, respt:lctively, infm. 
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The IN'ords "damage done by any ship" had convassed many legal opin-
31, 
ions and produced a great deal of litigation. In The Beta, the Privy 
Council decided that section 7 embraced every possible kind of darn-
age, including personal injuries. The English courts had difficulty in 
reconciling that section with the provisions of Lord Campbell's Act 
which dealt with general injuries not caused by any ship}S Moreover, 
there was an important difference betweeen the admiralty and the 
common law rules as to contributory negligence. It became essrmtial to 
distinguish between injuries which were done by a ship, and therefore 
within section 7, and those which were not. 
The criterion is found in the words of Brett, M.R., "a case in 
which a ship was the active cause, the damage being physically caused 
by the ship,":36 and those of Bowen, L.J., "damage done ... by those in 
charge of a ship, with the ship as a noxious instrument."37 A review 
of the cases where admiralty jurisdiction of the Court was success-
fully invoked indicates the types of accidents,resulting in injuries to 
seamen,that will come within the criterion. In the New Zealand case 
of The Queen Eleanor, a stevedore's workman fell into the ship's hold. 
This was caused by some defect in the hatchway. Stout, C.J., said: 38 
11But for the decisions I have referred to I shall have 
thought that the words of the section were wide enough 
to cover such a class of case, but in interpreting the 
English Act I am bound by English decisions. It was, in my 
view, the ship that did the damage bv her faulty construc-
tion; but that is not the meaning of 'done by the ship' 
which the English courts have held to be within the juris-
diction of the Admiralty Court." 
34. (1869) L.R. Z P.C. 4£17. In deli\;ering the Privy Council judg-
ment, Lord Romilly said: 
"The \!\lOrds of the 7th section of the Adrniraltv Court Juris-
giction /"'ct 1861 ... clearly include every possible kind of dam·-
aqe. Personal injuries are undoubtedly within tt1e words 
'damage done by any ship'": ibid., p. tflf9. Cf. Smith \1. Brown 
(1871) L.R. 6 l~.B. 729 where the proposition \i\las~ruled 
on prohibition. 
35. In .Marv Seward v. The "V!=!ra Cruz" (1884) L.R. 10 C.P. 59, the 
House of Lords held that ~>. 7 of the Admiralty C::ourt /\ct 1861 
(Imp.) did not £~ive jurisdiction over claims for damages for 
loss of life under Lord Campbell's Act (9 & 10 Vic., c. 93). 
i"Jor·eovEJr, the English 1-\dmiraltv Division could not enter-
tain an action i.rl J..:.QID. for damagt-Js for loss of life under the 
Lor•J Campbell'~, Act. ~3ee H. Rentree, the Federal .Judicial 
~)vstem of Austre:11ia (1981~ G)d.), p. 255, ~~here the same vim!\/ is 
held. 
36. The 
37. Illid., p.l01. 
18. (1899) 18 N.Z.L.R. 7f3, tl4. !t was held that under s. 7 the court 
had no admiraltv jurisdiction mmr the matter. 
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Jn Wvrnan v. The "Duart CastlfJ";9 an engineer was scalded through thf:: 
breakin~J of a stop-valve in a sb::arner. 1"1cleod, J., held that the in-
jurv was damage done tJv the ship. 
h f . ._ Th t . "f) . " 40 · d t' T e case o Naqrmt. v. e S llP · ,fJQIS concerne an ac wn 
l!l~ brought in the High Court bv a passenger \:Jho ~vas injured in 
somm.oJhat unusual circumstances. The plaintiff was a passenger-sirJht-
seer on board the F~egis which was Follmving an /\rnerican cruiser down 
the hartJour. Owing to negligent na\ligation, she approached too 
close to the cruiser. In changing course to avoid i::l collision, she 
capsized, struck ami injured the plaintiff, precipitating her into the 
water. It was held that "proceedings in ~ lie11 umier section 7. 
Dixon, J., who gave the judgment said~ 1 
"Her [shir1sl behaviour as an activE! agent was the direct 
cause of the harm, and in that sense she was the noxious 
instrument." 
Jnjurv to seamen as a result of negligent management or navigation 
of the ship as a moving object deemed to be within tile criterion. 
The same reasoning can apply to injurie:3 caused by the unsem.oJorth-
iness of tile ship for which, a~:J we have seen, the ovvner is personally 
responsible. Common instances of unseaworthiness giving rise to neEJ-
1. t t . , . I d d . f h · 
112 
1gen · managemen or nav1gatwn me u e un. ermarmmg o · t e st11p, · 
43 . ~4 bad ~Jtowage of cargo, incompetent cre~<vs' and failure t;o hm1e a 
pilot on board when required b\f law:~s 
39. (1899) 6 Can. Ex. C. 387. The action, however, was dismissed 
as the plaintiff failed to produce reasonable evidence of 
negligence as the cause of the accident. 
40. (1938-1939) 61 C.L.R. 688. 
t.!l. Ibid., p. 700. 
l+Z. According to Car\Jer's Carriage of Goods bv Sea (12th ed. 
1971), vol. 1, para. 108, "She must have a competent master 
and a competent and sufficient crew.'' The absence of her 
chief officer was held to render a ship unseaworthv: 
Burnard & Alger \J. Player (1928) 31 Ll. L.R. 281. See also 
the Hague F~ules Ill, rule 1 (g). 
43. In Elder, Dempster v. Paterson, Zochonis (1903) 9 Asp. M.L. 475, 
the House of Lords held that, although the ship was structual-
ly fit to carry the oil. she was unseaworthy because of bad 
stowage. 
L.4. William Tetley, Marine C:argo Claims (2nd eeL 1978) op. 
p. 161, summarises the authorities in these words: "A vessel 
is not seaworthy .. .if the crew are inexperienced and untrained 
ln the_9peration of the ship and the owner fails to see that 
they are properly instructed in the ship's special features." 
L.5. Dixon v. Sadler (1841) 5 M & W 405, 414, /~15; The Framlington 
Court (1934) 69 Fed. f~ep. (2d) 300. 
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Another categorv of mishaps attributed to improper or care-
less operation or use of the ship's machinerv or equipment should 
be considered. It will indicate the possible scope of the criterion. 
In Union Steamship Company of New Zealand Ltd. v. Ferguson146 F 
who was a crew member brought an action in rem in the original juris-
diction of the High Court. As a result of the negligent operation of 
the ship's winch bv a servant of the defendant, F lost his balance 
and fell into the ship's hold, sustaining injuries. Windever, J., had 
some doubts whether "all industrial accidents occurring by the negli-
gent use of any of a ship's equipment in loading or unloading of 
cargo in Australian ports" could properly fall within the rule. He 
felt urged by the weight of similarlv decided cases to give judgment 
for F. The appeal was unanimously dismissed. Barwick, C.J., said:47 
11But on the footing that it was the movement of the lid 
which prec i'pitated the respondent into the hold, I am 
content, though not without some hesitation, to accept the 
finding that the fall of the respondent was caused by the 
ship in the t'elevant sense." 
The view taken by his Honour has the merit of extending, by analogy, 
the criterion to an unclosed category of mishaps. 
In practice, there are many accidents on board the ship result-
ing in injuries which fall outside the criterion. After discussing the 
authorities, Dixon, J., attributed them to "some defect in the condi-
tion of the ship considered as premises or as a structure upon which 
the person injured is standing, walking or moving, the ship [being] 
treated as no more than a potential danger of a passive kind, a 
danger to the user, whose use is the active cause of u·1e injury."48 
46. For judgment of Lllindeyer, J., see [1968) A.L.R. 371. 
t!l. [1969] A.L.R. 409, p. 411. 
48. Nagrint v. The Ship Regis (1938-1939) 61 C.L.R. 688, p. 700. 
In The Thefta [18%] P. 280, the plaintiff brought an action 
in rem claiming damages foe personal injuries. They 
were caused when he fell down into tt1e hold of the vessel 
because the hatchway was covered with tarpaulin. The action 
was dismissed on the swound that the "damage was not done 
by the ship. 11 The reasoning was followed in Mulvey v. 
The Barge "Neosho" [1919] 47 D.L.R. 437. 
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Hence a passengr~r. invitm::J and seamAn injurr)d in such circumstances 
~'\Jill bt:J unable to succeed in actions tJI'ou[lht unc18r section 7 of the 
Admiraltv Court Act 1861 (Imp.). 
6. Statutorv Compensation 
We have seen the serious gaps in section 7 of the Admiralty 
Court Act 1861 (Imp.). Australian court:c' have no jurisdiction to onter-
tain claims .I.:..§..!ll for personal injurlrc!s 1-vhich are not "done bv anv 
shipn and for loss of life. It 1,\illl IJe recallt:!d that, with the exct-!ption 
of McTiernan, J., the High Court Jud~JeS held that th8 SEJaiAtorthiness 
obligation under section 59 had ~:;uperseded the dutv of care owed to 
'·9 seamen at common law. The decision has far-react1ing consequences. 
lt implies that neither the shipOIIIIner nor the ship could be held liable 
where injuries are caused bv defects in tho ship, equlprm:mt or· mach-
inerv, which do not constitute unseaworthiness. /\part from til(:! bur-
den of proving that the ~>hipowner or his servant 1,vas m~SJligmlt, feiAI 
seamen ~;vrlo an'l injureU have the financial rnE!ans of instituting actions 
in rem a~Jainst the ship. 
Seamen have long been recognisl~d as a class which the lmAI 
favoured on account of their importance to the~ nEJtion. So far as 
the po~3i t.ion under English law v.1as concl~rrH"cj, the anomalies were in 
small part remmmd bv the ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~ 
1925 (lJ.K.):o Section 22 (2) enl<n·ged ttle adrniraltv jurisdiciton 
of the High Court in respect of claims darnaqe to cover' claims for 
loss of life and personal injuries. It wa~; by tim i\dministration of 
Justice Act 1956 (LJ.K.)l) 1 that the long-a\Nalted reforms were intro-
"2 duced. The right under section 1 (1) (f):J · to i n~;titute proceedings in 
~against the ship was not con fined to searmm or their personal 
representatives. It extended to -
"anv claim for loss of life or PBr~mnal injurv sustaim2d in 
consequence of anv defect in a ship nr in her appr:n'el or 
equipment, or of the wrongful act, ne~Jloct or default of 
the owner::.;, cllartererfi or pc~rsons in possession or conteul 
1..9. Huddar't Parker Ltd. v. CottF!I' (1%2) 66 C.L.f~. 621+. 
50. 15 & 16 Ceo. V, c. '•9. 
51. 4 & 5 Eliz. II, c. 1,6, 
52. F(e-enactefJ tn 5uprorm'3 Court Act 1981 (U.I'\.), ~>. 2D (2) (f). 
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of a ship or of the master or crew thereof or of am; othor 
person for whose wrongful ac neglects or defaults the 
owners, charterers or per~mns in possession or control of 
a ship are responsible .... " 
The disadvantaged position of seamen under English law \Alas substan-
tially rectified by extending the admiralty jurisdiction. 
In Australia, Commonwealth Pai'liament tvas not fully com-
petent to enact similar legislation. 53 This fact explains why the dev-
elopment in this area of maritime law stoppEld. Consequently, the 
approach which the Commonwealth amj State Parliaments adopted to 
deal with the problems was based on the Workmen's Compensation Act 
1906 (U.K.?.'• We shall ascertain how far the gap in the law has been 
closed. 
An early attempt by the Commom111ealth Parliament to alleviate 
the hardships of seamen failr:ld. In The D1Mners of the S.S. Kalibia v. 
Alexander Wilson?5 a seaman, who was shipped at Sydney for the voy-
age to Brisbane and back, was injured by accident during the \Joyage. 
The ship was detained unch:o.r sr~ction 13 of thf:) Seamen's Compensation 
Act 1909 (Comth.) until security was uiven for the payment of any 
compensation that might be awarded aqainst the shipowners. Section 
4 contained provisions which wrmt beyond the limits of the Par lia-
ment's constitutional power in so far as they purported to deal with 
purely internal coasting tradr~. Tll8 invalid provisions were so insep-
arably bound up with the valid ones that th~:~ High Court declamd the 
entire Act to be void?6 
Barton, J., and the respondent's counsel werr~ of the \Jiew tt1at 
the Act concerned matters of admiral tv and mad time laws. It 
submitted that seamen's compensation leqislatior1 could be treated 
as an outgrowth of Australian maritime law. 
The Seamen's Compensatim1 Act 1911 (Comth.) ushered in a new 
era for tt1e seafaring incJustry in Australia. l!Jith the (,~xception of 
53. I.e. b~::fonl the ~1tatute of LtJestrninister /\doption Act 1942 
(Cornth.) was passed. ~3Ele ct1apter rtwt::e. 
St~, 6 Edw. VII, c. 58, ss. 5-7. 
'h (19HJ) 11 C.L.R. 689. 
56. In am; case, tho 1909 Act was eepealed by the =:.=.::..:.;..:....:;:_ 
Compr')nsation Act (Comth.) (No. 13 of 1911), s. 18. 
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ships engaged in inti'a-State trade and in thu naval or rnilitan; ser-
vice, the Act applies to the employment of seamen on virtually all 
other ships. The policy of the legislation is to afford protection to 
seamen of all nationalities. Seamen engaged on ships not registered 
in Austr'alia can take advantage of the Act if they were employed 
under articles of agreement made in Australia and at the material 
time the ship was subject to the Commomvealtt1 law?7 Due to the 
1973 amendment, the Act is given a wider scope of operation. 58 By 
complying with the conditions laid down in section 4 (1) (b) or (c), sea-
men who are employed on British or foreign ships may claim the com-
pensatory benefits of the Ad. 
We shall consider the main advantages enjoyed by seamen. 
Firstly, minor exceptions aside, the Act imposes no-fault liability 
for injuries or death caused to seamen arising out of or in the course 
of their emplm;ment.59 Shipowners, dernisP charterer~; and other per-
sons, as employE~rs, are liable to pay compensation which is computed 
according to the First and Third Schedules to tile 1973 1-\ct (Comth.). 
SecomJl v, the ru!Hs l<:3icj down i\ustralian courts as to the 
burden of proof to be discharged grf:Jatl v favour claimants seeking 
compensation for loss of life. The issue before the court in Nelson 
v .. Mutto,.r,::60 was whether the captain of the S.~). Puobar_: committed 
suicide or died in an accident. There was evidence that he had suff-
ered from high blood pressure, headaches and giddiness. He disap-
peared in the early morning of 13th fVlarch, 1933, when the ship tvas 
proceeding along the eastern coast of Australia. An award of $500 
was made in fa\/our of the applicants. It appears that his status 
coupled witr1 the demanding responsibility as captain would lead to 
a sornmvhat more favourable inff~rence to tJe drawn. Thompson, D.C.J., 
'd 61 sa1 : 
1911-73 (Comtll s. 4 (1) (c). 
58. by Act (Cornth.) (No. 216 of 1973), 
s. 3. 
59. Ibid., s. 5 (1). 
60. (1934) 8 A.L.J. 30. 
61. Ibid., p. 31. 
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"The fact that the captain ... placed t1imself in a position 
where hB might meet with danger, 111/0uld not deprive 
his dependants of the right to say that his death was 
accidental .... " 
The High Court dismissed the appeal. Rich, J., put forward two val-
uable guidelines to deal with cases of this type, and arrived at the 
conclusion that the deceased fell overboard by accident. The first 
was to "weigh probabilities and balancE~ them at their respecthm val-
ue, the one against the other." The second was that the suggestion 
of suicide had to be supported by substantial evidence. 
In essence, the propositions of Rich, J., were unanimously en-
dorsed by all three judges in v .. Australasian United Steam 
Na\ligation Co. Ltd.62 wl1at for F~ich, J., was the second guideline was 
for their Honours a presumption operating at the outset in favour 
of the deceased against suicide. In place of the twin ~:Juidelines, a 
single criterion has been laid down, reducing furth~H' the burden of 
proof. Their· Honours said: 63 
" .. .if nothing rele\lant were proved exc£~pt that the dec-
eased disappeared from a ship at sea, the only proper 
inference would be that he fell overboard accidentally. 
If other relevant facts are pmved, thes£~ must bB taken 
into account along with the presumption, and the ques-
tion at the end of the case is ... whethor, ha\ling reslard 
to the evidence and to the presumption, tJ1ore is a real 
balance of probability that the death was accidental." 
In this case, a competent and able-bodied seaman disappeared at 
night from the ship S.5. Caloudra at sea. The High Court dismissed 
the appeal against the magistr·ate's decision that death was on the 
balance of probability caused by suicide. Thus the shipowner 
was exonerated from liability to pay compensation. An affirmative 
finding of death by accident was rendered impossible by two weighty 
factors. These were the fine weather conditions prevailing at the 
time of his (jisappearanc(:? and tl·m ci<3ceased's worries over the poss-
ible loss of his entire savings in a cafe business. 
Thirdly, the support givEm by courts to implement legislati\/e 
policy on tl1e subject is fairly consi~:Jtent. In the interests of seamEm, 
62. (1955) 29 A.L.J. 376. 
63. IbicL, p. 377. 
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thE! IAJOrds !!accidents arising out of EmcJ in the course of the employ-
rmmt" havr:? been given a widtJ interpretation mmr the years. The 
reasoning in !vic Kenzie \J. l1Jilliam Holvman & Sons Pty. L td.64 st1ows thnt 
judges take into account the heavy demands made on seamen in un-
predictable circumstances. WhilE~ P, a ~n::;arnan. wa~> returning from a 
public house to the ship, he stumbled on the wharf and fell into the 
water between the ship and the wh<:>rf. Durintj the rescue operations, 
Mcl'\enzie IAiho was a seaman nmJ fireman hf.!ld a lantern to Emable 
others to see what they wert:! doing. He fell from the odf]e of the 
vessel and was drowned. The Hiqh Court i3llmllled the appeal of the 
deceased's wife and daughter against uJasley J.'s docisinn. Latham, 
C.J., is credited with having laid down a just and practical rule in 
determining the liability of employers. He said~5 
" .. .if tr1e act out of wllicr1 the injun; EJrosr:J ic; sufficiently 
connected with the business of the f'Jrnplover to entitle 
the E~rnployer to direct thD particular PmployFJB to do the 
act in question if ttle f:')fT11'H'98r1C\/ had ari~3e:m in the pre~mnce 
of ttle employer, then the fact that thEJ <.=lct is done vol-
untarily the ernp!oyne ... cloes not I'emove thEJ act from 
the coUI'se of the emplm;ment of the umployee." 
McTiernan, J., held that the mishap CJI'OSe out of and in the course 
of doing something incidentEJl to ttm emplm;rnent. rt1e tendencv of 
courts is to brin~1 within the ambit of employrmmt a variety oF acts 
anrl services not ~;tdctly part of an ernploypo's cJuty. "v'lonzies, J., 
r1as aptly summed up tht=J situation wllen h~3 sumJBsted tt1at U1e concept 
of the course of t~he ~ttrorker's employment l1as bnen gradually wirJt:med 
b d . . ft d . . 65 y _ecision a er eci~.ilDn. 
Despite the High Court's finding in McKenzie v. William Holyrnan 
& Sons Pty. Ltd. fm· the plainti the clecison of llJasley, J., tilE~ trial 
judge, brought to light a defect in the law?7 It is unthinkable that 
where injuries are suffered by ~3earnen durirlg their presence on 
shore for valid purpost=Js thEN are precludod from recovering compen-
sation. The Seamen's Compensation Act 1911 (Cornth.) was accordingly 
G4. (1939) 13 A.L.J. 73. 
65. Ibid., p. 74. 
66. The Commonwealth v. Olivr~r (1962) 107 C.L.f~. p. 361. 
67. (1939) 13 A.L.J. 73, p, 7'"· 
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amended in 19sf8 to provide for mishaps occurring on shore. Seamen 
were ghmn wider protection. 
Under section 5AA (1) (a) of the '1911 Act (Comth.), compensation 
is payable where personal injury is accidentally sustained by a sea-
man "while he is travelling to or from his employment." 69 In .Davey v. 
Union SteamshiB Co. of 1\lew Zealand Ltrt., a seaman was injured while 
on shore. A rather restrictive construction was given to section SAA 
(1). Napier, C.J., said?0 
"It ... does not cover a seaman going to a race meeting or 
to a public house for a drink, or, as in the present case, 
for a stroll on shore to post a letter. Dn the evidence, 
the [seaman] was not travellinsJ to or from the st1ip. He 
was returning from a shore walk." 
The construction given to the provision in the Aw>tralian Coastal 
Shipping Commission v. Averell71 rectified the harsh approach. 
When the vessel Lake Illawarra moored at Newcastle, the seaman tming 
off duty between 5.00 p.m. and 8.00 p.m. left his ship to go to his 
horne at Tighos Hill. At about 7.50 p.m. while driving back from his 
home to the ship, he was injured in an accident. His claim succeeded in 
a District Court. In the joint judgment dismissing the appeal brought 
by the Commission, the High Court distinguished and ri~Jhtly refused 
to follow the previous decisions. Their Honours gave the following 
reasons for the judgment?2 
11In this case the fact that the applicant was returning 
from his home to his ship provides the terminus a guo and 
the terminus ad quem for the seaman's joumev. so that 
it was rightly held that, in the circumstances stated, he 
was travelling to his &!mploymcmt, nothwithstanding that 
he was required to and did live on board his ship .. .1\ccep-
tance of the appellant's argument woulu hardly leave any 
scope for the application of s. 5AI\ (1) for all seamen upon 
sea-going ships are required to, and do 'live in'. This con-
sideration is one which, we think, supports our conclusion." 
68. See Act (Cornth.) (No. 10 of 1953), s. L~, 
69. See The Commonwealth v. Wright:,. (1956) 96 C.L.R. ')36, p. 552, 
where the meaning of a similar r:::xpression was cnnsidt::recJ. 
70. Davey v. IJnion Steamship of 1\lew Zoalan~~ [1953] S.A.S.R. 
35, p. 
71. (1969) '~3 A.L.J.F~. 335. 
72. Ibid., p. 33r). 
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7. Commonwealth Legislation and Commun Law 
A seaman could not r·ocover more than U1e ~~tipul<Jtl~d amount 
suing under 
Compensation Act 1911-38 (Comth.). ln ~[.:..:...:.;:..~ 
a seaman who was injured on tJoard the ship tH~carnP incapacitated 
work and was lamJed at Newcastle. He under sections 127 
£652 4s Od. ?or maintenance including the wages due. He further 
claimed from the respondent company lt\l(~ekly compensation under sec-
tion 5 of the Seamen's Compensation Act 1911-1938 (Comth.). The claim 
t'\Jas brought on th£3 ground that, although hE! had "recmiBred" for the 
purposes of the Act 1912 (Comth.) he was still incapaci-
tated for work by the injury. The judge held the compensation pay-
able under section 58 of the :3eamen's Compensation Act (C:omth.) 
could not exceed £600. Tho appeal 1111a~1 therefore dismissed. 
Since that decision, there have been a number of amendments 
to section 58. do not roquire account to be taken of the am-
aunts received under tht! 1\iaviqation Act '1912 (C:omth.). The principle 
underlying the amendrm'!nts is in line with the view of the Supreme 
Court of South J.\ustralia jurJges,as follows: )L1 
"Section 132 !of tt1e 1\!avigation 1\ct] is not intended to 
take the piacr~ of the Seamen's Compensation J\ct 1911-
1947 (Cth.) amJ prm1ide \!IIOrkmen's compensation; it is 
something frurn that, whict1 i~> necessitated tJy the 
special circumstances of the seamen's t-~mployment. He 
f]ntitled to receivE: full wages until he is certified to 
have recovF::red; he is also enti tlerj to a free passage to 
his home port; and after tJoth these fits have been 
n~ceived, I1P is entitled to apply for workmen's compen-
sation if his physical cm1dition or state of health them 
warrants an award." 
It is cl~cJar· that by a claimant of the full ammmts payable 
under the 1912-73 (Comth.) and tht! Seamen's CornpEm-
sation Act 1911 T~ (Comtll.) will not prevent him from suing in negli-
gence. Thus in Union Steamship Company of Net'\1 Zealand v. 
the injured seaman in a subsequent admiralty action in rem l'ecnvered 
--
73. (1942) 42 S.F~. (N.S.W.) 62. 
71•. 1\adcliffe v. Howard Smith Ltd. [19M3l S.A.S.R. 133 (in f3anco), 
p. 139. 
75. (1967-1969) 119 C.L.R. 191; Nam·int v. The "Regis" (1938-1939) 
61 C.L.R. 688, applied. 
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a amount in terms of damages. The amount he eventually rec-
eived was reduced by the total amount already paid to him under the 
two Acts?6 
However, the right to sue in negligence is lost where a com-
pensation agreement is reached and a memorandum thereof is record-
ed as provided by paragraph 8 of Schedule II.77 In \1. Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd.~8 R, an able-bodied seaman on the vessel P.J. Adam, 
was negligently injured about six miles off the coast of Western 
Australia. Pursuant to an agreement made between the plaintiff, R 1 
and the defendant, the sum $135 was paid to R "in full and final 
settlement and discharge of all claims whether for compensation or 
otherwise .... " Subsequently, R sued in negligence. In the High Court 
case of Joyce v. Australian United Steam Navigation, Latham, C.J., 
McTiernan and Rich, J J., had construed the term "compensation" to 
include damages recoverable in tort?9Accordingly, seaman J., held that 
the prmtisions in paragraph 8 of Schedulp II were not confined to 
compensation or any payment under the Seamen's Compensation Act_ 
'i911-68 (Cornth.). As the agreement made between F< and the defend-
ant concernEJd rights under the Act (Cornth .) and at common law, the 
recording of the memorandum had extinguished the claim. It will also 
pr8\JBnt the claimant from bringing an action in rem against the ship. 
8. State Compensation Acts 
It is intPresting to consider how each State seE!ks to exercise 
jurisdic Lion over its seamen. New SoutJ1 Wales~30 South Australia,81 
Victoria82 and l1Jestern AustraliB3 have adopted identical provisions 
76. For position undBr the Sc~amrm's Compensation /\ct 1911-
73 (Cornth.), see 10A (3). 
77. It shall be Emforceable as if it wr~re a judgment of a county 
court. 
78. [1972] 23 F.L.R. 351. 
79. (1939) 62 C.L.R. 160. 
BD. l1Jorkers' Compensation Act (N.S.W.) (No. 15 of 1925) (re-
printed 1972), s. 46 (2). 
81. Workmen's Compensation Act 1971-79 (S.A.), s. Btl (1); this 
definition has rernalnecl unchanged since the Workmen's Corn-
pen~-lation Act 1911, s. 13 (1). 
82. Workers' Compensation Act {Vic.) (No. 61~19 of 1958), s. 59 (2); 
this definition has remained unchanged since the Workors' 
Compensation Act (No. 21~96 of 1914), s. 17 (1). ~ ~ 
83. Workers' Compensation and As~3istance /\ct, (LLJ.A.) (No. 86 of 
1981)' s. 16 ( 1 ) . . 
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to define thr~ meaning of "State ship".81+ F:or Pxarnple, section 46 (2) 
of the New South Wales /\ct rr:)acJs: 
11Irl this section, the term 'New South Ld<::1les ~;hip' means 
am; ship which 
(a) registered in this Statn; or 
(b) owned bv a tmdv corporate tJ~1tatllished ur1der the laws 
of this State or having its principal office or place 
of business in this ~)tate or i~J in the possession of anv 
such bodv corporate \Jirtue of a charter: or 
(c) owned bv anv person or bod\/ r;orporate whose chief 
office or place of business in respect of the manage-
ment of such ship i~:; in this Stat8, or is in the poss-
ession of arw such person or body corporate by virtue 
of a charter; or 
(d) 0\Ained by the Crown in respect of the Go\/ernment of 
this State, or in th8 possession of the Crown in that 
respect bv a virtue of a charter." 
Thus, in respect of an injurv to a seaman mnployecJ on a ship of anv 
of the four States, the relevant Act has appLication. Whilt:J para-
graphs (b), (c) and (tj) are sufficientlv clear, paraqrapll (a) is no long-
er operative. Since the corninq ir1to force on 26th Januarv, 1982, of 
the ?hipping Registration Act 1981 (Comttl.), there is only a single 
Ship Register at Canberra?5 Th£! varinuc; branct1 offices located 
mainly in Australian capital cities do not rerJif:iter ships. it follows 
that no ships are currently registered in Australian States. More-
m;er, ships pre\Jiousl v registered in l:he Australian S tatt=Js under the 
Merchant ShippinsJ Act 18% (Irnp.) had been transferred to the Common-
wealth St1ip f~egister. This de\Jeloprnent has greatlv reduced the scope 
of the Workers' Compensation Act 1927 (Tas.). In relation to a 
seaman, the Act will only apply if he is a workm~ emplovecJ on (i) a 
ship "which is registered in this StatE)", or (ii) "a ship IAthose first 
port of clearance and 1.<11hose dr=?stination are within this State.''86 On 
81~. S. h of t11e l.Uorkers' Comeensation Act 1927 (Tas.) 
(18 Geo. V i\lo. 82) pro\/ides that the "Act shall apply to a 
seaman only if he is a worker employed on a ship which is 
registered in thi~:i Stato, or a ship whose first port of clear-
ance, and whose destination are within this State." Tt1e 
definition of "Queensland ship" is gi\len in Queensland lllor-
kers' Compensation Act 1916-1965, s. 3 (1) (a). 
85. Supra. 
86. Sm3 s. t+ (1). 
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' 87 l d 88 l the other hand, the New ~1Duth Wales and G,lueens an Acts are ess 
affected as their sphere of operation is \,\lidelv defined, including the 
use of the words in situation (ii). 
In determining whether a seaman's claims IAtill come within a 
particular Act, the meaning of the words used in situation (ii) need 
to be construed. Australian seamen engaged on foreign-going ships, 
which are not registered in Australia, are not protected bv State 
legislation and, apart from two exceptions, the Seamen's Compensa-
tion Act 1911-73 (Comth.)~9 In Clarke v. The Union Steamship Company 
of New Zealand Ltd.?0 the plaintiff c.vhose home port was svdnev 
suffered injuries arising out of and in the course of his ernplovment 
on board the ship Moana. Although she was registered outside the 
Commonwealth, the articles of agreement between the plaintiff and 
the defendant company were made in Sydnm;. ShP was engaged in 
at ports outside the Commonwealth. According to Griffith, C.J., the 
port of clearance was Svdney and the port of destination was San 
Francisco, and vice ~.. The accident, which caused injuries to the 
seaman, occurred when the ship was some ZOD miles from San Francisco 
on her return vovage to Sydney. A strong High Court held that in 
respect of any such voyage tr1e port of clearance and the port of 
destination were not in the Commonwealth. In unanimously dismissing 
the plaintiff's appeal, the High Court held that Seamen's Compensa-_ 
tion Act 1911 (Comth.) was not in force on the stlip ltJhen the injuries 
were sustained. The overriding authority which led to tile decision 
is tile covering section 5 of ttl£~ Commonweal til of Australia Constitu-
tion Act 1900 (Imp.), containing words sirnilal' to those in situation (ii). 
Section 5 enacts, inter alia, that "the laws of the Commonwealth shall 
--
be in force on all British ships, the Queen's ships excepted, whose first 
port of clearance and whose port of destination are in the Common-
wealth." 
So far as protection of seamen under legislation is concerned, 
uncertainty may arise where a ~:;l1ip under a time charter is required 
to make a number of voyages. Apart from the geographical limits 
87. Workers' Compensation Act 1925 (N.S.W.). 
88. Worker~;' Compensation l\ct 1916-1965 (Qld.), s. 3 (1). 
89. See s.l'~ (1) (b) and _(c). 
90. (1911•) 18 C.L.R. 142. 
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within IMhich the ship may be engaged and the time period as provided 
in the charter, the charterer often has the option of declaring ports 
of cleamnce and destinations for the voyages. It is likely that, wiU1 
regard to some of the voyages, a State workers' compensation enact-
ment may have no application. The reason is that the mishap can 
occur while the sr1ip is under repair or on a voyage where the port 
of clearance and destination art) not in the same State. A good 
{3Xample is furnished by the case of _Mcl<enny v. State Government 
Insurance Office (Queenslandf.1 The vessel "Kos II" was chartered 
to the Commonwealth for four to six months for marine and geologic-
al work to be performed in several areas. From Brisbane, the first 
port of clearance, the ship sailed to a place off north-western Aus-
tralia. The charter provided that after the trip, she was to put in 
at Darwin or Cairns before sailing to an an~a in the Solomon Sea and 
the south-west Pacific Ocean. In fact, on the ~vav back to Townsville 
she struck a reef and repairs were necessary. When the ship was under-• 
going repairs at Townsville)M commenced duties as an engineer of the 
vessel. With the permission of the shipowm:~r and ship-repairer, !\1 
lived on board the vessel wllich was in dry-dock. He was killed as a 
result of a fall from a ladder whict1 provided access to the ship. The 
court found that at the time of the fatal accident the ship was being 
repaired for a voyage to an area in the Solomon Sea. President 
f"latthews held that the vessel ~vas not a Queensland vessel within the 
meaning of section 3 (1) (c) of the IJJorkers' Compensation Act 1916-
1966 (Qld.). M's wife was unable to recover compensation for hee hus-
band's death. 
The grave setback for seamen has resulted from construin~J the 
~vord "destination'' in the pro\/ision as the end of a \/oyage rather 
than the port where tl1e venture ends after a series of voyages or on 
completion of the chartBrpartv. It is submitted that tt1e wordinn of 
section 3 (1) of the f\ct 1916-1966 (Qlu.) should not be given a 
narrow meaning. Hnwever, the unsatisfactory situation can in prac-
tice be OV(~rcome by an agreement made bt=ltWt-?en a shipowner and the 
91. (19-;2) Q.J.P.R. 138 (Ind. Ct. of (Jld.). By ruling that the 
ve~3~3E!l "Kos II" \/\las not a Qur:Jensland ship, President 
Matthews had reversed the decision of the magistrate. 
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seaman expressly extending the provisions of the legislation to cover 
the seaman for the whole period of employment or the charterparty. 
The thrust of the workers' compensation legislation ls towards 
alleviating the hardships of s8amen. To give effect to the legisla-
tive policy, there should in such circumstances be a presumption in 
favour of the deceased's applicant. The decision in Ryan v. Selkirk92 
appears to support this view. s, the owner of a shark boat, The Rob-
ert John, entered into an agreement with X as regards its use for 
fishing operations. It provided that the gross return from the catch 
was to be shared between them. Goth contemplated that a crew would 
be required. Consequently, X engaqed V and paid him a percentage 
of X's share after deducting the expenses. The boat was apparently 
returning to Victoria from a fishing trip in Tasmanian waters. She 
foundered and X and V were drowned. Although from the case report 
she was presumed to be a Victorian ship under section 59 (2) of the 
Act (Vic.R3 the circumstances of the tragedv made it uncertain as 
to where lt actuallv occurred. Under snction 59 (1), the Act (Vic.) 
will onlv have applicCJtion where the injury or mishap occurs IAJithin 
the State of Victoria or its territorial jurisrJiction. Despite the ab-
sence of evidence that Y went overboard from the boat after she had 
entered Victorian territorial waters, the Workers 1 Compensation Board 
assumed jurisdiction?4 It held that ttle presumption that Y was a 
servant of the boat-owner, was not rebutted. 1~n award of £2,400 
was made for the applicant. 
9. An Evaluation 
Unlike the State legislation, the Seamen's Cornpfmsation Act 
1911-73 (Comth.) is deficient in orle vital aspHct. It is not mandatory 
for an employer, e.g. shipowner or domise chartor, to take out and 
maintsin a valid insurance policy to cmJer his statutory Liability to-
wards the seamen. Seamen, IJOWB\Jer, ore protected where their right 
92. (1955) :3 W.C.B.D. (Vic.) 227. 
93. Workers' Compensation ,l\ct. (No. 6419 of 1958) (Vic.). 
94. A precndent is found in Chapman & Co. Ltd. v. f~ose [1914] 
St. R. Qd. 302. A vessel ensJaged i.n trading between Queen-
slamJ ports was last ~>een at anchor in Quoensland waters 
during a cvclone. It was held that ther~::~ was evidence that 
a seaman thereon lost his life in QueEmsland waters. 
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to compensation arises befom thr! soqupstratirm m·dpr i:c; maciP nc;t 
their employer, or before the companv is I.'I!OurHJ up. :;ur:ll r'lairn:' ili'P 
included among the debts to be paid in primitv r1ut of tiH~ pr·npPrtv 
of a bankrupt or the assets uf a cornp<:mv tn:inq 1.-VOLJnd up. :;t'Cticm 
8 (3) further states that "the prm;isiun~3 of ;mv \iJ\..v~> rPlatirllJ to prr:-
ferential payments in relation to tJankruptcv nmJ IJlr} lvinrlinq up nf 
companies shall ha\Jf~ effect accordin~Jlv." rtm IIIICH'rJ~> "pr·opc:rtv" and 
"assets" in the section should inc l ucl8 <Hl\f :;hip h!c' lonqi IHJ to tim c~m­
ployer. It is submitted thot rights accrur::cJ uncif~r thi~; Comrnmt~'Jfmltll 
Act have priority over secumcJ crodi tors ~;uct1 a:> ship rnor·tgaqoF!S and 
maritime lienees?5 The Shipping r~oCJistration Act 19B1 (Cornl.h.) fm 
example, does not provide that a regist£:!red mortgage of a ~;hip nr 
any share therein is preferrod to a workman's compensation claim. 
The preferential treatment dDHS not avail ~:1earnen seeking C(]fn-
pensation under the State legislatiml. This setback is overcDme in 
an ingenious way. It is mandaton; for GJrnplovers to have in force an 
appropriate insurance policy. CJn the hc:.1pper1ing of CE!rtain events, 
e.g. the bankruptcy or winding up of the employers, seamen are en-
titled to the same rights and remedies as their employers have against 
tt . 95 1e msurers. 
Another substantial benefit enjoyerJ by ~:;earnen is that the 
compensation payable under the Commonwealth and the State /-\ct~l 97 
is not subject to the limitation of liability. 98 
The Seamen's Compen~;ation Act 1911-73 (Cornth.) makes provision 
for enforcing seamen's claims when~ the ship is owned by a non-Aus-
tralian resident or by a corporation which does not have an office in 
95. See Bankruptcv Ac~. 1966-73 (Cornth.), s. 109; for provisions 
under the Companies Code in eoch State, see s. 441 and 
s. 448. 
96. The seamen are subrogated to the rights exercisable bv 
their insolvent ernployors against the insurers: Act (No. 15 
of 1926) (N.S.W.), s. 49 (1); Act (1916-1965) (Qld.), s. 9A; Act 
(1971-79) (S.A.), s. 17 (1); Act (1927) (1B Geo. V, No. 82) (Tas.), 
s. 7 (1); Act (No. 6418 of 1958) (W.f\.), f:l. 61 (1); Act (No. 86 of 
1981) (W.A.), s. 173. 
97. Act (No. 1') of 1926) (N.::l.I.JJ.), s. 46 (3) (f); Acts (1916-1965) 
(f~ld.) (No provision made); Act (1971-74) (S.A.), ~3. 89 (§1; Act 
(1927) (18 Geo. V No. 82) (Tas.) (No provision made); Act 
(No. 6419 of 1958) (Vic.), s. 59 (3) (f); Act (No. 86 of 1981) 
(W.A.), .5. 16 (2) -
98. See NaviCJatiun Act 1912-73 (Comth.), Part VIII, as amended, 
discussed in Chapter Ei~Jht. 
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Australia. Under section 13 (1), an application may be made to a judge 
of the ~)upreme Court or the High Court, alleging, Inter alia, that the 
shipowner is "probably liable to pay compensation"under the Act. An 
orrJer may be made directing an officer of the Department of Customs 
and Excise to detain the ship if she is in any port or river or within: 
any territorial waters of 1\ustralia. detention tl\lill continue until 
the shipowner, agent or master thereof has either paid the compen-
sation or given security, approved by the court, to abide the event 
of the proceedings brought by the claimant?9 Although the detention 
proCf]dure may invoked by foreign ~1eamen, the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court or the High Court is confined mainly to foreign ships. 
Compared with an admiralty action in rlill} which could give rise to 
damages for wrongful arrest, the detention procedure is by far a 
safer proposition. Moreover, the heavy expenses normally required 
in instituting admiralty actions are not incurred in application for 
detention orders. Among the State enactments, only the Western 
Australian legislation provides for the detention of a ship on similar 
'l grounds. 
The foregoing analysis has brought to light a number of gaps 
in the law. Many cases of injury and death suffered by seamen fall 
outside the scope of section 4 of the Seamen's Compensation ,1\ct 
1911-73 (Comth.). The facts of McKenny v. State Government Insurance 
Office (Queenslandf show that a significant number of claims are not 
covered by State legislation. Moreover, as a matter of public policy, 
even where in respect of the injury or death of a seaman there is a 
right to statutory compensation, he or his spouse should have the 
alternative of being able to proceed under maritime Jaw against the 
ship. One anomaly stands in the way. Where the per~3onal injury or 
loss of life sustained is not ndamage done by any ship" within the 
meaning of section 7 of the _Admiraltv Court Act 1861 (Imp.), Australian 
courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an action in £.§!!!. It is sub-
mitted that the law should be amended along the lines of section 
20 (2) (f) of the ~;upreme Court Act 1981 (LJ.I'\} and also to allow claims 
for statutory compensation to be enforced by proceedings in ~ 
against thB ship. 
99. l"lerchont Shipping Act 189l~ (Imp.), s. 692; _Workmen's 
Compensation .1\ct 1906 (Edw. VII, c. 58) (U.K.), s. 11. 
1. Act (No. 86 of 1981) (W.J\.), s. 179. 
2. (1972) Q.J.P.R. 138, .=..;;;;;.:._;;_;;;;, 
3. Cap. 5l,; sm:l Chapter Nine. 
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III. CARGO LOSS OR DAMAGE 
1. Shipping Practice and Cargo Transportation 
Apart from fishing and salvage \Jessels, most commercial vessels 
are employed in the carriage of goods <:md cargo in bulk. Although 
goods may still be shipped in conventional packages or cartons, con-
tainer ship~3 and tankships are fast replacing vessels of the older 
model. rhe high costs of maintaining and operating vessels, the fluc-
tuating world economy and other factors have increased the pressure 
on shipowners to maximise the use of their ships. 
Today it is common for ships to be employed in three different 
ways. Firstly, a shipowner may charter the entire \Jessel to a person 
or company as a large-scale importer. Under an F.O.B. contract made 
between an importer and an exporter, it is generally the former's 
obligation to provide or nominate a vessel at the port of loading:"* 
When the goods are loaded on board the chartered vessel, bills of 
lading signed by the ship's master or agent are issued to the chart-
erer. In the hands of the charterer, as ~1hipper, the rJills of lading 
merely serve as receipts of goods put on board by the shipowner. 
Unless otherwise stipulated, a bill of ladinsJ is by mercantile custom 
and statute a quasi-negotiable instrument. Subsequent dealings! 
in the goods, !h.9_. a resale, usually occur. The charterer will transfer 
the bills of lading and assign his rights to a buyer as endorse~. It is 
clear that a number of different contracts are involved. They are 
the charterparty made betweEln the shipowm!r and the charterer as 
importer, and later the contracts of affreightment which come into 
existence between the shipowner as carrier and the endorsees6. 
Secondly, a shipowner may operate as a s1eneral carrier, e . in 
the liner trade, by accepting from a large number of shippers an infin-
ite variety of goods for carriage. In respect of the goods shipped by 
l1. For position in Australia and Britain, see Trade Terms (1 C.C. 
Document No. 16) (1955 ed.), pp. 58-59; Incoterms (1980 ed.), p 
36, paragrapr1 1. 
5. _Usury, Bills of Lading and Written Memorandum Act (N.S.W.) 
(No. 1+3 of 1902), s. 5; _Factors /\ct 1892 (Qld.) (No. 56 Vic. 
No. 8), s. 7; Mercantile Act (S.A.)(No. 2285 of 1936), s. 14; 
Bills of Lading Act 1857 (Tas.) (20 Vic. No. 25), s. 3; Goods 
-Act (Vic.) (No. 6265 of 1958), s. JL,; Bills of Lading Act 1855 
(Imp.) (18 & 19 Vic., c. 111), s. 3, as <'ldopted bv 1856 Act 
(uJ.A.) (20 Vic. No. 7). 
6. Hague .Rules, /\rticle 1 (b); sep ScnJtton on Charterparties 
Bills of (19ttl E!d. 1981,), pp. 417-41B. 
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each customer, a separatEC.J bill of lading is isflued by the carrier. 
Thirdly, a company may charter a vessel from her owner for a 
voyage or a specified period of time. It has become an increasingll) 
common practice for a charterer to set up its business as a general 
carrier, issuing bills of lading in its name. The contracts of affreight-
ment7as evidenced by the bills of lading 1are indi\;idually made between 
the charterer as carrier and the shippers. 
Official statistics show that bet1,veen the years.1975 and 1976 
the three types of shipping services accounted for the carriage of 
over seventy percent of the total Australian imports and exports? 
Inefficacy of personal action. In view of the inestimable value 
of ocean freight on which Australia's economy depends, it is vi tal to 
evaluate the protection afforded to cargo-owners. In many instances, 
personal actions to recover compensation for cargo loss or damage 
against shipowners or carriers can prove to be abortive or disapp-
ointing~ Goods from foreign countries may, by their law~;. be required 
to be carried by their national vessels for export overseas, into 
Australia. The charterparties and contracts of affreighment are 
often made liverseas and subject to foreign laws. They may provide 
that disputes or claims arising out of the contracts of carriage must 
be settled in a particular manner, by arbitration or in tribunals 
abroad? Even in the absence of such "foreign jurisdiction" or "for-
eign tribunal" clause, a difficult hurdle may be encountered. If a 
shipowner or carrier has no office in this country, proceedings will 
have to be instituted overseas ar1d possibly under a different legal 
system. ,L\nother grave risk inherent in personal actions is that the 
shipowner or carrier, whether local or overseas, against which judg-
ment has been obtained may turn out to be an insolvent company: fJ 
7. pverseas Cargo Shipping Legislation Report (1978 ed.), Dept. 
of Transport, A.G.P.S., Canberra, pp. 145-147. 
8. Even tr10ugl1 carriers are members of protr:~ction and indem-
nity clubs (P & I Clubs), the tendency is to reject or limit 
cargo claims. The object is to reduce the contributions 
which carriers have to pay to their respective clubs. 
9. See The Cap Blanco [1913] P. 130, infea, where such a 
clause was incorporated in the bill of lading. 
10. Unless, of course, the Companies Code, s. 447 (1), in force 
in each of the /-\ustralian ~)tates applies. 
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Often the number of agent~; involved, the possiblE~ use of the vessel 
by mortgagees after taking possession of her and the charterer's 
tendency to sublet the vessel to others complicate matters for pros-
pective cargo claimants. The dilemmas confronting cargo interests 
in Australia and elsewhere cannot on a long-term basis be satisfac-
torily resolved by resorting to insurEmce. The reason is that, as 
against a shipowner or carrier, an insurer has no better right than 
an insured himself. 11 HenCf'} V..ihere insurers are unable to reduce or 
recoup their loss by exercising their rights of subrogation the risks 
will be borne by cargo owners ancJ consumers in terms of increased 
premiums. 
2. Goods carried into Australia 
A number of tf1e problems which arise in personal actions may 
be overcome if admiralty proceecJings in !:§.!.!!_can be brought against 
the carrying vessel. Apart from certain exceptions, English and Aus-
tralian laws on the subject t:]re similar. One leading advantage is 
that. where the writ of summons has been issued though not vet serv-
ed, the right of action in I.:£.!:1} is unaffected by a change of ownership 
of the vesse1. 12 tllhere admiralty juri:5diction is exercisable, generally 
the arrest and detention of the ship will often exert ~lufficient pres-
sure on shipowners or carriers to compensate cargo owners. Other-
wise the judgment obtained may be t:mforced by the sale of the ship. 
The proceeds of the sale vvill be applied to meet the claims. 
We shall consider trl8 situations whGre admiralty actions in l.:§.!!!. 
may be instituted in State Supreme Courts and the High Court. Sec-
tion 6 of the Admiralty Court Act 1061 (Imp.) reads: 
"The High Court of Admiral tv shall have Jurisdiction over 
any claim by the Owner or Consignee or Assignee of any 
Bill of Lading of any Goods carried into any Port in Eng-
land or Wales in any St1ip, for Damage done to the Goods 
or any part thereof by the Negligence or Misconduct of 
or for any Breach of Duty or BI'each of Contract on the 
Part of the Owner, Master OI' Crew of the Ship, unless it 
is shown to the Satisfaction of the Court that at the time 
of the institution of the cause any Owner or Part Owner 
11. Simpson v. Thomson (1877) 3 App. Cas. 279; Edwards (John) 
~Co. v. fVlotor UniOn Insuraroce Co .. [1922] 2 K.l3. 249. 
12. 
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of the Ship is domiciled in England or Wales .... " 
Bv the proviso in section 2 (3) (a) of the .Colonial Court of Admiraltv 
Act 1890 (Imp.), the name of the British possession is to be substitut-
ed for the expression "England and Wales". For the purpose of the 
Act, the Commonwealth and each of the Australian States are British 
possessions. Harold Renfree has rightlv pointed out the problems as 
follows: "[Tlhe jurisdiction does not extend to claims upon charter 
parties, nor does it extend to bills of lading except to a limited ex-
tent, nor to claims in tort in respect of goods carried in a ship except 
to a limited extent.'' 13 Charterers, who are not bill of lading holders 
and therefore without proprietarv interest in the goods carried, are 
outside the ambit of the section.14 Thev are not subject to anv 
serious disadvantage wt1ich justifv I statutorv intervention. More 
often than not, for non-fulfilment of a charterpartv greater detri-
ment is suffered bv the shipowner than the charterer. The excess 
of tonnage in the woPld means tt1at, as against shipowners, charter-
ers are in a strong bargaining position. 
However, the position of shippers and bill of lading holders 
calls for careful analvsis. In the St. Cloud, Dr. Lushington aptlv 
spoke of the general intention of the legislation in enacting section 
6 in these terms:15 
"The statute is remedial. The short deliverv brought to 
this countrv in foreign ships or their deliverv in a damaged 
state, was frequentlv a grievous injurv for which there 
was no practical remedv; for, the owners of such vessels 
being resident abroad, no action could be successfully 
brought against them in a British tribunaL .With a view to 
obviate a grievance so oppressive to British merchants, 
the enactment contained in the 6th section was passed. 
It was intended to operate bv enabling the aggrieved partv 
to arrest the ship in cases where ... the common law tribun-
al could (not) afford an effectual redress." 
To evaluate the remedv, the scope of the section needs to be ascer-
tained. It applies to claims in respect of car!"_::JO damage or loss which 
13. H. Renfree, Federal Judicial Svstem of Australia (1984 ed.), 
p. 10, supra. 
14. In The Yuri Maru, The Ltloron [1927] A.C. 906, p. 909 (Privv 
Council), Lord Merrivale states: "The jurisdiction in Adrnir-
altv of the Hig~1 Court of Justice in England did not extend 
to claims upon charterparties at the time when the Col-
onial Courts of Admiraltv Act, 1890, became law." --
15. (1863) Br. & Lush. 4, 111; 167 E.R. 269, p. 275. 
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occurs mainly in foreign ships. The goods must be carric~d into an 
Australian port and none of the sJ-llpowners is domiciled in Australia. 
The \!\lords "carried into any port [in Australia]" are regretably too 
restrictive in that the object of the legislature to provide a remedy 
against foreign ships is seriously defeated. The ::;action has been 
held not to applv where goods are incidentally brought back to an 
Australian port by an outward-bound ship. In F. Kanematsu and Com-
J?any Ltd. \/. The Ship ''Shahzada",16 a foreign ship loaded with 1,000 
cattle hides was leaving Sydney for Kobe in Japan. lLJhile within the 
territorial limits of the port of Sydney, she collided with a British 
ship and sustained serious damage. After she was refloated, she re-
turned for repairs at Sydney where a large portion of her cargo was 
discharged. A Japanese company, as bill of lading holders, instituted 
an admiralty action in rem against the ship. The High Court held that, 
---
as the ship had not proceeded beyond the territorial limits of the 
port, the goods were not carried into the port of Sydney within the 
meaning of section 6. Hence it had no jurisdiction. One agrees with 
the view of Taylor, J., that based on the wording, it is impossible to 
give the provision a liberal construction. Hn finds no justification 
for "holding that the expression 'goocJs carried into am; port' includes 
goods carried out of that port or goods in the course of being carr-
ied out of that port."17 It is probable that the unusual circumstances 
of such an occurrence did not enter into the contemplation of those 
who framed the section. The case of The 11 Bahia"} 8 which falls on the 
other side of the line, concerned the carriage into an English port 
of cargo consigned to a foreign port. A cargo of corn \!\las carried 
on board the ship at New York under a bill of lmHng for delivery at 
Dunkirk in France. In consequence of an accidc:mt, the ship put into 
the English port of Ramsgate. The master refuserJ to carry the cargo 
to Dunkirk or to allow its delivery at f~amsgate. To remedy the serious 
grievance caused to the plaintiffs, as bill of lading holders, Dr. Lusll-
ington commendably gave a wide interpretation to the section by 
16. (1956) 30 A.L.J. 478. 
17. Ibid., p. 482. 
18. (1863) 167 E.R. 298. 
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holding that it applied to the case. Thus for breach of a dutv of 
care owed bv the master, an action i.!J_ ~can be brought against the 
ship. 
New efforts were made bv cargo claimants to extrmd the ill J..:Q!!l 
remedv. In Co-operated Dried Fruit Sales Pty. Ltd. v. The Ship 
"Terukawa Maru",19 unsuccessful attempts were made to widen the 
jurisdictional base of the High Court of Australia. The plaintiff, as 
bill of lading holder, sued for damages for the loss of goods shipped 
at Melbourne for deliverv in Georgetown in Guiana. In the first sub-
mission, it was argued that, without reference to statutorv authoritv, 
the High Court of Admiraltv had the jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine the action. Menzies, J., alluded to the conflict in earlv times 
between the judges of the High Court of Admiraltv and those of the 
20 h'b't' . d Common Law Courts in England. The manv pro 1 1 10ns 1ssue 
bv the latter and the restrictive construction placed on the statutes 
had put an end to the admiraltv jurisdiction of the Court of Admiral-
tv with regard to cargo claims~ 1 Bv the second submission, it was 
contended that under the Countv Courts Admiraltv Jurisdiction Act 
22 1868 (U.K.), as amended bv the 1869 Act (U.K.), the English countv 
courts were empowered to adjudicate upon claims not exceeding £300, 
which arose out of contracts of carriage in anv ship. Bv order made 
under s_ection 6, 7 or 8 of the 1868 Act (U.K.), the Court of Admiralty 
could have obtained jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims. 
The judge rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case came with-
in the two Acts (U.K.). It was held that the Acts did not empower the 
Court of Admiralty to adjudicate upon claims arising out of contracts 
19. (1972) 46 A.L.J.R. 357. 
20. Recounted and summarised in E.S. Roscoe, The Admiralty 
Jurisdiction and Practice of the High Court of Justice 
(5th ed. 1931), pp. 4, et . ..§.gg_. 
21. For statutes involved, see 13 Richard II stat. 1, c. 5; (1391) 
15 Richard II, c. 2 and c. 3. In The "Ironsides" (1862) Lush. 
458, 466, when construing j\dmiralty Court Act 1861 (Imp.), 
s. 6, Dr. Lushington said: "Antecendently to the passing of 
the statute, this Court could not have exercised any jur-
isdiction at all in a case of this kind. I do not sav that it 
had not forrnerlv such a jurisdiction, but it would not have 
ventured to exercise it." 
22. 31 & 32 Vic., c. 71, as amended bv 32 & 33 Vic., c. 51. 
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of carriage generally but only where "such claims have been commen-
ced in the county court." 23 In the absence of ch::ar wording to that 
effect, the reasoning of the learned judge is unconvincing. It is 
submitted that, where the Court of Admiralty was empowered by stat-
ute to order the transfer to it of certain claims from another court, 
the jurisdiction of the former is at least co-r:!xistensive witt1, if not 
24 greater than, that of the latter. 
Judicial indifference to the needs of business communities and 
the unenlightened approach have add!:-Jd to the problem. To the dis-
may of Australian cargo interests, the outcome is not only retrogre-
ssive but detrimental to the country's economy. In the Rosenfield 
Hillas & Co. Pt'L. Ltd. v. The Ship Fort Laramil5 a large cargo of 
timber was allegedly loaded on board the ship at San Francisco for 
discharge at Melbourne. The plaintiff, as endorsee of two bills of 
lading, brought an action in r..lli!J against the ship for failure to deliver 
a portion of the timber and obtained judgment for £2,549 7s. 9d. Less 
than three months later, on the application of the defendant, the 
judgment was set aside. Evidence showed that the portion of timber 
not delivered at Melbourne had not been loaded. The bills of lading 
in question were signed by S, a managing owner of the ship Fort Lara-
mie, stating a larger quantity of timber than that n:.:ally put on board. 1 
Section. 72 of the Goods Act 1915 (Vic.) read: 26 
"Every bill of lading in the hands of a consignee or indors-
ee for valuable consideration representing goods to have 
been shipped shall be in all civil proceedings conclusive 
of such shipment against the master or other person sign-
ing the same nothwithstanding that such goods or some 
part thereof were not so shipped." 
Based on section 72 and the finding that the other co-owners of the 
ship had not authorised the signing and issue of the bills of lading, 
Knox, C.J., held that the quantity statements were not binding on 
them. Following the decision in Owners of S.S. Utopia v. Owners of 
23. (1972) 46 A.L.J.R. 357, p. 357. 
24. By Colonial Courts of Admiralty J\ct 1890 (Imp.), s. 2 (2) a 
Colonial Court of Admiralty may exercise, inter alia, "such 
jurisdiction in like manner and to as full an extent as the 
High Court in England, and shall have tl1e same regard as 
that Court to international law ancJ tl1e comrnity of nations." 
25. (1922) 31 C.L.R. 56. On appeal, the decision of 1\nox, C.J., was 
reversed on factual but not on leqal grounds: (1932) 32 C.L.R. 25. 
26. These words were reproduced V!,;lrlmtim from s. :3 of the Bills 
of Lading Act 1855 (U.K.) (18 & 19 Vic., c. 111). For current 
provision, see (loads Act (Vic.) (No. 6265 of 1958), s. 7'•· 
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?.S. Primula - The Utopi~, the court held that the plair1tiff was not 
entitled to recover. The principle which grosslv undermined the rights 
of cargo claimants is this: an action rem under section 6 of the 
.Admiralty Court Act 1861 (Imp.) will not lie against a ship unless there 
is the right of action in personam against possiblv all the shipowners. 
tllith respE~ct to his Honour f\nox, C.J., the decision was unsatisfactorv 
in a number of respects. No consideration \:Jas qi\jen to the extent 
or nature of S's interests in the ship. It was possible that the oth(~r 
owners were rnerelv minoritv shareholders. It is contended that to 
avoicJ unjust results liability of the person holding majority shares or 
interests in the ship should suffici8 Apparently, in holding that 
there must be a breach of duty or contract on the part of the ship-
owners instead of "the owner, master or crew of the ship" as provided 
in section 6, thBre is failure to give effect to the clear intention 
of the legislature. It hacJ been established bv a statute of George 
IV that a British ship may be owned by thirtv-two persons. 29 More-
over, tl1e reasoning applied by His Honour that S, being a managing 
owner himself, had no authoritv from the other owners to issue the 
bills of lading, may produce uncertaintv in international trade. As a 
policy matter, the decision will open the door for shipowners to 
commit fraud on innocent third parties. 
Another ~1etback to the exercise of adrniraltv jurisdiction in 
I.§!!l comes from the use of a "foreign forum and law'' clause. By 
accepting bills of lading containing such a provision, unwary Austral-
ian importers mav be deprived of the valuable right conferred by 
section 6. The facts of The Cap Blanco 30 illustrate the effect of 
such a clause upon the operation of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 (Imp.). 
Ten cases of gold coins were shipped at Hambury on board the German 
27. (1893) A.C. L,92, p. 499. The principle laid down is that in 
the absence of negligence on the part of the owners and 
their servants no maritime lien will arise. 
28. Cf. Professor Ivarny, Payne's CarriagP of Goods b'{ Sea 
(8th ed. 1968), pp. L,2-43. It is submittmj that the proposi-
tion should not apply to a situation where a bi1l of lading 
is siqned and issued by the co-owner of a ship. 
29. (1823) 4 Geo., c. '•1, s. 31. H1is number has n:Jmaim~d un-
chanoed under the English Merchant Shipping /\ct 189'• (Imp.), 
s. 5 (1). Under s. 11 (1) Cb.l of the Shipping ~~c;gistration Act 
1981 (Cornth.), the maximum number is 64. 
3o. [19BJ rr. no. 
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vessel Cap Blanco. They were to be delivered on the order of 
the plaintiffs, as bill of lacling holders, at Monte \/ideo or Buenos 
Aires. Under the bill of l<:Jding, the shipowners as carriers ~\/ere em-
pmvered to call at any place for discharging and loadin!.:J goods and 
to tranship, or reload the merchandisE! by one of their st1ips. Also 
all the vessels had the right to touch once or several times at any 
places in any sequence. Clause 1ll provided that "any disputes con-
cerning the interpretation of this bill of lading are to be decided in 
Hamburg according to German lmv." At Monte Video, only nine of the 
cases were delivered. On her return voyage to Hamburg, with the 
reportedly missing case of coins still on board, she put into Southam-
pton. She was arrested on behalf of tt1e plaintiffs in an action for 
breach of the contract of carriage or of a duty of care in respect 
of the missing case. The defendants objected to the EngLish Court's 
exercise of the jurisdiction. Although the court was invested with 
the jurisdiction, an order was made to stay the proceedings. Sir 
Samuel Evans, the English Court of Appeal President,lucidly explained 
the judicial attitude to clause 14 as follows: 31 
"[It] is to be treated as a submission to arbitration with-
in the meaning of s. 4 of the j\rbitration Act, 1889. The 
tribunal at Hamburg is not specified, but a fair business-
like reading of the contract means that such disputes 
are to be tried by the competent Court, and in accord-
ance with German law .. .In dealing with commercial documents 
of this kind, effect must be gi\/en, if the terms of the 
contract permit it, to the ob\/Jous intention and agreement 
of the parties ... and it is right to hold the plaintiffs to 
their part of the agreement." 
The abo\/e analysis of the authorities shows the \/arious difficulties 
that stand in the way of cargo claimants. So lono as ttle 1861 i\ct 
(Imp.) operates as part of Australian admiralty law, much disser\/ice 
and harm are being caused to Australia's import trade. 
Hmve\/er, a contribution of significance to the subjF]Ct of 
31. Ibid., pp. BS-136. In Australia, once a submission to arbit-
ration is made in writin[J, the parties are bound by it and 
cannot institute proceedings to override it; see Arbitra-
Jion Act 1902 (N.S.W.), s. 6; Arbitration Act 19T3 (Qld.), s. 10 
(1); /\rbitration Act 1881-1974 (S.A.), s. 3; Arbitration Act 
1892 (Tas.), s. 6; Arbitration Act 1958 (Vic.), s. 5; .Arbitration 
Act 1895-1970 (W.f\.), s. 6. 
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carsJo-interest protection has come from the Lord Pre~3iclent'~1 judg-
ment. His explicit re-statoment of tho established proposition and 
apparent!\; legislative policv should bf~ firmh; adhered to as the bul-
wark against adventurisms. After ref(cJrrinq to the lonrJ-standing 
. 32 
cases, he said: 
''The result of the autr10rities is that s. 6 of the Act \Alas 
intentionally fl'amed in large and gem~ral terms and ought 
to be construed with as great latitude as possible ~dthin 
the fair meaning of the words, on the ground that 'the 
statute, being remedial of a grievance, by arnplifving the 
jurisdiction of the English Court of Admiral tv, ought, 
accol'ding to the general rule applicable to such statutt-Js, 
to be construed liberallv so as to afford the utmost 
lief which the fair meaning of it~~ language ~Aiill allow'." 
l-Ie held that in order to found jurisdiction under the Act it was 
totally unnecessary that the goods should be carried into an English 
port for the purpose of deli\Jerv. It is art::Juable that his pronounce-
ment has gi\;en Australian courts a wider jurisdiction. Thus admiralty 
proceedings Jn rem should lie against forei~Jn ~jhips where goods are 
"carried into" any Australian ports by reason of CElsual or fortui-
tous circumstances OI' for transhipment pul'poses. 
t'\nother limitation on tt1e in I1illL remedv should not be ovBr-
looked. In so far as section 6 can onlv operate where the action 
based on a bill of lading, the nature of this document merits consid-
eration. It is remarkable that such a vital instrument of ir1ternation-
of the Australian State Acts. In established shipping practice, when 
all the goods have been put on board the sl-lip, a "shipped" bill of lad-
ing signed bv the ship's master Dr agent 1:1.1ill be issued. Thi~> document 
is clearly within the ambit of English and f~u~>tralian 1egi~>lation.34 How-
ever, it is questionable whether the holder of a "received-for-shipment" 
bill of lading can similarlv immke section 6 of the 1861 Act (Imp.). 
32. [1913] P. 130, p. 134. The general scope and object of the 
1861 Act were described by Dr. Lushington in The St. C:lowj 
(1863) Br. & L. 4 and The"Bahia"(1863) Br. & L. 61. 
33. The Pieve Superiore (1874) L.R. 5 P.C. L18Z. p. 492. 
3l~, Bills of Lading Act 1855 (U.I"'\.), ss. 1 and 1; Usurv. Bill~-o of' 
Ladinq and Memorandum Act 1902 (N.S.W.), s. 5; factors Act 
1892 ((Jld.), ss.5 and 7: J'vlercantile Act 1936 A.), ss. 14 and 
15; Bills of Ladinq Act 1857 Cfas.), ss. 1 and 3; Goods Act 
1958 (Vic.), ss. /4 and 75; 1856 Act (W.A.) giving r~ffuct to 
the Bilt5 of l_ading 1\c~ 1855 (U.K.). In Ir1coterms (1980 eel.) 
Dp. cit., p. 12, U1e term 11 bill of lading" is defined as a 
"shipped bill of lading issued bv or on behalf of tho CarTier:' 
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A distinction between the two types of document was made in 
Diamond Alkali Export Corporation v. 8ourgeois~5 McCardie, J., con-
siden'ld that a "r·EJceived-for-shipment" bill of lading in the hands of 
an assignee doe~1 not constitute conclusive evidence of the shipment 
of the goods referred to therein. He is therefore unable to take 
advantage of section 3 of the Bills of lading Ac,t 1855 (LJ.I\.). 
In _Alex, Cowan & Sons, Ltd. and Others .. \J. The ''Ship Malborough_ 
'11" 36 l . d f " . d f h' t" HI , severa consignees or en orsees o recei\Je · or s 1pmen 
bills of lading jointly issued a writ out of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales and had the ship arrested. The plaintiffs admitted that 
they did not know whether the goods \<llere shipped in the 11 Malborough 
Hill" and lost on the vovage, transhipped during the vovage and lost, 
or never shippBd at all. In keeping with the expansionist policv, thB 
Full Court of the Supreme Court construed the "'mrds in section 6 to 
mean "carried or to be carried". In affirming the judgment, the Privy: 
Council held that the "received-for-shipment" bills of lading were 
't~ . th . f . 6 37 WI ,un e meanmg o sectiOn . 
says: 
In his article "Shipping Law Revision", Professor 1 Hardy Ivamv 
38 
" ... when the [Bill of Lading] Act of 1855 was passed, the 
practice of using 'through bills of lading' covering transit 
by law and sea had not vet arisen. It would appear that 
no consignee named in such a bill can claim the protection 
of the Act. This seems a serious disadvantage under the 
present law. 11 
His viet.v is equally true in respect of the position of Australian imp-
orters. The term "bill of lading" is expressly used in ~3ection 6 of the 
Admiralty Court .1:\ct 1861 (Imp.) and also in the bill of lading legisla-
tion of each of the Australian States.39 Accordingly, the problem 
will arise in relation to combined transport documents, those 
. d d th "f C iVJ C t' hO d t ' t . d b. t 1ssue un er r 18 • -·1 . .onven 1on, an o recmp .s Issue su JPC 
35. [1921) 3 K.B. h/~3, pp. t.50, 452. 
36. (1919) 19 S.R (N.S.W.) 306. It was held that the Court had 
jurisdiction under s. 6 to hear the case. 
3/. [1921] 1 A.C. L,44. 
:SB. (1959) 10 C.L.P. 185,p.186. For bill of lading and non-negotiable 
Peceipt, see William Tetlr~v. Marine Cargo Clairns,QE..cit., pp.5-9. 
39. For the Act in each State, s<m footnotes above. 
MJ. /".s to dE!flnition, see f\rticle 1 ['Ulfc1 2 of the draft conven-
tion C:f.C. IV/18/f~ev. 1; TRANS/37l!/i~m;. 1: 24th .Jan. 1972. 
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to the special conditions under Article VI of the Hague Rules. 
3. International Conventions - The Rules 
National LElgislation. The law of conti'act has generalh; per-
mitted the parties concerned to make their own bargains. 41 In con-
tracts of carriage of goods by sea, the "freedom of contract" prin-
ciple had been abused. By reason of their predominant position, ship-
owners and carriers were genorally able to provide services on their 
own terms. Tho laissez fairB system, the unequal positions of the 
carrier and shipper rmd thE! policy of common law gave rise to a 
problem which threatened the foundations of maritime commerce. 
StBrting from the seconrJ half of the nineteenth century, carr-
iers began introducing new and more wide-ranging exclusion clauses 
. b"ll f 1 d" 42 h 1 t . l d t tnto 1 s o a· mg. Sue c auses were ex enstve y use o exoner-
ate from liability the shipowner and the carrier, and also the cBrrying 
vessel. Towards the end of th~) nineteenth century, shippers, cargo 
consignees and mmine underwriters were so uncertain about the legal 
implications of the infinite variety of terms and clauses used that 
government intervention became necessary. Unless scrupulous care was 
exercised, importers under F .0.8. and C.I.F. contracts could be buying 
worthless scraps of paper or expensive lawsuits. 
The United States took the lead by passing the Harter Act 
1893 43 which achieved several objectives. It applied to contracts of 
41. "In mv view, it is not right to say that the law prohibits 
and nullifies a clause exempting or limiting liability for a 
fundamental breach or breach of a fundamental term. Such 
a rule of law would involve a restriction on freedom of con-
tract and in the older cases I find no trace of it:" Suisse 
Atlantique S.A.M.S.N. v. Rotterdamsche K.C. [19671 Z All E.R. 
61, p. 67, per Viscount Dilhorne. 
42. For example, carriers sought to exonerate themselves from 
liability for cargo damage or loss due to: "any circumstances 
whatsoever" (Taubman v. Pacific S.N. Co. (1872) 26 L. T. 704); 
"leakage and damBge"; (Czech v. General S.N. Co. (1867) L.R .. 
.3 C.P. 14); "dangers and accidents of the sea" (Hamilton, 
Fraser & Co. v. Pandorf (1887) 12 A.C. 518); "any act, negli-
genct;, default, or error in tr1e judgment of the pilot, master, 
mariner, or other ~3ervBnts of the shipowners in navigatinD 
the ship or otherwi~m"(BaerselmBn v. Baile~ (1895] 2 Q.B. 301), 
etc. 
tl3. l16 U.S. Code, ss. 190-196; came into force on 2nd Julv. 1893. 
It was the forerunner of the early Sea-Carriage of l~oods Act 
1904 (Comth.). 
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of carriage of merchanrJise or property from or between ports of 
the Unitc'!d States and fonCJign portsY1 ,1\ll stipulations in tJills of lad-
ing that relieved the Oliliner, master, agent or manager of the ship 
from liability for cargo loss or damage due to failur8 to exercise 
cargo care or due diligence to make the ship seaworthy were rendered 
unlawful:~s Thus under contracts of carriage subject to the Act (U.S.) 
shippers amJ bill of lading holders were able to exercise important 
rights against the owner, master, agent or manager of the ship. Where 
a shipowner failed to exercise due diligence to make the ship seawor-
thv in all respects and cargo loss or damage was sustained, admiralty 
action in could be instituted against the vessel. 46 Moreover, for 
violation of any provisions of the Act (U.S.), the fine and cost;J im-
posed would give l'ise to a lien on the vessel~7 
The llar~ue Rules. Towards the inception of thB twentieth cen-
tury maritime trade becamEJ recognised bv increasinglv more industri-
alisBd and developing countries as a major source of wealth. A pre-
requisite to th8 achievement of their goals was thB establishment of 
an international rogirnB to promotB certainty in shipping trade and 
uniforrnitv in thf:~ law relating to contracts of carriage. This \Mas done 
at the International Conference on i"laritime Lali\1 held at Brussels in 
October1 1923. It amended and adopted the International Convention 
for the Unification of certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading 
(thB "Hague Rules"). Bv the vear 1975, over nightv countries around 
the world had ratified and acceded to tile Convention~8 ' In 1924, 
Britain and Australia passed legislation to give effect to it~9 
Our chief concern here is whBther, aE;ide from the rights of a 
bill of lading holder to obtain compensation from the carrier in a 
personal action, the former is able to proceed against the shipowner 
and the carrving vessel. Bills of lading issued for thB carriage of' 
1,4. Ibid .. s. 1. 
t1S. Ibid., s. 2. 
46. Ibid., s. 3. 
it?. Ibid., s. 5. 
48. See William TetlE~V, Marine Carqo Claims, cit. pp. lt87-489. 
49. The Carriage of Cioods Act 1924 (LJ.I"\.) was repealerJ. The 
[::arriaqe of GoorJs tJy Sea Act 1971 (U.I"\.) (c. 19) gives effect 
to the Ha~]ue l~ules, as amended tJv the Brussels Protocol 1968 
(or the VislJV f~ules). The Brussels Protocol 1968 has not been 
qiven effnct in /\ustralia. See ~1na-Carriaqo of Goods /\ct. 
1924-75 (Cornth.). 
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goods by foreign ships into .1\ustralia are usually subject to the~ Hague! 
Rules. The matters under consirJeration are directiv relevant ~111t1en 
/\ustralian importers contemplate imtituting actions ill. rem und[~r the 
1\dmiralty Court ..L\ct 1861 (Imp.). 
An interesting Australian case in point is J. [1adsden Pty. and 
/\not her \J. Australian Coastal Shipping Commission_?0 ,!4. cargo of tin-
plate \,vas carried on board a ship belonging to the Australian St1ipping 
Commission from Port Kembla (N.S.lJJ.) to f<.winana (l1J.A.). The bills of 
lading issued by B.H.P., the charterer, who opecated as carrier, were 
subject to the Sea-Carriage of' Goods /\ct_ 192l~-19T3 (Comth.). rhey 
~111eee not signed on behalf of the ship or the shipowner. Due to the 
entry of water into the hold, rust damage was caused to the tinplate. 
Under the contract of carriage subject to the Commonwealth f\ct in-
corporating the Hague Rulr::~s. the two parties involved were the carr-
ier and the bill of lading holders, as consignees. 1'\s the cargo damag~; 
occurred more than a year ago and no writ of surnrmms had been issw=Jd, 
the rights of the consignerJs against the canier under the Hague 
Rules were therefoee extinguished. Rule 6 of f\rticl8 III of the Hague 
Rules, inter alia, reads: 
"In anv event the carrier and the ~;hip shall be discharged 
from all liability unless it [the action] is brought within 
one year aftt:!r delivery of the goods or the date when the 
goods should have been delivere(J." 
The plaintiff consignees, however, sued tile shipowner on the basis of 
bailment and also in tort. 
In the trial court, Sheppard, J., rejected the d~"fences of the 
shipowner who relied on rule 6 of Ar·ticle III, and ga\/e judgment for 
the consignees. The appeal against the judgment was unanimously 
dismissed. One cannot but applaud the learned /\ppeal Judges, Moffit 
and Samuels, for the sound reasoning and consteuction applied to thE: 
Hague Rules. They have shed nmv light in a number of respects on 
the rights of shippers and bill of lading holdee!:-J. 
Firstlv, it was held that the shipowner, not being a party to 
the contract of carriage, was not entitled to er~lv on rule 6 of Article 
III. Although Article I defines "Carrier" to include ''the owner", 
1)0. (1977) 31 F. L.R. E)7. 
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the shipowner can only be brought within the rulfJS if he is a party to 
the contract covered by a bill of lading. Otherwise tt1e rules, e.g. 
rule 6 of Article III and rule 1 of /~rticle IV, 11\Jhich provide for dis-
charge from liability, will not extend to a person who is sued for lia-
bility in tort arising outsic18 the contract. 
The omission to include the shipmvm:'r by name in the definition 
of "carrier'' or failure to issur~ the !Jill of lading on behalf of the 
shipowner prmmd to be a l-vindfall for tt1e comignees.'::i1 Although the 
case report makes no mention of this matter, they were fortunato in 
another respect. If the ship had been on chartor by demise to B.H.P., 
it is submitted that the position would ha\Je been different. Bv the 
law of carriage of goods, B.H.P. as domise charterer would be the 
employer of the crew on board and ha\/e possession of the ship and 
the goods put em board. Since in such circumstances, the shipowner 
is not placed under am; duty of care with respect to the cargo shipp-
ed, he cannot be held liable to thE~ consignees. 
Second, according to Samuels, J.A., the ust~ of "carrir~r11 and 
11ship" in rule 6 of Article Ill. rule 2 of Article I\/ aruJ i\rticle \Ill ~~as 
designed to distinguish the liability of the carrier from that of the 
ship. One can certainly agn;e with his well-reasoned proposition as 
regards the alternative subject of liability unrJm· the Hanue Rules. 
The vessel used for the carriage of goods can itself, in an admiralty 
action i.!..!_ ~· be held liab1e or responsible for the cargo loss or darn-
age. His viBw certainly offers great potential for cargo claimants. 
Moreover, if tho Hague Rules wen::: held to confnr on courts admiralty 
jurisdiction over ships, proceedings ill .. .I.:.lli!.L could be instituted against 
the carrying ship without refenmce to the /\cJrnlraltv Court /\ct 1861 
(Imp.). 
Third, the word "ship" in rule 6 of Article III ls not held to in-
clude the owners and thom~ intemsted in her. By giving a restricted 
51. Generally, the charterparty pro\lides tl1at the charterer 
is bound to indemnifv the shipowner for any liatJility in-
curred towards bill of lading hold1::rs beyond that express-
ly ~>tatecl in the charterparty. See, e.g. paragraphs 7 and 
9 of "Baltirne 1939", as amended ir1 197~ 
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meaning to the word, the court is realh; relegating all such persons 
to the position of strangers to the contract of carriage. The signif-
icance of the decision lies in enhancing the number of persons who 52 
may be held liable as well as the remedies available to cargo interests. 
On the other hand, a bill of lading can be signed by the ship's 
master and issued on behalf of the shipowner, thus making the latter 
a party to the contract of carrias~e. For cargo loss or damage, or 
delay, in delivery, a claimant under the Hague Rules may proceed in a 
personal action against the carrier or, where appropriate, institute 
an action ill !:.§!D. against the vessel. 53 This principle of liability of 
the carrier and the ship is subject to three defences. Rule 6 of Art-
icle III has already been considered. Lllhere a carrier or vessel is 
proceeded against for loss, damage or delay in delivery due to the 
ship's unseaworthiness, it is a defence that the due diligence required 
under rule 1 of Article III has been exercised. Lastly, by rule 2 of 
Article IV, "Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for 
loss or damage,'' resulting from one or more of the causes in para-
graphs (a) to (q). 
The Hamburg Rules. Developments in shipping and trade prac-
tices during the last two decades have rendered the Hague Rules in-
adequate in mam,1 ways. The Brussels Protocol 1968 was an interim 
measure to upgrade the Hague Rules for the purpose of dealing with 
some of the problems. However, apart from the fact that in 1978 only 
ten countries had ratified or acceded to the Protocol, 54 its benefit 
to cargo interests in terms of Gxtending the right of instituting ad-
miralty action in !1llD is doubtful. Par'agraph (e) of Article II disen-
titles the carrier and the ship from the right to limit liability where 
the damage is caused intentionally, or recklessly and knowingly. 
52. It also means that the defences and limitation of liabilitv 
under the Hague RulE~s will not avail them. 
53. J. Gadsclen Ptv. and Another _v. Australian Coastal Shipping 
Commission (1977) 31 F. L. R. 157, p. 162. 
54. Or tht:! \Iisby Rules which came into force on 23rd July, 1977: 
William Tetley, ]:'larine Cargo Claims_, op. cit., p. 1,98. 
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Under rule 4 of /'\rticle IIT, a similar disentitlement appliE:!S to carrier's 
s8rvants. The effect of these provisions is to increase the compen-
sation recoverable against the ship or the carrier rather than to 
. extend the right of proceeding rem. At the Conference commned 
in HE1mbul'g, the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea was signed on 31st March, 1978. 55 It is known as the Hamburg 
Rule~3~ 6 When ratified by tho requisite number of States and given 
effect as municipal lm.,;s, they will replace the Hague Rules. 
The Hamburg Rules are intended to apply to all contracts of 
carriage by sea between two different States if any of the criteria in 
paragraphs(ill to (g2 of Article II rule 1 is met. Their wide-ranging 
mandatory application will ensure international uniformity in the 
law relating to bills of lading. It the common understanding adopted 
at the United Nations Conference that tho 1iat1Uity of the carrier 
under the Hamburg Rules is based on the principle of presumed fault 
or neglect. Except in certain cases modified by the provisions of the 
Rules, the general rule is that the burden of rebuttinq the presumption 
rests on the carrier. 
It is thougllt that thE~ presumption of fault or neglect based 
on cargo loss or dama~Je, or delav in delivery will facilitate i!2 rem 
proceedings being brought against the ship. The United States dele-
gation had rightly foreshadowed that "omission of a provision for some 
sort of ~jurisdiction was a fatal defect which would create great 
difficulties ln the United States and rendf3r any eventual adherence 
to the new convention very unc!c:rtain .... " 57 Another serious pitfall to 
be avoidPd was to pre\/Wlt carrier interests ft·orn introrJucing into 
the Convention provisions which would considerably disadvantage 
55. United Nations Commission on International Trade! Lmv Year-
book, Vol. IX: 1978, p. 212. 
56. See 1'\. Gronfors, "The HarntJurg Rules - Failure or Success'' 
(1978) J.B.L. 334. 
5/. Joseph S~'lieeney, "The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carri-
of Goods by Sea (Part I)", (1975) -7 (No. 1) J.M.L.C., p. 96. 
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cargo interests as to forum selection. Eventuallv a compromise rem 
provision was preserved in paragraph 2 (Q) of Article 21. This eeads: 
"Nothwithstanding the preceding provisions Df this article, 
an action rnav be instituted in the courts of arw port or 
place in a Contracting State at which the carrying vessel 
or any other vessel of the same ownership may have been 
arrested in accordance with the applicable rules of the 
law of that State and of international law. How£.-!VDr, in 
such a case, at the petition of the defendant, the claimant 
must remm1e the action, at his choice, to one of the juris-
dictions referred to in paragraph 1 of this article For the 
determination of the claim, but before such remm1al thB 
defendant must furnish security sufficient to ensurE! pay-
ment of anv judgment that mav subsequentlv be awardBd 
to the claimant in the action." 
The benefits to cargo interests of the first part of the paragraph 
depend on the admiraltv jurisdiction exercisable by the courts of a 
Contracting State. As has been noted, the position in Australia is 
governed by section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act 1B61 (Imp.). In res-
pect of outward-bound goods shippc-Hj under bills of lading, it may be 
thought that cargo claimants can choose a forum in one of the Con-
tracting States where the national low permits procef)dings in to 
be brought ogainst the carrying Vl3Ssel or her sister ship. It is common 
knowledge that governments, public authorities, horbour boards and 
privote persons can, in certain circumstances, under existin9 domestic 
laws and regulations arrest m~ detain ships. Hov.1ever, paragraph 2 (a) 
does not extend such a right under thE! dorm~stic laws of a C:ontmcting 
State to cargo claimants. The.! IIIIDrcJing of the fii'st paet of the para-
graph suggests that the arrest of a ship - whether it be the carrying 
or the sister ship - must be in accordance with the "law of that Stote 
and .•. international law." This expression is not defined in the Ham-
burg Rules. The submission is that it refl3rs to a State's legislation 
or municipal law giving effect to thE~ lnternationc:ll ConvEmtion relating 
to the Arrest of Seogoing Ships 1952.58 As para~]rapl1 2 (a) speak~~ of 
the arrest of 11the carrving vessel or anv other vessel of the sBme 
58. For text of this Convention, ~:;ee RPqister uf Conventions 
Bnd Other Instruments cuncurning InternaUonal rrade Law, 
United Nations (1973), vol. I, pp. 156-163. Australia is not 
listed as o signatory. 
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r9 
ownership," the 1952 Arrest Convention is meant.) ff this view is 
correct. the in-rem process in paragraph 2 will onlv avail caego 
claimants where t:he Contracting State has adoptt::cJ the 1952 Areest 
Convention and givPn pffEJct to it as part of its national laws. 
An underlying object of paragraph 2 (a) is to enable cargo 
claimants to obtain sufficient security from a shipowner as a comJi-
tion for the release of the anested ship. On meeting this require-
ment, the defendant is entitled to have the action removed, at his 
choice. to one of the jurisdictions provided for in paragraph 1 of 
Article 21. 
IV. NECESSARIES AND SERVICES TO SHIPS 
It is proposed to consider the position of creditors who have 
provided necessaries and services to ships. 
1. Necessitous Circumstances 
It has been observt:Jd that part of Britain 1 s policy t.vas to main-
tain and expand her merchant fleet. Wherev~::!r possible overseas fin-
ancial resourn~s anrl trade crEJdits were ulitised. An aspt:Jct of this 
policy is the long-recognised authority of a master, when faced with 
an emergency in a foreign port, to obtain the supply of necessaries 
and services on account of the st1ipmvners and the ship. Since~ the 
first half of the nineteenth centurv, a number· of factors have combined 
to boost the demands on mateda1 men and ship repairers in the Empire. 
At cornrnon laiAI, shipowners were under an absolutrc] warranty as to Ultc] 
seaworthiness of the ship at the commencement of the vovaoe and 
.. w 
also at the commencement of each stage thnreot. LatFH', by the 
Merchant Shipeing Act 1876 (Imp.), the obligation as to the ship 1S sea-
worthiness was imported into everv umplovnmnt contrAct made between 
shipowners and seamen?1 This undertaking - a~:; noted previously -
has berm re-Emactc~d in the 1912-/5 (Cornth.)?2 The 
59. :1ec~ para. 1 of /\rticle III. Tilt! proviBiOn!'> of this ConvPn-
tion ha\le not been given thEl for'Ct:l of law in 1\ustrnlia. 
60. ~~~~~~~~~~~~ (12th ed. 1971). vol. l, paras. 
107; 115-116. 
61. 39 & 40 Vic., c. 80, c.L 5. 
62. ~iection 59, supra. 
312 
power eXIJrcisable by certain authorities or persDns to detain ships 
for non-compliance IAiith statutory requirements often prompted ship-
owners and masters to obtain adequate supplies to, and the necr3ssary 
repairs done on,their ships. In Australia, besides the list of safety 
requirements to be met under the Navigation Act_ (Comth.), there arB 
further conditions to be observed under other legislation. Many of 
the safety measures are thE~ outcome of international cDnventions.63 
They usually extend to ships of all countries which are signatories 
to the conventions. Moreover, shipowners and carriers will suffer 
substantial loss of freight if their ships are ill-equipped or not cargo-
worthy. Naturally importers, trade financiers and marine underwriters 
will steer clear of transactions involving the carriage of goods by 
such ships. 
It is interesting to note how the expanding demands for the 
provision of necessaries and services to ships on credit have shaped 
the development of maritime law. It ls probable that foreign States 
whose legal systems were founded on civil law tradition had long im-
posed a maritime lien on the ship for necessaries supplied. 64 In Britain, 
however, the lien would only exist if a bottomry bond had been prop-
erly given~5 The \/alidity of the bond depended on the absolute 
necessity of the case. Dr. Lushington in The Trident66 defined the 
situation as follows: "Where the master is in such a condition that 
it is impossible for him to meet the necessary disbursements, and he 
has no means of procuring money but upon the credit of the ship." 
63. ~ Con\/ention on the International Regulations for preven-
ting Collisions at Sea 1972; International Convention for ttle 
Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 and ttle 1978 Protocol; and Inter-
national Con\/ention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships 1969-
scheduled to Nm;iqation Amendment Act 1979 (Comth.), Part 
III. 
64. See G. & C.J. Northcote v. The Owners of the Henrich Bior!J 
(1886) 11 App. Cas. 270, p. 274 (House of Lords), IAitlere counsel 
for appellants referred to Abbott 011 Shipping (5th ed.), pp. 
108, 109. 
65. It confers on the person advancinsJ money a maritime lien on 
the ship, freight and cargo: The Onward (1873) 42 L.J. Adrn .. 
p. 70. As to bond respondentia, see tt1e cargo ex. Sultan 
(1859) Swab. 504, 510; inft'fl. 
66. (1839) 1 W. Rob. 29, 31. 
313 
It is possible that in many instances masters were either· unwilling to 
hypothecate their ships or the bottomry bonds executed were invalid. 
One undesirable consequence was that material men and ship repairers 
were placed in a lt:Jss advantageous position uncler English law than 
under the civil law. In the absence of a bottomry bond, under English 
law creditors who had provided materials and services to ships could 
only enforce their claims by personal action. Such defects in the law 
were a grave setback to Britain's shipping policv and the [Jrowth of 
her ship-repair and other related industries. In the early part of the 
nineteenth century, English and foreign creditors began to institute! 
proceedings in civil law courts in order to secure better remedies. 
2. Dilemmas of Creditors 
It is crystal clear that English maritime 
law was deficient. Even though personal actions could be instituted 
in England, they might not yir~ld satisfaction as the shipowners might 
be insolvent. The frequent in\JolvBment of agents and charterers 
made it difficult to determine the identity, the credit-worthiness and 
the ~.<;hereabouts of forBign shipowners. 
John MansfiEJld in his learned article said:67 
"i\lthough it is clear that the Court of 1\dmiraltv prior to 
1840 exercised ... rm jurisdiction O\Jer claims for necessar-
ies supplied, as is usually the case, on the land, whether 
in this countrv or abroad: it is by no means clear that 
the court would have refust=Jd to entertain a suit for nec-
essaries supplied on the high seas, if any such case could 
be supposed to arise under circumstances not amounting 
to a salvage ser\/ice. Nor is it all clear how such a juris-
diction, if exercised, could have been prohibited, seeing 
that it t'l!ould not have been obnoxious to the statutes of 
Richard II.'' 
In the light of IMhat Mansfield said, it is vital to enquire whether the 
Court of /\drniraltv exercised jurisdiction in 1::_gm in claims for necess-
aries supplied, and, lf it did, whether it was lawfullv assumed. Fortun-
ately, WE) have from ttle f.lrivv Council case of The 17Tt'IIO Ellens" 68 
67. (1888) 4 L.Q.R. 379, p. 38l~o His view is based on the writings 
of Edward Coke in 6 Rep. Admiralty. Part XII, p. 79, and on 
Cornyn's DicJ8~3t in Title Admiralty, E. 19, 1793 mJ. 
68. Donald Johnson \J. John Alexander Black (The ''Tw_Q_Ellens") 
(1872) L.R. 4 P.C. 161. 
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authoritative statements that answer both questions. In delivering 
tho judgment, Mellish, L.J., pointed out in these words: 69 
"It is clear that, previous to the passinrJ of the 3 & l, Viet. 
c. 65 [i.e. the Acimiraltv Act 1840) the Court of Admiralty 
had no jurisdiction in the case of necessaries supplied to 
a ship ... It is perfectly true that for many years prior to 
the time of Charles II, the Court of Admiralty had claimed, 
and to a considerable extent exercised, such a jurisdiction; 
but the Courts of Common Law in the time of Charles II, 
and subsequently, had prohibited thorn from exercising that 
jurisdiction on the ground that they never possessed it." 
Despite the Court of Admiralty's assumption of the jurisdiction for 
many years, the Privy Council held cat.egorily, as it had done prev-
iously in The Neptune_70 that the Court of Admiral tv ne\Jer had, by 
the law of England, such competence?1 Moreover, in the absence of 
express statutory provision, the inherent jurisdiction would not 
authorise the Court of Admiralty to entertain in 
72 
aries supplied. 
suits for necess-
Closel\; related to the supply or' necessaries is the provision 
of tm ... JagB services 1.~hich are of n~cent oricJin. There are two confl ic-
ting views. Accordin~J to William and Bruce, ttle r·ight to proceed 
against the ship for towage services rendered was not created by 
statute tJut had existed before ~vith no maritime lien. 73 Without defin-
ite authm·ities on the matter, one can onlv surmise that, if IJJilliam 
and Bruce were correct?h the remedies granted by the Court of 
Admiralty were beyond its competence. One remote possibility, which 
cannot be entirely ruled out, is this. Under its ancient jurisdiction, 
a plaintiff could enforce his claim W.. personam, without the l..'.§2. being 
affected, where the towage services were rendered on the high seas?5 
3. Imperial Reforms affecting /\ustralia 
Despite the bitter opposition of common law judges in the past, 
69. Ibid., p. 166. 
70. 1 Knapp's P.C. Cases 94. 
71. (1872) L.R. 4 P.C. 161, pp. 166-167. 
72. As to matters dealt with in the exercise of inhenmt juris-
diction, see Chapter Nine. 
73. See The Henrich Bjorn (1886) 11 App. Cas. 270, p. 283 (P.C.) 
~~here Lord Bramwell referred to Williams & Bruce, Admiralty 
practice, p. 152. -
74. Apparently, the case of The Isatmll, 3 Hagg. 427, concerning 
simple t~wage carne before Sir John Nicholl in 1 EBB. 
75. The Henrich Bjorn (1886) 11 1\pp. Cas. 270, p. 283, ll£ll: Lord 
F3ramwell. 
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st£~ps were taken to restore to the HiDil Court of /\drnir<Jltv rart of 
its ancient rule. By widening the admiraltv jurisdiction and reforming 
the maritime law. Britain was abla to capture l1er share of the lucra-
tive litigation involving foreign sl1ips, and promote her national ship-
supply c-md sllip-rernir industries. 
7G Under U1e 1840 Act (Imp.), rassed as the first phase of the 
reforms, the Court was empowered, inter~ to dECJcide all claims and 
demands "for supplied to any fon~ign or sea-going 
and to enforce pavment thereof .... " Tile section applied whether the 
necessaries were supplied to a foreign ship when she was t.vithin the 
body of an English county or upon the high seas. Dr. Lushington was 
renowned for his far-sighted judgments. These so supplemented the 
existing law as to further the shipping interests and policy of Britain. 
Apparently his goal that the Court of Admiralty should be able to 
compete on equal terms with its foreign civil law counterparts promp-
ted him to grant a new remedy. Thus in The West Friestland, 77 decided 
in 1859, and in 78 decided ln 1863, he held that by rea-
son of section 6 of the 1840 Act (Imp.) the plaintiffs who supplied 
necessaries to a foreign ship in an English port had a maritime lien. 
These authorities and others which applied the proposition had left 
their imprint on English law. As recent as 1957. an Australian Supreme 
Court judge remarked: 79 "I think it is still open to at'gument, in juris-
dictions bound bv decisions of the Privy Council, tl1at section 6 of 
the 1840 Act conferred a maritime lien on material men." 
Pmotl1er ~>ignificant thrust LNC!f> made to strengthen the juri:;-
diction of the Court of /\dmirElltv. It ste:1rtt:!d l'\Jith the distir·,cticm 
·.~so drawn between a fonlign port amJ other . Dr. Lushingtnn sc:nu: 
76. 3 & 4 Vic., c. s. 6. 
77. Swab. 45th 
78. Br. & L. 32. 
79. Dalqety and Co. Ltd. v. l\itchison; Tile "F~ose Pearl" [19571 
2 F.U,. 219, p. 226, Qer KriE~waldt, J., who anah;sl~d thfJ 
authorities. 
80. The India 32 L.J. (Ad.) 185, p. 187. Dr. Lushingtun'~3 view 
~'lias cited with approvCJl by A.L. Smith, L.J., in The l\.1ecca 
[1895] P. 9S. p. 112 (C.A.). 
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111 think it is impossible to maintain that the words 'in the 
body of a county, or upon the high seas' involve necess-
aries supplied in a foreign port; nor do I see any express-
ion from which I could infer that a foreign port was included." 
The 1.1ill1 process availed creditors who sought to enforce payment 
for necessaries supplied to Foreign ships anywhere on the high seas 
except in foreign ports. lt h~d the far-reaching nbject of diverting 
Enolish and foreign merchants, who had provided such necessaries, 
from instituting actions til civil law courts. A valuable negative aspect 
vvas to deprive the ship chandlers and repairers in foreign ports of the 
statutory remedy. Consistent with the pre-conceived objectives, Dr. 
Lushington held in The Wataga81 that section 6 of the 1840 Act (Imp.) 
conferred Admiralty jurisdiction over a claim for necessaries supplied 
to a foreign ship in a colonial port. Later, the words "high seas" were 
held to include foreign ports which were not located in any artificial 
basins or docks excavated out of the land. This was an attempt by 
the Court of Admiralty to draw more overseas-based merchants to 
enforce their claims in England. It is interesting to note that the 
amalgamation of the various courts in England under the Supreme 
Court of Judicature Acts 1873 (U.K.) 82 did not prevent the judges from 
continuing to extend the admiralty jurisdiction. This trend is shown 
in the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in The Mecca, decided 
in 1894. Lindley, L.J., said: 83 
'' ... on general principles of law, I should arrive at the con-
clusion that, in this case, the Court of Admiralty had under 
the Act of 1840, jurisdiction to proceed against the Mecca 
when in this country for the coals supplir~d to her in Alex-
andria and Algiers, she being supplied on the high seas at 
those places, although they are also pof'ts." 
Further impetus to the growth of the jurisdiction of the High Court 
of Admiralty came from logislation. The authorities discussed above 
and the provisions of the Imperial f\dmiralty Court Acts, 1840 and 1861, 
underlie the development of Austmlian maritime law on the subject. 
Section 4 of 1861 1\ct (Imp.). Where 11 the ship or proceeds there-
of are under arrest of the Court," claims for the building, equipping 
81. (1856) Sw. 165; 166 E.R. 1075; followed in Dalgety and Co. Ltd. 
v. /\itchison; The "Rose Pead" (1957] 2 F.L.R. 219, p. 225. 
82. 36 & 37 Vic., c. 66. This Act,as subsequently amended. carne 
into force on 1st November, 1075. 
83 (1895] P. 95, p. 108. A.L. Smith, L..J., WEmt. even further: p. 116. 
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and repairing of the ship I..;Jould gi\m ri~il~ tD ilctions in rtJrn. ~)inc£~ 
different conditions must be satisfit?cJ irl relation to ~3ection::l L, and ':i, 
tim nature of the work done Oil, ur ~3m'\/ice~:; remJered to, a :3r1ip has 
to be distinguished. The f'!nligt 1teninEJ ce1se of \J. 
The Ship ''Kaptayanni"84 dealing c'llith section t1 CiJmE! lJl'~fore thP- ~)up-
reme Court of Victoria. 1n thc~ admiral tv action i.!J.. lht'l plaintiff 
cornpanv, carrving on busim'l:'ls as :;hip chand!t.~rs and r~C~pain:~rs at 
Geelong, claimed the sum of mmr $25,00!1 Thi~; dt'lbt ti\Jas incurred foi' 
the supplv to the ship of a r'otaey pump, ~;ornn turnlJuckles and fifty 
nuts and bolts, and in respect of a ~'hip-cle<:ming operation to rende1 
her holds fit to carry a cargo of qmin. Thf: lnar'ned judgE! Papc~ 
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the claim was for the repairing 
of the ship. In his \/iew, the cleaning oper·ation and tho use of tum-
buckles to hold dmvn the feeder hntchos in ttlR ~ol1ip'~; decks were not 
. H 'd 85 I'f)pairs. e sa1 : 
"1 am disposed to think that all cJf LtlF!St-1 \tJCJrks may be 
said to constitute equipping of the ~;l1ip Lhev IAIEH'e op-
erations necessary to be unrJertakPn to make t.hP. ~;hiP 
fit to carry out the primarv purposB foe IAillich shE! was 
at the port of Geelong, namely to load a carqo of wheat 
and carry it to /\lexandria, am1 1.<\.lhen they were completed 
and not before was she equipped to urldBrtake ttle carr-
iage of the cargo. It 
The criterion adopted by Pape, J., is a practical solution, but impre-
cise in that the meaning of "equippin~:l'' in each ca!:Je is determinecJ bv 
the purpose for which the iterns and are required. Little 
difficulty is encountered where a specific \/oyage uncJer fairlv predic-
table weather and marine conditions irwolving tl1e shipment of a known 
commodity is concerned. It is questionable wr1ether tho criterion 
could apply if the items and ser\/ices are prm1idecJ to enable the ship 
meet tho obligations of her owner unUer a six -month charterparty. 
If a passenger ship is later con\/erled for u:c;e as a cargo ship, it i~i 
doubtful whether all the works previouslv done on her could be 
collectively d£:Jscribed as equipping. Undee the new AcJmiralty 
84. [1971~] V.H. 465. 
85. Ibid., p. 471. 
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Act (Comth.) to be enacted, Australia should pursue similar goals as 
the United Kingdom. As part of Australia's shipping policy, the courts 
here should give to the words of section '•· 11building equipment and 
repairing", a wide meaning that is commonly understood by shiptJuilders, 
ct1andlers and repairers in their trades. 
According to Roscoo~6 tho "equipping of the ship" relates to 
\,vork done on the ship Cls opposed to things supplied to it. With res-
pect, this view fails to take into account tr1at the parts or items 
supplied are often to be affixed to tht"l ship as additional or replace-
ment equipment. Under a single contract, a repairer may have to 
provide new items and skillfJd labour. For example, in Lewmarine Pty. 
v. The Ship"Kaptayanni",87 the rotary pump supplied by the plain-
tiff company was fitted to thE~ starboard lifeboat w1·1ich had no pump. 
It will be unpractical if the service or labour component is dealt with 
under section 4 and the parts though supplied and woeked into the 
ship by the same repairer are dealt with undee section 5. 
An interesting element of the case concerns the arrest of the 
ship. This is a prerequisite for the exercise of the admiralty juris-
diction in rem under section 14. Both the 11\Jeit and warrant of arrest 
---
were issued and served on the ship on the same day (i.B. on 25th 
March, 1971), apparently in that order, but with some time difference 
in between. Applying the proposition laid down by Lord Mansfield in 
_Puqh v. Duke of Leeds88 that 11ln law them is no fraction of a day", 
Pape, J., held that the two events took place at the same time. A 
South Australian case which falls on the other side nf the line is 
Kali Boat Building and Repair Pty. Ltd. v. rhe Motor Fishing Vessel 
"Bosna" and Others~9 The plaintiff company claimEld against a motor 
86. E.S. Roscoe, The Admiralty Juf'isdiction and Practice of the 
High Court of JusticE! (5th ed. 1931), p. :?07. · 
87. See footnote above. 
88. (1777) Z Cowp. 714; McGuffie, Fu~eman & [)ray, Admiralty Prac-
(vol. 1, British Shipping LaiAIS), pp. 8 and 9. ltJhr~rever 
necessary, the court will always inquire as to the time a 
particular event took place: Miller v. (195lt) 92 C.L.R. 
406, p. 411. 
89 (1977) 19 S.A.S.R. 112. 
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fishing vessel and also sevE::ral dDfrJmJants for Em amount alleqedly 
due for work done on, and nE!ce~;sarie~> supplied to, it. AlthOUf]h the 
writ and the warrant of arrest were both issut:?d on 19th September, 
'1977, the former was sen1ecl on se:mm dew, but tl\8 lntter 1/\las not ser-
\18d until 21st ~)epternber. As the action was not recognizable in the 
admiralty jurisdiction of the Suprr~me Court. the writ and the warrant 
of arrest were therefore set aside. These two apparently conflicting 
decisions are reconcilable on the r]I'ouml that a \Jessel is onlv "under 
arrest of the Court" wherE:! the tvarrant of an·est has been served. 
This event must occur either before. or Dn the sanm dav, the 1"wit is 
served on the ship. ff1e date of their issue tw the court is irrele-
vant. Moreover, the wording of the ~mction makes it clear that a 
cmditor has no right to proceed against the ship before the arrest. 
rmn unlv arises from the moment the arrest is 
offectr:Jd and has rto relation back tu tile issue of the warrant or the 
tirne of thrcJ £!quipping of the ship. rt1at protJablv Pxplains 
f t t . ' t . t I . .. ' I . t . . f f t. fJ(J ore , 18 r1g1l arl~38S, , 18 SB['VlCB Ut r: 18 WI'l lS HHJ PC '!VB. 
It provides foe procrJedings iD, to be bmught 
ar]ainst British as wrJll as foreign :;hips to enforce claims for necess-
arie~3 supplied. Its scope will be considered in Llle li~Jht of case auth-
orities and ttle tc...;o provisos to the ::3E'Ction. 
I. /\ucJtraliElfl juc1ges havu on the wllolt:l endorsed the wide mean-
ing giv~Jn to tile tt:::!rm "necossarie~," hv Er1glish judges. The definition 
in admiralty law gil;en to it b\1 1\bbott, C.J., in v. Sc'Jekamp is 
unparalleled. He said: 91 
"I am of opinion, that whatever is fit and pmper for the 
service on ~\ltlich a vessel is r:mga[JE;!d, wt1utr::!ver the owmJr 
of that vessel, a~.J a prudent man would hCJve ordr~red, if 
pmsent at the time, comes \\Ji thin th(J mEwning or the term 
'necessarv' as applied to thosf-J repairs dorm ancJ things 
prm1ided for the ship bv ordee of the ma~>tE!r, fcH' which 
the m"JrlEjrS C\re liable." 
It has been consistently· adopted and app!iE~d in both English and f\us-
tralian cases. 92 The attitude of judqes is reflucted in the worcJs of 
90. [19S?] 2 F.L.R. 219, .=..:;..;;..;..· 
91. (1821) L, Barn & Ald. 352, 354. 
92. H1e Riqa (1H72) L.n. 3 r\ & E 516; \J. Buchhei: 
ster & Co. [1908) /\.C. t.t)B. p. l;66 (F)rivv Council); Christie \J. 
The Ship "l~anJ" (1926) 27 S.R. (N.S.Ltl.) l;£,3, p. l;4r), per Street, 
C.J.; followed in v. The Ship "Knpta~<mni" 
[1974] V.R. 465. 
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Dr. Lushington in The PerlE!. He sairi: 93 
11The Court INill not put a restricted meaning on the term 
'necessaries' in this ven; beneficial statute so as to con-
fine it to things absolutely and unconditionally ntJCl-1ssary 
for a ship in order to put to sea." 
Unfortunately, Abbott, C.J.'s proposition may result in the 
defeat by shipowners of the purpose of ~;ection :i, namely, the provis-
ion of in I.:.2!!l actions. For material men, there is a further setback 
to their claim~:J. Goods and whatever itr:Jms suppliE~d. which fail to 
qJalify as necessaries, fall outside the ambit of the provision. It 
appears that shipowners are under no personal liability. In such cir-
cumstances, the person providing Um articles and services is in the 
position of a volunteer, and the benefits conferred are in the nature 
of bounties. It is submitted that he is denied the right of recovery 
under the law of quasi -contract.% In practice, however, the problems 
seldom occur. Ship chandlers and repairers ltJill only supply items and 
spares on credit when expressly I'equested by shipowners or their 
agents who act in compliance with the reports of SUJ'vevor·s. It is 
plausible that the judicial recognition of the exclusive right of ship-
owners to determine what are necessaries is based on maritime law 
principles. Shipowners are personally duty-bound to ensure that their 
ship is seaworthy and that the statutory requirements are met. 
I I· r The 1emedy p10vided by section 5 is ;:;ubject to two condi-
tions to be satisfied. First, an action in personam must lie against 
the owner at the time when the ill ~suit is institutod. This require-
ment is not met where the claim is unenforceable, §.:.9..:. when statute-
93. (1858) Swab. 353, 354, when speaking of the Admiralty Court 
18£1D (Imp.), s. 6. 
9l~o The commonlv quoted statement of Bowfm, L.J., in v. 
Scotti~;h Imperial Insurance Co. (1886) 34 Ch. D. 234, pp. 2l~8-
249, is the authority: 11The general principle is, beyond all 
questions, that the work or labour done or money expended 
by one man to preserve or benefit the property of another 
rJoes not according to English law create any Hen upon the 
propm·ty saved ... nor even create any obli~Jation to repav 
the expenditure." See also Stoljar, fhe Law of Quasi-Con-
trc3Ct (196h), pp. 178-lBO. 
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barred. Second, it is nDt m;ery supply of "necessariBf.in to a ship that 
will render her owners personr:JllY liable. This problem highliqhted 
in the decision in v. The Ship "Lastrigon_i". 95 A for-
eign ship under a time charter to !"U.S./\. was arrf:~sted in Melbourne 
and proceeded against in admiralty. The plaintiff~; sought to recover 
$103,230.50 for bunkers supplied to the ship under n contract made 
between thernselvm3 ancl Um chartE~rers. Clause 6. ~ of' the contract, 
to which the shipm'liners wer8 not a partv. reDd: 
"Security. Each sale and delivery l1ereunder l'\Jill be made 
on the faith and crecJit of thH vessel to IAihich deli\/ery is 
rnadtc1, as WE:lll as the f<:Jith <md credit of Buyer." 
It was not disputed that tt1e shipowners l>\Jere under no contractual 
liability to pay for thF! bunkers. Both the writ of summons and warr-
ant of arrest were set aside. Thf:! qem:ral rule of admiralty applied 
was that an action rem cannot tm maintainm1 unless there i~:; liabil-
ity in the shipowner~;. 
Two of the views of Mr:mzie~'· J., on sDctiorl :i are rmtewol'thy. 
ThE! first is tl1at necessariE:!S are or1ly 11:3uppliGd to any ship" within 
its meaning if they are suppli(C!d for the owner. Tt1is interpretation 
admits of one exc!~ption. In ruferring to the Privy c=ouncil decision 
-· - . • . ' ~ 96 . . ' 97 in Foong l a1 & Co. \J. E:lucl1he15Ler & [,o., MenZies, J., satd: 
"The case is not an Em::;v one. 13ut it :mems to rllt:) to have 
been decided upon \/BI'Y spE:!cial facts, nmnoly that. al-
though the defendant was not the m>\Jner of the ship in 
question, it was the equit~able owner and that the expen-
diture for nece~3saries was to its benefit." 
His second \Jiet-v rnay be sePn as a warning to creditors contern-
plating admiralty actions in Thus procm~dings under the section 
are not intended "tD allow pressurFJ to be~ put upon a person who is 
himself under no liability in respect of U1e liabilities of others.'' 
Where loss i~:; caust:;d to the shipowner or charter·er as a result of the 
wrongful arrest of the ship, courts should bc~ prepared to award dam-
98 
ages. 
95. [197l;] L,8 A.L.J.R. 295. 
96. [1908] A.C. L,58, 
97. [197!4] 48 A.L.J.R. 295, p. 297. 
98. Cf. Oalgety & c:o. Ltcj_, \t. Aitchi~;on; TllQ ''F::ose PPar]", wherf~ 
the counterclaim for darna[.JB5 for wrongful arrest failed: 
[19571 2 F.L.R. 219, p. 222. 
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III. The remedy open to creditors in ~:;ection 5 suffers an inherent 
weakness. It is easy for shipowners. as debtors, to put the ship be-
yond the admiralty jurisdiction of Australian courts. Under the law, 
no action will lie if at the time of its institution the debtors 
no longer own the ship. In The flenrich Bjorn?9 the appellants brought 
an admiralty suit for recovery of moneys thev had advanced in March 
1882 for equipping, and supplying the necessary stores to, a Nor'IAJeig-
ian ship then lying in the port of Liverpool. Unfortunately, between 
March 1882 and the time when the suit was instituted, there was a 
change in the ownership of the ship. In affirming the decision of the 
Court of Appeal, tl"le House of Lords helrJ that the action could not be 
maintained. 
Naturally, courts will set themsel\;es against any devious trans-
actions fabricated by shipowners to oust trlBir jurisdiction and defeat 
the rightful expectations of creditors. Shipowners who are person-
ally liable to pay for the necessaries supplied are required to dis-
charge a heavy burden of proof. It must be strictly est~ablished that 
on the date of the issue of the warrant of arr·est and writ of summons 
they have completely divested themselves of their title to and inter-
est in the ship. Courts tend to give to rna terial rnen the benefit of 
any doubt on the matter. 
wl1ich came before the Sup-
reme Court of the Northern Territory. The "Rose Pearl" was arrested 
on 18th July, 1957, In the port of Darwin. In the action, the plaintiff 
company sought to recover the price of necessaries previously supp-
lied to the ship at ports in New Zealand, F~abaul and Nournea. On 23rd 
July, 1957, an appearance was entered for "Bruce Aitchison the owner 
of the abovenamerJ ship." Judgment was givon for the plaintiff corn-
pany. The main flaw in the defendant's case ~vas that the bills of 
by which he claimed to have purchased the st1ip on 12th Julv, 1957, 
were for various reasons held to be ineffective to transfer the ship. 
What the defendant should have done is underlined in the wor·ds of 
99. C. & C.J. Northcote v. The Owners of the Hrmrich Bjorn 
[1886] 11 App. Cas. 270, supra. 
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the learned judge Kriewaldt:1 
"Finally, evidence of acts of owm!r~3llip carmut Pl't'\lilil 
against an established legal title; l1r=mclo Lmtil U1o frwrn<li-
ities requisite to effect a transfBr of Dwnr~r~;hip llcli;U 
been effected the Crescent, Corpm·DUDrl rnu'3t lH' LiJkL'fl 
to be the owner .... " 
One submits that it is insufficient that Em mlfDrc:c~EJlllP r:rmtrcwt fm' 
the sale of thB entire ship has tJer~n marJB or· thCJt Uw r~qLJi Lnhll? irll,Pf'-
est in the ship has been assigned to <mothm·. Tllfl n:ilSmlinq. 1~1hir:h 
underlies the above decision, is consistent with Uw Pri\;\; r:uurwil 
decision in Foong Tai & Co. v. Buchheister & Co.? It~; r~ff'Pct is to 
render section 5 applicable wt-mre nece~'>Silries twrJ lJPPn ~itJflp\imJ to 
a person on the credit of the ship prm;idP.d th<:Jt <-Jt the tirnr~ tl1P. ac-
tion was instituted he was an equitable owm~r. 
The right to sue i..Q. rem is lo~it wherP tJH-.) ~;hip is c1Pstroved or 
forfeitE!d under the law. Equc:Jllv it dm?~i nut RxtemJ to irtsur'ance 
moneys recmtered from under·writerc> for her loss or to ttte proceeds 
of a voluntary sale effected tJE!fon=~ thE! mTc~st. 
The Prmtisos. In two situatinr1s, a creclitm· is exprc~sslv pre-
cluded from invoking the ]uriscJiction of U1P coul't under section 5. 
Thev are the suppl\f of "nere~3saries to anv ~;hip .. .in the port to which 
the ship belongs" and proof to the "satisfactinn of the court that at 
the time of the institution of the e<Juse anv owm~r or part owner of 
the ship is domiciled in Er1glanrJ or Wales.'' The underlving reason for 
the provisos was probablv the Hi~lh Court of Admiraltv's reciprocal 
acknowledgement of the jurisdiction of Cornmon Law Courts in return 
for the common law judges' consent to the enactment of the Imperial 
Act. In either of these situations, Um necessaries can be supplied on 
the credit of some person or the undertaking given bv some financial 
institution. The liabilitv incurred IAJill give rise to personal claims 
v..1hich can be enforced at common law without difficultv. By section 
2 (3) (£) of the Colonial Courts of Admiraltv Act 1890 (Imp.), the words 
"England and LLJales" shall be read to rnean "British po~CJSFJssion". 
In relation to Australia, thP provision in sc-.)ctiorl 2 (3) (ill might 
create sorne difficulty. DPspite the passing of thl-.) ~)tatute of 
1. [1957] 2 F.L.R. 219, p. 233. 
2. [1908] 1-\.[. 458. 
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Westminster Adoption Act 1%2 (Comtll.), the Cmnmonwealth of Austral 
has been held to be a British po~1session? An Australian State 
would then be a possession within a (larger) possession. If this reas-
oning is pushed to the extreme, it could imply that the romedy pro-
vided by section 5 would not be avaUable if a shipm111ner or part-owner 
was domiciled within any part of Australia at the time when the action 
was commenced. It is submitted that this view is untenable. 
A case where the two provisos are involved is the Kali Boat 
Building and Repair Pty. Ltd. v. The Motor Fishing Vessel "Bosna" and 
~~..:.u..4 In the admiralty action, the plaintiff claimed against a vess-
el and several defendants for sums due for work done on, and mater-
ials supplied to, the vessel. At all matorial times, the vessel was 
registered at Port Adelaide in the Register of British Ships. The per-
sonal defendants were domiciled in South Australia. Moreover, the 
1n1ork was done and necessaries supplied at Port Adelaide. The warrant 
of arrest and the writ were set aside as the provisions of section 5 
were rendered inapplicable. 
It is important not to confuse a judicial pronouncement, pre-
viously discussed, with one of the provisos to the section 5. The 
former operates to defeat an action in rem if at thB time when it is 
--
instituted the debtor has divested himself of his title to and inter·· 
ests in the ship. The proviso "unless it is shown to the satisfaction 
of the court that at tho time of the institution of the cause any 
owner or part owner of the ship is domiciled in [the British IJu::;::;~:~::;::;;tu! 
fulfils a different objective. It is to enable the in ~action includ-
ing the warrant of arrest to be set aside so that the owner or part 
owner domiciled in an Australian State may be proceeded against per-
sonally. The purpose of the legislature i5 not to defeat the crBditor's 
3. Mcih111raith McEacharn ltd. v. The Shell Comeany of 1\ustralia 
Ltd. (1945) 70 C.L.R., p. 192, gee Latham, C.J.; see also China 
.Pcean Shipping Co. and Others v . .S,tate of South AustraiTB 
(1979-80) 27 A.L.R.1, p. 8, where Barwick, C.J., hold that 
to the 1942 Act (Comtll.) the Comrnon1,vealth was no more than 
a self- governing colony. 
4. (1977] 19 S.A.S.R. 112. 
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claim but to substitute an action personam for one in This 
reason justifies a different meaning being given to the \.<llnrd 11 owner" 
in the proviso. 
Following the Privv Council decision in Foong Tai & Co. v. 
?uchheister & Co.~ Mitchell, J., construed the cvord "o~Atner'' in sBction 
6 5 to mean beneficial owner. lie relied on v. Havmen as a 
"clr:.:ar authoritv for the proposition that the propertv in the sl1ip 
passes by the bill of sale aml is not dependent on the registration of 
that bill of sale." 7 
V. CONCLUSION 
A number of gaps in maritime law havP been filled bv Cornmon-
wealth and State legislation which provides for compensation. How-
ever, where an action i.!J. avails for injuries or loss of life~ it 
offers certain distinct arJvantaqes over the statutDI'V rernedv. A 
successful claimant is able to recover more cornpensatim1 under mari-
timE! law than under the relevant enactment. 9 Ir1 admiral tv proceedings 
in 12.§!.!], once the writ of summom1 is issued, even though it is not, 
served, the right of a claimant is not affected bv the subsequl:Jnt 
change of ownership of the ves~ml. Unfortunately, the rigllt to en-
force pavrnent of statutorv compensation by detainiwJ the srlip is not 
5. Supra. 
6. (1864) 33 L.J. Ex. 170. 1VJitcheiL J., rejected thG proposition 
in Rochester v. The Garden Citv [190B] f\.C. L1 1:l8 that the word 
"m'llner11 in the Adrniraltv Court /\ct 1861 (Imp.), s. 5 meant 
"registered owner". He distinguished the decision on the 
ground that the finding must he read in relation to the facts 
of the case. 
7. (1977] 19 S.A.S.R. 112, p. 115. 
B. As to persons who may brir1g the action ~AJhere dt~ath is wrong-
fully caused, see P .F .P. lliggins, ElemE=mts of Torts in Australia" 
(1970 ed.), pp. 537-540. 
9. E.g., Seamen's Compensation Act 1911-73 (Comth.), Third ScherJ-
ule, specifies tim· amount of compensation recoverablo in 
relation to the different types of injury sufh~red. 
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exr;:}rcisable when the title to the ship is transferred. In contrast to 
the statutory remedy which is usually enforcnable only 111./ithin Austra-
lia, the right to sue is not so restricted. Under the laws the 
' . 
10 d . 11 f l th l ' ·t . Umted Kmgdom an· Smgapore, or exarnp e, · e c a1man , may m-
stitute proceedings aqainst the same ship or a sister ship. 
The claim, whether brought under maritime law DI' for statutorv 
compensation, is for injuries or loss of life suffered bv the seaman. 
It submitted that the proposed Admiralty Act (Comth.) should 
jurisdiction on Australian courts to entertain "no-fault" claims 
on Commonwealth and State legislation. 12 
The Hague Rules suffE~r one major setback. Courts tend not to 
interfere with bill of lading clauses imerted by carriers which are 
adjudged to be outside the scope of the Hague Rules. As has been 
shown in The Cap Blanco: 3 a jurisdictional clause in a bill of lading 
mav prevent a cargo claimant from proceeding in [g!D_ against a ship. 
Unless struck down by rule 8 of Article III, an arbitration clausE1 could 
have a similar effect. It is unfortunate that there is no provision in 
the Hamburg Rules to extend the rights of cargo claimants uncler the 
admiralty law. 
A grave stumbling block to modern methods of cargo transpor-
tation is the use of the term "bill of lading'' in section 6 of trm 
miralty Court Act 1861 (Imp.). It operates to prevent holders of "com-
bined transport documents''. 11through bills of lading" and pm~siblv 
10. See Chapter Nine. 
11. High Court CAdmiraltv Jurisdiction) Act. Cap. 6, Singapore 
Statutes, Rev. Ed. 1970, s .. 3 (1) (f2.. 
12. The decision in The !'-1oliere [19251 P. 27 makes the poc:Jition 
clear. lt was held that claims in of loss of life 
which give no right of action for damages but only a ri~Jht 
to statutory compensation fall outside the admiralty juris-
diction. [1909] P. 176. An occident occurrt:Jd 
as a result of negligence of the defendants' servants 
in navigating their vessel. fhe sum paid bv the plaintiFf 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (U.K.) wa~J lleld 
to be recoverable as no damages in an admiral tv action in 
personam. -
13. [1913] P. 130. 
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non-negotiablE:: receipts 14 from irl\loking the section. 
The provisions conferring jurisdiction on courts in respect of 
necessaries supplied are too restrictive. One undesirable consequence 
is that material men in Australia tend to favour foreign, rather than 
locally-based, ships. The reason is that where there is default in 
paying for necessaries pro\/ided on credit, proceedings in IJml may 
generally be instituted against foreign ships in Australia! 5 Hence 
from the \/iewpoint of credit-worthiness, the pro\/isions discriminate 
against locally-owned ships. 
This chapter has highlighted a number of areas where reform 
urgently needed. 
14. As to non-negotiable receipt, see Hague Rules Art. 6; Har-
land & llJolff Ltd. v. Burns & Laird Lines Ltd. 40 L 1. L. Rep. 
286. In Hugh Mack & Co. v. Burns & Laird Lines Ltd. 77 Ll. 
L. Rep. 377, the reference on the receipts was to "sailing 
bills. Non-negotiable''. 
15. Admiralty Court Act 1861, s. 5. Cf. s. 4 relating to claims 
for building, equipping and repairing of ships. 
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CHAPTER 7 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The aims of this chapter are to tracE; the de\;elopment of mari-
time liens and to ascertain how far tlltJ principles of English maritime 
law have become part of the Commom111Balth and State laws. The prob-
lem areas will be rlighlighted and suggestions made as to the changes 
which are deemed desirable. 
fhe vvords "maritime lien" did not originate from English arJmir-
alty diction. According to Scott, L.J., they were borrowed from the 
French t'llho used the telling phrase "creances privilegit=!es" to describE1 
the secured rights of sea creditors in tt-1e reciprocal adjustment made~ 
under sea law. He equates the "privi1esJe11 of continental law with 
" · t. 1· 11 • c 1· h l 1 It . t. b. 1 I f ~. t l man 1me IBn In eng IS aw. 1s ques mna e lOW ar conL!nen a 
law has accorded to the term the unique atti'ibutes t'\Jhich a maritime 
lien enjoys under English lalftJ. 
In delivering the Privy Council judgment in The "Bold Buccleugh", 
Sir John Jervis sairJ? 
"Having its origin in tho eule of civil a maritime lien 
is lftJell defined by Lord Tenterden, to mean a claim or privil-
ege upon a tiling to be carried into effect by legal pro-
coss." 
The right is inchoate from the moment whFJn tho claim attaches. LLlhen 
carried into E!ffect by legal process, it relates back to tt1e time of 
3 
attachment. It ls a right acquired by a person over' a marltim£~ 
property belonging to another- "a re alit:ma". It is a 11sub-
straction from tt1e absolute propertv of the owm~r" 1+ in th&~ ~ Since 
it travels tvith the vessel into whosoever's posst'~ssion she may come, 
the lien may be enforced even against a bona purchaser for value 
and t'\Jithout knowledge of its attachment? It h3 secret in character 
pp. '149-15D. 
2.(1B51) 7 i"loo. fJ.C. 267, 281~o 
3. fhe principle that a damage lirm relates back to thFJ moment 
it first attaches was originally laid down by thf~ Privy Council 
in The Bold Buccleuoh (1A51) 7 Moo. P.C. 267. It was later app-
ro\/ecl by tt1e Housl'! of Lords in v. M'Knight [1897] A.C. 
97. It has b('Jf.;)n assumed witt-1out quE:Jst.ion that everv mari-
time lien has the "relation back" upr~ration. 
L, •• The Rieon City [1897] P. 226, p. 242, r2er C~on~ll Barnes J., cited 
with approval in [1%6] C.A. 1 p. 1'~5. 
5. Ibid., 2ll1. 
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and renders unavailable to such a purchaser thr::l protection of the prin-
ciple of equity. Its value as security is enhanced by the fact that 
its existence is not dependent on possession of the by the lienee. 
While a bottomry lien is transferable,6 the lien for seamen's wages 
7 
may be assigned only with the sanction of the court. 
II. WAGE AND DISBURSEMENT LIENS 
1. Origin of lJJage Lien 
There is doubt as to hmv or when the mal'itimo lien for seamen's 
wages came into existence. Paul Herbert advanced the "historical" and 
"procedural" theories to explain the origin of maritime liens in English 
law.8 Sir W. Houldsworth believes that in sixteenth-century England 
there was very little evidence of the maritime lien for wages? Thomas 
states that the first trace of its existence armm in Johnson v. 
"Black Eagle!!, decided in 1597.1[] where a decree for wages and other 
debts were pmrmunced aqainst a ship. There is a view that brings thFJ 
date of its existence forwar-d by over a century. In lllells 0. Osmond, 
decided in 1704! 1 despite the statute of Richard II; 2 Holt, C.J. re-
fused to grant a prohibition against proceedings in the Court of 
Admirnlty foe seaman's wages. Marsden contends tl1at this refusal 
could have proceeded from the recognition of a charge or lien for 
wages given by maritime law, which could only be enforced in aclmiraltJ.3 
6. Rhind v. The Zita [1924} Gaz. Law f~ep. (N.Z.) 7, pp. 7-8; for 
same view, see also c;. Price, Lm"' of fVlaritirne Liens (1940) 
pp. 72-73. 
7. The Fair Ha\mn~: (1866) L.r~. 1 A. & E. 67; The Rridc;watee (18Tl) 
3 Asp. 506. 
8. P.M. Herbert, ''The Origin amJ Nature of IVJc:witime Lien~"" (1929-
1930) 4 Tul. L.R. 381, pp. 382 et. sog. 
9. Sir lJ.l. Hould~ciworth, A Histor!L of Engli:>tl Low (reprinted 1966) 
vol. 8, p. 271, footnote 8. 
10. D.R. Thomas, Maritime Lien~3 (19BO), p. 1 where reference is 
made to Marsden, SE~lect Flleas in the Admirnltv, Vol. II, 1 
xxiv. 
11. 2 Ravm 1044. 
12. 13 Richard II, St. ·1. c. 5. 
13. R.G. Marsden, "Two Points of Admiral tv La~Ai'' (18B6) 2 (J.L.R. 
357, p. 366. 
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One of the early nineteenth-century cases which unambiguouslv 
recognised the lien is The "Neptune". decided in 182£,.14 Parts of a 
ship saved by the mariners t~1ere the onlv assets available to pay their 
wages. In of the lorHJ-standing rnaxirn that "freight, is the mother 
of wages", Lord Stowell in his judgment ga\;e effect to the lien on the 
ship's remains for the wages. 
A number of reasons underlay the juridical ini tiati\te. Seamen, 
often poor and illiterate. risked their lives in the service of the na-
tion's merchant navy. The ancient jurisdiction of the Court of Admir-
alty over actions in as distinct from persnna1 actions, is partly 
attributed to considerations given to the ship as more than a rc~s. 
Since the birth of the "British ship" concept under the statute of 
Williams III in 1696; 5 a foreigner has never been permitted to hold any 
share in a British ship. Both in Engli~;h and American iaws, there was 
a tendency to per:mnify the ship. An American supreme court jud[JB 
has said: 
"She [a ship] acquires a personalitv of her m'lln, becomes 
competent to contract. Emd is individually liable for her 16 
obligations, upon which she mav, be· ~1ued ... in her own name.'' 
ltJe have seen that between th[; reigns of Charles II and William 
IV (until June 1837) which extmldecJ for about 'i 50 years. covering the 
British Empire-building phc:jst::. CJ series uf enactments were passed. 
Legislative encouragement \.vas aimed nt expanding the merchant navy 
and transforming it into a viable colonising and trading force. More-
over, by law at 1east se\Jentv-five percent of tho ~:;hip 1 s crow. includ-
ing her master, harJ to be British subject.~.:P T11e Court of !\drniraltv 
must have translated U1e F.::mpire-tJuilcJing plans into action. In this 
context, the creation at the beginning of the nir1eteenU1 centurv of 
14. 1 Hagg. 277: 166 E.R. B1. 
15. 7 & 8 Will. III, c. 22; see Chapter Four. 
16. Tucker \i. Alexandi'Dff (1902) 183 U.;i. l,24, 1,23: sr~f3 also P.M. 
Herbert, "The Ori~1in and Nature of Maritime Liens" (1929-
1930) 4 Tul. L.R. 381. p. 392. As to cas<:! wt1t:::re a ship was 
regarcled as emplovt:Jr, sm'l Casmr afl(j Othpr·s v. l:he Dr;ccan 
[1906] S.f\.L.R. 125. 
17. See Chapter Four. 
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h 1. h' 18 't . t' t e wage Ien on a s lP could bEJ seen as a necess1 y In promo mg 
the nation's shipping polic~;·. There was no conscious attempt by Eng-
lish Admiralty Court judges to bring the rights of seamen into line t.vith 
those of their counterparts under continental laws. The wage lien 
conferred on seamen (mainly British subjects) a valuable security for 
the payment of their wages, particularh; wht"lre the shipowner or de-
mise charterer defaulted or became insolvfmt. 
That the above reasoning seems correct is supported by the 
compromising attitude of the Common Law and Admiralty Court judges. 
The statutes of Richard It9 forbade Admiralty Court judges "to medd-
le with anything done within the realm." However, except where sea-
men had been employed under special contracts or deeds executed on 
land, common law judges rarely interfered with suits for wages in the 
Court of Admiralty, even though the general contracts t1ad been made 
on land. It seems that the restraint was exercised by common law 
judges to promote the national policy and enable seamen to take 
advantage of the more effective remedies. For example, in Woodward 
20 21 . ?2 
v. Bonithan, Anonymous and lilells v. Osmand~ where general con-
tracts for seamen's wages were involvt-}d, prohibitions were refused. 
The reasons given were that, for the benefit of seamen, the "ship is 
made liable to them; and there they may all join in the suit.'23 Ad-
. mittedly, these proceedings were not available at common law~'' 
18. O.R. Thomas submits that "by the tJr::ginning of the nineteenth 
century its existence (i.e. the ~vage lien) was assumed lvithout 
dispute?": Maritime Uens(1980), QE.r p. '175. 
19. 13 Richard 2, St. 1, c. 5; '15 Richard 2, c. 5. 
20. Sir Thomas Hayrn. 3. 
21. 1 Ventr'. 1£+6. 
22. (1704) 2 Rayrn. 1 Ot.L~, 
23. Howe v. 
ZL •. The sympathy of judges was shared by the British Parliament. 
f3y tht:J statute of (1705) '• Anne, c. 16, s. 17. the C:ourt of 
f\dmir·alty was given jurisdiction to entef'tain wage suits. 
The material words of the section are: "That all suits and 
actions in the Court of f\dmiralty shall bE! commenced and sued 
within six y1:~ars .... " 
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The illogical rJistinctior1 made between gemo,ral or ordinary con-
tracts and deeds meant that claims of seamen employed umler the 
latter would not; be protected by the lien and wr;n? outsicln the juris-
diction of the Court of Admiralty. In Britain, the anomaly was recti-
fied by the Merchant Shipping Act 185l~ (Imp.). In every British sea-
port which had a local marine board, a shipping office was established 
to facilitate the engagement and discharge of SE~amen. As the sup-
erintendents had control over thP mode of conducting the business 
at such offices, it was unlikely that a uniform contract would not 
be used so as to give seamen thP benefit of the wage lien. 
Another anomaly concerns the different and discriminatory treat-
ment of master's wage claim. It was consistently decided by a line of 
cases that, unlike a seaman, a ship's master had no charge or lien on 
the ship for his wages?6 In 4Jilkins and Others v. Carmict1ael an ac-
tion of trover was brought by the assignees of a bankrupt shipowner 
as1ainst the captain. The defence raised was that. tho captain had a 
lien on the ship for his wages and for ~:;tores supplied on his order. 
Judgment was given for the plaintiffs. The reasons for the non-rrJcog-
nitlon of the lien, at least by the common law jud!]es, were stated by 
Lord i"lansfield as followsP 
11i\s to wages, there was no particular contract that the 
ship should be a pledge; there is no usa~]B in trade to that 
purpose; no stipulation frorn the nature of the dealing. 
On the contrary, the law has always considered the captain 
as contracting personally with the owner .... 11 
Despite the personification of the ship, pre-1B4rj <3drniralty law had 
treated the master as an alter ego of the shipowner rather than as 
an employee of the shiP. Moreover, it \>\las in principle ir1consistent 
that a ship} placed under the personal charge of a master for the pur-
pose of achieving his employer's goals7 shDuld become subject to the 
former's wage lien. 
25. See 17 & 18 Vic., c. 104, ss. 122-124. 
26. See e.g. v. _Sudgrave, 91 E.R. 34, confirmed in Bagley 
v. Grant 2 1"1od. 440. 
27. (1779) 1 Doug. 102, 105. 
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The heyday of ships' masters came when their wages were 
accorded similar protection as the wages of seamen. Section 16 of 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1844-8 read: 
"That all the rights, liens privileges, and remedies ... which 
by this Act, or by any lm~1. statute, custom, or usage belong 
to any seaman or mariner, not being a master mariner, in 
respect to the recovery of wages, shall, in the case of the 
bankruptcy or insolvency of the owner of tht:! ship, also be-
long and be extended to masters of ships. "in respect to 
recovery of wages due to them from the D\ivner of any ship 
belonging to any of her Majesty's subjects." 
One of the earliest cases where the provision was construed was The 
11Julindur" .29 The master proceeded against the vessel for wages due 
for services rendered on her and on another vessel belonging to the 
same owner, who had become bankrupt. nm High Court of Admiralty 
held that the master's lien on a vessel was confined to the services 
rendered on that vesseL It meant that a captain, who had servmj on 
se\mral ships, though owned by the same person, and who llad not 
been paid his wages, had to proceed against each of the ships separ-
ately in order to enforce the lien. As the lien for- wages earned on 
one vessel did not extend to ~;vages earned on a ship, the secur-
ity provided is,in that respecL,unsatisfactory. Lord LiJatson has poin-
ted out that, as a legislativ~:J policy, the lien for thr~ wanes of master 
and crew attaches to the ship independently of any personal obliga-
tion of the owner provided that such wages have bmm l~arned on the 
ship?0 The liens for the \.rJages of mastc~c and crew hEN(~ n1maim~d a 
feature of tho Merchant 5hippin!=J /\cts (Imp.).31 
2. Laws in Australian Colonies and States 
Wage lien. There is evirJence that the maritime lir-m wages, 
regarded as the foundation of admiralty jurisdiction in England. was 
part of the laws received into the Australian colonir::s. The scarcity 
of early Australian cases on the subject is attributed to several rea-
sons. Under various colonial enactments, Shipping Masters were 
ZB. 7 & 8 Vic., c. 112, s. 16. 
29. (1853) 1 Sp. l::cc. & /\d. 72; l6l1 E.F~. L,2. 
30. The "Castlegate" [1B93] A.C. 3B, p. l)2. 
31. 1854 Act, ss. 182 and 191; 18% Act, ss. l"16 and 167; s.-~e also 
Merchant ~)h.ipping Act 1970 (c. 36) (LJ.f\.), ss. 16 and lB. 
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appointed to ensure the payment of wages to seamen on their dis-
charge, and to deal with disputes~2 The unambiguous prm;isions made it 
difficult for shipowners to deprive seamen of their I:Jage!:i. To pre11ent 
admiralty proceedings ~rem from undulv interfering with thre emplov-
rmmt of a ship> wage claims below a certain amount C.~· twentv pounds 
in New South Wales) could only be brought bv summ<::Jry ac Um1. An 
exception to this rule was allowed where thE~ ~ihipowner ltJas t1ankr'upt 
or insolvent:3 In that situation, in I'ern proceE~dings would confer Clfl 
seamen the distinct advantagfJ of the maritimr~ lien. Thiel qave them 
the prioritv of payment over thE:' shipowm~r's other creriitors. 
It will be recalled that the wag8 lien was created tJv the adrnir-
altv judges partlv to promote Britain's shipping policv. In that re~i­
pect, the colonial legislatures placed the mnttECJr on a sound footing. 
It is interesting to note that the New ~3outh LtJales ~!rchant. ~)earner~ 
Act 18l~~4 which applied to l~ueE::rlsland <:md Victoria, r.he Marine Eloard 
7!" 
and 1\lavigation Act 1881 (S.A.J)) iJfld the) Merchc.mt SF!<:Jmen Act 1859 
- 26 . 
(Tas.;' ga1;e effect to thEJ lien. H1esB /\cts pr-ohibited ~;hipowrmrs and 
demise charterers from contractirl(J out of UlP :;llip':c; liability. Thev 
expressly provided that ''1\Jo sBaman of any sl1ip bv rec:Json of anv 
agreement shall forfeit his lien upon the ship .... " 
In an action to eecover' ltJages, seamen mav have a ship arrested 
in a forei~~n port. f~1 ending its outcorne, severe hardships could be in-
Flicted on the seamen who are dtmied their I'cltions. In Victoria t;he 
serious gap in the law has been remedied. H1e case of KPenev ancl 
Oth Th Sh . "A . II 37 d . ' . ers v. e rp - newra concerne an actiOn l!J..rr"m agarnst a 
32. Merchant Seamen /~ct. 18L.9 (f\J.:).lJ.J.) (13 \/ic. No. 28), s. L1; Sea-
men's Laws Consolidation Act 1861~ (N.S.lJ.J.) (27 Vic. i\Jo. 13-),-
s. 39; Merchant Seamen Act 1859 (Tas.) (23 Vic. No. 7), s. 43; 
and Marine f3oard and Na1;iga tion Act 1881 (S .A.) ( 44 & L1'J Vic. 
f\Jo. 237), s. 82. -
33. Merchant Seamen Act 18l.9 (N.S.L!l.), s. 19; S.eamen's Laws Con-
solidation Act 1864 (N.S.W.), s. l19; Merchant Seamfm i-\ct 1859 
(Tas.), s. 5Cl; fVlaeine Board <=md Navigation Ac~ 1881, (S.A.), s. 90. 
3l •. S. 4. Obviouslv thB provisions in the colonial enactments 
were modelled on s. 5 of the Imperial Act, 7 & 8 Vic., c. 112. 
35. s. 82. 
36. s. 43. 
37. (1927) V.L.R. 387, p. 389; DI'der of Mann, J., ill Paul & Grav Ltd. 
v. The Ship ",i\mv Turrmr'' (192?) V.L.R. 740, n 74-3 f d t >- _ ,,, . , rP erre ·o. 
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foreign ship brought lJv the mast.er and seamen. Their claims were for 
wages due to them and for the cost of their passa[le back to the 
United States pursuant to the terms of the articles. After the ship 
had been arrested, the provisions on board were almost exhausted, 
and the crew could not obtain fresh food. A shipping broker was pre-
pared to advance money for the period Df four to five weeks, at eight 
per cent interest, for purchasing food. His term was thut the court 
was to grant him a first charge or maritime lien on the ship or the 
proceeds of her sale for the advances made and the interest charged. 
An order to that effect was made. The decision is a sensible and in-
deed needful extension of the wage lien. Tt appears from the author-
ities that a person who pavs the wages of one or more of the cre~'li 
with the leave of the court may be given the same lien on the ship or 
the proceeds of her sale which the seamen possess. In othPr words, 
under maritime law, he is subrogated to the rights of the lienee. 
It is crucial to consider \Aihether under the law in Australia a 
ship or the proceeds of the sale would become subject to a lien for 
38 master's wages. /\ case directly in point is The "Rajah of Cochin" 
- . 
After the ship had arrived at !"lauri.tius, the captain was in such 
a state of ill health that it justified his lem1ing the ship. The ship 
was subsequently arrested in England. The amount claimed by the 
master as wages) whem he left the ship bv necessitv, was disputed. 
Dr. Lushington held that a master's right to recover wages under sec-· 
tion 209 of the i"1erchant Shipping Act 1854 (Imp.) in such circumstances 
applied to the colonies, and that it was an additional provision in 
favour of seamen. His judgment made it plain that, by section 191 of 
the Act (Imp.), a master had a lien for his wages in the Vice-Admiraltv 
Court, whatever might tJe the municipal lav.1 of the colony. He n'!ferred 
to the notable exception, viz. the proviso to section 547, which pre-
vented "the whole uf the Act extendin~] to the colonies." "It would be 
impossible to construe this Act without supposing it [3Xtended to our 
38. (1859) Swab. 474. S. 158 of Merchant Shipping Act 18% (Imp.) 
has been repealed and replaced by s. 4 of Merchant Shipping 
.Act 1970 (Imp.). The position under t.he Navigation Act 1912-
1973 (Comtt-1.) will be considered in due course. 
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colonies, for other\Nise there are provi~>ions applying to them, v.;hich 
would not confer the benefit the statute was intendecl to do, but 
ld d f . d d' d " 39 wou pro uce con us1on on tscor . 
In the light of the proviso to section Sl17 and of IAJhat Dr. Lush-
ington said, it- necessary to consider the status of the colonial 
enactments dealing with maritime liens. Part III of the 1854 Act (Imp.) 
concerned, inter alia, the wages of seamen and masters enga~1ed in 
British ships registered in the United Kingdom and the colonies. Sec-
tion 109 defined the scope of Part III as follows: 
"So much as the Third Part of this Act a~j relates to Rights 
to Wages and Remedies for the F~ecovt:ry thereof ... shail 
apply to all ships registered in any of Her Majesty's Domin-
ions abroad [ i.e. including the colonies], when such Ships 
are out of the jurisdiction of their respective Governments, 
and to the Owners, Masters and Crews of such ~-JhiPs." 
lhe section showed some lee1.vay qiven to colonial leqislatures. 
Probably an Australian colony could enact lm-11s applicable to ships 
registered therein so long as U1ev were \111ittlin thE~ colonial govern-
ment's jurisdiction. Lllt1ere tile principles of Admiralty Court decisions 
or the provisions of Part III of tho 'IBSl1 Act (lrnp.) were in ~;ubstance 
reproduced in colonial enactments, their objective was clearly to 
apply English law. ::Jir1ce they did not "rept:ml. wholly or in part, CJny 
provision" oF the Imperial Act, they appear to fall outside section 547 
of the 1854 Act and also section 735 of the 18% /\ct (Imp.). It sub-
mitted that the provisions, which conferred on masters and seamen 
maritime liens in respect of their waqes, in the Merchant Seamen Act 
1849 (N.S.W.), the i"'larine Board and Naviqation Act 1881 (S.A.) and the 
Merchant Seamen /~ct 1859 (Tas.) were valid.t,o Dr. Lushingt~on's fears 
that, unless the Act applied to colonies, confusion and discord would 
prevail were therefore unfounded. 
lJJage li!ms have ccmtinued to be a feature of succeeding colon 
ial legislation. Tile enactment of section 736 in the Merchant Shipp-
ing Act 1894 (Imp.) presented Australian legislators with difficulties. 
The local legislation, which could be construed as being related 
39. Ibid., 476. 
40. Sections refBrred to above. 
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to coasting trade. would be held imtalid for nut mm:!tin~:J tt1e requirEJ-
ments of ~mction 736. nm conditions to be ~mtisf.ied as regards tho 
"suspending clau~m" and the public signification of "Her 1'1ajestv's 
pleasure" suggest that indefinittJ delavs misiht occur before a 11Coast-
ing trade" rmactmtcmt could be~ opBrcltiVfL Rathm· than exposing the 
lh;elihood of colonial seamen and masters to uncDrt-.aint'!, since HGr 
Majestv's pleasure might not be grantr~d. a numiJer of the colonh1s 
circumventsd section 736 by adopting a convenient and expeditious 
. I~ 1 ' . 42 j I t (\ t l' 43 d course. Tasmama, V1ctona anc lJJE!S ;ern hU5 ra 1a passe , as 
"reception11 mechanisms, t\cts to extend to t.heir rRspective teri'itor-
thm1e provisions of the Imperial Act relatin~i to ~;eamPn and mas-
ters, including the lmv with respect to IMage liens. In fact, section 
264 of the 1891.; Act (Imp.) empowers tho 1~:-Jgisle:Jtures of British posses-
sions to modif'! and apply for such purposes an'! provisions of the 
Act that will not otherwise EJpply. 
Disbursement Lien. We sr1all look at thE:! right of a ~;hip's mas-
ter to be reimbursed \'llith regard tD pprsonal liabilities incurred in 
obtaining supplies to, or rtJpairs done on, the ship. Strangely enough, 
the only remedy open to a master to recover disbursements was by a per-
l t . . t 1- I . . l,l, sona ac 1on agams t11e s npowner 1n a Common Law Court. By sec-
tion 191 of the ~1erchant Shipping Act 1854 (imp.), the mastf~f' was, for 
the first time, indir EJctly allowed in special circurnst<Jnces to sue for 
disbursements in the Court of 1\dmimltv. TakE! the case of a suit bv 
a master for li\Jages and a set-off or countt:!I'-claim being set up by 
the shipowner. It tvould tt1en be competent for thl'l Court to settle 
all accounts outstanding between ttm t~\Jo partie~•. and to enforce 
against the ship pm;mcmt or the balance DltJing to the mastel' as wa~ws 
and disbursements. The Act, did not permit a ma!:iter to initiate a suit 
41. Mercrmnt Seamen Act 1935, (Tas.), s. 3 (1) .. 
42. Seamen Statute 1865 (Vic.), s. 3; Marine Act 1890 (Vic.), s. 230. 
The section was preserved in the Marine Acts (Vic.), 1915, 
1928 and 1958, s. 234 until its repeal. 
43. Merchant Shipping Act Application Act 1903 (W.A.), s. 2 (1). 
44. The Marv f\rm (1865) L.R. 7 A. & [, 8, p. 10, l2lli' Dr. tushington. 
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din?.ct in the Court of Admiral tv for the di~~bur~.Jemc,nts. [ t ~t.;a~> part! v 
to remedy this defect that the Court of Admiralty Act 1Elfi1 (Imp.) lt.IEJ~3 
passed.45 Section 10 gave the Hil]h Cour·t of !\rlmiraltv juric,dicUnn. 
inter alia, 11 0\Jer any claim bv the master ... for di~>bursements made tw 
him on account of the ship." In i"1arv /\nn. Dr. Lushington held thFJt, tw 
extending the jurisdiction so as to enable the [ourt to Lleal ~\lith thr~ 
subject-matter in other cases, the le~;Jislatur'P muse bE:' tc:~ken to t1mm 
intended to create a mal'itime liE:m. His pr·opo~3ition was i1PPrJrentlv prom-
pted bv the inadequate protection given by the pre-1B61 law to mas-
ters who had incurred disbursements for Um !:1hip~ 6 rtw construction 
was followed by Sir Robert Phillimore in The Feroni<l 117 i:md thl~ F:n~Jlish 
Court of Appeal in The "Sara"~B However, when The "Sara" was later 
taken on appeal, the House of Lords, after examining the cases where 
the master was held to have had a maritimE' 1 ien in rrJSP<?ct of dislJur-
sements, unanimously reversed the Court of !\ppr,al dm:ision. 
1
'
9 Lord 
Watson emphasised that neither the Morchant Shiopinq Act 1B54 (Imp.) 
nor the Court of Admiralty Act 1861 (lrnp.) 11 Gxpre~;slv <::1Lt.adws a lien 
to his [the master's] claim for disbursem<mt~;." 'J[J 
\ 
One grave consequence of the Hou~>e of LorLl~i dr~ch.Jion wi:ls irljus-
tice to creditors who had provirJed m~cessm'ir')::i to ship!:> in rPliCJnce on 
the proposition first laid dowr1 in 1865. ln ovr~r·t. ciupport of Dr. Lush-
ington's approach, the r:'lerchmlt ::Jhippinq /\ct Hl89 (lrnp.) vi!CJS pa~;serJ. 
Section 1 provided that "Every mastPr of EJ ~3hip ... ~:;hall, ~>o fdr aci the 
case permits, have the sCJme rights, lic~n~:; ond remr?dies for the recov-
en; of disbursements properly made ... ond for liabilities propPrh; in-
curred by him on CJccount of the ship, as t:J rnastc~r r1ow hds for the 
recm;ery of his wages .... " The qualifying words "so fc.1r CJS Lhe Cd~le 
permits" suggest that certain disbursement~3 or JialJilitiGs will not give 
45. This Act extends to /\ustralia. See Chapters :-Jix and 1\lim'). 
46. (1B65) L.R. 7 A. & E. 8, p. 12. 
47. (1868) L.R. 2 A & E 65. 
48. 12 P.D. 158. 
49. The Llecisions ov~~rruled included those in The c;lentmmer, 
Swab. 415; The Marv Arm (1865) L.P. 7 A & E B; The Fercmia 
L.R. Z A & E. 65; and The Ringdove_ 11 P.O. 120. 
50. The "Sara" (H389) L.F~. 11, P.C. 209, p. 217; sF~e alsop. 211f, Qill' 
Halsburv, L.c:. 
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rise to the lien. Its scope was considered by the House of Lord~> in 
The "Castlegate":1 By a non-demise charterparty, the charterer's 
undertook to "prm;ide and pay foi' all her coals." The master who harJ 
notice of its terms obtained the coals and drew on the charterer's 
for payment. After the bill was dishonoured, the mastei', who was 
sued on it, instituted an action in rem for disbursements against the 
ship and freight. A master's authority was held to have arisen from 
the necessity of protecting the interests of the party concerned. As 
the disbursements were incurred for the charterers' benefit to enable 
the vessel to prosecute the voyage, they wei'e therefoi'e not made 
on account of the ship OI' her owners. The House of Loi'ds held that, 
as the shipowners were not pei'sonally liable for the disbui'sements, 
the mastei' had no maritime lien on the ship. Lord lJ.Jatson's narrow 
interpretation serves as a caution to creditors. The 1889 Act (Imp.) 
did not empower a master to fix upon the ship a liabili tv which he did 
not, expressly or impliedly, have her owners' authority to incui'?2with 
regai'd to the alleged maritime lien on frei~Jht in respect of disbui'se-
ments, the House of Lords applied the principle stated bv LorcJ Ellen-
borough, C.J., in Smith v. Plummur.. He said: 
"Then if he [the master] has no lien on the ship ... l1e can 
have none upon the feeight, as the lien on the fi'eight is 
consequential to the lien upon the ship."53 
The "disbui'sement lien" provision has been reproduced in section 
167 (~)of the Merchant Shipping Act 18% (Imp.). In The Elmville (No. 
2),54 the question arose whether the word "rJisbursements" would in-
clude costs which a master was 1 i able to pay. 14. rnastei' drew a bill of 
exchange on the shipowner's in payment for bunker coal supplied to 
the ship. After the bill of exchange was dishonoul'ed and the master 
was sued as its dratver, he unsuccessfully defended the action and irl-
curred costs. The decision depended on whether it VJas reasonably 
necessai'y in the interests of the ship to defend the action. 
Sir F.H. Jeune found that, since by allowing jud[Jment to go bv default 
51. [1893] A.C. 38. 
52. Ibid., p. 53. 
53. (1818) 1 B. & Ald. 575, 582. 
54. [1904] P. 422. 
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he could recover the ship based on the lien, he had acted in his 
capacity as an individual and not as master the vesseL55 Thus the 
lien does not extend to the costs of such defence. 
Another aspect of the disbursement lien, lvhich hm; great 
l . f . . . T' R' C't 56 icance for supp ters o necessanes, 15 m 11e tpon 1 v. By 
a contract of sale, tt1e defendant owners .lll. Co.) transferred the 
possession and contra l of the ship to a C11a~;qow firm (N.I"I. Co.). 
Under the terms of sale, F.W. Co. were t,o remain registered mvmJrs 
and mortgagees until the purchnse-mom::y was raid. On a voyage to 
the F<iver Plate an account of N.M. Co., the master, 1.~1ho was appointed 
by N.M. Co. and had no notice of the contract of ~3a!e, drew two bills 
of exchange on N.M. Co. for the bunker supplied according to a 
contract made previously between N.M. Co. and C.~\. C:o. The tJil!s 
were dishonoured on maturity. F.l!J. Co., e:Js unpaid vendm·s. retook 
possession of the vessel. Bv a signed mt:lmorc:mtium of mandate, dec-
lared to be irrevocable, Lhr~ master authorlsRd C.FI. Co. tu exercise in 
his name,or their 0\llln,his right of lien the ship in of 
the two unpaid bills. r he rnom~y rncovBrPd w;.:~s to b~~ applied in ex-
tinction pr·o tanto of his indtc;btedrm~1S to thorn em the two bills. 
-----
However, before the triai F .W. Co. ancJ U1Eo. rna~;ter entered into a ~:;et­
tlement. A receipt was taken fi'Drn tJ1e master for £L,Ol1 paid to him in 
full settlement of his claims CJgainst F .uJ. Co.. He al~3o agrm'!d to all 
proceedings in the action being forthwith . The present. action 
was initiated by 8. Co. in Um name of the mastm' as nominal 
tiff. G. Barnes, J., held that F.lll. Co. t1ml ~:;ufficient notice or know-
ledge of the facts to r·endur thr:? settlement vuicj as against C~.B. Co .. 
As the liability was incurred by thE! master an account of the ship, 
he had a valid maritime iien ur1der sc:ction 16/ of the Met'chant ~3hipp­
ing Act 189L,, The court found that, as he had no kr1owledge of any 
Facts which would deprive him of his r'ight of lit:m, he was entitled to 
look to the ship as tv for his claims. Howuver, as in 
tlegate''?7 the shipowners were not under c:my pr~rsonal liability for 
55. It is in line with Em eat'lier dBcision in Thr~ CJI'ir~nta [1895) 
P. 49 (English Court of Appeal). .A. mastur, who at the r'equest 
of the shipowners drew a bill ot' exchange on them for the 
payment of coals supplied, 1.vas held not to have incurred lia-
bility bv him in his office as master. Hence he had no lien on 
the ship for disbursements. 
56. [1897] P. 226. For summai'y of the see pp. 229-230. 
57. [1093] A.C. 38. 
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the disbursements incurred tJ\f thEJ mast.m'. lJmJ vi tc:1l element ,,~;hich 
distinguishes between the two cases is that in this case the defond-
ant owners, F.W. Co., allowed :\!.M. Co. to hold themsel\/es out as !lman-
aDing owners11 to the master. This fact would "place him in a position in 
which he was entitled to make disburst.~monts and incur liabi on 
account of the ship." tjB An issue to be is this. It is ques-
tionable whether U1e personal liabilitv of the shipo\Ainers is a prere-
quisite. i\ievertheless suppliers of 
advantage of the mastr~r's lien, should 
who seek to take 
diligentlv ascertain whether' 
or not there are circumstances or facts which will deprive~ the mas-
ter of his Hen. 
A further observation should be made. Even if the memorandum 
signerJ by the master was not an r::~quitatJle assiunrmmt, it carne very 
close to it. It is submitted t11at C:.B. Co. had fur their mvn tJermfit 
complete control of the master's Jim1, unaffoctc~d by any set.tlornent 
made ber1inrj their back. Hmvm;er. rJisburserm:mt and wagn liens Buffer 
a common limitation. In The Prc:tone',i<J Hill, J., rmfLJ that persons. ~vt10 
without request paid off seamEm 's wagc~s and master's disbursements, 
~~;oulrj not be entitled to tt1e benefit of tJm llcm because thfJV 
as 11olunteers. 
There is no reason to suppose that /\ustralian courts IAJOulcl dis-
regard the 1-louse o I' Lords decision in anLj their construe-
Lion of section 10 of ttm Court of l\drniral ty /\c t 1861 (Imp.). 
the disbursement originated from thn Uni.ttJd Kingdom's 
its application in Australia must be further considered in the light of 
,:\ustrali<m Iegisl<:1 tion. 
i'\ ~3hocking gap ir'1 ~3outh /-\ustralian la\AI ~vas brnuqht to liql1t in 
58. [1897] fJ. 
59. [19171 P. 198. William:~ and Bruce's /\clmiraltv Prnctice 
r~d. 1902), pp, 196-197 and IIIJaclochlan on IIIJc'!rchant Shipping 
(5tll f'ld. 1911), pp. 120-121. In tl1eir· view, thr~ maritime lien wm; 
creatmi in favour of a master. The tle::m'lfi t of thp lien was 
therefore croated Pittmr bv Em assigmnEmt m· a~~reemont that 
the master 1.111as bound to brinn an action for the creditor·s' 
br?nefit. See alsu r:\hind v. The~ "Zlta" (1924) C1az. l.dw Rep.(I\I.Z.) 
/. 
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The Louise Roth,60 decided in 1905. The chiBf mate of a steamship had 
her arrested to enforce, inter alia, a claim for di~ibursements. They 
were incurred by him at the request of the master on account of the 
ship. It was hald that in respect of such disbursements a mate had 
no maritime lien on the ship. The caution given by Supreme Court 
· . . t th H 'd61 JUdge Gordon to masters and nec~Jssanes men 1s no ewor y. e sm : 
" ... rny examination of t:he authoritias makes it clear to me 
that masters of ships registered in South r'l..ustralia are un-
der a very serious disadvantage ... in as much as our law 
them no lien for disbursements on ship's account. llJhr:m in 
1889 the House of Lrl!'ds in The ''Sara" 14 App. Cas. 209 ... de-
clared that masters had no lien for disbursements the Imper-
ial Parliament at oncE! passed legislation conferring the 
lien. This is now embodied in the !"lerchant Shipping Act. 
1894, sec. 167, sub-sec. 2. But this part of the Merchant 
Shipping Act not apply to South Australia, and our law 
is as it was in Great Britain before the legislation to which 
I have referred was passerJ." 
It is heartening to note that following Lh8 allove observation the 
South Australian Parlioment passed the Board and 
Further Amendment f\ct 1906 (~1./\.).62 PlH'~:;uont to section 736 of the 
18% J\ct (lmp.), it was ruservod and tfHJ assent thereto wos pro-
claimed. Thus the defect has bEJen rmmJciimJ by incorporating in this 
and subsequent legisli::ltion a provision similar to that in section 167 
(2) of the 18% Act (lrnp.). 
In Western the lacuna highliDhted by Gurdon, J., was 
forestalled by thEl ME!rchant Shippinq l\pplicatiun Act 1903 (ltJJ\.). Sec-
tiom 2 (1) extend£~d as law of l1Jestern Au~>tralia FJart II including 
"disbursement lier-," provision of the i\1erchant ShippinCJ l\ct 1894 (Imp 
It applied to "British ships re~Ji~'ltm'ed at, or trading v.Jith, or atn 
any Western /\u~iLrc:Jlian port, and to t:llP OIJ\Iner~~. masters and crews of 
ships when thev were within the Statl'J's juri::;diction. The solution 
was not entirely their owners and masters 
were outside its scope. Moreovet', as we have ~1een, with the enact-
ment of the Shipping f~Pgistmtion /~ct 1981 (Comth.),63 British 
mgistered in Australia under the '1894 Act were transfern:>.d 
60. [1905] S.A.L.R. 107. 
61. Ibid., p. 11?. 
62. i\lo. 917 of 1906, s. 6. 
63. Came intn force on January 26, 1982, 
=c..;..:,;:.:. 
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to the new Australian Registrv at Canberra. The clefect!:; would have 
remained had the Western Australian Marine Act 1%8 not been passE~d, 
incorporating in section 144 (2) an aptlv-worderJ provision. 
We have seen that Tasmania and Victoria followed Western 
Australia bv adopting the reception mechanism, I:Jith the accompanv-
inn shortcomings. Section 3 (1) of the Merchant Seamen Act 1935 
(Tas.)64 extends as part of the laiAi of Tasmania the provisions of Part 
II of the 1894 Act (Imp.). Bv the Marine /\cts (Vic.), 65 1915 and 1958, 
onlv those provisions of the 1894 Act (Imp.) relating to ships' masters 
and seamen were imported into Victoria. However, with the repeal of 
two Acts (Vic.) in 1961~6 it appears that under Victorian State 
legislation a ship's master has no right of lien for disbursements or 
other liabilities incurred on account of the ship. 
Like South Australia, Queensland dealt with the defect by enact-
ing in section 48 of the Navigation Acts Amendment Act 1939 (Qld.) 
and in subsequent legislation67 a "disbursemFmt lien 11 provision similar 
to its English counterpart. 
Probablv, New South Wales, the premier State, was unwillin[i to 
follow the pattern set bv the other States. 
3. Commonwealth Legislation 
Incapacitated Seamen and Mastr~rs. We~ ha\Je sef:!n that the wages 
of seaman or mastBr give rise to a rnaritirm~ lien. rim protE:~ctlcm rJE~p­
ends on the meaning given to the term 11WaSJEd'. ~)oction B (1) of thn 
Navigation Amendment Act 1981 (Comt.IL) 68 has naiTCJIJ\Jerj thr:1 scope of 
Part II of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) 1nhich deals with matters 
relating to masters <:md seamen. Thi~3 Part will only apply to (i) ships 
registered in Australia; (ii) ships engaged in coasting tradE~; <.md (iii) 
non-Australian registered ships operated by .Australian residents Ol' 
companies and manned largelv tJv Australian residents. It Pxtends to 
the owners, masters anrJ crew of such shipJ:9 
64. See Chapter Three. 
65. SeP s. 234 of each f\ct; supra. 
66. Marine Amendment Act (Vic.) (No. 681.7 of 1961), s. 9 (a). 
67. QueenslancJ Marirm Ac~ 1958, ~1. 77 (2). 
68. No. 10 of 1981. 
69. S. 10, as--arnt-Jnded by NavisJatiun Act AmenrlrnPnt /'ct 1981 
(Comth.), s. 8. 
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In the 1912-73 Act (Comth the word "wages" is defined as em-
70 
olurnents. It was well poir1ted out by Sir Francis Jeune that the 
word is used in a broad sense. It includes not onlv what is received as a 
wage but also 1.vhat is obtained in thD course of the service as recom-
pense in the execution of dut.~/ .71 Pav for overtime work is part of 
thD wages. 
Section 132, which t1as given to much 1itigcJtion a feature 
of the Navigation i'\ct (Comth.). It is the foundation of the 1,vage lien 
in many instances. Although a number of its ingredi£:mt~3 came fmm 
tne Jmperial Acts, 185h72 and 189473 it has been amended to avoid 
ambiguit\f and make genemus provision for thB payment uf wage;j to 
seamen whu are left on shore sick or injured. LLJhen the Navigation 
Act 1912 (Comth.) was passed, the Commonwealth Parliament "intended 
that. .. the rights of the ~3eamon :lhould tJe reduced to cortaintv and 
not loft to be determined in a conflict of wl1r~U1er his contractual 
relations with the ship werP sevc~red or not. 11 )!1 ~;ection 132 pro-
vided for a seaman lc~ft on ~;!Jon? "in anv rnanrme <1utJmri;mJ lJV law, 
b\f reason of illm?ss or iJCcicJt:mL in Lhn s~Tvice u f' UH! :JI1ip'' r·emJr~rir1q 
him unfit for duties. Hr:! would b£! dm~rnc=?cJ to tJavu tmen cJi~1chm·cJr?d 
from his ship. 11is vJages would LJe p<watJle till t.lm m1cJ of his <J<JI'lm-
ment, for a maximum perlocj of thr~:1u rncmLt1:.J. lr1 1921, tllP ~mcLim1 ~'\Ia~; 
recast in that it no lonDor provicJc-::d that t11r~ ~>£~iHTlan :;ilould be dm=:;rm~cl 
to be discharged from U1e sl1ir/') llH! condition hH'rnt!rh; applical1le 
to illness was oxt[mcJed to illnHss, t1urt or iniur·v. Uv trm arn<?nding 
Act of 1952 (Corntf1.), tr1e uncertainties int1erent in thr! expn!~j~.Jicm "ir1 
anv manner authori~3ecl lJv lm'\111 <md tllP lack of uJn·esponrJm1co Lle-
t1,veen "illness and accident" und " 
70. S. 6 (1 ). F~or ~iimildr U(Jfini tion ifl 
(Imp.), see s. 7Ll2. 
71. Ttm ElmvillP (i\JO. 2) [190ll] P. l122. 
72. See s. 209. 
73. See s. 11)8, now replacc~cJ 
s. 4. 
t1urt or 76 wore? rmnmmd. 
74. Isaac in Bruhrl v. AtJ~itn:Jli<:m Stnnmsilip~3 Pty. Ltd. (1922) 
31 C.LJ~. 136, pp. 1111-142: cited tJ\f Kitto, J., in t1is dissenting 
judgment in I io<:;at.os v. ThE~ Atl!'>tralian 1\Jationcll Lim~_ (1964) 
111 C.L.f~. 282, at p. 296. 
75. Ibid., (19614) 111 C.L.f( i'82, p. 298. 
76. The section Wds ~;utJstituted provi::>iom> of an amenc1ing Act 
(No. 36 of 19'J8) but without anv rnatorial alteration; see s~L 78-81. 
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Section 132 (1) reads: 
"Where a seaman belonging to a ship registered in Austra-
lia or en~Jaged in the coasting trade is left on shore at 
his proper return port by reason of illness, hurt or injun;, 
he .. entitled to receive wages ... in respect of each day 
... commencing on the dav on which he was left on shore and 
ending - (a) at the expiration of a period of one week 
after the date of the recoverv; or (g) at the expirotion 
of a period of three months after the day on which he was 
left on shore, whichever first occurs." 
A seaman may in similar circumstances be left on shore at a port oth-
er than his proper return port. He entitl to receive IMages in 
n}spect of each day commencing on the day he was left on shore and 
ending -
"(9) in a case in which he arrives at his proper port before 
his recovery -
W at the expiration of a period of one week aftrn' the 
date of tlis recovery; or 
at the expiration of a perimJ of three rmmths after 
the date on which he so arrives, wt1ichever first 
occurs; and 
in a case in which lle does not arrive at hi~:c. proper re-
turn port before his recovery -
(i2 when he arrives at his proper retUI'Il port; 
(ii) when he rejoins the ship; or 
(iill when he enga7es in other employment, whichevE!r 
first occurs.'' 7 
The case of Australian Steamships Pty. Ltd. v. Murphy 78 went on app-
eal to the High Court from a decision u f the Supreme Court of' Vic-
toria. The dispute concerned a seaman's right to wages which in turn 
depended on the meaning of 1!rEJcovery11 • llJhile in the service of his 
ship at Devenport, the respondent seaman, whosE: horne port was Mel-
bourne, sustained serious leg injures, incapEJcitating him from perform-
ing his duties. After being in Devenport for several months, he re-
turned to MeltJourm". There the respondent IAJas Dxamined tJy a medic-
al attendant. Three or four months after the eespondent's return, a 
77. S. 132 (2). A seaman's entitlement to wages under:~. 132 is 
extended to the mc:Jster and the apprentice: s. B2 (l1). 
78. (1934) 5() C.L.R. 568. 
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certificate was issued to tho effE!Ct that hi~; leg had then made all 
the improvements it was likely to make and that he had a useful 1 imb. 
The question was whether the time during which wages contir1ued to 
be payable to the respondent ended bE!fore,or at the time of, the giv-
ing of the medical certificate. Under the then section 132 (1) (b), 
there was no time limit during vvhich wages were payable. The High 
Court affirmed the judgment of Lowe, J., that the wages ran on after 
the medical certificate which did not constitute a certificate of re-
covery. A significant aspect of the judgment is the clear explana-
tion given by Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan, J J., as follows?9 
''The word 'recovery' i':lppears to describn the attainmcmt 
of a condition of health. If the illness or accidental injury 
is one which will lea,Je a pennanent bodily disability, defect, 
impairment or infirmity, the seaman has 'recovered' within 
the meaning of the provision when tm has obtained his health 
and reached what will continue to be his normal condition. 
The word 'recovery' is neith8r scientific nor exact. .. Pc~r­
haps all that can be said is that the rnore immediate and rem-
edial effects of hi~; accicJent or illne~;s must ha\/e gone, lr!a-
ving hirn in such a state tJ1at, in common ~3PE:~ech, r1e would be 
described as now well, or no longer iii." 
Their Honours' description of wtmt constitutes recovery is no sub~;tit­
ute for the is~>ue by a medical attendant of a certificate of n!coverv 
in unambiguous terms. 
no 11 , 
tilE:"! wurd~1 ~3D far <Js 
can be ascertained, an illness contractf~d m1 tJoCJt'd the ship or in UHJ 
service of the ship" in section 132 (b) wen~ ccmstrumJ and applir""d. 
The High Court had to cJecide wlmth£~r a prt::-employment comJition in 
a seaman would necessarily disentitle him feorn re:?ceiving wages under 
sectioo 132. !Jurinf.J a voyage, a scJarncm (W) l•Jas found to bE" sick as 
a result of a myocarcliol infarction <Jnd was left m1 ~;hor8 at Fremantle. 
W was bc~lieved to have had a coronary artery di~;oataCJ, as cl pre-t}Xist-
ing condition, which cau~md him no incapacity, amJ to have suffered 
from a myocardial infarction from which llt:? had i'(~covE::red. The reas-
oning applied by all five High Court Judges is an overt extension of 
79. Ibid., p. 578. 
80. (1972) A.L.J.R 636. 
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legislative policy in favour of seamen. It appE)ars that, in consider-
ing when and where an illness is contracted, the criterion to be 
followed is whether a seaman is incapacitated from performing his 
duties. The High Court unanimously held that the pre-existing artery 
disease,as a possible underlying cause of the myocardial infarction} 
will not prevent the sickness from falling witllin the description of 
"an illness contr<:icted" within the meaning of section 132. According-
ly, the myocardial infarcticm was flot regarded merely a~:; a manifest-
ation of heart disease previously contracted by W. 
To the already generous provisions made for victims of accid-
ents and illness is added a further element. The High Court decision 
in Liosatos v. The Australian National Une81 will alleviate the conse-
quences of certain health hazards, e epidemics at a port of call and 
the handling of contaminated goods. Generall v it is difficult to det-
ermine where, when or how an incapacitating illness is contracted. 
In terms Australian shipping policy, the decision operates to pro-
teet the interests of seamen ami masters wl1o serve for reasonable 
periods of time in the same ship or possibly with the same compan\,1. 
The High Court heard, on appeal from the dEJcision of the Supreme 
Court of South Australia, a claim hinged on the meaning of the expre-
ssion "illness contracted on board tt1e ship or in the sr~rvice of' the 
ship" in section 132 (6). By reason of' illness or disease, tile appellant 
seaman (l) was on 17th June, 1960, left ashore at Melbourne. This was 
not his proper return port. So far as could be ascertained, t,he ill 
ness or disease was contracted t-Jarlv in 1960, l.J.?.. prior to the current 
articles were signed on 17th f"laf'ch, 1960. L hacJ been in the service 
of the same ship, which was r-egistered in Australia, and her Dwner 
from September, 1957, to June, 1960. L few perimj~3 of annual and 
weekend leave on full pay, L had not tJeen absent from the ship. The 
High Court found in favour of I_, and rever·sed the Supreme Court de-
cision. The benefits to long-serving seamen aro seen in the broad 
meaning given by Barwick C.J., to section 132 in these words~2 
"It is not in terms limitod in its operation to incapacitv 
resulting from illness, hurt or injury contracted or su~­
tained during the currency of the articles under which 
81. (196L;) 111 c.u~. 2s2. 
82. Ibid., p. 291. 
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the seamc:m was sHrving wt1en left on shore? nL other' th<:m 
his home port. It is enour-Jh that D ~c;c:mnan brJlcmqinq to 
the ship should lJe left or1 shore ted fmrn <m iII 
ness, hurt or injury contracted or JPd on tw<:1rd the] 
ship or in the SBrvice of the ship or of LllH (J\:Jrwr." 
Chief Justice BanAJick's emphasis on 11SRaman tJc:lmlninq to UlP c;hiP 11 
and the weight of authorities discu~3secl show thnt n ~;c~rnnnn rn<w 11m1r'? 
sen;ed the ship, though not the ownr?r. I lis ~.vnqH~.i in tlw ~>Pn:;n (~un:;irJ 
ered above, when payalJle, will give ri~m to n lif:'fl en the ~;hip. /\ccorrJ-
ingly, the change of owners of a ship in tho coun;o uf hb 
cannot affect his right under the section nml hi:> posi ticm <'lS a 
Another aspect of a seaman's protc:ction cmnPs from U1e t.vurds 
"service of the owner". It is submittmJ t:J1at thr=! principlt3 !Rid down 
in Liosatos v. The Australian 1\lational Line ~;huul£J nquallv avail a sBa-
man whose injury or sicknm3s i~> cau~:JPd rJurinq his mnplovment in mw 
of l1is employei''s ships. A seaman mav he rr:quirmi to SFH'\/R nn differ-
ent ships belonging to, or charter·od llv, thn ~.>mnn pnrson, or be: a~:;siD'­
ned to uttlBr ships owned hv cnmpaniHs ot' <1 qroup. It i!1 questionable 
whether thf:l total amount of ltJa~Jf':~; rJue to him ir1 n:spr::ct uf his em-
ployment wit11 diffFJrent ships would be sucurmi tJY a sincJle lien on 
just one ship. It is probatJ!e that, apart from proceeding in 
against each of the sl1ips to ~.vhich a I.Aii:'Jge lien has attached, a 
seaman may not be nble to recover his \fl}a(]es in fulL !he rBasun is 
that the lien on the ship procBeded against 
wages due. 
extend to all the 
Ranking of Wage ar1d DistJursBmcmt Liens. Liko thr: 1894 Imperial 
Act~3 the Commonwealth legislation 81~ prohibits any seaman or appnm-
by any agreement from forfeiting his !iBn on the ship fm his 
wages. The Commonwealth ParliamBnt, howuver, t1as mm;ed one step 
further. By an extraordinary prm;ision, which has no precerJrmt in 
legislation of any British Commonwealth country, the lien for sea-
men's and apprentices' wages is given priority ovt:'!r all other liens~5 
83. S. 156, now replaced by MBrchar1t Shippin~J /\ct 1970 (Imp.), 
s. 16. 
84. Nsviga tion Act 1912- s. 83 (1) (b). 
85. Ibid., s. 83 (2). S. 83 strikes dmrun any contractual stipu-
lation which r:ontravenes any provision of the Act. S. 85 (6) 
rJefinesa1wages'1tO include such allowances as are prescribed. 
However, the position of holders of maritime liens for wages 
and disbltf'sements will apparently be prejudiced if Draft 
Admiralty Bill 1985, clause 37 (5) is implemented as Common-
wealth law. 
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It highlights the Commonwealth P<::lrliamEmt's policv of conferring max-
imum protection on wage claims. 
Section 94 (1) of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) pro\/ides 
that a ship's master has, so far as the casFJ permit:c;, "the same rights, 
liens and remedies for the recoverv of l1is ~.vagElS as a seaman has bv 
law or custom." This subsection reproduced yertJatim the repEmled 
section 167 (1) of the '1894 Act (Imp.). In the recent case of The __ _.. ...... 
al Wells?6 Sheen, J.'s enlighteninsJ judgment has placed the lien for 
master's wages on par with that for seaman's tvages. In his view, 
there are no just grounds todav for maintaining the nineteenth-cen-
tury rule that wage claims of seamfm should rcmjov priori tv over sim-
ilar claims of masters. He held that, since a master is today not per-
sonally liable to the crew for their wages, the whole foundation of 
the decision in The 5alacia87 had been removed. In modern shipping 
practice and under Australian law, the 's master. officers Bm1 
crew are all employees of the shipowner or the clemise charterer. 
There is no ground for holdin~J that a s ~vasJe claim should 
rank after the wage claims of the crew. 
Naturallv, first priority given to the wage lien will adversely 
affect the rights of the other claimants, e .. U1r~ salvors, rnurtga~wes. 
holders of bottomry bond and necessarios rnrm. Section 83 (2) and 
section 94 (1) offer one vital advan to ~>hlpm,vners ~\1ho are unable 
86. [1984] 3 All E.R. 193. 
87. (1862) 167 E.R. 246. The rule that seamen's claims for wages· 
had priority over master's wagBs and disbursements was actu-
ally applied, before the Navigation f-\ct ·191 (Comth.) was 
passed, in two New South Wales cases: The /\nglo-ImJlan, 
(1868) 8 N.S.W.L.R. 102; The TytJurnia (1887) 4 LL!.N. (i\l.S.W.) 1. 
This preferential treatment was based on the premise that 
the ship's master was bv law regarded as being liable to the 
seamen for their wages. l1Jhere the proceeds of of 
the ship were insufficient to pay seamen IMages, the mas-
ter wa~ not permi.tted to deplete the fund further bv taking 
a portmn out of 1t to meet his own claim. 
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tu pay the crews' wages promptly. In view of their first-priority 
on the ship, ma5ters and crew members may readily render their ser-
' vices on credit by looking to the ship as . There is apparent-
ly another benefit to shipowners. A wage lien constitutes a secret 
charge on the ship. The need to carry out cai'eful im;estigations be-
forehand will deter a prospective plaintiff, other than a seaman or 
master, from taking pror.eeoings in rem against ::;hips to which section 
' -·-
10 of the Navigation f\ct 1912-73 (Comth.) applies. Otherwise the ac-
tion may prove unproouctive. 
To the dismay of other creditors, the security value of ships 
under Commonwealth law is reduced by yet another first-priority lien. 
Section 9!. (2) reads: 
"The master of a ship shall, so far as the case permits, 
have the same rights, liens and remeoies for the recovery 
of disbursements and liabilities properly made or incurred 
by him on account of the ship as a master hEJS for the re-
covery of his wages." 
The provision, when read in conjunction with soction % (1) and sec-
tion 83 (2), confers on a 's master a disbursermmt lien which ranks 
on par with a seaman's wage lien. By upgrading the order· of priority 
of the disbursement lien, the Commonwealth Parliamr=mt has, in one im-
portant way, increased the security value of ships defined in section 
10. Thus a master should be able to obtain, without difficulty, essen-
tial supplies and on account uf th~3 ship. l!Jhef'e a master 
personally liable to third parties in such circumstances, £:.2· under 
bills of exchange which are rJishonoured by the shipowners, the cred-
may avail themselvE:!S of the master's liisbur~:;ement lien. rt is 
submitted that with the master's consent they can, in t1is name and on 
his behalf, institute pmceeliings .!.!::__ r~ against thEl ship.138 tl.lhere the 
relevant provisions of the Navigation /\ct '1912-73 (Comtll.) apply as 
the proper' law in a conflict of laws situation, is imrnatorial that 
the disbuesements are incurred outside i\ustralia and tho action in 
teLD is instituted in a foreign court. 
88. See The Ripon Cit'L (1897] f). 226. 
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III. SALVAGE LIEN 
1. Origin 
It is not certain how this lion began. The origin of a salvors 
right t~enerallv thought to have been based on the r~oman concept 
of negotiorum A negotiorum was one \Mho had done 
. M 
something, saving some propertv, for another without beinn ask eo: 
Where the intervention was reasonable, he was entitled to be reim-
bursed. Rut Roman law in its wider field did not entitle such a person 
90 to claim anv reward. 
In tho earlv case Hartford v. Jones, decided probably in 
1699?1 an action for trover was brought against the defendant. Aft-
er having saved the goods from being lost, he refused to part with 
them until he was paid. Holt, C.J., gave judgment for the defendant 
on the grounds that "salvage is allowed bv all nations; it being reas-
onable, that a man shall be re~.varded who hazards his life in the ser-
vice of another." Thus at common law, a salvor had a possessorv lien 
on the goods saved. About four vears later in Tranter v. 
-----'-
Holt, C.J., went one step further. He t1eld that the custom and law of 
nations "gives the master in this case ar1 interest in the ship and 
goods." 93 In his view this interest, in the sense of security, could 
not be divested even though the master hacJ parted witt1 his poss-
ession. This case contained an earlv t.race of a lien independent of 
possession. 
It unknown when the Enqlish Court of Admiraltv first rec-
ognised the maritime lien in fa\/Our of a salvor. rhe lien could have 
89. W.A. Hunter, Roman Law (2nd ed. 1885), p. 661; Jolowicz, Hi.s-
torical Introduction to Roman Law (1967), p. 312. -
90. W.W., Auckland and A.R. McNair, Roman Law and Common Law 
(1936), pp. 259-260. 
91. 2 Salkeld 6St1; 1 Ld. Ravm. 393. 
92. (1703) 2 Ld. Ravm. 931. 
93. Ibid., 933. Fur concept of salvage, see also "Life ~3ah;age in 
Anglo-American Law" (1978) 10 J.M.L.C. "79. 
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arisen from the notional hypothecation to the sahmr of the property 
saved. There are a number of other reasons which led to the devel-
opment of the principle. The inconvenience to the owner of allowing 
'd d 9lJ a salvor retain possession of the property salved had to be avm e . 
Otherwise it might defeat the purpose of the salvage work under-
taken. Public policy has been repeatedly emphasised as the premise 
on which salvors are to t1e encouraged and especially rewarded for 
the hazardous nature of thPir ~.vor'k. Further impetus came from a 
series of ;'\cts ~\lhich provided for salvage rewards~5 It is submitted 
that the circumstances outlined by John l"lansfield are more related 
to the creation of a lien for salvage than to any other claim. He 
96 
wrote: 
"Proceeding to generalise, it appears that in every case 
of maritime lien we will find the circumstances in which it 
arose, the inaccessibility in general of the owner of the 
property subject to the lien, coupled with two at least of 
the following elements, narnel y, r1ecessity, emr3rgency, some 
ground of public policy justifying the lien." 
In the "Two Friends", decided in 1799, U1e Court of Admiralty gave 
judgment for the salvage claims of the crew of an American ship. 
They recaptured her from the enemy. Sir W. Scott made an unambig-
uous reference to the maritime lien when he said: 97 
" ... every person assisting in rescue has a lien on the thing 
saved. He has, as it has been argued, an action in person-
iill.! also; but his first amJ his proper remedy is in rem; and 
his having the one is no argument against his title to the 
other." 
The earlier proposition applied by Holt, C.J .. which distinguished be-
tween the master's interest and possession was t'eiterated. Lord Sto-
well in "Eleanora Charlotta",98 decided in 1823, made it clear that in 
94. Salvors have, as an alternative remedy, a possessory lien on 
the thing salved while it remains in their possession: Hat't-
ford V: ~ones. (1699) 1 Ld. Rym. 393. In The Tullantia [19211) P. 
78 an m.Junctw~ wa? granted to protect a sal\10r's right of 
possess1or1 agamst Interference by rival salvors. 
95. (1713) 12 Anne St. 2, c. 18, s. 2, giving rea~~onable rewards to 
salvors; (1.809). l19 Geo. III, c. 122, ss. 4-9, ('l8l16) 9 & 10 Vic., c. 
99, consolldatmg and amending Ulic} l<JW on salvasw. 
96. "Maritime Liens" (1888) 4 L.[J.f~. 379, p. 391. 
97. 1 C. Rob. 271, 277. 
98. 1 Hagg. 156. 
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order for salvors to maintain their rights it was totally unnecPssarv 
for them to retain possession by remaining on the vessel ~mhmd. 
Thus under English law the modem aspect of maritime lien for salvage 
had emerged. 
It is reasonable to presume that the salvage lien was part of 
the law received into Australia under the Australian Courts Act 1828 
(Imp.)~9 A number of State Supreme Court and High Court of /\ustra-
lia decisions have directly adopted the principles of Engli~>h salvage 
law.1 In terms of the Navigation Act 1912-1973 (Comth.), the Common-
wealth Legislatuee recognised the existence of the lien for 
vage services. By section 32ll (1), a salvor may abandon his lien upon 
the wreck alleged to be salved. It has its orislin in section 554 (1) of 
the Imperial Act 1894~ Moreover, subject to the prmliso, section 396 
(1) of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Cmnth.) bars the enforcement of 
any salvage claim or lien against a vessel, her cargo and/or freight 
unless the action i!l!J@l!! is brought within two years from the rJate 
when the salvage services were rendE:~red. This prm;ision modelled 
on section 8 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (U.K.). it is sur-
prising that so far only the legislatures of New South Wales and Tas-
mania have given statutory effect to the internationally-accepted 
provision? In this respect, thEl laws of the other States differ. 
2. Basic Requirements 
As the salvage lien based on a salvor's right to rell\lard, it is 
essential to analyse the conditions that must first be met. lJJith 
minor exceptions, the body of rules on the topic develop£3d by Aust-
ralian courts mainly of recent origin. 
Propertv. ~!alvage claims can only arise in connection with a 
narrow class of so-called "maritime pt~operty". fhis rneans a sl1ip, 
cargo, freight or any part thereof salvecJ. Section 6 (1) of the N<J\1-
igation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) defines a ship as "a vessel not orljinarilv 
99. The ~ifficulty, howe\Jer, is t11at before the Supreme [ourt 
(Admiralty) Act. 1832 (Imp.) was passed, it was doutJtful that 
the lien could be enforced in a colonial court. 
1. These will be discussed in the following pages. 
2. Unfor·tunatetv the wor·ding of both the Cornmomi\/Elalth and 
Imperial provisions i~1 insufficient}\; clear. . 
3. Limitation Act 1969 (1\l.S.W.), s. 22 (3) and Limitation Act 1974 
(Tas.), s. 8 (3). · 
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propelled by oars only." Sailing boats and barges may be na\;iqated 
without the use of oars and are therefore within the definition. Sub-
t 
to certain Bxceptions, wrecks' and the remnants of damaged or 
sunken vessels may still be the subject of salvage claims. Mr. Justice 
Story, a cvell known /\rnerican judge, held "the wages recoverable 
in cases of shipwreck are recovered in the nature of salvage, and as 
such from a lien on the property salved." 5 In tile Queensland Cc3Se of 
"The Gothenburg" ,6 the Privy Council applied the ordinary rules of 
salvage to a claim in respect of a derelict. 
The word "ship" has been held not to include a beacon or similar 
object. In The Gas Float Whiddon (No. 2/ a lightship was intended to 
be moored in tidal waters with her light lit at night as a navigation 
aid. lt broke away from its moorings while bein~l towed in the Thames, 
and was later recovered. It was held that, as thFJ vessel was not mari-
time property, no salvage reward was It was not constructed 
for the purpose of being navigated or of r;arrying cargo or passeng-
ers. It was in truth a lighted buoy. Th£CJ argument that the gas in 
the float could be regm·ded as cargo by it was rejected. 
Naturally where human life ancJ maritime property are together sal\1ed, 
the lien for salvage reward will attach to tho latter~ 
Danger. In all fJalvage claims, danger an essential element. 
The nature and required can only be gathered from an 
of the case authoriLies. Until rEJcently, danger has been viewed 
mainly in terms of the likelihood of dama[JE! or injury to, or loss, 
truction or deprivation of, the property. Emphasis has been placed 
on physical danger. It mav arise from tht:: position or conditicm of 
t.he vessel salved, the incapacity or shortasJe of crew, the master's 
4. Fur definition, see s. 294. 
5. Frothingham v. 3 Mass. r~ep. 
Insurance_ (Boston 1823), p. 163. 
see also f.Jhillipps on 
6. (1875) 4 G).S.C.R 133. 
7. [1896] P. 42. .A.); see R.G. Marsden, "Admiralty Oroits and 
Salvage - Gas Whitton, No. II" (1899) f)O L.CJ.R. 353. 
8. Bligh v. Simpson, The Fusilier (1865) 3 Moo. P.C.C.N. 51. 
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want skill or ignorance of the locality, or from capture by cmemy 
or pirates. The giving of distress signals or acceptance of t1elp by 
those on board the vessel salved mav be evidence of the presence 
of danger. Dr. Lushington's classic description of danger in The Char-
9 
lotte must be understood in the physical sense. He explained: 
"It is not necessary, I conceive, that the distress should 
be actual or immediate, or that the danger should be imm-
inent and absolute; it will be sufficient if, at the time the 
assistance is rendered, the ship has encountered any dam-
age or misfortune which might probably expose her to des-
truction if the services are not rendered." 
10 ' 11 In two modern cases, namely, The Glaucus and The Trmlus, 
English judges have been much influenced by economic factors. The 
question of danger to a ship in terms of both physical danger or des-
truction and the loss of the ship's use to her owners was considered. 
In both cases, the ships were towed to Aden in a disabled condition 
and without motive power. As they could not be repaired at Aden, 
they were towed to ports where the repairs could be done. In The 
Glaucus, Will mer, J., held that the ship, while at Aden, was in a posl tion 
12 
of danger. Apart from the physical danger, he seemed to regard the 
loss of use of a highly valuable chattel due to immobilization as an 
important factor. T11e decision was followed in The Troilus, but un-
fortunately reliance was placed upon the state of possible physical 
danger to the ship rather than upon the deprivation of her use. 
On appeal, the trial court decision in The Troilus \..IJas affirmed. 13 
Both Bucknill and Somerville, L.J J., were pursuacJed by the arguments 
in favour of the two-stage sahJage s~!rvices, i.r:L salvage when the 
ship was towed to t'\den and from there to the port foe repairs. In 
dealing with the question of safety of the ship at the intermediate 
place, Aden, Sommerville, L.J., appeared to ha\/e in mind the avail-
ability to her owners of the ship as a revenue-earning chattel. He 
9. (1848) 3 Wm. Rob. 68, 71. 
10. (1948) 81 Ll. L. Rep. 262. 
11. [1951] A.C. 820 (H.L.). 
12. (1948) 81 Ll. L. Rep. 262, 266. 
13. [1950] P. 92 (C.A.). 
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ably pointed out that1l1"a disabled vessel at a temporary restinD place 
en route, where she cannot be repaired, is still valueless wher-e she 
is although tht.:~re mav be a safe anchorage for her .... " According to 
him, the distress caused bv the original accident continuPd in the 
sense that 11she cannot without assistance traverse the high ~3oas to 
t d t . t' t f . n15 1er es ma 10n or some por, o repair. 
The appeal brought bv cargo owners to the House of Lords \Alas 
unanimouslv dismissed. Lord Porter, who delivered the single judg-
ment, emphasised the importance of considering danger from the view-
point of possible economic loss to the owners of the cargo carrif?d 
and the ship. He said:16 
"Of course, if no salvage award is permissible when once 
the damaged vessel has reached some place where she can 
lie for an indefinite period in phvsical safetv ... the ship 
must lie deteriorating and the cargo ultimately pBrishing, 
r~adit quc-Jestio. But I do not accept that view. The mas-
ter whose ship t1as suffered darnaqe mu~3t do his best to 
preserve the ship and cargo amJ to bring both to their 
destination as cheaplv and r~ffich::mtly as possitJle. rhr:J 
possibilitv of expense and the E?fff3Ct of delm; upon both 
the ship and cargo must be borne in mind ... Ttm possibility 
of repair at con\Jenient por·ts and thE! time ln\Jolved and 
safety of operation to ~'lhip and carDO rnust be borne in mind. 
The answer, in mv \Jiew, is not the simple one - 'Is thB ship 
in a position of physical safetv?"' 
From the financial viewpoint, thB wide meaning given to lfdanger'' 
meets the needs and objectivBs of maritime ventures. It also sef\18S 
to fill a sBrious gap in sal\JagFJ law. 
In Australia, the historic decision in the Oceanic Grancieur case17 
has brought the concept of danger into line wi til recent develop-
ments in Britain and America. /:C.. tanker carrying m1er 55,000 tons of 
crude oil struck a rock in the Torres ~)trait:5, damaging her tanks and 
losing a larqe quantity of her oil ccwgo. She listed to port and part 
14. Ibid., p. 110. 
15. Ibid., p. 110. 
16. [1951] A.C. 820, p. 83h. 
17. fisher and Others v. The Ship "Ocean Grandeur!!; Roberts 
and Others \J. The ~~hip "Ocean Grandeur" [1972-73] A.L.R. 
948, heard in thB High Court of Australia exBrcising origin-
al jurisdiction. 
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of her deck \1\Jas awash. But ~>he came to anchor later in ~3liallm .. l wat-
er and was not sir1king. Tile vessel, Leslie J. Thompson, t'\Jrmt along-
side the Oceanic Grandeur. At some peril to herself and after great 
exertions by her crew, she engaged in a complex transhipment oper-
ation, removing a large part of Oceanic GrandDur's cargo, raising her 
bows and correcting her 1"1or-emmr, the verv ingenious and ardu-
ous method adopted and executed bv the officto,rs of the Leslie J. 
Thompson enabled divt:!rs to carry out temporary repairs to the hull. 
The Oceanic Grandeur later SAiled for Singapore \'\!here permanent 
repairs were done. 
Stephen, J., reviewed various ,l\ustralian, English and American 
authorities on the subject~ 8 He found, as an alternative ground, 
that of use of the \/essel to her owners as a r·esult of being imm-
obolized at where she lav presented the nocessary danger. Undoubt-
edlv, his Honour took cognizance of the deprivation of her gainful 
emplovment as a tanker and Um continuing leakagr~ of rmr cargo, as 
important economic factors which constitutt::rJ the danger. 
We ha\/e seen the deva~:;tatin~J pollution damage that can arise 
from spillage into the sea of oil aml noxious substances. The huge 
costs of clean-up operations and the severe civil and crimlnal liabil-
itv imposed bv law will ha\/e crippling effect~" on shipowners.19 The 
consequencos can be more di::;astrous than losin£J the ship together 
with her cargo on board. Suppo~:;e that a salvor succeeds in a\/erting 
a mammoth pollution disaster by towing a tanker from a dangerous 
position out to sea and causing her oil car[W to be dumped far from 
the shoro. It virtually certain that, for the preventive services 
rendered, he does not. ha\/e a lion on thc'1 tanker. This unfortunate 
result is due to the narrow meaning (:Jiven to certain a::1pects of sal-
vage law. The pollution damage and st<Jtutmy liability averted are 
not maritime propertv. IVJoreo\/er, the threat of pollution by oil or 
18. Ho was influenced by the fact that in /\merican and English 
decisions the concopt of deprivation in terms of her- use 
for earning purpo~3es has been £'ecognised: ibid, p. 953; The 
National Defender [1970] 1 Lloyd's F~(0p. t~o. p.44 (Souttmrn-
District Court of New York); The Troilus [1951] /\.C. 820, p. 
834, ~ Lord Porter. 
19. See Chapter Fi\/e. 
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ottler noxious substances is, in essence, diffon:mt from the rJan~Jer 
as defined in salvage law. 1f the reasoning is correct, this area of 
the law should, as a matter of public policy, he ur~.Jently nmenderl by 
legislation. Handsome salvage rEJI.vards givin~J rist=J to a maritime lien 
on the ship and cargo invol\/ed should be provided to encourage pre-
venti\/e measures to be taken to <:J\/oid pollution damage. 
Voluntary nature of ser\/ice. According to Lord StowccJll. a sal-
\/OI' is a "person wllo, without <my particular relation to a ship in 
distress, proffer~1 useful service. and gives it as a volunteer ad\len-
turer, without any pre-existing covenant that connected him IJ\Jith the 
duty of employing himself for the pnJsen1ation of that ship .... " 20 In-
herent in this classic definition is \/oluntariness as a lDng-rEJcognised 
requil'ement under English law. This element IJ\ISS crmsidered in the 
New South l1Jales case of \J. The EldersHe 
' 21 Co.. In responstJ to rr:Jquest, fJ firtJ tJriuadn extingul~ihed a fire 
which occurred on bm-Jrti the "Butr)shimn. At tht::• timP, ~ihe \Mas lying 
moored to a wharf i1t flcwt Jackson ami mn.sid[c! th(~ area of re~>pons-
ibility of the twiuade. TllPre ~'\Ia~; no danger of tho firt:l spread-
ing to the wharf or the a(jjacent builclinq~>. U\Air-m, ,J., held that tile 
services l'endored to th~:; te~;hire" \,vercc! ouLc:Jlde the sphere of the 
fim brigade's duties. F~rJliance tvas plac<Jd on a o:;taternent in Williams 
and Bruce's Adrniraltv Practict'): "If, hmrv'evur, they 1:.10 bevcmd thEl 
limits of their official duty ir1 ~Jiving Bxtrc:mrdinarv a~;:3lstance, they 
"2 
are enti tied to be considered as ~3al vors." t 
\/oluntariness as an t=!lEmmnt of :Jal vage law is foumled on pub 
lie policy. The moral aspect i~! well tJrought out t)y LonJ :lt.owell in 
The Waterloo as follm'\ls: "It i~; tl18 cJutv of all ships to give succour 
2"2 
to other's in distress; none llut i:3 frE~Ptmoter would wiLhr1oid it.''_) By 
thE-~ crucial implication of public policv is the basic distinction 
drawn bet1..veEm tl.\10 tvpes of Sl=!rvice nmdered by a seaman m· rna;>ter. 
rhey are ser\/ice which falls within tr1e origirldl contract mac]e with 
20. The 1\Jep t;une (182l,) 1 Hag. Adm. 227, 236. 
21. (1899) 1l, W.N. (N.S.lLJ.) 320. 
22. (2nd eel. 1886), p. 129. 
23. 2 Dod. ll37, 4t,3, citr~d with dppr·oval by IVJelli~>h, L.J., in rJeliv-
8ring the Privy Council judgrn(:-:nt in The ":"JHeprm" (1871) L.R. 
3 P.C. 690, p. 694. 
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the shipowner, as emplm;er, and EJxtraordinarv service. In holding that 
onlv a volunteer salvor is entitled to salvage remuneration, tile 
courts ha\Je acted as tile guardian of tile extra-contractual rights of 
seamen. 
Ignorance as to tile ownership of the vessel rescued does not 
alter tile character of tile services rEmdered. Irl Tile "Sappho"~4 a 
screw steamer S, wllicll became disabled in verv bad weather, accep-
ted salvage services provided bv another screw steamer N under an 
arrangement. It was unknown at tile time that both ships belonged to 
the same owners. The Privv Council held that as tile services rend-
ered were of extraordinarv nature, and therefore not within their 
orliinarv contracts, both the master and crew of the ship N were 
entitled to salvage. An important rule laid down is that neither the 
mistaken arrangement nor the common ownership of the vessels wlll 
preclude such entitlement. 
The fr'eedom of salvors to resort to a court of law for deter-
mininr:l the value of the services rendered cannot be fettered bv pre-
existing agreements made bv third parties. In The Magerv,25 the own-
ers of two fishing vessels, M and F, and their vessels were bv the 
rules of their respective clubs tJound to rer1der assistance to each 
other. Thev also provid eli that the price to be paid for such assis-
tance was to be determined bv a particular type of arbitration. On 
appeal to the Divisional Court, the trial court decision was upheld. 
The master and crew of the salving vessel, who were not parties and 
had not assented to the club rules,were not tJmmd bv them. One iss-
ue raised was whether such an agreement, ever1 if assented to bv the 
cre1A1 members, would not lJe against public policv. 
An ir1teresting question is this. How far are courts prepared 
to go in order to safeguard the independer1t rights of the master 
and seamer1 based on the concept of voluntariness? JudiciiJl madin-
ess to reward volunteer adventurers for their diligE-mce and prompt 
response to a distress call is seen in the case of The FrieslrJnd.26 The 
24. [1871] L.R. 3 P.C. 690. 
25. [1902] P. 157. 
26. [190l!] P. 345. 
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ov.Jners of The Friesland, IAiith a b1·oken shaft amj lying ln a po!::;ition 
of danger, agreed with the tug owners that their broken-down 'JBssel 
should be towed to Liverpool undfc~r the usual towage terms. Before 
the master of the tug received instructions from its owners and be-
came aware of any such towage agreement being made, he had arrang-
ed with the master of The Friesland to provide salvage service. The 
order of events showed that the tug started out independently of 
advice or orders to perform the servicE: and had got up to The Fries-
land lrJhen the towage agreement between the respective m\/ners were 
made. Sir F.H. Jeune held that the salvage work had commenced, 
. . . t ' d d t . ht 27 "[T]h t t . g1v1ng nse o m epen en ng s. e owners canno Jargam 
away the vested rights of the master and crew by a bargain in which 
d . ,28 the master and crew o not acqu1esce. 
The concept of voluntariness was applied to distinguish the 
independent rights of the master from those of the crf3W. In The 
Britain~9 Dr. Lushington held that the master of the salving vessel 
could, by agreement made with the owner Df the salved vessel. only 
bind the interest of himself and his owner. Comequently, such an 
agreement is nDt binding on the rest Df the Cl'BW if made without 
their sanction and concurrence. 
In r'\ustralia, there are two High Court decisions where \iolunt-
ariness, as an aspect of public policy and requirement of salvage law, 
is rendered obscure. It is submitted that when: services are provid-
ed,as stated in a towage contract, no salvage is payable and her1ce 
no salvage lien will attach to the property preserved. 
In The Cartela v. Tile Irwerness-~)hirE~,30 the Tasmanian [1overn-
ment paid the owners of The Cartela the sum of twenty five pounds 
to proceed to the assistance of a ve~~sel in distre~~s. The master of 
The Cartela was informed of the services to be provided but not the 
terms of the contract made between the Dwners Df the two vessels 
27. He followed the decision of Phillirnom J., ir1 The Inchmnree 
[ 1899] P. 111 that shipowners cannot by agreement bind the 
master and crew in respect of salvage sE:r\;ices already ren-
dered. 
28. [1904] P. 345, p. 351. 
29. (1839) 1 lllm. RDb. 40. Cf. Tim Ni]~>rm;th (1885) 10 P.D. !~1. 
30. (1916) 21 C.L.R. 387. 
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and the GmJBrnment. It was agrE~ed between the masters of the two 
vessels that The Cartela would tow tile !nverness-Shire for the sum 
of £500. If The Cartela had been on an independent voyage and fall-
en in with The Inverness-Shire, all the necessary conditions would 
have been present rendering the towage a sal\Jage service. The change 
of weather and other circumstances necessitated sen1ices of a much 
more onerous nature than those within the contemplation of the 
parties when the towage contract for the sum of twenty-fhJe pounds 
was made. The owners, master and crew of The Cartela brought an 
action against The InvernBss-sl-lir£:! for £500, or alternatively for sai-
vat)e. In the Supreme Court of Tasmania, judgment was given for the 
defendants on the ground that nothing occurred during the towage 
operation to ct"1ange the character of the services from towage to 
salvage. On appeal to the High Court, it was held that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to an additional remuneration of £175 to be distributed 
as follows: one hundred pounds to the owners and the balance to the 
master and crew. 
It is regretted that the opportunity lrJas not seized upon to 
clarify the principles on which the distributions were made. lllith the 
exception of Isaac, J., Griffith, C.J., Barton and Rich, J J., seemed 
content to let the vagueness remain when they said:31 
"[I]t is immaterial IAih!::>ther the larger remuneration is 
regarded as towagE or as salvage ... The extra ser\Jices ren-
dered are analogous to salvage in this respect - that they 
do not depend upon express contract but upon a liability 
imposed by maritime law .... 11 
Isaac, J., differed entirely from the view of tho majority with regard 
to the fundamontal rules of admiralty law applicable to th1:1 case. In 
emphasising that salvage is "a mixed question of private right and 
bl . l' !! h l pu 1c PO 1cy, e correct IJ f'rc!-stated \Joluntarim~ss as an t:1SsPnti<Jl 
element of salvage law. Ht:J was firmly of the view that the compen-
sation allowed should be on a salvage basis. 
Uncertainty as to the grounds of the majority decision could 
have influenced the outcome of a later caso. In Huddart Parker Ltd. 
v. The Ship Mill Hill anrJ Her C:Ewgo; MasttH' and Crew of the Tug Fom-
most The Ship Mill Hill and Her Cargo,32 an agreement was signerJ 
31. Ibid., p. 396. 
32. (1950) 81 C.LR. 502. 
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between the plaintiff owntH'S of a t,ut,:J Fmemost amJ the aqents of thE! 
owners of the ship Mill Hill, her cargo and freight. Bv it, the tug 
would get. a salvage l'f:l\lliarrJ if the ship wa~> salved, or be paid a hire 
if the efforts failed. nm Mill Hill v.1as saf~?lV towed into Port Lincoln 
in Spencer Gulf. In the admiral tv proceedings that follmllied, the 
master and crew of the tug conter1ded that the agreement did not 
prejudice their right to maintain iJ suit for salvage. It is probable 
that the someiAJhat narrow meaning given to, and the apparent dis-
regard of, the concept of' \Joluntarine~3s are due to Dixon J.'s mis-
reading of the English authorities. His proposition, if accepted at 
face value, will seriouslv undermine thr~ pusition of masters and sea-
men seeking to enforce their independent rights. He said: 33 
"In the present case I think that in circumstances that 
existed on the evening of ~3aturday, 19th /~ugust 1950, it 
was competent to the oiAmers of the tug to make an ag-
reement for her to render assistance and thereby to bind 
the master and crew a~> to the character and amount of 
the reward." 
It is submitted that this decision can onlv be reconcilr::!d IAJith the 
mainstream of authorities in one uf t~\JTJ ways. fJn~sumably, being ern-
plm;ees of a companv which opr!ra tod a Luq for· ~cial vage c:mcJ towage 
purposes, their contract of employrnr!nt \~muld empm-.Jer· the company 
to render its services to other shiPmlliners un terms lrJhich bound them. 
Alternatively, in r8turn for the special r<:Jtes Df t'emuneration and 
other benefits, their dutiGs could havE:! br::;ecm so widely defined that 
the salvage services provided ~vere INithirl thr! DI'dinan; contract of 
employment. Apart from such pmisibilitv, it is nowhere mentioned in 
the judgment that the master amJ crc"!w CJ F the Lug hmJ verbally con-
sented to the agmement beforehand. 
The independent rights of the owrH:)l'S of \IEJssel~; carrying out 
rescue operations are inextricably n~lated to those of the ma~~ter 
and seamen. The decision in Fisher ar1d Cltllers \J. The Ship "Clceanic 
Grancleu~; F3oberts and Others \/. The Ship "CJcear1ic Grandeur" 34 is a 
welcome rectification of the judiciCll misconceptiml~3. Stephen, J., 
sittinq as Judge of the High Cuurt of' first inst<mce, rJid not regard 
as important the physical ctwractt-Jr' uf tt1e particular :mrvices, e.g. 
33.Ibid., p. 511. 
34. [1972-731 A.L.R. 948. 
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lightenin[], towage or sah;agrJ sm'\Jices. but rather the circumstances 
under V~Jhich they 1,vere carried out. His penetrating ancJlysis of the 
various authm·ities has helped to LEJ~mhm the confusion immlving 
salvage and other servicEJS. To qualify as salvagE~, the 11110rk carried 
out must, inter alia, be (a) outside the pre-existing contract to ligh-
ten or tow the ship in distress, and (ii) rendered necessary under the 
circumstances to avoid the risk of dan~ler to her. The test to be 
applied is not original but a refined version of the proposition laid 
doV~Jn by the Privy Council in The Minnehaha. Lm·d Kingdown said: 35 
"But if in the discharge of this task (towage contract), 
by a sudden violence of wind Dl' waves, or other accid-
ents, the ship in tow is placed in danger, and the towing 
vessel incur·s risks and performs dutiE!S which 1 were not 
within the scope of her original engagements, she ... may 
claim as salvor .... " 
Stephen, J., has correctly enunciated the underlying principle. Pro-· 
vided the necessary elements of salvage are irl\/olved, the services 
rendered in the form of lightening, tolrvinD or other maritime opera-
tion will give rise to sal\;age reward. In determining Um nature of 
the rescue opr::!ration or \tJork carried out, courts tend not to be 
swayed by the name Dl' description used by the parties involved. 
Lord Blackburn in r\Jicholson v. Leth Salvage and Towage Co. Ltd:36 
highlighted this aspect of salvage law when he said: "[I]n many cases 
of pure salvage nothing rnore is requinJd than towage sen!ices." The 
tug-m111ner providing such sentices will therefore be entitled to a 
maritime lien on the ship towed. 
ln the 1\lew South ltJales cnse of' Thr~ Steamship Macl-;regor-Hes-
elton's Claim.37 thB 'vessel was under charter· \/\/hen tmi\.1age was rend-
ered necessar~,t by her com1ition or prcJrilous position. Sir James Mar-
tin, C.J., (Judge Commissary) held that, as the court had jurisdic-
tion over the proceedings in J.:..§ill2 for tml\/age, a clalrn for towage gavP 
L'ise to a maritimFJ lien. Hml\lt!\/er, as the facts ~1how that the ser\/ice~; 
on both occasions were rer1derPd under tml\lage contracts, it is sutJ-
mitted that the f~s~>ential element of \/oluntariness wa~'> absent;. In the 
35. (1861) Lush. 335, 347. 
36. [1923] S.L.T. 229, p. 231, cited with appmval in Fisher and 
[Jthers 11. The ~3hie "Ocei:m GramlmJr"; Robel'ts and Others \J. 
lrm ~".hip "OcPan Grandeur" [1972-73] 1\.L.f~. 948, p. 957. 
37. (1876) 11~ N.S.W.L.R. '107. 
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lisJht of the preceding analysis, the cjecision cannot be supported. 
Successful services. No salvage reward is payable for Gny 
attempt made to rescue life or property at sea unless some maritime 
property, e.g. sr1ip, cargo or freight, is ultimately saved. 
Where no property is sa\;ed, salvage law does not allow a claim 
for life salvage to attach to the damages recm;erecl. In The /-\nnid.8 
the vessel A was negligenth,t sunk in the River Thames by the vessel 
R. The master and crew of the former vessel werf'J picked up by the 
tug S (the sahJDrs). Full compensation for the vessel A and the cargo 
sunk was recovered from the owners of vessel R. The IAII'eck was lat-
er raised by the conservators and sold. 1t \Alas l1eld that thr~ salvors 
were not entitled to reward for life salvage. As their services had 
only resulted in the saving of lives, they had no maritime lien on the 
compensation recm1ered and the \AJreck. To encourage the saving of 
lhJBs as a public policy, the Commonwealth Parliament has adopted 
the incentives provided by Imperial legislation~ 9 Thus where no prop-
erty is saved or the property saved is of insufficient value, the Min-
ister may at his discretion pay life salvors out of monevs appropria-
ted by the Parliament such sum as he thinks fit.L10 
Propel't\/ that is succc~ssfully perSE)rved may lJe subject to 
claims relating to lifE~ salvaqe amJ propertv salvage. (Jne unfortun-
ate ccmsequence is that, irrespecti\10 of whether the propertv saved 
belongs to the shipowners or l;o tllird parties, tJ1e application of the 
rule could exhaust its entire \Ji::llUEL In The Cargo Fx Sarpedor{:1 an 
English steamship, which had bec~n ~ilNerely damaged irl a collision 
with Emother vessel, wa~i abamjoned. ;\ Spunish ~;l;£~amship tonk on 
board from the English steamship her· pa~>sengers, master, crew and 
part uf her cargo, amJ landerj them :.Jafelv at ar1 Engli~~h port. In the 
admiralt·y proceedings which followed, the cargo which was arrested 
was held liable to pay salvage reward for the preservation of li\Je~; 
and the property. H1e prayer of the cargo-owner'~) that they ought 
38. (1886) 12 P.O. 50. 
39. Merchant Shippinq 1\ct 1 f394 (Imp.), s. 544 (3). 
40. Navigation Act 1912-73 (Cornth.), s. 315 (2). 
41. (1877) 3 P.O. 28. 
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to be recouped bv the owners of the English steamship in respect 
the salvage remuneration paid for the lives was rejected. It 
is submitted that the lien on the propertv saved 1.111ill extend 
to the claim for life 
By section 315 (1) of the Navigaticm Act 1912-73 (Comth.), whore 
services are rendered witt1in Australian waters in saving life or 
where in saving life from anv Australian-registered ~>hip, a reason-
able amount of salvage payable by the shipowner if property be- ,. 
longing to him is also salvecl~2 In such a case, the salvage reward for 
preservation of life pavable in prioritv to all other salvage claims. 
The principle that salvage is pavable where some property is 
saved is subject to a number of important exceptions. They were 
outlined bv Dr. Lushington in The Cape Packet~3 First. if neglect or 
misconduct on the part of salvors is \,vilful, could be a forfeit-
ure of the whole remuneration. Second, if there is "gross 
negligence", apart from wilful inattention, the claim might also be 
1111holly debarred. In these situations, despite their successful pre-
servation of property, can maintain neitt1er a personal action 
against its owners nor an f3dmiralty action ill. as1ainst the prop-
ertv salved. There is, howe\/er, "another kind of ne~~ligence, the eff-
t::?ct of which is to diminish the amount of rewarcj, not to take 
't t· 1 ''44 ·r·~ · dh d · h 1 '•5 1 en Ire y awav. rllS concept was a ere to ll1 T fJ Magda en. 
Some damage was caused bv the second ~>et of salvors as a result of 
an error. Thev received less than thev would o have been 
awarded. Dr. LushingtDn explained that the reduction was made to 
indt:~rnnify the owners anrJ not for the purpose of punishing the sal-
vors. 
. 116 In The TOJO f\1aru, Lordships' decision not to limit the 
consequences of negligence has added a new exception to the prin-
ciple. Before gas from the adjoining tank was rrmKJ\!od, a salvor 
42. Like its Imperial counterpart, s. 315 (1) does not, in the 
absence of an agreement, impose on shipowners a liabilitv 
to pav salvors For the preservation of life their· ship 
or part thereof has been salved. See also The /\id (1822), 
1 Hag. Adm. 83 and v. Simpson, (1865), 3 Moo. 
P.C.C.N.S. 51. 
43. (1848) 3 W. f~ob. 122. 
114. Ibid., 125. 
1-15, (1861) 5 L-:-T. 807. 
46. [1971] 1 All E.R. 1110 (H.L.). 
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began covering an aperture in a tanker caused by D collision. He 
attempted bolting a wide plate into place by using a bolt gun. The 
bolting resulted in an explosion which caused extensive ciarnage to 
the tanker. The rights of salvor·s whose services were successful 
were examined in relation to those of the owners of the tanker which 
was negligently damaged. It was held that there is no rule of mari-
time law that, where a slavage operation has been successful or 
where the salvors hm;e achieved more good than harm, the owners of 
the salved vessel are precluded from holding the salvors liable for 
negligence. In the owners' counterclaim for negligent damage, they 
were nDt restricted to a right to offset that loss against the 
amount of the salvage award. It is obvious U1at where the damages 
recoverable by a property owner equal to or exceed the salvage aw-
arcj, salvDrs have no maritime lien on the property. Consequently, 
sal\;ors may be held liable for damages for wronsJful arrest of the 
property. 
The principle, which gives ri~:;e to salvage entitlement, also app-, 
lies where any act done or step taken has contributed to success. Sir 
John Coleridge, in delivering the Pri\J\f Council judgment in The Atlas, 
l . d/17 exp ame : 
" ... where a salvage is finally effected, those who merit-
oriously contribute to tt1at result are entitled to a share 
of the reward, although the part they took, standing by 
it~3elf, would not in fact have produced it." 
As a matter of public policy, courts tend to treat with sympathy sal-
vage efforts, though they have only indirectly contributed to succ-
E!Ss. In the Supreme Court of New South Wales case of H18 Cythera~8 
a yacht was stolen from her owrmrs. /\ fter making sm;eral unsucc-
essful attempts to take possessior1 uf the yacht, tr1e cargo ship CM 
collided with her. Ultimately, a goVE!rnment launch was arranged to 
go out and collect the ~;acht, this being made possible by the pres-
ence of the cargo ship CM. In the admiralty proceedir1gs brought 
against the vacht and her Cat'go, judgment was Diven for U1e cargo-
IJ7. (1862) Lush. 518, 528, distinguished by House of Lords in T.bg 
Tojo i"lar·u [1971] 1 All. E.R. 1110. 
48. [1965] N.S.W.R. 146. 
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ship owners,as salvors. f'llacfarlan, J., cummentr3d favourably on the 
part played b\; the cargo ship CM,resulting in the formal action of 
boarding the vacht. He saicl:49 
"It is not necessarv ... that positive acts actuallv on or 
dlrEJctlv in relation to the salved vessel shall be done bv 
the salvor; it is sufficient if the salvor, bv standing bv. 
enables acts to be clone by other persons or ships which, 
lf the salvor had not stood bv, would not have been done." 
The proposition is commendable in that it recognizes for salvage re-
\r\lard indirect assistance or ever1 the passive role of sahJOrs. 
In l'\ennedv on Civil Salvage, the proposition is carried one step 
further. It gives?a~3 an "exceptional class of cases': instances \A/here 
salvage remuneration was given for services even though thev had 
not contributed to the ultimate preservation of the property. The 
learned author justified the award on the ground that the services 
were rendered on request or were "engaged" or "emplm;ed"~0 It is 
not easy to reconcile this categon; of cases witt1 the general prin-
51 
ciples. In O\A/r1l3rs of S.S. Melanie v. Owners of S.S. San Onofre, Vis-
count Cave, L.C., said that cases ''where the claim was not for salv-
age but for payment for work done on l~equest, stand of course on a 
diffei'ent footing." However, the courts are generally unwilling to 
suffer acts of assistance go um'ewarded where they have contributed 
to the ultimate preservation of the property. It appears that the 
absence of a logical link between the services rendered and the prop-
erty saved should prevent. a maritime lien fi'om arising. 
3. Statutory Intervention 
A number of aspects of salvage law have been subject to legis-
lative regulation. The statutory effect on the rights amJ position 
of salvors merits consideration. 
Merchant Shieping and Navigation /\cts. llle have seen how pub-
lic policy and the courts have stopped attempt!_~ by shipowners to 
whittle dovvn the rirJhts of salvors. Moreover'; to pcevent unjust ex-
ploitation of seamen, th£? Imperial P~~diament stepped in. Bv section 
49. Ibid., 154. 
50. Bv Ken11eth C. McGuffie (1Llth ecJ. 195fl), pp. 112-'119. 
51. [19251 A.C. 246 (H.L.). 
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182 of tile Merchant ~1hippin~] .i\ct i8Sl, (Imp.), every agreement by a 
seaman ''tn abandon any l'I~jht wl1ich he may have or obtain in the nat-
ure of salvage shall be wholly inoperative." Apparently, the protec-
tion did not then extend to masters and apprentices. It was re-enact-
. ed in section 156 (1) of the '18% Act (lrnp.) and has been rE~tained as 
part of section 16 (1) of the Merchant Shipping Act~ 1970 (Imp.). 
In essence, section 156 (1) of the 1894 Act (Imp.) has been enlarged 1 
and reproduced in section 83 (1) of the Navigation Act 1912-73 
(Comth.) to applv to seamer1 and apprentic8s. Under English law, an 
agreement has held to be inoperative lAJhere it provides for 
deductions bv the owner before salvage apportioned or for a sal-
vage claim to be abandoned in certain circumstances.52 It is submitt-
ed that in keeping with the legislative intent words 11right that 
he a seaman or apprEmticeJ mav have or obtain in the nature of 
salvage11 in section 8:) (1) ~d) should be wideh; construed. They should 
embrace possessory and maritime liens as well as per!:mnal remedies. 
Section 83 nmders void m1erv aqreement which is inconsistent 
11\/itll the provisions of the 1912-73 Act (Comth.). 
Like the lmpBrial Parliament, trw Commonwealth Parliament has 
adopted certain safeguards. In all cases of wreck or loss of the ship, 
proof that a"seaman has not exerted his utmost to save the ship, 
cargo, human life and so forth shall bar his claim to wages." 53 Thi3 
provision is based on necessity and public policv. Other~Aiise when the 
ship is on the high seas, beyond Um reach of others, trm crew could 
place her or her cargo in danger, stage a "salvage operation", and 
then claim a maritime lien. Thus, so long as tr1e master-servant rela-
tion subsists between tJm shipowner? including a demise chaeterer) and 
a sr:Jaman, t,he latter cannot claim salvage for saving t1is own ship or 
the cargo carried. His claim will, howevEw, be allowod if the service 
performed is outside tho scop£~ of his contractual duty. This occurs 
tNhen he is regarded aci a volunteer, e. where he is cli:>charged from 
service by the master !1' the ~>hip is finally abandoned bona fide and 
53. i\ia\/iqation ~~ct 1912-73 (Comth.), s. Sl,; 1894 Act (Imp.), ~3. 157 
(I) (repealorJ); see 1970 /\ct (U.i\.), ~i. 16 (1). 
54. The lLJarrior (1862) Lush. 476. Sr~e 1912-73 
(cmnth.), s: as (1). 
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' . 55 t> h' . t j b . 56 with the masters autlmrlt\1, or .11e s lP 15 cap -urec v £memv. 
WIJBre there is a personal liabilitv to pay salvage a\:vard, whethPr 
under an agreement or maritime law, a lien attaches to the 
property salvE:1d?7 
Section 83 (1) (d) does not extend to an agreement made under! 
section 324 (1). A master or any crew member of a ship, wt1o has ren- ! 
dered salvage mav voluntarilv abandon his lien upon the 
wreck alle~]8d to sah1ed. Pending the decision of some Fedt=Jral or 
State Court, security for an amount based on an agreement made 
between the parties concerned may be given to the salvor-claimant. 
The agreement is binding on the ship, cargo and freight and the own-
ers thereof for the salvage which mav be adjudged to be payable. 
Section 324 (1) is clumsily worded. It is grosslv unclear as to whether 
the master \.~lho is authorised to enter into the agreement acts for 
the salving vessel or the maritime property saved:8 Although this 
provision is in urgent need of redrafting, its beneficial effect must 
not be overlooked. Wl1ere a pre-trial is made, the wreck 
or other maritime property salved can be rt:~adily disposed of free 
from the salvage 
Pollution bv Oil and other Substances. It will be recalled that 
in the 1967 Torrey Canyon disaster one of the problems encountered 
by the British Government L'\Jas the lack of statutory authoritv to 
intervene at an earlv stage?9 Thus during the salvage operations, 
arrangements were being made to buy out the Dutch salvors if 
tanker was refloated. The object of the British Government was to 
acquire complete and immediate control over her disposal. Delav and 
the worsening weather brought this prospect to e:m end, resulting in 
the devastating 
So far as pollution bv oil and other noxious substancl~s is con-
cerned, the rights of salvors are lncreasinglv affected bv legislation 
55. The Florence (1851) 16 Jur. (Pt. I) 572. The abandonment must 
occur at sea for the purpose of sa\/ing li ft.J and must be 
spe revertendi. 
56. Two Friend~> (1799) 1 C:. Rob. 271, 
57. The Hope (1803) 3 C. Rob. 215; (1838) 1 Hag. /\dm. 1119. 
58. For corresponding provision, ~;ee Merchant Shipping f\c t 1894 
(Imp.), s. 551, (1). 
59. See Apr.fl 1967 (Comnd. 3242), para. 1 supra. 
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and international com;entions. Since 1972, various amendments have 
been made to the anti -pollution legislation of New South IJJales, Qut::en-
sland, South Australia and Victoria. In each State, the Authority 
concerned, e.g. tho Boarcl or f'v1inister, given fairly wide powers to 
prevent or reduce the discharge of oil from ships~0 The exercise 
of these powers often ·impinges upon salvage law in a number of ways.
61 
It is a principle of salvage law that salvors, who have effective 
occupation of a wreck while carrying out salvage work, are entitled 
to exclusive possession of it. This right was protected from inter-
ference in The Tubantia62 where an injunction was granted. The same 
principle applies in the ca~1e of a vessel which, due to her complete 
abandonment, constitutes a derelict in maritime law. An important 
exception arises where her master appears and asserts his authority. 
The salvors must allow him to "nJsume charge, to employ whom he 
pleases, and to take t.vhat measur~.:)::; he thinks proper for the preser-
vation of tJ1e ship." 63 A salvor's reward may reduced or even for-
feited if he persists in forcing his services upon the master or other 
representative of the shipowner where they are no longer required. 
Under the prevention of oil pollution legislation, the Minister or 
Board may, by written notice, direct certain pi'ompt action to be tak-
en, e. the removal of the ::>hip from a specified place or the cargo 
from the ship. Thus the rights of salvors to exclusive possession and 
to apply for an injunction to prevent interference are now subject 
to the overriding statutorv powers of intervention?4 Since compli-
ance with such orders by ttle shipowners conc~.:)rned is essential, sal-
vors rnay agree to carry out their salvage operations as directed. 
60. Navigable Waters (Oil Pollution) Act 1960 (Vic.), s. as amend-
ed by Navigable Waters (Oil Pollution) Amendment /\ct 1972 
(Vic.), s. 11; Pollution of tlJaters by Oil Act l973 (fJld.), ss. 
20 and 2h; Prevention of Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters 
(Amendment) Act 1973 (N.S.W.), s. 7A; Prm1ention of Pollution 
of Waters by Oil Act .Amendment Act 1979 (S./\.), ~:;. la. 
61. See Ct1apter 5. 
62. [1924] P. 70. 
63. fl1e Champiun (1863) Br. & L. 69, 70, r2er De. Lushington. 
64. ScCJe sections referred to in footnotE! 60 above. 
371 
However, in carrying out the orders which are gE!ared tm~1ards the 
prevention or mitigation of pollution, salvors may be disentitled from 
any reward because the property may ultimately be lost or destroyed. 
Under sections 8 (2) and 10 (3) of the protection of the Sea (Powers 
of Intervention) Act 1981 (Comth.), the measures which the Minister 
can take on the high seas include sinking or destroying the ship and/ 
or her cargo. It is arguable that, in the light of the extensive pow-
ers of intervention conferred by State and Commonwealth Acts, the 
courts should, wherever it is just and equitable, make an exception 
to the rule that some property must have been salved. The sah1age 
remuneration - it is submitted - should take the form of an award to 
be made against the shipowners who are under a personal obligation 
to comply with the orders. Where no res is saved, the salvors' claim 
is not protected by a maritime lien. 
Salvors can adopt another approach. Apparently the duty of 
compliance with the of the Minister or Boanl under the State 
A t . . d h' 65 C' l b h . 't' l t' c "S ts tmpose on s tpowners. ~)a vm·s, y w ose tm ta exer Ions 
the propert~y has been preserved up to a point, have a possessory 
lien thereon. They mav refuse to relin~Juish their lien unless payment 
is made for their work or some satisfactory arrangement is reached 
with the shipowners. However, even if neither payment nor arrange-
ment is made, salvors cannot peevent the actions ordered by the Min-
or Board from carried out. One relating to the 
of salvors in such circumstances has to be resolved. Under 
State Acts, the expenses and otller liability Incurred by the Min-
or Board constitue a debt due from the shipowners to the Crown. 
The debt not only gives to a charge on the ship but also renders 
her liable to detention until the amount is paid or accept-
able to the Minister or Board is provided?6 Although a salvor who 
contributed to the e\tentual pn::~servation of the property is 
65. Subject to certain exceptions PI'D\/ided in the Acts, the pen-
altv of $50,000 is imposed for non-compliance with t.he order: 
Pollution of Waters by CJil Act 1973 (Qld.), s. 22; Pnwention 
of CJil PD!lution of 1\Javiqable lJJaters C!\memJment) Act 1973 
(N.S.W.), s. 7 C; .Er.Q.lliill!Jsm of Pollution of l1Jaters by-Oil Act 
A~endmen~ Act 1979 (S.A.): ss. 7 and 7 a; Navigabh~ LtJaters" 
CJ1l (Pollutmn) Act 1960 (Vtc.), (as amended), s. '24. 
66. P?llution .of Wate~s by Oil Act 1973 (Qld.), s. 23 (3) (QJ; Peeven-
t.wn of Otl Pollutmn of Naviqable LtJaters (Amendment) Act 
1973 (N.S._W.), s. 7 0 (3) (QJ; Pre\/ention of Pollution of l1laters 
bv Oil Act Arn~ndment .Act 1979 (S.A.), s. ~ e (1) <·md (2); i\Javig-
able Waters Oil (Pollut10n) Act 1960 (Vic.)(as amended),s. 26 (3) (b). 
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entitlelj to a maritime lien tnereor1, hi::; claim rnav be postponed to thEl 
statutory charqe. This unfortunate result \J\Iould arise, as we shall 
see, where the ship subject to the charge is placed undor statutorv 
detention. 
The Protection of the Sea (Powers of IntenJBntlon) Act 1981 
(Comth.)67 givE~s effect to the Intt:~rnational Convention relating to 
Intervention on the Hiqh Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution and the Proto-
col relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution. 
by Substances other than Oil, 19/3. The l"linister mav, for example, 
exercise the wilJe-ranning powers on the happening of a maritime 
casualtv as provided in section 9. 
In a number of respects, the position of salvors under the 1981 
Act (Comth.) differs from that under the State Acts. Firstly. such 
measures on the high seas as the Minister n~gards necessarv may ex-
pressly extenrJ to the salvage of the ship, part thereof or her cargo~8 
fhe measures may be ordered whether before or after salvors have 
commenced work. In the latter situation, they may be construed bv 
courts as additional assistance which tho salvors are unable to re-
69 This statutory intervention IAiill reduce thl"l salvage reward 
and the value of the lien attached to tht:; property saved. 
Secondly, by section 11 (5l0 a salvor in POSSf:JSsion of a ship 
being salved can be personally ::;ervecl with ministerial diroctions. 
These may require or prohibit certain act~1 to be performed in rela-
tion to the ship and/or cargo. A salvor may be placed in a dilemma. 
If he fails to comply with such directions, IH::l may be found guilty of 
an indictable offence which carries a pene:1lty of up to $20,000?1 Com-
pliance witr1 the ljirection~.; mav mean tho sinking or destruction of 
the ship and/or cargo and the loss of the valualJle lien, inclucJing his 
right to salvage. 
67. See Chapter Five. 
68. Ss. 8 (2) (a) (iii), 9 (2) (a) (iii) nne! 10 (3) (a) (iii). 
69. Salvors must not unreasonably refuse the offer of assis-
tance if there is doubt as to the ~:;uccess of their opera-
tions: The Camtwia (1848) Pritch /\d. Dig. 3rd eel. voL II. p. 
1822; see al~3o The Dantzic Packet (1837) 3 Hagg. 385. 
70. ::;irnilar PDWI::!rs are exercisable uncJec ~;. 8 (2) (b) (iii). 
71. s. 19 (1). 
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Thirdly, the measures to be taken must not <?xceed INiiat is 
rr~asonably necessary to prevent, mitigate anci Ec'lirninc:=Jte the danger 
of pollution by oil or other noxious substances.72 The 1981 f\ct 
(Comth.) disallows unnecessary interference with the rights and in-
terests of any persons likelv to be affected by the mea~;ures. lt is, 
therefore, possible for salvors in certain cases to c3ucceed in chall-
enging the validity of a ministerial OI'der. This coUl'Se of action may 
enable salvors to retain possession of the property to IMhich a mari-
time lien lias attached. On the other hand, where the property has 
been sunk or destroyed, and the direction is held to be excessive, a 
salvor should be entitled to recover damages against the Minister?3 
An action may be bought for thE~ \1\}rongful interference with the 
rights and interests of a salvorJ ar1d loss of the maritime lien. 
Under 5ection 21 of the Protr~cticm of the Sea (Civil Liabilitv) 
Act 1981 (Comth.) provisions ar·e rnade For recouping the expenses in-
curred by the Minister? 1~ :3uppose the shipol!lmers are insolvent and 
the proceeds of sale of the property saved are insufficient. It is 
submitted that thtcJ salvor's maritime lien should have priorit~,r over 
the statutory charge in Fm;our of the Cornmonl!l.lealth unless the latt-
er has had the ship detc:1ined under section 22 (1 ). 
Historic Shipwrc~cks. The l'ight::; of ::;alvors in n:!lation to the 
subject are affected by tmtil CDmmonwealth and State leglslatiDn. 
f\n interesting case dealing with Western .Australian law Dn the matter 
72. However, LJ\f s. 8 (5), the anti-pollution measures that may be 
taken are not restricted by s. 8 (4). As to restrictiDns on 
the measures that may be taken otherwisE! than under the Con-
ventiDn and the 1973 ProtocoL see s. 10 ( 4). 
73. Under Article VI of the Convention, compensation For damage 
caused by any unreasonable measure taken may be recovered. 
74. Protection of the Sea (Civil I lability) Act 198'1 (Comth.), s. 22 
~1). The ~erc~ant Shipping (Oil_ PollutiDn) f\ct 197·1 (c. 59) (U.K.) 
rncoeporates mto the Unitod KingdDm domestic law many of 
the provisions of the International Convention on r-:i,;il Lia-
bility For Oil Pollution Damage, 1969. f3ut it does not confer 
a charge em the of fending ship. 
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• f"1 b' so v Wnst-r:rn Auc;tralian Must=~um?5 ln 1957, the plaintiff IS \0. HL ll . c_ c:; ~ _ 
discovered the wreck of thB Gilt Dragon, a Dutch East India Company 
\Jessel. lost in 1656, less than thrE~e milEs from the coast. After not-
ifying tt1e Commomvealth Roceiver of l1Jrecks at Fremantle of the dis-
cmJery and claiming his interest in the wreck as a finder, he lost 
track of it. In 1963, lie relocated the r'emains, ~:Jal vaged a number of 
articles therefrom and, as before, ga\Je notice of the discovery. The 
Gilt Dragon is named in the Schedule to tho Musoum Act Amendment 
~ 1964 (W.A.)?6 As this IAJreck \,vas vested in the LlJr-Jstern Australian 
Museum f:loard by the Act (W.A.), no compensation was payable to any 
person as finder. 
It was an offence for am; person who, without the consent of 
the Board, in any way "altm's, remm1es ... m· assumes the custody or 
control of any historic 1.vreck vested in th~l Board." Ely section 6 (1) 
. . }] . 
of the _Marit1mr; Archaeology Act 1973 (W.f\.), the propeJ"ty m, and 
rigt1t to possession of, all historic ships an~ vested in the Museum on 
bl~half of the Crown in right of LtJnstern Australia. Ttw plaintiff arg-
ued that the Musl'!um /l.ct 1959-1964 (W.A.), the fvluseum Act 1969 
(I.LLA.)J IAihich repr:!aled the former Act,and the Ma1ine Archaeologv Act 
1973 (LlJ. i\.) were void because tllev wnre beyoncJ the le~Jislative comp-
etence of the State Parliament of l1Je~1tern 1\ustralia. He had done 
such acts of possession in relation to the mmains as thev permitted 
unde1 the circumstances. He claimecJ to be entitl£-?cJ to salvaqe in 
the ~;trict sense of' the IAJord or f<Jir compensation for his efforts if 
the Acts were inoperative. Since thE~ members uf the fligh Court of 
Australia were equally divided in npinior1, the decision of Barwick, 
C.J., prevailed by reason of section 23 (2) (tJ) of the Ju(jiciarv Act 
- m - -
1903 (Comth.), as amended. He held that thr-J Western Australian 
statutes were invrJ!id and that thm; interfered with the plaintiff's 
right to salvage. It was clearlv r'ecognized on two [)rounds that the 
statutes IAJere void. First, it we:1s beyond the legislative competence 
of the State to pass statutes dealing with tt1e sea-br~d and things 
75. (1977-78) 16 /\.L.R. 623, doci~:iion of U1e f-ligh Court of Aus-
tralia given on appeal. -
76. No. 58 of 1964, s. 11. 
77. No. 66 of 1973. 
78. No. 6 of 1903. 
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. 79 '. . 
upon it within three nautical miles from tt1e shorelme. SeconrJ, 1t 
could not be said that the subject-matter of the ~arine Archaeoloqy 
1973 (W.A.) t>\las related to the peace, order and good gmJBrnment 
of the of Western Australia. A finder of a wreck, as described 
in the situation above, has an interest therein. He should be entitled 
to salvage reward and also to a maritime lien on the propertv. 
Unfortunatelv for historic \Aireck searchers in Australia, as a 
result ot' the 1980 Constitutional Agreement made between the Comm-
onwealth Government and of the State Governments. wi off-
sllore legislative powers are exercisable bv the State Parliaments. 
It appears that the constitutional powers (coastal waters) legislation 
does not operate with retrospective effect.8° Consequentlv, the 
Western Australian statutes are not validated. 
VictoriJ1 and South Australia82 ha\Je each enacted the ~ 
toric Shiewrecks Act 1981, which closelv modelled on the Common-
~ealth Historic Shiewrecks Act 1976~3 In three important ways, tt1e 
rights of a finder of a historic shipwreck or relic are affected. The 
Minister is empowered to required any person, who has custody or 
possession of a historic shipwreck or relic, to furnh>h information or 
t h·b't t . t' . I . . 84 . ,o pro 1 1 cer am ac ,wn m re atmn to 1t. Moreo\/er, a f1nder of 
79. Barwick, C.J., said: "Having regard to the term~:; of s. 51 0:0 
of the Australian Constitution, tt1e State may make laws con-
trolling fishing in the seas comprised in the first three naut-
ical miles off shore of its territm·y ... But the l\Jaters within 
those limits neither form part of the territory of the State 
nor are themselves the subject of legislati\/e power of the 
II ( ' • State: ..1977-78) 16 A.LR., 634. See also New South lllales v. 
The Commonwealth (1976) A.L.J.R. 218: Pearco v. Florence 
[1976] A.L.R. 289. 
80. See Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Comth.); Constit-
u~ional Pn~t~1ers (Coastal Waters) Act 1979 (N.S.W.); Constitu-
tlDnal Powers (Coastal Waters) Act 1980 ((Jld.); Constitutional 
Powers (Coastal Wnters) r'\ct 19/9 (S.A.); Constitutional Powers 
(Coastal l.tlaters) Act 1979 (Tas.); .Constitutional FJowers (Coastal 
Waters) Act 1980 (Vic.). 
81. No. 9722 of 1981 (Vic.). 
82. No. 76 of 1981 (S.A.). 
83. No. 190 of 1976, as amended by Historic Shipwrecks Amend-
ment Act (No. 88 of 1980) (Comth.). 
84. ~?· 9722 of 1981 (Vic .. ), ss. 15, 16 and 19 (5); No. 76 of 1981 
CJ.A.), ss. 10, 11 and 13; No. 190 of 1976 (Comttl). ,,, 10 11 
and 13. ' ;:);::), ' 
376 
the remains of a ship, part thereof or am,1 articlE? essociated wi ttl it, 
is under a duty to notify the l"linistFH' C:Js requirf:=!d. 1n return for a 
dr~scription of the location of a historic wreck or historic relic, ttle 
finder may be paid a reward not exceeding the prescribed arnount.BS 
Under salvage law, a salvor's entitlmnent to relftJarcj is protectmJ with 
a maritime lien on the t'llreck or other maritime propr~rty saved. Thts 
valuable right may be taken away by tht:~ publication of a gazette 
which declares a historic shiplflireck or rnlic to be \iested in the 
Crown or in one of the specified authorities. [3y sc~ction 20 (3) of 
the Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 (Comttl.), the owrlEH'ship of the r(~­
mains of a particular ship or article will \Jr~st in the manner provided 
"free of any charge or other encumbrance." The State Acts enable 
salvors and finders, I.Nho are ttlus deprivecJ of their rights, to claim 
compensation within six months of the publication of the notice.86 
Where maritime property found or ~:;m:ed by a pecson is acquired un-
der the Commonwealth f\ct, the comporls<::Jt(on is determined by agree-
t b t ' ' t8/ men or y an ac Ion m cour ·. 
Part IX of the 1894 f.\ct (Imp.) dUE'Js not df:;al with historic stlip-
IAirecks or shipwreck rolics as !.'iuch. lndt:;ed most of its provisions 
ting to wrecks show by their own term:~ that they are inapplica 
ble to the waters or Britisl1 possessions outsicJe tr1e United f\ingdom: 8 
However, section 523 provirJes: f"lajestv and Her Royal success-
ors are entitled to all unclairnmJ tflir£Jck in any part of 1--!er Maj-
's dominions, except in p!act:!s INilere Hec2r IVJajesty or any of Her 
Royal predecessors has granted to dny other pnrson the right to the 
wreck." It is sutm1i tted ttl at, b<Jsed on ~:;ecti on SL16?9 a person llliho 
has salved an unclainmd l:vreck or one pre\/ioush; given to another tJv 
roval Duthori is E~ntitled to a li(c;n thereon for' :3al\1age rewards. In 
the vif~w of GibtJs, J.?0 by sect:ion 523, all unclaimed wrack found in 
B5. fb!d., Act 19B1 (Vic.), :3. 2'• (1); jbid., Act 19BI (;3./\.), s. 18 (1); 
tbtd., Act 1976 (Cumtrl.), s. 18 (1). 
86. , Act 1981 (Vic.), s. 26 (3); !bid .. /\ct 1981 (SJ\.), s. 20 (l1). 
87. 1\io. 19[] of 1976 (Cornth.), s. 21 (1). 
88. See ss. 511 rnoremJE:~r, ss. 535 and 537 taken together 
~3uggest that s. r;36 limited to wrecks in the United K.ingcJom. 
89. It has been reproducr:!cJ in Nmligation Act 1912-73 o t> ) 
17_ - m 11. , s. 
90. Robinson v. Westf~rn Austre:1lian fVJuseurn (1977-7§) 16 A.L.R. 623, 
at p. 6L,/-;-
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the waters within three miles of the l~oast of lLIPstem Australia be-
comes the property of Her Majestv. HE'. rwld that, as the Crown is 
one and indivisible throughout Her Majestv's Dominions, t;hen~ was no 
repugnancy betwE~en the provisions of lJJestern Australian statutes, 
IJ\/Ilich vested the f::illt Dragon in thB Boarrj,and section 523 of the Imp-
erial Act. 
IV. DAMAGE LIEN 
1. Origin 
It is possible to trace th£~ of'igin of l~he damage lien to the deo-
rjand of old English law and thE! noxal action of Roman Law. Under the 
former, the cart or other inanimate object which had caused thP harm IAJas 
forfeited:l1 Mavers referred to a statement in an fJarly textbook by 
Britton that a ship which had caused death or damage \Mould be for-
feited. He saw in the idea of a ship as wrongdoer thf:J gmm of the 
maritime lien?2 In F~oman law, noxal surrender was W3ed in ancient 
practice by the master to fme himself from the consequences of 
wrongful <'lets committBd by the ~~lave. [3\f surrendering the tfllrong-
doer (i.e. the noxa) to the injured party, thE! mastm' IAiould cease to 
be responsible?3 The English notion of forfeiture and the Roman 
practice of "appeasement" could have led to the recognition of the 
"personality" or "juridicial entity" of the ship?t~ This doctrine gained 
momentum in a number of ~~~~ays. In rE~lation to a contractual claim for 
wages, Powell, J., said that r'in the admiralty the llody of the ship is 
l . bl n95 1a e. 
One of the important developments which followed from the 
fiction is the special recogniti un accorded to claims for wages and 
collision damage. The fact that the Court of f\drniralty treated such 
claims as ha\ling priority over many others is significant. Probablv, 
the deodand of En~Jlish law, the noxal action of Roman law and the 
91. O.W., HolrnPs, J., C'ornmon l_aw. pp. 25- 30; J.H. Bakm, An [ntrod-
uction to English LPgal History (1971), pp. 211-212; deodand was 
abolished bv the statute 9 & 10 Vic.) c. 62 (Imp.). 
92. "Maritime Liens" (1928) 6 Can. Bar. Re\1. 516, p. 5113. 
93. llJ.A. Hunter, f~omar1 I E:lW (2nd ed. 1885), p. 167; A. lJJatson, ThEJ 
Law of Obligations in the Later f-(ornan Republic (1965), pp~t1 
and 278. 
94. G. Price, "Maritime Liens" (1%1) 57 L.f~.R. 409, p. t111; R.G. Mars-
den, "Two Points of Adrniraltv Law" (1886) 2 L.Q.F~.,p. 369. 
95. Wells v. Bsmcm (1704) 2 fxavrn. HJt~L,, 101~r:J. 
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fictitious persormlity of LhE~ ~ihip mu5t tw\JE! combinmJ to im;est suits 
For collision darna<:]G (cmd vvc:l~tc2S) with a ur1ique charm:tm. CJbviously 
one way of ensur·ing tt1<::1L suril juclqment credit.or·s l;vDuld be paid first 
out of the procEJE!ds Df sale of the ship ""'as for Admiralty judges 
to recognise an attachment of thD~3E? cl<~ims to the body of the !3hip. 
" ' " . d ' '] 0 3-96 ' th ·f' t ' It appf')ars that rt1n /\lmr:; , cJ('!Clde 1n u lJ, 1~1 , e 1rs case 
where the concept of rne:1ritirne liEm tvas EJ[1pliecJ in a collision suit in 
order to obtain a dt?sired result. rhruugh the fault of ht~r master 
and crew, The "Aline", a Ru~1sian \Je~;sel. collided with and damaged the 
vessel "Panther". After thr'! collision but before rhe ''Aline" was arr-
ested, the master executed iJ tJottomry bond. This \Alas given to a 
third party (0) who had paid fnr repairs done on The "Aline". The 
owners of the '~Panther" (X Co.) and 0 were competing claimants. The 
proceeds of the sale of The 11 /\l im:" wen'! in~:;ufficient to satisf\,1 the 
judgment debt in favour of X Co. Dr. Lushinc~ton hr1ld that X Co. "in 
possession of a decree of this [ourt in a cause of clamage11 had rights 
co-extensive with those of the uwrmr in the \/essel cc-Jusing the dam-
age?7 This placed X Co. in a prpforrecJ position. For the first time, 
it was held that the maritime lien em LtlE'~ ship f-Jxt.ended to subsequent 
accretions in the ship's value,ari~3irlg from rl?pair~'> performed at the 
owners' expen~e,and the freight <Jctually recehJE'Jd at the material 
time. 
About twelve years later, Lhe riqht of t;he owner of an injured 
vessel to a maritime lien CJn Lhr:? wrongdDing vessol was put beyCJnd 
·t· I Th "B ld . 1 "rJB , · ques 10n. n e o Bucc l'Jugtl , t;he vessel negligently collided 
with and sank the barge "Luilliam" in the Rivrcn· HLmter. ~3ir John Jer-
vis delivered the Pri\;y Cnuncil judgment for the owners of the "Will-
iam". In declaring their entitlPment tn a mut'itime lien, he adopted 
the clc-Jssic definition of the tL~rm given by Lord Tenterden 99 and the 
legal process explained by Mr. Justice Story for enforcing it.1 Lord 
96. 1 W. Rob. 111. 
97. Ibid., 117. 
98. (1851) 7 Moo. P.C.C. 267. 
99. Ibid., 28t~. 
1. 1 Sumner, /8; cited by Scott, L.J., in The Tolten [1946] P. 13~), 
p, 1LI4 (C.i\.). 
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uJatson in the House of Lords cas!:! of' v. M'Knight made the 
following rernarks:2 
"The principle of that decision [in The ''Bold Buccleugh"1 
has been adopted in the American Courts; and in the Ad-
miralty Court of England it has for nearly forty years been 
followed in a ty of cases in which lien for damage 
done by the ship has been preferred to claims for salvage 
,, 
The doctrine is now firmly established as the maritime laws 
of the United 1\ingdom and rnany British Commonwealth countries. 
2. Position in Australia 
It is opportune at this stage to consider llvhether this doctrine 
has become part of Australian laws. Its late development in 1839 or 
more likely in 1851 the /\ustralian Courts Act 1828 (Imp.) in-
applicable as a reception mechanism. Unlike the wage lien, the clam-
age lien is not provided for in any of the State marine or State nav-
igation Acts. Strangely enough, it appears that in none of thFJ Aus-
tralian cases dealing with collisions havo judges snized tt1e opportun-
ity to adopt the doctrine. Moreover, the doctr.ine could not have 
been imported into the Australian legal systems lJV the Imperial Mt:1r-
9hant Shipping Acts, 1854 and 18%, as the subject of maritime lien 
for collision damage outside their scope. 
Australian courts of unlimited civil jurisdiction are empowered 
as Colonial Courts of Admiralty to exr:::rcise jLH'iscliction over all 
claims for damage done by any ship to the same extent as the High 
Court of Admiralty in In the absencB of legislation effec-
tively enacted by the Commonwealth and State Parliamonts to the 
contrary, the principles of maritime law admini~ltBl'FJd by theso Colon-
ial Courts of Admiralty should be similar to those of English maritime 
lmv. As pointed out earlier, it was a preponderant objective of Brit-
ish policy makers to apply a uniform body of maritime law throughout 
tile Empire. In today's maritime commerce and activities, /\ustralia 
will lag behind other countrie~3 unless this area of the law is brought 
into line with modern 
Tt d . . . Th "B ld l " 1' . 1e eclslon m e o Bucc £1 Uqh 1s more than pursuasive 
2. [1897]/ A.C. 97, pp. 105-106. 
3. Colonial Courts of Admiralty 1\ct 1890 (Imp.), s. 2 (1). 
4. (1851) 7 Mou. P.C.C. 267. 
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authoritv. It was handed down by the Prh;v Council, being at the 
apex of the hierarchy of Superior Courts /\ppeal in the British 
. ') 
Commonwealth of Nations, including those of the Australian States. 
There is almost irrefutable indication tr1at the Commonwealth 
Parliament and two of the State Parliaments had thrl intention of im-
porting the maritime lien into the Australian legal systems. The 
i time Conventions Act 1911 (U.K.} reads: 
"8. 1\lo action shall be maintainable to enforce any claim 
or lien against a vessel or her owners in respect of any 
damage or loss to another vessel, her cargo or freight, 
or any property on board her, or damages for loss of life 
or personal injuries suffered by any person on board her, 
caused by the fault of the former vessel...or in respect 
of any salvage services, unless the proceedings therein 
are commEmced within two years .... " 
fhe preamble to the Act refers tD two Conventions signecj in 1910 at 
Brussels, one dealing with colli~:;ions beti:Jeen and the other 
with salvage? In cases of ambiguity of language, it is permissible tD 
look at the wording of the former Convention. It is unclear lrJhether 
"lien against a vessel" will only arise in rBspect of sahmqe servicE:s. 
But there is no doubt in His Honour Kitto's mind that ~>ection 8 cov-
ers the damage lien. He .B 
"The first class of claims or liens with which the provis-
ion deals CDnsists of those which arise from damage or 
lm1s caused (1,v1lolly or partly) by the fault of om} \lessel 
or to the other vessel 15 cargo or freight or any property 
or person on board her .11 
Although the Act does not apply to Australia: section B is virtually 
reproduced in section 396 (1) of the Navigation r-'\ct 191?-73 (Cornth.). 
With regard to thE~ State laws of New South Lllales 10 and Tasman-
11 the position has bt:::en beyond doubt tw the lLCJgislatures. 
'J. Appeals from the High Court of Australia to the Privy Cuun-
cil have been virtually EJbolished by the "-.:;._~:<::-=;:-;:;;;..;~;..:.;:..~~~ 
ation of AppE\'Jls) Act 1968-1973 (Comth.) 
(Appeal~> from the High Court Act 1975 (Comth.). 
6. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
with F~espect to Collisions 1910, ratified by Britain on 1~;t Feb-
ruary, 1913. 
7. Convention for the Unificaticm of CPrtain Rules of Lmv Relat-
ing tu Assistance and Salvage at Sea 1910, ratified by Brit-
ain on 1st February, 1913. 
8. Burns Philp & Co. Ltd: v. i\lelsur1 and f~oberton P9L:.._Ltd_. (1958) 
A.L.J. 921, p. 92'5. lie agreed witl1 Dixon, C.J., McTiernan and 
l1Jilliarns, ~ J., that the appeal should be dismissed. 
9. Proviso to Maritime Convnntions Act 1911 (U.K.), s. 9 (1). 
10. Limitation Act 1969 (N.S.lu.), s. 22 (2). 
11. Umitation Act 1974 (Tas.), s. 8 (2). 
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In these statutE~s. the limitation period relating to an action to en-
force a lfclaim or lien" against a vessel in respect of damage to, or 
loss of, another \Jessel, her cargo or freight Is provided for in a sep-
arate subsection from that dealing with salvage Lien. It appears that 
the damage lien provision has had its source in the Commonwealth 
Act. In the interest of uniformity and certaintv, it is imperati\le 
for legislatior1 to be introduced in Western Australia. South Australia. 
Queensland and Victoria to bring the law into line with the existing 
Commonwealth and State legislation. The Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) 
applies to ships engaged in inter-State trade, foreign-going ships and 
shiPs· owned or controlled bv the Commonwealth Government.12 It is 
submitted that the proposed legislation should applv to certain claims 
for collision damage sustained vJithin the territorial waters of each 
' of the four States. 
3. Circumstances giving rise to Damage Lien 
!\Jot everv collision or wrongful act committed bv the crew vllill 
give rise to the damage lien. The Admiralty Court judges have long 
formulated the prerequisites for it. After discussing the caso of The 
"Bold Buccleugh", Lord bJatson stated the principle: 13 
"I think it is of the essence of the rule that the damage 
in respect of which a maritime lien is admitted must be 
either the direct result or the natural consequence of a 
wrongful act or manoeuvre of the ship to which it att-
aches. Such an act or manoeuvre is rl8cessarilv due to 
the want of skill or negligence of the person by whom the 
vessel is navigated; but it is, in the language of maritime 
l~w, attributed to the ship because the ship in their neg-
ligent or unskilful hands is the instrument which causes 
the damage. 11 
The rule is made up of two elements. 
First. There must be default or negligence constituting a 
breach of dutv of care em the part of the crew members or the mas-
ter in the na\;igation of the ship. The word "navigation" has been 
12. As to proceedings i!J..!.:Q!!!. against anv ship, cargo or other 
~ro~ertv belonging to the Commonwealth or a State, see Nav-
IgatiOn Act 1912-73 (Comth.), s. 405 A. 
13. Currie\/. M'Knight [1897) A.C. 97, pp. 106-107. 
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held to include the steering of a vessel, ca~iting off of a tm"J_rope, 
'16 ' 1 7 
selection of an anchorage, neglect to heed a llght on a reef, and 
starting out without regard to weather bureau warnings.18 It does 
not extend to default or neglect in the management of a ship 19 which 
has adverse effects on Um cargo carried. Examples are improper 
loading and recklessly allowing water from a ~;hore-supply pipe to 
overflow into the holds, re~:;ulting in car·go damage?° Cargo claimants 
are not entitled to a lien on the cmTying ship. Suppose that due to 
faulty management the ship lists suddenly and damages another ship 
or the pier. It is sul1mitted that no lirm ~'\/ill attach to the former 
ship because the damage is not directly caused by negligr:mt nmliga-
tion. 
The authorities have established that the damge lien must have 
its root in the liability of the mtJner, or of the crev.1,of the ltJrongdo-
ing sllip. This is where the concept of the ship's "juridical entity" or 
"personality" breaks dolo\Jn since in a collision cli"'lim "thE! property is 
not treated a~3 the delinquent Qer se.'' Though a ship is commonly 
spoken of metaphorically as if she wme capablE.< of duing a wror1g, 
her liability will depend on whether her na\ngators can in la1tJ be 
identified with the mvners. Dr. Lushington in The Lmninqton 21 defirmd 
14. The Warkworth (1884) 9 P.D. 20, p. 1 L,S. 
15. The Vigilant [1921] P. 312. 
16. The Etona ('1896) 64 FeeL RPp. 88D; 71 Fed. REJp. 895. 
17. The E.A. Shores (1B9G) 73 Fed. Rep. 32Lt. 
18. Hanson v. Haywood ('1907) 152 Fed. Rep. 401; cf. Texi-35 and 
Gulf S.S. Co. v. Parker (1920) 263 Fed. Rep. B64. 
19. In Suzuki v. Beynon (1926) 1,2 T.I_.R. 269, 274, l_orci Sumner said 
"management" is not a term of e:Jrt and has no prm:ise legal 
meaning. No limitation is put on its meaning. 
20. McFadden v. Blue Star line [1905! 1 h.B. 697. 
21. (1874) 2 Asp. :"lar. Law Cas. Ld1). 
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The scope of the lien has been tAJidenecl by his judgmrmt in tile follow-
. d 22 tng lAior s: 
"Damage wrongfully done by the whil:1t in Um possess-
ion of the charterers is, therefore, damage clone bv the 
owners or their servants, although those mNr<Prs rnay be 
only temporary. Vessels sufferi.nq damage frr.m a char·ttJred 
ship are entitled prima to a maritime lien upon that 
r-;hip, and to look to thr~ as securit\; for re:3titution." 
In certain situations, it is competrmt for owners of \IP~1sels or wrecks 
to ne.gate liability for damage. The. facts of The Tasmania23 furnish 
a good illustration. A tug engaqed in towing the plaintiff's vessel 
collided with, and sank, her. The tug hc:Jd tJeen chortered by the de-
fendant company for towing purposes. It was known to the plaintiff that, 
in providing the towage service, the defemjant: company was exoner-
ated from liability for loss or darnaqe) whethr .. H' occasioned by the neg-
ligence of their servants or otherwise. ThE! judC]e held that, since 
the defend<mt company's liabilitv was excluded amJ the tug OIAiners 
wore not personally liable, no action i_!]_ r_~~ agai;1~;t the tun was 
rnaintainabln. J\1 thou~Jh a darno~]e Hen prima at taches from the 
time of the collision, it is not absolute~ as its operation cjeponds on 
the court's finding of some personal liability. 
''l 
In The Utopia;"' the F)rivy Cmmcil laid dmvn the critnria for 
determining liability where dama~Je arises from collision with a wreck. 
The Utopi<:l was lying with her Llvo masts, yards and funrml above the 
water in Gibraltar !3ay. f~e~;pom;ibllity fen· placing a hulk near tho 
wreck and displaying lights to I:Jarn \J~J~3sels of tilE' cianqr~r was assum-
ed bv the C:iibraltar Port authoritv. Evidence showecJ tnat the steam-
ship Primula carne into coli~3ion V>1i. th tile wreck bccausL" the lights on 
board the t1ulk were insufficient. in numbr::r and not in thr:: proper 
position. In delivering tr1e judgment. Francis Jeune held that in 
' 
order to fix the owmJr of the wreck 1,11ith liability, two conditions r1ad 
to be satisfitJd. He must not ha\/e NJlinquished control of tt18 Lvreck, 
22. Ibid., p. li7B. 
23. (1888) 13 P.O. 110. 
24. [1893] A.C. 492. 
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by abandonmEmt or 
misconduct or the 
protection of other \IB~lsels from 
of IAtith re~]ard to the 
from hor. Tho con-
trol and managE'mont of tt1e tnJJ'P.ck f'or the purpose or pro oth-
er vess£:.Jls had bec'!n properly transferrer! to LhEl port authority. On 
the finding of the alJsFmC(J of rierlliqnncc• on the part of 
owners, the decision of thr~ Vice-/\dmirnltv C:mn·t v.tas re\Jc~rsBd. The 
argument that, as 
the ship could be hr'lld liable'!, thOU!:Jh there wa~:; no llabilitv in own-
ers, t.vas rejected 
principles. 
His Lordship as tH~ing contrary to maritirm'! law 
Transfer of control and mcmagenmnt; as a rm-Jans of F!Xonerating 
the owners and the st1ip from liabilitv for neqllgont damage by c 
'7', 
ision has l1een recognisod in uthm· ca~lm:i. In The "flalleyu, ... the iJWn-
tJrs succes::;fullv invc:ked ~>f]Ction 380 of t.lle 1VJeechant Shippin~J /\ct 
l8Sl1 (Imp.). H1L" Council i 1e lcl til a c Lt1e nwm~rs 1Aten3 not liatJ le 
for damage caused uy tr 1B unsk i I ful of thoir ves~jel a 
pilot ~\/hom they \.vero cmnpeiiF~fJ IN fm·cc=Ji~Jn lm"1 Lu Lake en board. !\ 
.,, 
further ap[Jlication u I' tl1is concept is c!\/JUcmt. in The Svlvan f\rrow.dJ 
While the ship was under requi:>ition, rnanrwcJ f.Hld operate;d bv 
United Statf]S GmtL'rT1rnent, she VH3S allegecJ to hm;o neqligently coil-
cumstances, it was obvious that the mast<:H' and thr~ crew had 
their authority from chr2 UnitE-3d StatE!S Guvemmont <:md not from tile 
defendant shipowners. Lhouqh shtJ \,vm> latE~r n~Lurnec1 to the de-
fondants. ttle court flt~ld that rm maritime Jic:n attacheci to UH; ship 
tw reason of the collisio11 darnacJe. CJm1 IAIB\f of explainir1g thl< LIAID 
pr-ecetJing cases is this. luhere Lho nr~onLrol ar1d mana~wment" tran~3-
fer t1as occurred. 
time uf the 
. 27 
mg. 
ncnce of UH~ mlim:rs or LhPlr snr'JCJnt5 at ti1e 
a:> founclatiun m<~ritime Ht:m - is Jack-
25. (1868) U~. 2 P.C. 193. 
26. [1923] F1 • 220. 
27. St:~e Tho Utoria [1il9)] 1\.C:., p. /+99, PElr ~)(c· f~l'Elr1Cici Jeune. 
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There are, hmvnver, cF;rtain exception::J. lllhere ~>trict liability 
is imposed, e by statute, the lien 1111i ll attach evcm \n the absence 
of negligence. tho Navigation r'\ct '1912-73 (Cornth.) the m<:1ster of 
tt1e ~3hip is not relie\Jed from responsit1ili tv for the conduct and nav-
igation of the ship vJhilE) shP is under pilotaqo. It means that the 
ship will be subject to the lhm 1,vllere collbion damage is negligently 
caused by tile pilot. SE?ction L+ 10 B (2) dealfi spc~cificall v with cornp-
ulsory pilotage required by tho of a :=Jtate or TF?rTitory. In such 
situation:l, despite "anything contained in an Act or State Act", the 1, 
owner or master of th~:~ ship renclered Hable for any loss or damage 
caused by tile ship during navigation. Thus where the prmtision 
applies, the lien will arise, even though the master is not negligent. 
There another instancr:> to be t.mr'm~ in mind, The Hen comes 
into e.xistence on the occlJrrenctj of a colli~)ion. !t follows the res 
into the hanc1s of sub~iequunt purchasr:~rs, even thouqh thr:y arE' un-
a\AJan:; of, and not liable for, tilE' colli.sion. 
Acording Ln Lord Watson in tt1e 
damage or loss rnust have br1en directly cau~md by the ship as a nox-
ious instrument. To come within this requimrm:mt, the ship must have 
been an active a[Jent in producing Lhe rni~:>hap. In thi~> casP, the steam-
handed, tile f::asdale. was ciriven astlm'e and clamaged~9 The House of 
Lords held that r1o lien I•JDul rj arise rm tr1e qrounrJ that the damage 
IAJas occasioned wholly by the act of The Dunlossit's crm111 for the 
purpose of removing an obstacln which prevented her from taking to 
sea. Damww dut:~ to impact by The Dunlossit or her movem~mt is re-
garrJecl as essential to the existence of trm lim1 and its attac!lml"!nt 
28. [1896] A.C. pp, 106-107, follm<\/ing thE1 rjecision in The "Bold 
Bucclt:~tJatJ''(1851) l Muo. P.C.C. 267. 
29. Thr:J owner~> of The Dunlossit h/EH'8 held liable. 
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to her. Lord HE~rscllell ha~1, llm~IF~\it:?r. C]iverl a llroadPr ambit. to thr=: 
pi'inciple. In his viro.w, ph\f~iical crmtact LJv tht: wrorl~ldoinq ship is 
not necessarv. Thus, if owing to tile nrJ~Jligr=mt na 1Jigation of vessel 
A, vessel B is driven into collision with 'JE:essel C rw iJn object, thn 
lien will attach tu ve~;sel A fur the damage rlnm~. McCJuffie in his 
learned \AJurk holds a similar \/iew L)Ut takes cc:Jre to point out that it 
3ll 
"has not been expres~~l v clecidr'!d ." -
Oamaqe and propertv ~1ubject to lien. A se<=JrchincJ qtJest.ion con-
cerns the tvpe of mischief which is recognised as giving risr=J to the 
lien. In 1Jl§.. ''l\li!l~'' and The "Bold Buccleugh", the principle began 
\Aiith collision darnage to vessels. It VIlas extended to injurv to a land-
ing stacje, a pier lJI' harllour works and later to a IAireck. In the his-
toric cme of The Tolten~ 1 the fnqlish Court of Appeal had to con-
sidE~r., inter' alia. wh(~ther the doctrine would nppl v where inj•JrV was 
negli~Jentlv done bv a ship to a wharf or ~-itructure at Lagos, a British 
colony. Bucknill, J., qa\m judgrmmt HI U1e acJmit·altv action i!_!_ rem_ for 
the plaintiff ownBl'S <Jnd occupil'l'~1 of the wharf at Li'lSJOS. The app-
t:~al tJrDU~Jht lJV owm~rs of tJ1e l3r·itisil vPssel fhfC~ lnlten \.>\las unanim-
ouslv cJi~>rni~>~3ed. ~)orner\;oll, L.J., ~c!mplla:;ist:!s tile~ d~?sirabilitv ir1 the 
interests of nation::.1 intE,!r se to appl\; thf'J :1arm~ Pl'inciplc~ as follows: 32 
"[t \Alas ciecidL?d ir1 Tile! \/l~riLas Lhat darnage to a pm't in 
British IAJatero3 !]a\;e rise to a rn<:1ritirne lien, <md l ~iee 110 
reEJSurl for applvin~] ar1v diffr~nmt rule INherl tt1e clarnage 
is to a foreign port." 
The decision and what Scott, I .. J., sc_-1id in his judt-)rm~nt i:li'e a short 
step tll recusJnizin~J the li<m as ~Jecul'itv fur injurv lJy i::l ship, ac3 an 
ir1strurnent of mischief, to goods and; or people em a ltJhart in a for-
. t33 8l~Jn por" 
LJr1doubtecHv. the r~xter1t. uf' tilt~ sccw·it.\;' is of primary conc~Jrn 
to litigants seeking cmnpensnLion. C:lo:;c~l1; r·elaterJ to the cmlsidee-
ation is the naturE' u F ttJr-' rrupert\l l,.,_:hicll could tJo sullject Lo t.lle 
30. l~ermeth C.., i'1cGuffie, Tht:! Li-JW of CCJllisions ~~ SP~~ (11th 1961), 
para. 82. 
31. [1 %6] p. 135 ([,}\.). 
32. Ibid, p. 165. 
33. O.R. fhurnas, Maritime ljc~rls (19RO), pp. 132-'133, i~l of Um \liFJIN 
that a maritlrm_1 lir~n extends tu personnl ir1jurv. LJndPr In-
trJnlc:-\i:ional Lom;Pntion fDr thr~ llnific<Jticm of Cf~rtain f~L~~> 
rolntinq J;o 1"]\:lritime Lim1:3 ami Mortq<lqos 11126, Article? para. 
L1, and 196 7, /\rticl e '~ pm·a. 1 C__ijj), rnari tlme llen::i are cunferred 
for (a) bodilv injurv to rassengers or crew, and (b) loss of 1i fe 
or personal injurv, cespectivelv. 
387 
damage lien. The authoritiE15 have e~>tc-Jhlislled that the lit:;n attaches 
to t.hE-J hull of the ship, her tackle and apparel, a wreck and the frasJ-
11 l' ,J 4 [-) l h. t menLs lr1to which it mav be broken. In The A me , r. .us mg ·on 
held that it extendE~d to ~;ubsequent accretions in the value of the 
ship arising from repairs effected at the owners' expense and thE1 
frnight pavable at the material tinm. FishinsJ gear, sails and risming 
have been held to be subject to it~5 
The pi'inciple has an important limitation which wa~> fii'~lt pr'o-· 
nounced by trm United States Supreme Court in United States of Am- '; 
!Jricc:J. Owners of the Western 1'-'laid \/. Auxiliary ~3choom:::r Liberty aml 
~3tE-Jamship Carolinian~6 It was held bv a majoritv nf the judges that, 
in the case of collision,no maritime lien attached to a government-
owned ship. The English Court of Appeal decision in The Tervaete37 
seernl?d to have ~]one one str:?p fur'ttler. In a collision, the res-
pomJen r.s' vessel L vnntu1111rl 1111as neqligen t ly damaged by ttle shiP Ter-
:;aete IAJhich at the~ time 111tas t~1e propertv of ttle Belgian Govermmmt 
and engaged in thr~ government's service. ~3ubsequent to thE! collis-
ion, the Belgian l~uvernrnent transfmred TJ:le T(~_?E1_te to a privatE' 
O\AJrlBI' who sent tim ves~;el to a dock in England. HlR n~spondents 
contended that, as she had become pl'ivate propm't\/, tt1e damage lien 
which had attached to her could be enforced bv procemHngs in rern 
in the English Court of Admiralty. Their' Lordships 1-vero unanirnuus 
that collision darnage occasioned tJV <:l fon~ign c>tate-owned vessel 
does not, by English law, impo:1e a liE.>n on the vess<~l. file loffBct of 
the rule is this. Since at the tirne of the collisim1 no lien was in ex-
istf:mce - not being a case where it was kept ir1 c:J!Jevance, ''it cannot 
attach at all" when she ttJas later transferred ir1to pr'i\JatE' ownership. 
34. (1839) 1 W. F~ob. 111. 
35. The Alexam-Jr::r (181 ;~) 1 Docj:3. 1'78; The DumJr:::e (1823) 1 Ha~J. Allrn. 
1D9. 
36. Umepor·ted case, tJut refern~rl Lo in The Ter\Jm~tFJ [192:2] P. 
259, p. 261. 
37. [1922] P. 259. 
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The decision is based on the principle of international law that a for--
sovereign or foreign state cannot be impleaded at all in a court 
of law unless there is submission to its jurisdiction. It is submitted 
that the principle was extended to ships when their Lordships umm-
imouslv refuserJ to impose the lien. The reason was to prpvrmt the 
value of the ship in the sovereign's hands being a dvr::Jrsel v affected~8 
There is little· doubt that Australian judges will adopt the same 
principle and approach in administering Commonwealth and state laws. 
In the United States of /\merica v. Republic of China:9 the plaintiff 
sought to enforce a mortgage of the ship when she was 
in the Port of Brisbam~. The mortgage IAias allegedlv given by her 
owner, the Republic of China, to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court 
of Queensland ordered the writ and all the proceedings to be set 
aside and the plaintiff to pay the costs of the motion. Philp, J., bas-
his judgment for the Republic of China solelv on English cas(cJ-law 
principles. 1\s the Queen rif the United Kingdom also the CJueen oF 
Cornmomvealth of Australia, it is inconcFJivsble that, in their n~­
lations with foreign smJereigns am1 their pi'Opertv, the ttvo nations 
should adopt diff~orent doctrines. 
The "foreign sovereign'' principle first applied bv American and 
later bv Englisl1 Admiralty Court judges to exE!mpt:. foreign government 
-owned ships from attachment of the dama!:-]e lien was appanmtly ad-
opted by tt1e Imperial Parl.iarnent. It sought to extend to certain pro-
perty owned by ttm British Government a similar privileged treatment , 
where proceedings _in ~ are instituted in English courts and possib-
lv in fDreign tribunals. The Ceown Proceedings Act 1 CJll7 (Imp.)~·0 
which deals, inter alia, with thB civil liabilities and rights of the 
Crown, does not "give to any person any lien on any ... ship, aircraft, 
cargo or other propertv" belonging to the Crown. About nine years 
the Commonwealth ParliamRnt intmducerJ a ~:;imilar provision by 
38. Ibid., p. 266, Qff Bankes, L .J.; p. 271, l2ill' Scrut.ton, L.J.; p. 
275, pee Atkin, L.J. 
39. (1950) Q.S.C.F~. 6. 
40. 10 & 11 Geo. VI, c. 44, s. 29. 
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amending the Navigation Act 1912-7:5 (Comth.). Thus the amended Sf;)C-
tion 405A (1) (Q) reads 
"Nothing in this Act gi11es anv person a !len on a c:;ovem-
ment ship or cargo or other prDperty belonging to tim 
Cornmonwealth or C:l State." 
ThE! expression "GO\Jernment ~Jhip" is tvideh; defined in soction 6 (1). 
It includes a ship which belonns to trm Commonwealth11 1 or f.l State or 
wr1ich is demised or sub-demised to, or in the:! fJ,Xclusive possession of, 
the Commonwealth or a State. It extends to a ship the beneficial 
interest in IAJhich is vested in the Commonwealth or a State. Thr~ pro-
vision is of outstanding importance in that it exempts all such Prop-
erty from attachment of thE~ damage lien amJ all DtrlE~~' maritime liE:ms. 
Contributory Negligence in Collisiorl. We have smm that, apart 
from certain exceptions, the lien comes into existm1ce as a pri\Jil-
oswd claim upon the offemjinD ship. Since it providns a remr:!dV for 
the loss attributf3d to her fault., it i:::1 relevant to consirJer how the 
loss occasioned in a collision mav bt-3 apportimmd. 
Until recently, \Athero tho cause of an accident was due to the 
fault of both parties, there \Alas a diffecence bet\;vfJen tllt:l rule of 
common law and the ru1e of 1-\dmil'alty. l3y the former, if the accident 
was occasiom~d by both, tiO\AJ!:Ner ~3rnall the blame rniqtlt be on om~ side, 
neither partv could recover. Tl1e lo~3~3 was troatt>d as an inevitable 
accident, amJ \i\/oulcJ ~vhr~re 1t fell. Prior to the ca~m of Hav \1. Le 
Ne\/e42 there \Alas a quc-:!stion In the Court of Admiralty a~; to ~vhetl1er 
trm ]o;:;s sustained \.vas to tJt:l c=Jpportioned to the two parties accord-
ing to the degree in which th[N ~vt:~re to blame. 3ince the decision 
by the Houso of Lords, the ruin of Admiralty bi"Came sPttled. Thus 
if both parties had negligently contributed to the collision, thEJ loss 
would be brought into a hotchpot;ch and divided betwc~on them. Tht:~ 
party who t1ad sustaim1d greater loss would ha\/e a maritime Hen on the 
other's vessel for the difff:H'once in amount n~coveralJlo frum him. 
This Admiralty rule of equal apportionment remained an aspect of 
'41. For dofinition of "CurnrnCJrliAiealth ship", see Na\ligaUon /\rnend-
ment Act 19130 (Cnrnth. ), s. 5 (1) C.Q2. 
42. (1824) 2 Shaw Sc. 1\pp. 395, I,DLL 
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Englhh maritime law until statutory effect was givrm to Um Interna-
tional Commntion for the lJniHcation of Certain Rules with Respect 
to Collision between Vessels, 1910, by the Maritime Conventions Ac~ 
1911 (U.K.). HmA!ever, Australia did not become a signatory to the 
Convention until some two ck>cades later ~ 3 Moreover, she is expn'!ss-
ly excluded from the scope of thf3 1911 i'\ct (LJ.K.)~4 
lt is not merely of acodemic intt=Jrest to ask what rule Austral-
ian courts would apply if two ships involved in a collision IA!ere to 
l s 
blame. /3,pparenth;, the Admiralty rule as laid down in Hay v. Le Nr~ve• 
would eithm have been imported into /3,u~;tralia under the AustrccJlian 
Courts Act 1828 (Imp.) or quite likely b8 followed by AustraliEm judge~1. 
The position of QueenslanJf6 and VictoriB Lfl had been clarified by leg-
islation which provided for the application of the rule in the adminis-
tration of maritime law. To avoid the harshness of such a rule, Austr-
alian judges were often reluctant to put any blame on a party, unless some 
neglect or fault actively contributinq to t.he collision was established. 
This is well explairmrj by Lord ~1ellmme, L.C., in his speech in ::Jpaiqht 
v. Tedcastle: ItS 
"C-Jreat injustice might be done, if, in appl yin~i the doctrine 
of contributory negliswnce to a case of this sort, the rTli-lX-
im r;JLQ2_<im9, [lJ;JJ:l [f?Jnota, ciPectatur, wel'e lost sight of. Wt1en 
the direct and immediate caust=J uf damage is clearly pruvl?d 
to be the fault uf the defendant, conti'ibutDl'y negligence 
43. It was through Brite:1in tllE:lt J\ustralia accfJcled to the Com;en-
tion on 9th ~3epternber, 1930; see 1\J. Singh, fnternatinnal Mari-
time Lm.v Convf:mtions (1903), vol. 4, p. 2958. 
44. See proviso to Maritirrm ComJentions J\ct 1911 (Imp.), s. 9 (1). 
LtS. 2 Shaw ~)c. App. 39t). 
46. ;Jupreme Court Act 1B67 (CJld.), ~:i. 20 prmJiderJ tJ1c1t all laws and 
~3tatutBs in force in tngi<'Jflcl at the time of the passinq of the 
lmperi.-Jl /-\ct 9 Geo. IV, c. B3, not being incon~3istEmt with the 
lr:Jws in Force in the colm1y, would bEl applied in the adrnini~:J­
tr'c3tion of justice in Queen3land courts. 
l1l. SuprernG Court Act 1B90 (\/ic.), s. 63 (9) read: "Ir1 anv clluse 
llr proceedings for damaqes ari~:;ing out of <J collisio;l tJetwmm 
two ships, if both ~ohips shall be found to have bem1 <:Jt fault 
the Rules in force prior to the commer1cement of "ThP Judica-
t.lJrB /\ct 1883" in the Court of Vice-Admiralty so Far <:JS they 
hovp bE::en at variance with the Rulr~s in for'Ce in Courts of 
Cllrnmcm Law shall prevail." 
LtS. 6 /\.C. 217, p. 219; applif:?cJ by Strr~et. J., ir1 The Mintara and 
The LLJairuna (1909) 9 S.F<. (N.S.W.) 97, p. 104. · 
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tJy tile plaintiffs cannot be established by rnerf::ly shoiAring 
thiJt if those in charge of the ship had in some earlier 
state of navigation taken a course ... a rlifferent. situatior1 
would have resulted, in which the same danger might not 
ha\le occurred. Such an omission ought not to bt:J regard-
ed as contributory negli~Jence if it rnig~1t in the circum-
stances l!vtlictl actually happened t1m1e been unattended 
with danger but the defendant's f<:Jult, and lf it hac! 
no proper connection as a cause with the damage which 
followed as its efft:•ct." 
Unfortunately, in cases of non-compliance with colli~>ion regulations, 
tt1e efforts of Australian judges to apply equitably Lord Sf!lborml's 
proposition were For a long time thwarted hv ~;ection L119 (l1) of the 
i"1erchant Stlipping Act 1894 (Imp.). UndE!r the -sm~tion, a ship in-
volved in a collision was deemed to be at Fault IAJhem any of the 
collision regulations was contr8vEmed by that ship. Here a~~ain it is 
note\N'orthv that the l'"laritime Corwentions /\ct 1911 (UJ<.). ~vhich rep-
ealed the provision, no application to /\ustral.ia. 
The anachronism in Australian taw and imjumJ the unju~;t re:Jult 
d t d 1 .. l t' h t· 
119 
. II ue o e ay m 1mp em en mg t1 re 1910 Convon ton arc~ seen l n ~ leJ 
New South Wales ca~lo of Coal Cliff Collierie~> Ltci. \/, fl1r:: SiJITJ~i: H<:u-
II) --
elWOOd Steamship Co. Ltd. v. ~hie! Saru~~L cJE:}cidml in 191"J. lJJhG'n ~1hip 
S,at a high sper:!d and in closE:; proximity, overtook a sm<'lllE~l' ':ifli~' l·l, a 
suction 01' interacticm was set up lmtween them, causinq thr-!m tu 
collide. As a result of the collision, ship H wa~> tt1rown uff, but :;t1~:~ 
committed a bnmch of the statutory regulations in not keeping on 
the starboard side of the ship SH with which she colliden. Then] was 
no doubt as to the liability of ship S. Since the colli!:>icm occurn~d 
in Port Jackson, \Mithin Ne11v South Wales waters, Lim position as re-
gards ship H was apparently goverm::::d by the 19rrt 
(N.S.llJ.). Street. J .. followed tim Full Court of /\ppual cecision in 
'..;;;:.=~==.:.....:::.::;.:;;;:.::.::.:.:...:..:~~~~~· \1. SmiLil and OU1er:?1 and held Lhat 
117 did not override, but had to lJE) I'(}acl subject to, ~;ectior1 
'•19 (f*) of the 1894 (Irnp.). It was not f'stablished 
49. International Corl\/entiml for the Unification of Cr::Jrt<:Jin l~ul£~s 
1111ith Respect to Collisions between Ve~=J~mls, 1910. 
50. 33 W.I\J. (N.S.l.L!.) 3. 
51. (1885-6) 7 N.S.llJJ1. 207, 
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on behalf of ~;hip H that clepar'ture thP coli on rc!gulations was 
necessarv under the circumstancr:=!S or IJ1Elt t!w 0 f' llf:]!' COUI':3F1 
could not by any possibility hmm contribuLucJ LD tJm <Jccidc:!nt. /\cc-
ordingly, both ships, ~3 and H, were held to hlilmP. ;)hip :111, to l'.illich 
no fault was attributed in rr?spect of Lllr" cCJlli~;ion, vJn~' helrJ rmtitled 
under the principle of rnariUme lm.,l !,{] rrJCO\JtJr Uln untire from 
either of the t\IJO delinquent ship~;. 
It was open to the mvn8r~3 (~)H r:o.) of :;hip :;11 Lu Pnf'rHTf' Lilt> 
damage lien for the ent in~ lo~;s a~Jai n~;t. Pi thor ~1t1ip. :;uppo:;p thnt l1v 
enforcing the lien against shifl H, :;H r:u. \,v.:Js ut1ln Lo obtain full com-
pensation. It is questionablt:! tvhE?ther, in l'H~>PFJr:t of tlln contritJuUon 
recoverable from the tortfeasors, the owners (H Co.) of ship H could by 
subrogation avail themselves of tile lien which m1 Co. could have Em,-
forced against ship S~i? If Lllis cour~>e of action was not allowf:~d. the 
right of H Co. to cuntributicm could Llf) d!dr:~nted other claims 
which had a higher eankinq, pat't.iculc-1rlv wharf~ t.ne Dwners of ship S 
l.vere in~3olvent. 
Subject to certain excoptions, the prm;i~ciion:.; of the 
_---. .......... .;.... 
Conventions 1\ct 1911 (U.K.F3 ~vere reproduced by the Commonwealth 
Legislature in sections 259 to 365 ancJ 396 of the i\lavigation Act 1912-
1973 (Comth.). These sections were brought into force by a proclam-
ation dated 31st March, 1920?4 about ten years after the 1911 J\ct 
;::- J'~ 
(U.K.) was passed. The King v. Owners of 5.5. Arm;lishireJ:Jwas prob-
ably the first collision case which arose after such provisions be-
came operative. Two vessels came into collision in IVJoreton Bay by 
reason of the negligence of both sides. 1'-'lacNaugtlton, J., applied 
section 259 (1) of the Navigation Act 1912 (Comth.). It read: 
52. For right of contribution involving collision between ships, 
see 1\javigation /~ct 1912-73 (Cornth.), s. 259 (1); Supreme Court 
,8ct (Vic.) (No. 6387 of 1958), s 66 (1); ~3uprerne Co~ 
1935-1979 (rep. 12th May, 1980) s. 26 (1). 
53. 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 57. 
54. As providecl in f\ct (No. '• of 1913) (Cornth.), s. 1. The sections 
came into force on 1st July, 1921; see The 1\ing \/. Owners of 
S.S. Arqylishire_(1922) St. R. Qr.J. 1fl6, p. 2D3. 
55. (1922) St. R. Qd. 1B6. It appears that thr~ coLlision occuned 
in circumstances that rendered thB CommonwBalth law applic 
atJle. 
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"Where, by fault of two Ol' more ve~3sels, damage or loss 
is caused to onr-:! or more vessels, to their car~10es or 
freight, or to any property rm board, the liability to make 
good the damage or loss shall be in proportion to the de-
gree in which each vessel was in fault." 
The judge apportioned the damages as to two-thirds against the f\rg-
ylishire and one-third against the other vessel. It is submitted that 
the vessel, which has suffered less damage but adjudged as more 
blamm~mrthy than the other, will be subject to the damage lien for 
the difference in amount. 
The speci fie legislati\;e pmAiers exercisable by the Common-
wealth Parlic.1ment have created some doubts as to the sphere of op-
eration of sections 259 to 265 of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.). 
In the New South Wales case of Schlederer \/. The Ship Red Fin 56 a 
motor launch collided with, and sank, a yacht in ~3vdney Harbour. The 
collision was caused by the contributory nesJligence of the helmsman 
of the launch and the yacht's helmsman. Shepphard, J., held that the 
matter of contributory negligence wc1s governed by section 10 of the 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) l~ct 1965 (N.S.W.).57 The section, 
however, has no nderence to collisiorl bc-'!tween ships. In his view, 
the case fell outside the scope of the NEJ\Jigation f\ct 1912-73 (Comth.). 
H 'd [J8 e sal : 
"However, it IAIOUld appeal' that tho~;e prOV1510nS r.L§.. in 
section 259] apply only in cases ~>Jhict1 are 1"1ithin the lim-
its of Commonwealth legislative jurisdicticm. That is, thev 
would not apply to a case suci 1 as the prr:!sent where nei-
t.her of the vessels involved l\/as a vessel engaged in inter-
State or overseas trade.'' 
If the reasoning of Sir Frederick Jordun and Sheppard, J.'s judgment 
are correct, an anomaly exists~9 It <1ppear~i that only \/ictoria~0 
LLJestern i~ustralia61 and South Australia 61 lla\;e ~~~gislation pi'Dvidlng 
56. [1979] 1 N.S.LLJ.L.R. 2'58. 
57. 1\Jo. 32 of 1965. 
58. [1979] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 258, p. 262. 
59. Shepphard, J.'s jud~1ment was in part based on the view of 
Sir Frederick Jordan expressed in The 1-\dmiralty Jurisdiction 
i[l Ne~Jv South Wales (1937), Sydney, p. 32; see also Kirmani v. 
Captain Cook Crui~>E:~s Pty. Ltd. (198l,-85) 59 A.L.J. Z65. 
60. Suprem~3 Court Act 1958 (Vic.), s. 64. 
61. ~?_upreme Cuur.t A~.t. 1935-1979 (l.LJ.i'\.), s. 26 (1). 
62. Supreme Court Act 1935-1975 (S.A.), s. 111. 
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for the liability to make good the lm3s or darnage:1 :3u~1tained in pro-
portion to the in which each vesst:Jl involved in the collision 
was in fault. There is the need for similar legislation to b~J intro-
duced in the other States to bring the law into line with the develop-
rnents. 
V. BOTTOMRY BONDS 
Dr. Lushington 
risk."63 In 
that "thr:! verv terrn 'bottomry' implie~; sea 
"bottomry" \AIBS taken as a Flemish term ~=::;;_;;;;:.;:.:......::::..:~:::::.:..:.· 
derived from the figurature use of the bottom or koel to r::1mbrace the 
entire vesse1?4 Lord Stowell in The Atlas~5 decided in 1827, dofim~d 
bottomry bonds as "contracts in the nature of rnort~]ages of a ship 
on which the owner borrows money to t:matJle him to fit out the ship, 
or to purchase a cargo, P-ars Q£.9 toto, as ~mcuritv for nwavrnent." 
They ~vere usually given by the rnastr~r for payment uf repair~> ancJ 
other necessary expenses in foreign ports where Lhe ov.lnRrs had no 
personal credit. Where the cargo alum~ is tJypoU1r~cated, the con-
tract is termed respondentia. For convenience, reference to Llott-
omrv bonds is intended to include respom1entia. 
Before ship mortgage registrations wf:lre introduced, sucr1 bomJs 
were used for the benefit of shipowners and tt1e general advan 
of commerce. They had been regarded with PE~culiar favour in Courts 
of Admiralty as of \/erv high anci ~jacred character" and were "held 
in great sancti tv the Maritime Courts of Europe generally." 66 For 
a valid contract of bottomry to be made gi\Jing rise to a maritime lien, 
it must, inter state ttle voyage on wt1ich tile maritirm~ risk was 
67 to be run and the time when the lo<m was to bc:cmne repavat1le. 
63. The Royal Arch (1857) Swab. 269, 281. 
64. (1859) Swab. ')04, 510. 
65. 2 Hag. /\dm. /18, 53. 
66. The Hope (1873) 1 Asp. Mar. Law. 563 1 p. 565; Zodiac (1825) 1 
Hag. Adm. 320, p. 323. 
67. In The James W. Elwell [1921] P. 351, the instrurmmt was held 
to be unenforceablB as a bottomry becauscJ these two require-
ments were not satisfied. 
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II' the pruperty is lost in the course of the voyage due to any peril 
enumerated in the contract, the lender will lose his money. By a 
statute (Irnp.) of George n,68 protection was provided where the prop-
erty, subject to the bond and insured uncJer a polic\f in the manner 
prescriberj 1 was lost. The bonrjholder was entitled to recover a prop-
ortionate part of the 8state of the shipowners or insurers in thf-J event 
of their bankruptcy. 
For further advancBs made by creditors, the court may, in 
special circumstances, grant a bottomry bondholder priority of pay-
ment out of the proceeds of the sale. In the "Kammerhevie Rosenkr-
ants",69 to save the expense arising from the detention of the ship 
by her crew, the bondholders were permitted to pay the wages of 
the crew. The court decreed that, in respect of their advances, the 
bondholders werB BntitlBd to bB paid out of thE) procePd~i of salB 
of thB ship in priority to other claimants. 
For a number of reasons, bottomry Llonds havE; become ubsolete 
for over two dBcadBs now. ThCJ lucrative lJu~>iness of lEmding money 
on such bonds, which attracted exorbi t.ar1t interBst rat£~s,was based 
on a twofold concept. Owing to unfore~;een events, e.q. damage to 
the ship OI' !'>hortage of necessariBs, funds were urgently needecJ in 
a foreign port. Otherwise the ship would have to be sold and the 
valuable venture would be lost. The lender also took upon himself 
the maritime risk of the voyage as an insurer. He would lose his out-
lay if the ship failed to reach the destination safBly. In modern cred-
it-finance agreements, the above consideratlor1s carry little weight 
and are hardly relevant. Moreover, it is tmlikel y U1at such problems 
will threaten to break up a voyage. Usually funds could be macJe 
available at short notice by telegraphic transfet~ or by the ship's 
agents locatBd in foreign ports. 
There was a growing uneasiness among shipovuners and cargo-
ownBrs about the wicJe autr1ority of ships' masters to hypothecate 
the ship, freight and cargo. Thus in ThB CJrienta1 70 and The Bona-
68. (1746) AnrlQ cJe(::imo nO!lO [;eg_ffijj !I, c. 32, s. 2. 
69. (1822) 1 Hagg. 62. 
70. (1851) 7 Moo. P.C.C. 398. 
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parte71 the court gave effPct to t.he concern bv holding thElt such an 
authoritv was unlv exercisable subject to communication with the 
owners and other' persons. The requirement restored the rights of 
maritime propertv owners but rendered doubtful the validitv of the 
bonds given. 
The point is illustrated in an Australian case lvl!hich also shows 
that the principles of maritime la1r.1 l~elating to bottomrv bonds are 
part of Australian jurisprudence. In Re The "Ladv Franklin",72 a ship 
belonging to a New Zealander discharged her cargo at IVJelbourne with 
the intention of proceeding to NewcastlE~. The master obtained three 
separate advances from the agents for repairs and lvages,and on 214 
th Januarv, 1874, executed a bottomn; bond for the repavment. Un-
known to the agents, the shipowner had become insolvent on 13th 
Januarv. The respondents. who held a mortgage executed in Septem-
ber, 1873, seized the ship. As the \/O\jage was not terminated at Mel-
bourne, the bond was not nmden1d lm1alid on that !]round. The court, 
however, held that the bond lv\las invalid because of the master's fail-
ure to communicate with thr.:: owner. It was further held that the 
agents could not convel't the advcmces made upofl the owner's per-
sonal credit into <~ bottomrv bond. 
It will be recalled that the maritime JiEcJn was fir:it conferred 
bv section 1 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1889 (Imp.) on tt1e master in 
respect of disbursements made or liabilities incurred bv him on account 
of the ship?3 From the viewpoints of the master, ship-repairers and 
necessaries men, this lien provides a valuable securitv for credit 
facilities, in place of the anachronistic bot.tomrv boml. Its validitv 
is not dependent on prior communication being m<::1de with the owners. 
The interests of cargo are safeguarded in that its attachment is 
confined to the ship and freight. WE~ t1avrJ rmted that a similar lien 
is conferred on the master bv section 94 (2) of the Navigation 
71. (1853) 8 i"loo. P.C.C. 459. 
72. (1874) 5 A.J.R. 185 (Vic. Vice-Adrnir'altv Cour·t). 
73. Reproduced in Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Irnp.) ~i. 167 (1); 
now replaced bv Merchunt Shipping Act 1970 (U.K.), s. 18. 
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1912-73 (Comttl.). The availability of the master's disbursement 
lien to the suppliers of necessaries in certain circumstances was rec-
ognised in The Ripon City?4 That bottomry obsolescent is obvious 
from the last English decision in The St. Georgi: delivered in 1926. 
VI. ORDER OF PRIORITY 
We have come to a complex area of the law-namely, how the 
privileged claims rank among themselves. Where the shipmvners are 
insolvent and the fund obtained from the of the res is insuffic-
ient to pay in full the lien-holders, in ~A/hat order will the distribution 
be made? Certainty as to the rules that determine the preference 
of one type of lien relative to another is essential to all prospective 
creditors who look to the ship as security. PE!rsnns who come under 
the category include ship financiers, repairers, suppliers of necess-
aries, seamen, masters, salvors i:mcl claimants under the law of torts. 
The shocking scarcity of Australian legal material on the subject has 
complicated our investigation. 
1. Domestic Law 
As a matter of principle, the courts strive to ensure that in 
every dispute involving competing claimants equity and justice are 
administered. Barring any special circumstances, British judges will 
generally apply the order of preferencE! as outlined in Halsbury's 
L.aws of England?6 
"In the first , liens arising ~?X delicto, in the absence 
of laches, rank as between themselves [lari passu, but in 
priority to liens arising ex contractu, exct:1pt a subsequ-
ent lien for . Secondly, as a general rule, maritime 
liens arising ex contractu, namely those for master's wages, 
disbursements and liabilities, seamen's wagE'S, bottomry and 
salvage. are payable in the inverse-? urcJer cJf their' attach-
ment, although as between themselves wages rank pari 
paSSlJ. II --
The formula for adjusting the preferential riuhts of the parties is 
7 4. [ '1897] p. 226. 
75. [1926] P. 217. 
76. (l~th ed. 1983), vol. 43, para. 11h3; see also D.r~. Thomas. 
time Liens (1980), op. cit., pp. 21,6-250. 
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based on two distinct but related ~Jrouncls. Firstly, a person having 
a lien arising e.g. for wages, disbursements and bott-
omry, is deemed a part-owner in interest with the proprietors of the 
vessel. A lien-holder becomes a party to the adventure. He holds 
the lien on the ship subject to the vicissitudes of her \/0\;age, includ-
ing fresh liens which may arise.77 Consequently, £'!ach claimant by 
rendering ~mrvices or advancing funds has helped to keep the ship 
in motion in achieving the object of maritime commerce. All the 
claims which arise ex contractu will rank in thr:J inversP order of 
their attachment. As between salvage claims which arise quasi c:;x 
contractu, the same rule applies ir1 that a subsequent salvage,which 
has preserved the res~has priority over an earlier one?8 
Secondly, the high priority accordecl by courts to damage lien 
is founded upon a combination of several considerations. Unlikt~ lml-
ders of liens for t.vages, disbursements, salvage and bottornrv. a per-
son suffering damage by negligent nm1igaticm of a ship has not chos-
en to enter into any relationship with the \Jessel for his own inter-
79 
ests. It has been noted that salvors, seamen, masters and bottom-
ry bondholders are, tJy reason of their liens on the \/8ssel, part-own-
ers. Since they havr~ some control m1er l1er emplovment, they ~Jhould 
to the extent of their interests be held responsible for collision cjam-
age due to negligence. In The Linda FlorP0 Dr. Lushinqtorl was ~:~xer­
cising the equitable maritime jurisdiction of tJwJ Admiralty Court. He 
concluded that it would be unjust to the mvner of t.h8 injurRd ship 
if the fund against which the r1amage lien had priority hlas reduced 
by paving wages. Moreover, the special prefm'F!nce gi\/en to the darn-
age lien is justified by public policv to ensure U1e safety of lives 
and property as well as the proper navigation of \/essels. By case 
77. The Veritas [1901] P. 304, p, 315; The Elin (1B82) 8 P.O. 129, p. 
130. 
78. The Veritas [1901] P. 301~, pp. 312-313. 
79. The "Aline" (1839) 1 W. Rob. 111, 118, RJIT Dr. Lushington; llill.. 
E.!l!:2 (1883) 8 P.O. 129. 
80. (1857) Swab . .309; 6 W.R. 197; Thl~ Benares (1850) 7 No. of Cas. 
Supp. 50. 
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authorities, a damage lien ranks before an earlier, but not a sub-
sequent, ~3alvage lien~ 1 
Thus under English maritime law, seamen and masters tend to be 
victims of the misfortunes of shipowners) particularly where limited 
companies are involved. It is most unfortunab::J that the wage lien 
of seamen and master's liens for wages and disbursements are 
l . f l 82 d ll' . postponed to prior and subsequent wns or sa vage an co 1s1or1 
83 damage. 
However, 1111ith regard tD the remedies of unpaid seamen and 
masters, the Commonwealth Parliament adopts a different app['Oach. 
It pursues a conspicuous "employee welfare 11 policy much at the ex-
pense of other interests, e.g. those of financiers, salvors and victims 
of collision damage. By section 83 (2) of the Na\Jigation Act 1912-73 
(Comth.)/' the lien for seamen's and apprentices' ti\Jages shall ha\Je 
priority of all other liens." lt submitted that, for similar policy 
considerations, the effect of section 91 (1) and (2) is to upgradr::) mas-
ter's liens for his wages and disbursements to the same order of 
ranking as seaman's wage lien. Certainly, unlike thEJ position under 
Englist1 maritime law. tile lien for seamen's and apprentices' ~vages 
enjoys prioeity over other liens", including of course salvage and 
danger liens. What is uncertain, pt:Jnding a strong High Court of ,1.\us-
tralia decision on the point, is whether the words "all other liensn 
include subsequent salvage and damage claims. lf the above submiss-
ion is correct, the top preferential treatment accorded to master's 
lien For disbursements, which ranks equally ~vith seamen's t\lage lien, 
is a important factor to the ship's creditors. The potential and via-
bility of this lien depends on what Australian courts consider as dis-
bursements or liabilities properly rnade or incurred lJy the master on 
account of the ship. Where this valuable security is available, it is 
81. The Inna [1938] P. 148; The Elin (1882) 8 P.D. 129: see also 
Currie v. M'Knight [189J] A.C. 97, p. 106, QS>T Lord llJatson. 
82. The Mons. (1 43 Ll. L. F~ep. 151; The Sabina (1BL12) 7 .Jur. 
182. 
83. Currie v. M'l~night (1897] ,'\.C. 97, pp. 10)-106, flBJ' Lurd ltlatson. 
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to be preferred by prospective creditors to a ship rnortage or bott-
omry bond. Jt is likely that the persons in whose fa\/our the mas-
ter has, on account of the ship, incurred liability may be submgated 
to the master's claim vis-a-vis the ship. They may be able to enforce 
the lien. Moreo\/er. section 83 (3) renders \/Did evBry stipulation in 
any agreement whict1 is inconsistent with the pro\/ision of the Naviga-
tion Act 1912-73 (Comth.). It seems to strengthen a master's posi-
tion as regards the wage lien and disbursement lien under section 94. 
lt should be borne in mind that the order of priority accorded 
to the maritime liens may be affected by legislation other than the 
Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) and by the rules of conflict of laws. 
As an example of the former. we shall first look at a situation 
under English law. In the House of Lords case of Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Board v. Hay~4 the steamship Countess negligently collided 
with,and carried away part of, the dock gates belonging to the Board, 
and also damaged or sank about twenty barges. To keep her from 
sinking and prevent her from being a danger to safe navigation of 
the port, the Board exercising its powers under the Mersey Docks 
and Harbour Act 1912 (U.K.)85 took charge of, and effected temporary 
repairs on, her. The damage done to the barges amounted to £55,000) 
while the damage done to the Board's gate came to £10,000. For the 
damage done to the dock, the Countess was detained by the Board 
in the exercise of its powers. By section 94 of the Mersey Docks 
Acts Consolidation Act 1858 (U.K.), when damage was done to any 
gate or work of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board through the 
negligence of those on board the vessel, she L-Jould be detained until 
8'•· [1923] A.C. 345. 
85. 2 & 3 Geo. V, c. 12. 
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such damage was paid for m sufficient depusit was made. The vessel 
was subsequently released on payment into court by the owners of 
£55,000,which represented the statutory amount of their liability and 
the expenses incurred by the Buard. The Huuso of Lords held that the 
whole of the fund was to be paid to the Board on the ground that its 
statutory power to detain the ship, constituting a possessory lien 
thereon, was exerC'isable until payment was made. Although in point 
of time the collision damage caused to the barges was subsequent to 
that caused to the dock gates, the Board's claim was accorded prior-
ity over the damage lien of the barge owners. 
It is quite probable that, following the House of Lords decision, 
Australian parliamentary draftsmen have adopted a similar technique. 
86 We have already referred to the Commonwealth and four State Acts 
on the prevention of pollution of waters by oil. These Acts provide 
that the expenses or other liability incurred by the Minister or Board 
in exercising the statutory powers is a charge on the ship. She may 
be detained until the amount is paid or "security for the payment of 
the amount is given to the satisfaction of" the Minister or Board. 
The exercise of such power resulting in actual detention, which con-
stitutes a possessory lien on the ship, may override the high-ranking 
wage lien arid master's disbursement lien. An inherent weakness of 
this "overriding" charge is that its precedence will only operate 
under the relevant Commonwealth or State Ac@? 
2. Conflict of Laws 
This segment of the work examines two methods used by courts 
outside Australia to adjudicate upon various claims wllich arise under 
86. Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Comth.), s. 22 
(1 ); Prevention of Pollution of Waters by Oil Act 1979 (S.A.), s. 
7e (1) and (2) as amended; l)!avigable uJaters (Oil Pollution) Act 
1960 (Vic.), s. 26 (3), as amended; Prevention of Oil Pollution 
of Navigable Waters Act 1960 (N.S.W.), s. 70 (3), as amended; 
Pollution of Waters by Oil Act 1960 (Qld.), s. 23 (3),as amended. 
87. For issue relating to the order of Priority under conflict of 
laws, see infra. See, however, Draft Admiralty Bill 1985, 
clause 37. It relates to cases where, as a result of any civil 
claim, a ship may be detained under a statute. Under the 
Draft Admiralty Bill, where the civil claim is enforceable by 
proceedings in rem, it is payable in pl'iority to "any claim 
against the ship .... " It appears that if clause 37 (5) is 
irnplemerrted as law, the position of holders of maritime liens 
for wages and disbursements will be adversely affected. 
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diff~rent national svsterns of law. On t)le prt)sumption thi:lt thD rnorD 
authoritative method will btJ adopted, it 1~3 essential t~o know how pol-
matters embodied in Australian legislation rnav be e:1ffected. 
Under Australian laws, maritime liens for six classo~.; of claims 
have been established~8 Thn laws of the United States of America89 
go 1 f ·t· and Taiwan, for examp e, con er man 1me on at least thirteen 
f l . l f . 
91 d [·~ 92 d. t tvpes D · c aam3. By aws o France an Jermany, ere 1 .ors, 
mortgagees and necessaries men, are given certain right~> against 
the ship. In general terms, the order of preference~ accorded to 
maritime claims differs from one legal svstem to another. It is not 
uncommon to come across rights conferred on creditors by foreign 
maritime laws which do not fit into any of the categories recognised 
by Australian laws:3 Suppose an American-registered ship belonging 
to an insolvent company is arrested in Sydney by A who is entitled 
to salvage under C3erman law. At the tri<Jl 8, a seaman, cldims that 
his three months' wages have not been paid, and C claims a maritime 
lien on the ship under Punerican law for necessaries supplied to the 
ship. It is questiunable as to ~<vhat rules of conflict of laws should 
be applied so as to determine the ranking of the tlleee claims in a 
just manner. 
88. The maritime liens rer::ognised are tl1ose in respect of damage, 
seamen's wages, m<Jster's wages, master's disbursements, 
vage of property and bottomrv including respondentia. 
89. In addition to the anove, martttme Liens are confermd on 
least seven other typos of claims, (i) general a\lerage 
contribution: The Odysseus III, D.C. (19Ll8) 77 F. ~3upp. 
297; (ii) shipbroker's reimbursements : The Anna R. Held-
ritter, D.C. (1923) 289 F. 112; (iii) freight alone: 
Schirmer Stevedoring Co. v. ~)eaboard Ste\IL=!doring Core .• 
C.i'\. Cal. (1962) 306 F. 2d. 188; (iv) pilotago: Ajubita v. S/S 
Peik, C./\. La. (1970) 428 F. 2d. 1345; (v) towage: ·1 hE1 Trans-
marine Barge No. 100, C.C.A., N.Y. (1932) 62 F. 2d.'Z52; (\Ji) 
wllarfag~J: Beard v. iVJarine Li~Jhterage Corp., D.C., N.Y. 
(1924) 296 F. 11,6;-(vii) sllip- repairs and necessaries: The 
'~Halcyon lslc" [1980] 3 Ail E.R. 197: sr:le also United States 
Code Title 46, Sr1ipping, chap. 25, 971-973. · 
90. See nc. Huang, "Maritime Liens in the Hepublic of Chinan 
(1977) 8 (No. 2), J.M.L.C., pp. 228-229; as Lu maritime liens in 
Indonesia, S£~8 R.N. Hornick, "Jnrlonesian Maritime Law" (1976) 8 
(No. 1), J.M.L.C., pp. 78-79. 
91. The Colomdo [1923] P. '102 (C.A.). 
9Z. The Zigurrls [1932] FJ. 113 (C./\.). 
93. In the Draft Admiralty Bill 1985, 17 (2), a maritime 
is stated t.o include a lien for ~:>alvrlqr:>.. damago, \,lli:lges of 
master DP crew mRmber of a ~_;hip, or master's disbursements. 
403 
Owing to the absEmce of Australian authorities on the subject, 
an insight into the above problem~3 mav be gained bv analysing cert-
ain British Commonwealth cases. This body of judge-made law has 
been barely touched by legislation. 
With rare exception, for almost eh1ht decades, judgl~S were cor1-
tent to deal 1..vith conflict of laii\IS cases by relving on the propDr law 
and tile lex fori. By the rule of conflict of laws, where a claim pur-
sued in an Ennlish court is acquired under a foreign logal system, the 
substantive right is usually determinod according to the fon=dgn law 
as the proper law?4 Thus if bv a foreign law, <3 particular transaction 
- by whatever name it may be called - gives rise to a right to or an 
interest in a maritime property, a court seized of the case 
would take cognizance of it as a maritimD lien. The rule that the 
nature of a claimant's right should lJe governed by the proper law 
appears to have been adopted by the EnsJlish Court of Appeal in JhP 
Colorado. 95 A French ship was arrr~stud in England in an admiral tv 
action rem, and sold. The competing creditors were the Cardiff 
necessaries men and a foreign bank claiming under a French hvpoth-
eque. It was ascertained that, by French law, claimants under a 
French hypotheque WEJre mortgagees who had tile equivalent of a jus 
in rem, which gmn~ them a limited right to follow the ~into the 
hands of a subsequent purchaser. Althounh such a right was admitted-
ly not capable of exact description in tf'lrms applicable to well-
reco~Jnized English rights, it was held to possess attribute~' which 
entitled it to rank in the same class as a maritime lien or an English 
mortgage. ln affirming the trial court dr=!cision, the E:nglistJ Court of 
Appeal unanirnouslv held that the En~Jiish necessaries men were post-
poned to the French hypothecaires. 
/\bout half a centmy later, The "Ioannis Oask.:Jlelis"96 in\Jolving 
American necessaries men and Grer=!k rnort~]agees went on appeal to the 
94. Jean-GatJriel Castel. , Notes and Materials on the Con-
Wet of Laws (1960), pp. 340-341; Cheshire'~:; Private Interna-
tional Law (8th ed. 1970), p. 676. 
95. [1923] P. 102 (C.A.). 
96. 32 D.LJ~. (3d) 571; [1974] 1 Llovd's Rep. 174. 
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Supreme Court of Canada. It was not disputed that, American law, 
the neces~;arit:Js men had acquired a maritime lien on the ~;hip in res-
pect of the costs of nec£:~ssary repairs effected thoreto in 1\mBrica. 
The mortgagee of the defendant ship, which ~'lias registered in Greece, 
was not by Greek law entitled to a maritime litJn on thE~ ship. Ritchie, J., 
appeared to follow the English Court of Appeal deci!:;ion in Tile Color-
d ' h 'd 97 §......9.. ~J~men e sat : 
"[W]here a right in the nature of a mari Urm') l irm l:?xists 
under a foreign law which is the proper law of the con-
tract, the English Courts will recognize it and will accord 
It the priority which a right of that nature woulcl be 
givt-m under t:nglish procerJure." 
He allmved thr'l appec:Jl and held that a claim for necr1ssary rt:)pairs in 
the United StatE!s,carrying a maritime lien, hmJ priority m;er a mort-
gaqe. 
In 1978, thr! ~)ingapnn? c:nurt o I' l\ppeal tlr:a rcl on appec:>l tlltcJ case 
.. '! 11()8 
uf [he · Halcvm1 !slB . TtH:1 fnccs weno ratt1ec ~~imilar to those of The 
.c.=~:..:.::.:;;:__;;;;:~:.:..::..::::.;:..:;:.:= 1 ~C!xcc:p t Li1a t the w<Y:J a i:)ri ti sh vussel and the 
rnortga~]ees were an Efl(]lioh cornp;]ll\1. Followinq the juugmt:mt of 
Hitchie, J .. llJee, C.J., IH~ld th<:-1t thH /\merican ship J'epairm's, t.Nho b\f 
the application of ttlo proper laiN' lle:lcJ a valid maritime Hen. would rank 
abov~c"J the mortgagpes a~; claimants. lio ~;tatocl thE pffocts of the 
Canadian judgment upun ~.iingapm'e courts in thr:J following terrns?9 
"A rJc?cision of the ~1uprerne Court of Canada, particularly 
a unanimous decision, is of U1o higt1esL pursuasi\/B author-
ity on questimm of admirolty jurisdiction, maritime lmv and 
priorities. This 1::; so bL"!cause historicallv our two count-
ries havE~ inheritr~d the law on these matters from the latrv 
of England <~nd the law of our t~.;vo countries r1as develop-
ed in conformity ~vith and to preser·vo uniformity with the 
law of England on these matters." 
For a number of reasons, the <wproach adopted hv Courts of 
Appeal in the two British Commonwealth countrios 1 hlould have unjust 
97. Ibid., p. '576; sel? also 
p. 205. 
98. [1978] 1 M.L.J. 189. 
99. Ibid., p. 195. 
1. Their Lordships, hm.vm;er\ cor1siderecJ that in 
kalelis" [197h] 1 lloyd's f~Pp. 1711, thE! judgrn~:-mts 
ado [1923] P. 102 wPm rni~;undm·stoorJ by th£? SuprPml:-} Court of' 
Canada: The "Halcyon I:3lt?_" [19fl0J 3 A11 .. R. 19/, p. 205 (P.C.). 
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results. First, a claim acquir'e(j l1y a person under a foreign system, 
. American law, which recognises twice as many classes of li~:ms 
as English lat~l, will often entitle him to rank in priority to another 
creditor whose claim arises under En!~lish law. creditor, whose 
claim is by the proper law accorded a lien, has the distinct advantage 
of being able to choose to institute in ~ pmceedings in a forum 
vvhere the other competinq claim is not protected by a lien. Second, 
as between the lienee and the shipowner, the proprc!r law mav fairly 
determine the substanti\/e rights of the formElr. But it is grossly in-
equitable to let the same proper lm'll dominate the outcome of a dis-
pute involving another person who is r~nforcing a right acquired un-
der a totally unrelated transaction subject to a different law. Third, 
a maritime lien is a secret charge on the ~ It is hard! y reasonable 
to expect a prospective mortgagee or financier to make enquiries in 
O\/erv jurisdiction under which the ship has traded in order to ensure 
that no lien has attachecJ to her. It is ob\Jious that the !!proper 
law" approach imposes unrealistic demands on prospecti\/o creditors 
to make such in\/estigations. The \/alue of a ship as security for 
loans and the supply of necessaries on credit v.Jill greatly diminish. 
particularly in those legal systems where such Lr<:Jnsactions cnnfF..n· 
no maritime liens. Fourth, in confining U1e rr1lc:J of Lhe 
;;..;;;.;,...;_;..~ to 
such matters as remedy, procedure and pl'iDcitv, thE! sulJ:otantiv!'J 
rights allegedly acquimd under a fmeign ldw may bel qi\/en priori l;y 
o\/er rights derived from similar transactiDns unrJL~r local law. 
On appeal to tho Pri\/y Council, the SinnapcJrB Cour't of l\ppe<::ll 
decision in Tho "Halcvon Isle" was re\/ersed.2 rn LJell\/ering tile major-
i tv judgment, Lord Diplock held that trm mortgagees were entitled to 
priority. In se\/eral respects, the judgment is a historic event in 
that it changes what would oth~Jrwise have beor1 an undesirable de\/-
elopment in the law of maritime liens. Thr~ trend, if allowocl Lo con-
tinue, would ha\/e serious implications for mortgagees, ship-repairers 
and suppliers of necE?ssaries in all those countri8s where their rights 
and rr:Jmedies are largely based on English law. It has br:!Pn pointod 
out that the "proper law" approach would resui t in the rights of such 
creditors, though contre:1ctec1 under the municipal law of thf:l forum, 
2. [1980] 3 All. E.R. 197. See A.M. Tettenborn,'~Maritime 
Securiti§ls and the Conflict of Laws - Some Problems11 
[1980] I~ L.M.C.L.Q. 404. 
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being postponed to similar eights acquired undee foeeign laws. The 
reason that b1; foreign la~"s such eights often earn; maritime liens. 
Lord Dip lock a\;oided the complications that resulted from the 
rules of conflict of laws by subjecting competing claims, whether ac-
quired under foreign laws or otherwise, to one law, i.e. the lex fori. 
By this metllOd, paeties to proceedings i.£.l r~ are required to estab-
lish that the transactions - by whatever system of law they may have 
arisen - fall IAii thin the classes of claims mcognised by the )yx fori. 
The problems posed by the infinite variety of claims, esch with its 
peculiar incidents, an~ thus resoh1ed. This is done by requiring them 
to be put into the corresponding maritime-claim slots, with the order 
of pl'iority, as provided by the law of the forum. Loed Diplock dealt 
with the issue on the basis that both the supply of necessaries and 
the mortgage were effected in Singapore. He said:3 
" ... the question whether or not in the imtant case the rH-JC-
essaries men aee entitled to priority 0\/81' the moetgagees 
in the proceeds of the sale of the11 HaU:::wn Isle1'depends on 
l.vhether or not if the repairs to the ship hac! been done 
in Singapoee the repairer would hmm been entitlecj under 
the law of Singapore to a maritime lien on the 1'Halcvon Isloj) 
for the price of them. The answer to that question is that 
they are not. The mortgagees are entitled to priori tv." 
fhe Privv Council decision has extendPd thB role of the lex fori to 
matters of jurisdiction and substanti\Je ri~1ht, including 
whether a particular claim is secured bv s maritime Ji['!fl. 
question 
In today's competitive business world, the decision has far-rea-
ching benefits for manv c'>tlip-related industries in the British Comm-
onwealth, e. credit Finance, :C3hipbuilding, ship repairing and chand-
ling. Presumablv, it will bo followed by the majority of, if not all, the 
courts in the British Commonwealth. 
The question of interest for us is, what strmd does /\u~;tralia 
take? fhere are several reason5 why the "lex fori"4 method is pref-
erred. One can see no policy grounds on which th8 State and 
3. IbirJ., p. 208. 
4. The Privv Council and the IHgh Court of 1-\usr,ralia h8\J£'l 
applied the proper law of the contre:1ct to determine the 
~ubstance of the obligation where foreign low elemFmts are 
mvolved: Bonvthon \1. The Commonwealth of AustmUa [1951] 
A.L.R. 37 (P.C.); Wanganui-F\angitikEli E:Jr)ctric Power B;arrJ v. 
0~JstraliC'ln Mutual Provident Societl{ (1934) 50 C.LJ?. ·581~.-
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Commonwealth Parliaments mav step out of line with the rest Df the 
British Commonwealth. Apart from the distinct merits of simplicity, 
wl-lich the "lex fori" method offers, and unifmmitv with the United 
1-\ingdom's law, Australia will benefit from the protection conferred 
on her ship-related industries. Adoption by Australian courts of the 
"lex fori" method will be in line with Commonwealth legislation. ThFJ 
policy is that liens for the wages of seamen and apprentices and 
liens for masters' wages am1 disburs£~ments shall have priority over 
all oU1er liens~ On ttm other hand, when an Australian or foreign 
sr1ip is proceeded against in a country outside the British Common-
wealth the application of the "lex...f.9.!:L' method may give to a 
different result. 
3. At International Level 
It is undeniable that at the hear·t of the prupee law approach 
or the "lex fori" method is the object of doing even-handed justice 
between competing creditors of shipowners witl1 a limited fund. Ob-
viously whatever rules of conflict of laws emploved, whether in civ-
il law or common law jurisdictions, will havf:l their srJOrtcomings. rhe 
facts of The Colorado6 furnish an interesting example. Claimants 
under a French hypoth1'1que were treated by all tru::'l English Cour·t of 
Appeal judges to bt:' on par witr1 mortga~]ees under English law. E3ut 
English neet:Jssaries men 11vere denierJ the benefit of tile priority whid1 
they had under French law over the hypoth8caire~/ In The T E3 
the dispute concerned the ranking of rnortuagees and the master of 
an Argentine ship. The mastm claimed a lien fDr wag8s earned and 
disbursements. expended in the course Df se\mral \Joy ages. By ArgEm-
tine law, his right to the lien for these sums t'llas restricted to the 
last \Joyage only. The English court applied the lex fori in its \tvicje 
scope and gave th£~ master thf'l benefit of an English maritime lien 
for all the wages t3arned and disbursements incurred. Further ineq-
uity of the methods used by the court is Elxemplified by The Zigurds: 
5. See NavicJatiDn Act 1912-73 (Cornth.), ss. 83 (2) and 9l! (1) and 
(2). 
6. (1923] P. 102 (C.A.). 
7. Ibid., p. 1D9. 
8. [1903] P. 44. 
9. [1932] P. 113. 
408 
Bv the C3erman Comm()rcial Corle, Gm'man nec:c!SSi:1l'i8s mEm,(IS ":3hlrh 
creditors'~ had rights analogou~3 to thosP qiver1 n rnaritirnEl lim1 [f 
the ship l'lias e:Jrrested in Grc:rrnarw. Thcc?ir claim,i1~> creditors>of ~1 
higher order than either rmcessarit.::~> rnrm or rnortqaqfJ£)5 ur1der h1qlish 
law,was rejected. 
The first attempt to doal Lvith ttlr~ pmlJIE!rncl c:d' r~rmf'lictin'l 
rights relating to the ~;hip, l\lhict1 arisr~ unclr:r di f' furtmt rwLinnal ~;v~;­
tems of law, t-t1as the formulation of the l~1_:.:t.'-'-r!.::_l'_..n_n_:.:t.:..:i :::..:..:..:.:.c__;:_;..::c_._c~~:,:.__ .•• :... .. .:...::.. 
the Unification of Certain RulBs relatin~J to Mari timt:l Urm~> _(;!nd Mort-
-;;.._;;;;__..;.. 
1926. It was ratified,or e:1ccet1erJ,to twr:nty mm cuuntrit=!~l 
and signed by ele\Jen other countries, includinq thP Uni tecJ l'\irl~Jdom.10 
The Convention, of which Australia is not a signatDl'IJ, sought to con-
maritime liens on not fewer than twentv-thrf!£:' tvpes of claims~ 1 
For a number of reasons, tht:~ United 1'\inqdorn nRVF:'l' rnU fir:d thR Con-
\iention. fVIember Stat£~5 would tJp requil'erJ to crr~atu rmcJ !'(~coqnizu 
maritime liens in favour of necessariHs men anrJ rnanv uthr:w clnsse:> 
of creditors. It would result in a wirle cJEwm·turu frorn tilt:! qum!ral 
law of the sea. This move had alrearjy uccurwcJ in mam; \.V!::~tern 
countries, e. France and the United ~>tate~1. whuse Llmnustic laws 
pmvide for the enforcement of maritime lier1~' For d widE: f'i'li)(JP uf 
1 . 12 B •t . ! t'f' t• 'tl t tl jC'J' ' c mms. · n am s non-ra 1 tea wn l~nsun:o , 1a ~ . 1e prt?- hb man-
time law on tt1e subject would be retained in tJw i:.lriti~lll Cormnon-
liltealth. 
The 1967 Convention repre::;enLecJ D spcomJ international effort 
to unify the law relating to maritime liens and rnortgages: 3 The Con-
vention signed by twenty-threE! countries, including f:'lritain but not 
Australia, has not entered into force. CcHnpared with those of its 
1926 predecessor, its changes are less extensive in that onlv Four new 
10. Register of Texts of Conventions and Uther Jnstruments con-
cerning Intemational Trade Law (United Nations, 1971), vol. 1, 
p. 245. See also H1e Tolten [191!6] P. 1 p. 152, e.Q!' Scott, L.J. 
11. See Article 2. 
12. The "Halcyon Islg" [1980] 3 All. EJ~. 197, p. 206. 
13. International Con\/ention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
relating to Mar 1 tirne Liens and Morlgages-;-196 7, --~~·ciT:·.··;-p~·26B. 
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classes of maritime liens were created. These are claims in respect 
of waterway dues, pilotage dues, loss of life or personal injurv and 
general average contribution! 4 Occasionally legislation in British 
Commonwealth countries which creates port and canal authorities 
also confers on them maritime liens for the collection of waterway 
and pilotage dues. The 1967 Convention meets a number of the vital 
needs of the world's maritime industry. One key advantage is that 
it provides uniform rules relating to maritime liens anrJ other claims 
and their order of priority. A great deal of intelligence-gathering 
work by prospective creditors and expensive, time-consuming litiga-
tion that follows can be avoided. It suggested that, after it has 
come into force on the receipt of the requisite ratifications or acc-
essions from Nation States', Australia should consider taking a similar 
step with the view to giving statutory effect to it. 
VII. EXTINCTION OF MARITIME LIENS 
Less than eight decades ago, admiralty proceedings in rJilll to 
enfoece maritime liens were virtually not confined to any fixed period. , 
There were no Australian limitation statutes applicable to such actions., 
The principle that the rights or privileges after attachment will 
travel with the into whosoever's possession the res may come 
originated in Admiralty Court decisions. Its operation with tion 
back to the moment of the attachment is seen in the case of 
Ship "Strandhill" v. Walter Hodder Company.15 By American law, the 
ship tt1en registered in America as the Lincolnland was subject to a 
maritime lien for necessaries supplied to her in America. Before tl1e 
admiralty action was commenced, she had been sold, hr:Jr name changed, 
and she had been registered as a British ship. The Exchequer Court 
of Canada rEJcognised the right acquired under American law and all-
owed the necessaries men to enforce it. Naturally, having been all-
mved to bring into existence such a far-reaching doctrine of propriet-
ary rights, the courts were left by the British Parliament with thH 
responsibility of working out their limits. 
In carrying out this task, Admiralty Court judges followed ttm 
14. Article 4 para. 1. 
15. [19261 S.C.R. 680, p. 685, J2ill' Necombe, J. 
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t F 't 1· 1,··1o Pqt.lt'!,·,;·:lb!P Dt'incipl~J uf laches ttJci~1 Gpplied to CUr1CBP .5 0 . eqUJ \j. c ~ . , . , 
tlar plaintiffs from r:mforcir1g their claims iri certain ~ciitu<JUOilS. Mar-
itime liens EJre rlot tmfurcPr:lble t\illHre there is lack of reasonable dil-
iqence ill prosecuting the Cl<'Jtms or wlmre ir1ju~3t.ic£~ IAJlll rrJsult. 
In The Chieftain, 16 a 111El~iter livas hl~ld 11ot to l1ewe lost his wage 
liEm upon the ship tJV clelavinq to F•nforce his claim for ten monUls) 
although he had hmJ the OfJportunity to do SCl. Mor<Juver, a ma~;ter's 
release of his personal clnim a~FJinst the c.;hipowner for loJages does 
not operate to relr:JasP r.ln'" ship from hi~i wage lien. i\ lien for mas-
ter's wages and clisbursE~mf=mt~; incuiTod i~3 lo~>t INilen~ the master, irl-
stead of receiving pavment in cash, has agreed to leave the monev at 
inten!~it with the shipowner~:; or thr~ir agents. Appan:mth/, an Admir-
aitv Court will refrain from pfmali~;in~J a master' 1~.1hosc! mi~1taken but 
honest belief is the c<-1tJ:'Jl:~ of t;hH dE~iav. 1 he dutl:oritv for r.his view 
is found i11 Thr~ Fairport} 7 A rnastc)r wns not prmmntPd frorn enfor-
cing his di~;bu l'o3ernen t lit-?rl. r t 1P liE) lav II\ICJ~j due to h (~3 belieF that the 
shipmAJmer would ui~ochc:JI'~Je his p~:~rsoniJi l iabili t~.;• under 1::1 bill of exch-
c:mge which the charterer had dishonoured. The United Kingdom and 
Australian f.:larliarnents tJEJ\/e been ccmr;ent·. to let. their' re:wectlve 
courts <Jdjuliicatu upun is:iurJs n=:!lat.ing to the C)nforT8dl!ilitv of mas-
ter's liens for WE:l~"Jl-!S am! cJL;bLJI'~1ermm L~i. 
Bottomrv bomb, ft:dlen ir1to dbu:m Fur over· CJ cJt'carje, constit-
ute anott-mr closs o P clc:Jim \~J!Jich is uut.~3iclr'! r.he lirnitatim1 ~>tcJtutes. 
They an~ unenforceable un\E~ss U1ev <:Jr£~ prm/ecJ to tJc: Llf recPnt orig-
in and pursuml witll \Jerv active ciiligence. Tliis wm.cilful attitude of 
the courts had re:Julted frmn thP nature of bor,tumrv ti'Emsactions 
which affordt?d opportur1itie~1 for collusion. 
Under English law, the six-1,:ear limitation pef'iod vvithin \Milich 
actions for seamen's wages had to t1e commenced wa~! first introduced 
16. (1863) Grown ,Q, lu~ih. 212; 167 E.i~. 34fl 
17. (1872) l.F-1. 3 A & E. t.S. In The h1ii'poi't. (1fl82) 8 ~1 .[). 48, aitlmugtl 
the disbursPrnents l.Nere irlctJrn-;d in Aoril 1880, it was held that 
there was no wanr. of acti\ir::) diligence when the ~3uit was in-
~'ti tuted bv Lhe rnas ter in t\:ovembE!f', 11382. 
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18 by a statute of Anne. f\ccordingly, an admiralty action \.!:.! £§l!l to 
enforce a maritime lien for wages would be barred after six years. In 
.i\ustralia, seamen's wage claims are not subject to any limitation per-
iod imposed by Commonwealth legislation. Only the State Parliaments 
of New Soutn Wales19 and Tasmanii0have expressly provided that sea-
men's wage claim must be brought within a period of six years. The 
inference to be drawn is this. In Victoria, Queensland. WestBrn Aus-
tralia and South Australia where the six-vear limitation period is not 
applicable, the enfoceability of wage lir:ms \.vill be determined by the 
doctrine of laches. This inconsistencv in State la\.vs mav in some cases\ 
prove fatal to admiralty actions in rem brought by unwary seamen.· 
Prior to the passing of the Maritime Convr~ntions Act 1911 (U.K.), 
in applying the doctrine of laches to salvage and collision suits, Eng-
lish admiralty courts often took a sympathetic view of the extenua-
ting factor·s in favour of claimants. This pDsture resulted in prolong-
ing tt1e limitation period. particularly in relation to collision suits, 
to the detriment of other creditors. It will be recalled that by Eng-
lish law damage lienees rank in priority to other claimants except sub-
sequent salvors. In The Europa, a damage lien was successfully pros-
ecuted after an intervening period of three vears. The criterion to 
be satisfied was couched in the following terrns?1 
"Reasonable diligence means not the doing of everything 
possible but that ~;11hich, having rt:~gard to all the cin::um-
stances, including consilieration of expense and difficul-
ty, can be reasonably required.'' 
That judicial discretion in favour of damage claimant~; might be r~xer-
cised bevond the bounds of reason seen in the pre 1911 case of 
18. l1 Anne, c. 16, s. 17: suits and actions for seamen's IAiages in 
the Court of Admiralty had to be commenced l'llithin six years: 
see also Limitation Act 1939 (U.K.) (2 & 3 Geo. VI, c. 21), s. 2 
(6). 
19. Limitation .Act 1969 (N.S.Ltl.), s. 22 (1); othen.vise not applica-
ble to a cause of action in ~within the admiralty jurisdic-
tion. 
20. Limitation Act '1974 (1"as.), S 8 (1); uthPrwise not applicable to a 
cause of action i.n {1illl within the admir<3ltv jurisdiction. 
21. (1B63) BR. & L. B9, 89 (P.C.), 0lf Lord Kingsdown, Lord Chelmsford 
and Lord Wensleydale. 
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ThR 1\ong Magnus~2 The collision,in which a 1\lorwPgian steamship 
wrongfully sank a British vessel,occcurred in 1878 in the North Sea. 
Although the former had been to British poet~~ about forty-seven times, 
she was not arrested until 1889, . eleven years later! The plain-
tiffs were held entitled to prosecute their claim for damages. Trial 
judge Sir .James Hannen (President) consiclered the particular circum-
stances as to whether it would be equitable to entmtain the suit. 
They included the period of time that had elapsed since the collis-
ion, the opportunities of arrestinq the vessDl, the loss of witness and 
evidence, and the change of prop~rtv. The facts exemplify the diff-
iculties faced by the defendants. dE!spite certain presumptions made 
in their favour, in establishing to the court's satisfaction that the 
merit of the case should not be gone into. 
Britain gaVE~ statutory effect to the 1910 Convention on sal-
vage at sea and the 1910 Convention on collisions.Z3 The other mari-
time nations followed suit by adopting a two-year limitation period 
for claims and liens arising from salvage services and also collision 
damage. It is interesting to note that Australia's accession on 9th 
September. 1930, was made in relation to both the 1910 Conventions~4 
She prudently incorporated, in section 396 (1) of the Navigation Act 
1912-73 (Cornth.)~provisions similar to those in the 1911 Act (U.K.), 
Thus admiraltv actions i.Q. to enforce anv claim or lien for salvage 
or collision damage under the Commomvealth Act must be bmught 
within a period of two vears. Where, however, the actions are gov-
erned by State laws, as in cases of salvage services rendered to, or of. 
collision involving, intra-State trading ships in State waters, anomalies 
mav arise. Only the Parliaments of Tasmania~5 Wostern Au~>tralia 26 
and New South Wales27 have incorporated in their legislation the two-
22. f1891] P. 223. 
23. See preamble to Maritime Con\/entions Act 1911 (U.K.). 
24. N. Singh, International Maritime Law ConvPntiOD.§. (1983), \/ol. 
IV, pp. 2958 and 3088. 
25. ~imitEJtion /\ct 1974 (Tas.), s. B (2) and (3). 
26. Supreme Court Act 1935-79 (W.A.), s. 29. 
27. Limitation Act 1969 (N.S.W.), s. 22 (2) and (:'i). 
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year limitation period. Presumably the courts In tho other States 
IJJill continue to apply the age-old doctrim-3 of laches~8 
Where the statutory rule applies, the court is also empowered 
to extend the period to such an extent and on such condition as it 
thinks fit. In The Alnwick?9 the plaintiff's husband as a passenger 
in a fay boat was killed on 28th April, 1962, in a colli.sion between the 
boat and the tug Alnwick. The accident happened when the boat 
was passing between the sterns of the Alnwick and the Norwegian 
vessel Braemar. On 3rd Decr~mber, 196.), the writ claiming clamages 
against the Alnwick was issued. The defence oF tho Almvick, which 
should have been produced on 6th !"'larch, 1964, was not delivered un-
til 2nd May, 1964 - more than two years after the collision cJate. In 
an unexpected move, the Alnwick in her defence made allegations of 
negligence against, and placed blame on, the Braemar for the cause 
of the death. Hewson, J., tmld that action wa~1 not maintainable 
against the Braernar, the second defendants, as the proceedings had 
not been commenced against them witl1in two years as rccJquired by 
section 8 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (U.f\.). In the appeal, 
their Lordships held tl1at the following factors were "good and substan-
tial reasons to justifv'' granting the time extension sought - namely: 
1. the failure of the Alnwick to deliver the defence on the due date; 
2. the allegations made in the f\lnwick's defence as to the negligence 
of the Braemar; 
3. Lhe plaintiff's risk of losing the case unless such allegations were 
challenged; and 
l~, the entitlement of the Alnwick, if judgment went against her, to 
seek contribution against tllfJ Braemc3r within one year under sec-
tion 8 of the 1911 /Act (U.!\ .). 
There are situations whE;re creditors are, either temporarily or 
28. As to the proposed change in the law, ~'iee Draft Admiralty 
Bill 1985, clause 38, !.!lf.@.. 
29. [1965] Z All E.R. 569 (C.A.). In The Niceto de Larrinaga [19651 
2 All. E.R. 930, it was l1eld that the Maritime ComnJntions Act 
1911 (U.K.))s. 8 does not bar claims for loss of life of, or per-
sonal injury to, a person carried on board the \ttJssel against 
whose owners the claim was made. 
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indefinitely, pt'ecluded from institutir·1g proceedings in !:£:.!!2.· Suppose 
that a ship, while privately owned, tJecom~Js subject to a maritime 
lien, and is then chartered by dE~mise to;or acquired as the property of, 
a State or the Commonwealth r~overnrnent~0 It i~3 submitted that sec-
tion /~OSA (1) of the Navigation Act 1912.-73 (Comth.) will cease to oper-
ate as a bar to an action in I:.§!.!! aftm' the demise charter has expir-
ed or after she has once again reverted to privatt-3 ownership. The 
court should be prepared to grant a time extension, if necessary. 
The same reasoning should apply where the ship 7 encumben~d with a 
lien~ is meanwhile under a demise charter or transferred to a Foreign 
sovereign or foreign government. It is submitted that in such cnses 
the maritime lien being inchoate is not extinguished tJut held in abey-
31 
ance. 
Section 324 (1)32 of the Navigation .Act 1912-73 (Cumth.) prmlidr!s 
a statutory method for the mDster or any of the cn3w,ds :>alvm~ to 
abandon voluntarily his lien on the wr'eck <:Jilol)ed to llaVlJ br~en ~~ill\/ed. 
Tt1~3 wreck is dischargecj from th8 Emcumbrance whr:,rP a written dCJI'f't:'-
rnent, attested by two IAJitmJsses, i~3 entermJ into to abidE! the dl~ci~'­
ion of a Federal or State Court or1 thP. mattfJr, CJmJ securitv to Um 
amount agi'eed on tJy the pmties Lhen!LD is givrm. Under U1r! PI'O-
vision t11e security furnished by the wreck m,lnCJI'S is a ~~ulJ~itiLutc' fur 
the lien. The object is to rJn~1ure that sc:Jl\mrs IAiill tm paid iF thE'\/ <Jr'r'? 
30. As regards proceedings ill rom <JgEJinst C:Jny ~.Jhip ur other 
property belonging to Her' Majesty or t11e Crown,inclucJing 
the question as to whether any lien cCJulcJ <:Jttach to :.;uch 
ship or property, s~Je Crown Proceedings /\ct 19L,/ (lrnp.), 
s. 29. 
31. Cf. In The Tervaete [1922] P. 259 collision damage was occ-
asioned by a foreign state-owned vessel. It was held 
that no maritime lien attclched to thE:' vessGl. Accordingly, 
if the vessel was subsequently ~1old int.o pri\/ate ownership, 
sr1e could not be proceeded against in am; action in ~· 
32. It is modelled on l"lerchant Shipping f\ct 18% (Imp.), s. 'J5L+. 
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foumi legall~/ entitled to sall;ag£> n~warct 
Under E:ngllsh admiralty law, though the: matter ha:3 not vet berm 
considm·ed by any Australian court, <:1 maritime !ion is extingui~1t1r:!d 
~<Jhere bail or security is gh;en to prevent tho arrest Dr' s!'Jcure the 
release of thE~ ship in an ac1miraltv action in J'em? 3 Another rule long 
established by tt1e Admiraltv C::ouf't ir1 the exerch:Je of its jurisdid.ion 
that is applicable in Australia ls this. The arrest and saiL~ of a ship 
by a court of competent jurisdiction in proceedings in !.:.£!!:! 1111ill result 
in extinguishing the liens attached thereto?4 In the current state 
of Englist1 authorities, ther~:J is some doubt whether, apart Prom UH3 
case of bottomry, the voluntary assignmr:Jnt of a lien without thEl. sanc-
tion of a court will operate as an extinction;35 J\n ,n_merican court 
has held that there could bP no maritime lien for whaefage where the 
ship lvas withdrawn from navigation.:% It i~1 obvious tl1at descruction 
uf the subject to the liens puts i..'lll ond to ttle right to institute 
proceeding~:; in ~ against it. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The lm'll currently in force in Austealia relating to maritime 
liens is substantiallv similar to that of the United f'\ingdom. judie-
process and also Commonwealth c.:md State leqislatlon, there has 
been continual and systPmatic reception of the principles of Enql ish 
maritime law. 
For thr::; purpose of the proposr.:?d admir<::Jlty juriscHction, clause 
37 
17 (2) of tho Draft Admiralty Bill 19W) ' defines "maritime lir-m" as a 
33. The Christlansborv (1885) 10 P.D. 141 (C.A.); Tlw "Wild Ranger" 
(1863) Br. & L. 84; The Goulandrfs {'1927] P. 182. In the> Rein-
beck (1889) 6 Asp. Mar. Lav Cas. 366 (C./\.), it IA!Cl~:i fH':'ld that 
plaintiffs migr1t still resort to British courts thuugr1 bail 
was \toluntarilv put In by defendants in a fm't'?Ign court. 
34. Castrigue v. Imrie (1870) L.R. 4 I-LL. 411,; ThE" Chal'lF!S /\rnr!lia 
(1868) L.l~. 2 A & E. 330. 
35. The Pt::tone (1917] P. 198. /\ftEJr exhaustivelv rtNiewing the 
previously authorities, Hill. J., held that a person llliho ~"'ith­
out the sanction of court \Joluntarilv pays off a maritime 
lienee is not entitled to the benefit of the lien. In f~hind 
36. 
v. The ''Zita" (1924) Gaz. Law Rep. (N.Z.) 7, the plaintiff was 
Bntitled to the bene Pit of the rnastr~r's statutory lion in res-
pect of advances made for wages cmd necnssarir2s on the 
~-:~round that he IIIIas not a volunter~r. 
37. Tt1e pmposr~d admin:Jltv juriscliction ir. cor1sioerr~d in Cl1aptor 
Nine. 
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reference to a lien for salvage, damage, wages of the master or a 
crew member, or master's disbursc.J.ments. All these classes of liens 
have long been incorporated as part of Australian law. 
As a result of the 1980 Constitutional Agreement., the legislative 
jurisdiction of each State Parliament has been extended beyoncj the 
law-water mark to the adjacent coastal waters:8 It is vital for 
State laws on the subject throughout Australia to be uniform. 
Consistency is lacking so lon~J as the legislation in Tasmania~9 Queen-
sland140 and New South Wales41 dealing with contributory negligence 
occurring on land is to be applied to collisions between ships at sea 
involving contributory negligence. The old admiraltv rule of equal 
division of loss without regard to the extent to which the parties 
involved were in fault is long obsolete.42 
1 h3 . . 44 h l' 45 h . In Queens and, V1ctona and Sout Austra 1a, t ere IS appar- . 
ently no statutorv period of limitation relating to actions in rem for 
enforcing maritime liens for salvage and damage1~6 Uncertaintv and 
disharmony will arise due to the operation of the doctrine of ladms. 
Similar problems exist in connection with claims for seamen's wages 
which appear to fall outside the scope of the limitation statutes in 
these States. It is imperative for the Parliaments in these States to i 
38. Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Comth.), s. 5; Con-
stitutional Powers (Coastal tJJaters) Act 1979 (N.S.ld.), s. 5: 
Constitutional Fiowers (Coastal Waters) Act 1979 (S.A.), s. 5; 
Constitutional Powers (Coastal Waters) Act 1980 (Vic.), s. 5; 
Constitutional Powers (Coastal Waters) Act 1979 (W.A.), s. 5; 
Constitutional Powers (Coastal Waters) Act 1980 (Qld.), s. 5. 
39. See Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas.). This Act 
and the following two Acts contain no provisions which expressly 
applv to collisions at seo. 
40. See· Supreme Court Act 1867 (Qld.) (31 Vic. No. 23). 
41. See Supreme Court Act (N.S.W.) (No. 52 of 1970). 
42. Hav v .. Le Neve, 2 Shaw Sc. App. 395. 
43. Limitation of Actions Act (Qld.) (No. 75 of 197il). 
44. Limitation of Actions Act (Vic.) (No. 6295 of 1958). 
45. Limitation of Actions Act 1935-1975 (S.A.). 
/46. Undr~r the Supreme Court Act 1935-1979 (W.A.), s. 29, the two-
year. li.mi~ation period imposed for claims for collision damage 
a~d l:lJU[Jes does not apply to claims for salvag'e; for posi-
t10n m New South Wales and Tasmania, see Limitation Act 1969 
(N.S.W.), s. 22 (2) and Limit<~tion 1974 (Tas.), s. 8 (2). 
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bring the law into line with the provisions of the Naviqation Act 
1912-73 (Comth.)47 and the international conventions.48 The Draft Admiralty 
Bill 198~9 seeks to harmonise the law relating to the limitation per-
iods, and to remove. some of the difficulties. It appears that under 
clause 38 (1) (b) a proceeding on a maritime lien may be brought with-
in a three-year period. When gi\ten effect, it will fill the existing 
gaps in the State laws. We have noted that the legislation of Queens-
land, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia makes no pro-
vision relating to proceedings on maritime liens. Another object of 
clause 38 is to promote certainty. A claim brought within a period 
provided under the clause will not be affected by the operation of 
the doctrine of laches. The proposed legislation will give rise to 
some inconsistency with the limitation periods under the Maritime 
50 . h t 't' l . Conventions Act 1911 (U.K.), An advantage IS t a mar1 1me c a1ms., 
wt1ich are statute-barred in other jurisdictions, may be enforced in 
the courts of the four Australian States. 
(Jne difficulty concerns the ranking of maritime liens inter se 
and in relation to cr:lrtain claims giving rise to possessory liens. 
Another related problem is the secret nature of the encumbrances 
constituted by maritime Hens which are mainly within the knowledge 
of the shipowners. It is submitted that the law ~3hould impose on them 
a duty of disclosure. For example, under Australian law, ship mort-
gagees, necessaries men, salvors and damage claimants rank after 
crew members. Prospective ship mortgagees anU necessaries rmm, who 
look to the ship as security, can do litte to ascertain lvhether any 
maritime liens have attached to her? 1 It is su~me:.3ted that to prom-
ote honest dealings legislation should be introduced requiring any 
47. s. 396 (1). 
48. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
with respect to Collisions between Vessels, Drussels, 23rd Sep-
ternbEJr, 1910; Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
of Law RBlating to Assistance amJ Salvage at Sea, Brussels, 
23rd September, 1910. Britain acceded to both Conventions 
on behalf of Australia on 9th SeptembBr, 1930. 
49. See Chapter Nine. 
50. As to the limitation periods applicable to claims for collision 
damage or injuries and sal\tage, sne s. 8;and Navigation Act 
1912-73 (Comth.), s. 396 (1). 
51. Since masitirne liens could have arisen and attachE~d to the 
ship under any system of Jaw, there is no way of ct1ecking 
thHir existence. -
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exi~'ting liatJilitv incurrr:;d bv the ship or anv claim again~;t her, ~,,heth­
er or not it cardes anv maritime lien, to be EmtBred in thP. l~egi~;ter 
at the Shipping Registration Office. The availabllitv to thE:l public 
of information relating to such liabilit\/ or claim ~.vill gre<:Jtl\f alleviate 
the risk of extending credit facilities to the ship or of making advances 
to her owners on a ship mortCJage. 
It is self-evirlent that maritime liens are extinquishorJ the 
loss or destruction of tl1r:: n:es. lJJhen thi~> mmnt occurs, ttm ship-
owners t>liill usuallv be able to recover compensation tmdm' some in-
surance policv. The insurance monevs are not subjr~ct to rnari timr:1 
liens. Consequentlv, the forrnet' mortgag£::es and lienees will be rele-
gated to the position of gnmJral creditors. Their claims mav be po~3t­
poned to those of othl~r creditors of the shipowners. The result is 
a diminution in the amount rBcovt::Jrable, particulae/1,1 whr:lre the ship-
owners are insolvent. It is suc)gested that legislation i~:; nm~Cled. It 
should provide that the comprmsatior1 recoveratJh~, whetht3f' umier em 
insurance policv on the ship or in an action against armtJ1er ~3hip for 
wrongful damage caused, Ghall com.Jtitutl=J a fund to fTl(Jet tt1(-:l F'Xi~3t­
ing claims in the same OI'der of ranking as before the ship was lost or 
damaged. 
It is uncertain as to what rule of conflict of laws Australian 
judges will apply in those cases where ri~;hts in a ship are allecwdly 
acquired bv competing creditors under rJiffenmt systems of law. 
WhethBr tile High Court of Australia applies the propEH' law - follow-
r:z ing the Supreme Court of Canada decisionJ · and the Singapore Court 
of Appeal decisionr)3 - or the? lF:x fmi as in the Privv Council case of 
The "Halcvon Isle" 54 will not prmlide an equitable lonn-term answer. 
Courts in non-British CommonwPalth countries are bound by different 
rules. Creditors will continue the practice of' stcmking out a forum 
for instituting proceedings 1!.!. ~ that will give to their claim the 
highest order of priority pos::.;itJle. The problem concem::J not just 
Australia or the British Commonwealth countries but all the mar.i-
tlrne nations of the world. As an interim measure, Members of the 
52. file "Ioanni~; Daskalelis" [197ll] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 17'•· 
53. The "HalC\LDII Isle" [1978] 1 IVJ.L.J. 189. 
54. [1980] 3 All. E.R. 197 (P.C.). 
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United !\lations should adopt,and give statutory effect in their res-
pective S,tates to,the International Convention for the Unification 
of Certain Rules relating to Maritime liens a~1d Mortgages, 1967. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Steady increase over the centuries in the carrying capacity, 
speed and numbers of sea-going ships has produced a corresponding 
rise in claims against shipowners. Often the claims are rendered 
devastating by many factors. These factors include the loss of or 
damage to high-valued cargo, personal injuries to or deaths of 
persons, extensive damage to port or harbour installations, the sink-
ing of other ships, oil pollution damage and clean-up costs. It is 
true that marine insurance and protection and indemnity clubs have 
played a significant role in reducing the financial risks and losses 
borne by shipowners and other persons. International trade policy, 
the desim to promote maritime commerce, the prohibitive costs of 
insurance services and the need to lower freight charges have led 
to efforts to find some practicaL solution to the problems faced by 
shipowners and others. 
Maritime transportation is a venture. By its very nature, the 
two parties, namely, the sr1ipowner as provider and the shipper or 
passenger as user of the services, are subjected to certain risks 
of damage or injury. The early English legislators seized upon an 
equitable solution to the problem. The statutory limitation of lia-
bility was really the provision of a formula to apportion the risks 
between the two parties to the venture. The principle of strict and 
unlimited liability relating to common carriers had to be modified. 
The business of carrying goods or providing transport services 
became separated from insuring the safety of the goods or passen-
gers carried. A shipowner can only be held responsible for loss, 
damage or injury caused as a result of his or his employees' neglig-
ence. 
In this Chapter, we shall look at how the risk-sharing propos-
ition was first employed in the eighteenth-century shipping legisla-
tion. The concept had been consistently endorsed by successive 
British Parliaments before it was adopted by internationaL maritime 
bodies. Although in some of the international shipping conventions, 
the time-honoured expression "actual fault or privity of the ship-
owner" noC used, a similar principle of "risk-sharing" as a means 
of limiting the liability of the carrier or shipowner is applied. For 
421 
exc:Jmple, the l-lagU!'3 Rules schndulecl tn the Sea-Carriaqe of Coorl~:;.Act 
192L,-73 (Cornth.) limit a cmTiee's liability in normal circum~;tancns to 
$A 200 per package m unit of the goods lost. A remarkable, indeed 
new, form of risk apportionment in use today is found in the 
Brussels Pmtocnl 1968 and the Convention on Limitation of Liability 
for Maritime Claims 1976. ln each case, the limitation of liability 
applies unless the personal act or omission is pro\tEJd to ha\/e been 
committed with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and 
with knowledge that such loss would probably result. 
Attention is focussed on the \/arious problems arising out 
of the application of Australian and the UnitBd 1'\inqflom's lrc:Jgislation 
on the subject, ami rm the changos made ovc~r the years to re-dis-
tribute the risk~>. These le~]islati\/e rnea!'>ures extend the bmlBfit of 
limiting liability to a larger gmup of persons,~· ~1hip ctlai'term's 
and operators. Hmy also lirnit the rights of own101rs of propm'ty darn-
aged, e.g. by oil pollution, to partial compensntion. Inc1uded in the 
study al'e situations IAihEn'o tho tmnefit of limiting liallilitv an1 h£~ld 
to be unavailable and the ways in which Australian and the United 
1'\ingdorn's laws differ. 
II. CONTRACTS OF CARRIAGE 
1. Bill of Lading Contr·acts 
l1Je ha\tf:l looked at th~-:~ conrJitinns to be satisfied t:H::lf'm·£1 the 
admiralty ju!'isdiction under section 6 of the Admiralty Court 1\c.t. 
1861 (Imp.) can be exrJrcisFJd. The amount of compensation rr:!cmtr-:!r-
ai:Jle against Lhl~ carrying \tes~ml is now considered. 
SincEl section 6 only appliB~> to ooods canied tJv ships int;o the 
[)JmrnonwrJc:CJl ttl or· an A us trnl ian ~3taU3, provisions of the Ha~JUf! l~ules 
which llmt£~ thE! force of laiAI in foreign ports of sl1ipment. arE! solely 
r£Jlevant. ~3ectirm l1 (r.J) of the Carriage of Goods bv S§a /\c_!: 1936 
(LJ. ~l.) r·eads: 
"NeitiH:Jr the carriPr nor the ship shall in anv event bB 
or becurne liabll1 for anv lm>s m· damage to or in connec-
tion 1111ith ttm t;ram;purtation of goods in an amount ex-
cueding $500 per packa(.]e lawful money of the United 
States, or· in case of goods not ~;hipped in packages, per 
customc:Jry fminht unit, or thB equi\/alBnt of that sum in 
other curnmcv, unle~m the naturr'3 ami value of such 
qoocjs have been declared by the shipper before shipment 
in the !Jill of lading." 
It is cloar that the amount rBcmmrable in respc-:!ct of each package 
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lost or damaged depends on thB particular currBncy involved and 
also the rate of exchange. For example, "£100 per package or unit" 
in the old Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924 (U.K.) was replaced bv 
the ne\111 formula "equivalent of 10,000 francs per package or unit or 
30 francs per kilo of gross weight ... whichever is higher." 1 By the 
Carriage of Goods by Water Act 1936 (Can.)~ the expression is "five 
hundred dollars per package or unit, or the equivalent of that sum 
in other currency." This limit of liability is not always adhered to. 
The courts have in different ways struck down attempts by ship-
owners as carriers to lessen their liability. 
ThP imprecision of the terms "package" and "unit" in Article IV 
rule 5 of the Hague Rules has been exploited bv sl1ipowner~; and 
carriers. By the ingenious use of the "full container load" (F.C.L.) 
syst;{;~m. a nml\l pattern of packin!] and shipping goods \l\la~3 introduced. 
For reasons of expediting handling, preventin~J pilferage, pmtecting 
goods from transit damage and obtainin~J improved freight rates, 
shippers favour the F .C.L. system. A shipper may use a large con-
tainer to consolidate many cartons or items and ship it under a bill 
of lading as a single packagrJ. Subject to certain conclitions being 
met, the courts have givBn E~ffnct to thu agnmd adjustments made 
by shippers within the meaning of the wor·d "packagEJ11~ Any agree-
mm1t IAIIlich lessens the liability nf a shipo\AIImr as carrier other than 
by increasing the package dimensions is rendered invalid~ 
InterncJtional importers under C.I. F. and F .O.B. contracts often 
require the quantity of goods shipped to bE! specifimi in the docu-
ments of tith~:s American and Canadian decisions have safnguarded 
1. Ttm BnJfisels Protocol 196B (Ttu,; Vinby Rules), Articl.l::! 2. 
(a); m:e also Carri<Jge of Goods b~ Sea Ak'J: 1971 (U.K.), Art-
iclFJ 1\/ rule 5 (§2. ThB conversion rate is givBn in the 
Carria~)E-1 of Goods b~ Sea (Sterliog Equivalents} Oeder 1977. 
p_. I. No. 1(]l,L,; see alEm ttm comment~~ of N.R. McGHchrist, 
'rtm l\le\111 Hague Rules" [197t,] 3 LM.C.L.(J. 255. 
2. R.S.C. 1970., c. C. 15, Artic1B IV rule 5. 
3. Insurance Co. of North J.\merica \/, Japan Une Ltd. [197L,] 1\.M. 
C. 21,43. A! so in Primaev lndustriBs Corpn. v. Barber Lines A[S 
QOC1 ~3kils:2s Tropic ['1975] 1 Lloyd'~~ Rep. h61, each bundle com-
prising twenty-t\1110 tin inDot~; ti'EJated a~i a "packaDe". 
4. Article III rule 8. Australia has not given effect to Bruss-
els Protocol 1968. 
5. In these c~ses of documentary sales, l.vhich take place prior 
tu the ~I'I'l\ml o.f ~ar£JO, it i::1 vital that thu number of items 
and th81r descrtpt.Lon tm clearly statod in the documents. 
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the intemsts of assigness anrl holders of bills of lading by gi\/ing 
Article IV rule 5 a narrow construction. Enumerrltion by a ~3hippl~r 
or his agent in the bill of lading of the cartons or itfJms stowed in 
a container is given effect in the literal sense. Thtm in Leather's 
6 S'S A . L . 7 1 lA \1. ~).S. Mormaclynx, Camnco "· " . mer1can egto~! am" !....!.--! 
~ohnston Co. v. The Tindelfjell~ the bills of lading ste:Jted that the 
containers werr:J 11 ~3aid to contain" a specified number of cartons. 
The courts eightly took the \tiBIAl that, in accepting the number of 
cartons as described, the carriers had agrBefJ to thn limitation of 
liability on thB basis that each carton was a package. ThBse dP.c- · 
isinns uphold the principle behind the Hague Rules? 
A similar approach to the problem was taken by t~1e High Cour·t 
of Australia in lJ.JiHiarn Hnlvman & ~3on~j Pty .. Ltd. \/. Foy & CJipso~LJ:.ty-. 
Ltd.10 A package of women's unrlf?rwear valued at fiftv-seven pounds 
IIIias shipped under a bill of lading, subject to the ?Ba-Carria~w of 
.=-=;.;;;;..;:;;~...;.;:;.;:;_192h (Comth.),from Melbourne to Hobart. It was not cle1iv-
ered. Here the "agrend adjusl:.rmmt.s" did not rfJlate to the meaning 
of package but sought to rE:duce tile carriel' 1S liabilitv. A clause 
in the bill of lading stated: 
"rt is mutually aureed that til£) \talur~ nf EJEH:h packagE! or 
paecE:l n3ceipted for ... does not oxceed the sum of £5 un-
less othenvise stated thenlin .... " 
In affirming the Supreme Court of Victorir.J juclgmnnt in favour of 
cargo consigmms for the full value, the High Court h~::ld that the 
clause was void on the ground of its inconsistencv IAt.ith Article I\/ 
rule 5 of the Hague Rules. Moreover, by /-\rticlf:1 l\/ rule 8, any clause 
or agreement in a contract of carriage le~>sBning the liability, othE:r-
wise than as provided by the Rules, of "the carrier or the ship" for 
6. [19711 A.M.C. 2383. The words "::;fmlnd container said to 
cont.Bin 99 bales of leather" wero inserted bv shipper in the 
bill of lading. Each bale was hold to com1titutr:1 a package. 
·7. [1971'l] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 295. The number of cartons packed into 
LhE! container was EmumeratBd in the IJHl of lading. Each 
carton was treated as a package. 
B. [19/3] 2 Lloyd's Rep. ?53. In t.his Canadian cane, two contain-
r-lrs ~1!1ippnd t.vere def;crib£:Jd .in ttw bill of lacling aB contain-
inq 17'• cartons and 1Ld cart;on::i, r.especti\mlv. A!::Jain, oach 
cm·ton IAias helcj to be a packago. 
9. SetJ Pmfessoe J. Goldring, "The Container as a 'Packatw' or 
'Unit' under' tile Haguo Ruh:m" (1973-7l•) 2 A.B.LR. 127. 
10. (19l,S) 73 C.L.R. 622. 
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carno loss or arising from breach of thB duties and obl 
tions in /\rticle HJ i~; rt:mdered null and \mid. 
The other word in 1-\rticlo 1V ruln 5, which is insufficiently 
clear in meanin~l, is "unit". Although directly related to the amount 
of compensation recoverable against a for cargo loss or dam-
a~w. it is not dElfineli in the Hague Rules or anv Eng1ist1 or /\ustralian 
casr~s. Professor Tetley puts forward a number of reasons to support 
his argument tt1al:. the word 11unit" in the Hague Rules means a "freight 
unit" and not an unpacked object~ 1 Undoubtedly, his view is in 
wiU1 thl~ American concept. This is seen in the use of the expre~3s­
ion "customary freight unit'' in Section 4 (5) nf the Rules scheduled 
to the Carriage of Goods tJv Sea Act 1936 (U.S.). Since the woed 
"unit" is used, l,vithout qualification, in Arti.clo JV rule 5 of the Rules 
schedulE!d to thE' legisltJtion enacted in British Commonwealth count-
ries, it is unlikely English or /\ustralian courts will follow Pro-
ffJssor Tetley's vit.:H/\1 by givino lt a narrmv meaning. For example, 
consi~1tent ~-vit.h the use the ~;vord "unit" simpliciter in Article I\/ 
rule 5 under the 
courts have consteued it to mean "shipping unit" rather ''freight 
unit"} 2 The learned authors of Scrutt,on on Charteeparties and Bills 
uf Lading have taken a more flexible vil~w. Whilt.'l recognizing that 
the concept of the "shipping unitH, unlike the "feeight unit", is not 
all appropriate when applied to cargo in bulk, they consider 11a 
possible solution to apply the 'shipping unit' to individual artic-
les not in packages and the 'freight unit' to bulk cargo." 13 That this 
view is more acceptable is borne out by two facts. In 1924 1111hen the 
Hague Rules were adopted, lon~J before the af]e of containerisation, 
goods were shipped in different form~3. /\ccordingly, the two words 
I! k 11 d " . t" h. h ' d pac age an um , w 1c are not mten- ed to be synonymous, must 
11. W. Tetlr:w, Marine Cargo Claims (2nd . 1978), pp. 438-9. 
12. In Sept Iles Express [nc. \1. Tremblav [1964] Ex. C.R. 213 anrl 
FalcontJridqe Nickel Minr!s ltd. \!. China Shippinq Ltd. [1969] 
2 Lloyd's Rep. 277, "freight unit" was rejected in favour of 
"shipping unit". See also D.F. McEwen, "Pel' Package Limit-
ation A Di\;Brglng .AppnJach in Canadian Courts" [1976] 3 
U1.C.L.Q. 269. 
13. ~icrutton on Chartnrpartit!S amJ Bills of Lading l18th ed. 
1974), p. 443; see also the latest edition (19th ed. 1984), 
Q.E.. cit., p, 455. 
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be separately construed to apply to each lot, bundle or piece of the 
infinitE! range of goods shipped. This intention of the Hague Rules 
drafters can be inferred from Article Ill rule 3 (b). After the goods 
havB been receivHd into his charge, the carrier, his agent or the 
master i~i required to isBue a bill of lading shmMing, inter alia, "the 
number of packages or pieces or the quantity or weight as the case 
may be." It is submitted that the same approach was followed by the 
drafters of the Brussels Protocol 1968. The inclusion of the words 
"or 30 francs per kilo of gross 11\Jeight of the gcmds lost or damaged" 
brings out the point quite clearly .. Thus bulk cargo can he shipped 
in such a wav that the entire container or a large cubic measure 
may constitute a package or a unjt, respectively. Except where the 
protection under the Hague Rules is rendered inoperative bv an 
unjustifiecJ deviation or where the weight measure applies, the lia-
bility of a shipowner as carrier does. not exceed the statutory max-
imum for each package or unit of the goods lost. 
2. Increase of Compensation 
Lllhere the "agreed adjustments" concept applies, few Australian 
importers of containerised cargo shippp,d under the F.C.L. system or 
of unitisorJ cai'[lO will find it worth~Athile insti t.uting an admiral tv ac-
tion in cgm. 
The problems created bv containerisation and U1e ambiguous 
wording of Article IV rule 5 were dealt with bv the Brussels Protocol 
1968 (The Visbv Rules). One of the amendments that have been in-
corporated in the ~9rriage of Goods by Sea Act. 1971 (U.K) £'eads: 
"Unless the nature and value of such gomjs have been de-
clared bv the shipper bFJfore shipment and inserted in the 
bill of lading, noither ttJe carrier nor the ship shall in any 
event be or bocome liHble for arw loss of or damage to or 
.in connection I!Jith the goorjs .in an amount exceedinn the 
equivahmt of 10,000 francs per package or unit or 30 francs 
pnr kilo of gross wnight; oF thB noods llmt or clamagm1, 
wllichever is the higher." 
(1). Tho rigqr of the "a[}reed adjustments" cancopt has been 
modifind in several important wavs. By tile pmviso, irmeetion in the 
bill of lading of the number of cartons or pieces, or the 1111eiqht of, 
goods packed into the container wil1 render inapplicable the "per 
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package" concept.14 Moreover, if the alternati\;e method of com-
putation is more adwmtageous, a plaintiff in an aclrniraltv action in 
rem is entitlod to have the damages quantified according to the 
~ss IA/f~inht of tho goorJs, prE!sumablv including tho container~~) To 
counter the uncertaintv due to changing market value of the franc, 
tile Carriage of Goods by SEJa (Sterling Equivalents) Order 197116 \Alas 
made in tile United Kin~Jdom. It specifiBs £L,47.B1 nncl E1.3L, as thn 
sterling equivalrmts of 10,000 ancl 30 gold francs, respE?cth;elv. The 
disadvantBge, possiblv injustice, of this method of conversion to a 
plaintiff v.lill be cliscus~1mj in due course. Australia, NE!\111 Zr~aland, 
Canada and thB United States are not among the ten countries 1111hich 
have rBtifiecl,or accederJ to,the Brussels Protocol 1968 . 
(2). For .A.ustralian importers of goods shipped from countries, 
~· Britain, Singapore and France, which ~lave given statutnrv nff-
ect to tho Brussels Protocol, therr:J is an added protection. The 
bills of lading cml8ring the contracts of carriage are issued in thesE! 
countr-ies of shipmcmt subject to the provisions of the Brussels Pro-
tocol 1968. ThEJ amendment, which .is incorporated in Art.iclr~ 1\/ rule 
5 (B) ,read~•: 
"Nnithm· the carTinr nor tho Bhip shall be r:mtitled t.o the 
benefit of the limitation of liatlilitv provided for .. .if it 
is prmmd that the damage resulted from an act or omiss-
ion of the carriBr donn with int£~nt to cause damage, or 
£'EJcklL:.m~IIV and with knowlrHJnr~ that clama~J£:} IA/ould probnhlv 
result." 
The philosophv and policy underlying the amendment ha\;e strength-
ened the position of assignees and holders of bills of lading in Aus-
tralia. Under the 1971 Act (U.K.) an intBresting distinction is made 
betl.veen intentional or reckless damage caused by the carl'ir~r and 
that attributed to his servants or agents.17 Examples of the former 
14. The pr·oviso is clearlv intended to give effr:Jct to the prin-
ciple lair! down tw courts in dEJtermining when a container 
is not to bt~ treated as a packago; soe also [Annonvrnousl 
"The Hague-Vi~3bV Rules nmM opBrative in United Ktn~Jdom" 
[1977] 4 L.M.L;.L..Q. 512. 
15. Unless, of course, the contcJiner tlelon~JS to, or has tJmm 
suppliGd to a shipper or com>ignor bv tho shipowner at3 
under the Full Container Load svstem. 
16. Statut.orv Instrumnnt No. 1(]L,l, of 1977. 
17. Article IV rule 5 (ill. and 1-\rticle IV BJ _9, rule '~. Carriage of 
Goods b~ Sea Act 1971 (U.K.). 
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would probably includr~ physical caruo damage or financial loss caus-
ed by on-df:}Ck carriage, dE!lay in ~3ailinrJ or stowage in a hold known 
to the carrier of the cargo to be uncargowol'ttw, where these acts 
or opr~rations are done on the carrier's instructions. ltlhBre the 
carrier is a body corpnrate, the instructions must have come from 
some fairly seninr person as the alter ego of the company, e.g. Um 
managing director or sorne one charged with tt1e authority. It. app-
ears that tile claimant has the onus of proving the elements required. 
Thus in such circumstances, the compensation recoverable by the 
plaintiff as bill of lading holdm· in an admiralty action in rem, under 
section 6 of the f\dmiralty Court Act 1861 (Imp.),if:i not subject to the 
limitation of liability. It is submittf-Jd that a similar right would be 
~JXBrcisablr'! under ArticlE! VIII rule 1 of the Hamburg Rules, if thov 
are given statutory effect and applicable to the contract of carr-
iage. 
(3). The "agreed adjustments" concept is ah:;o consistent 1111ith 
the prm1iso to the first parauraph in Ar·ticln I\/ rulf~ 5 of thH HagUE! 
Rules. ltlhere before shipmont the nature ond value D F the goods are 
declared and inserted in the bill of ladin~J. a plaintiff in an admiralty 
action in ~may recm1er full, and not just ttl!] limitud "pnr pack-
ane", compcmsation. A highm cargo valuation is only binding on the 
carrir:w or the ship if the document containing the particulars is 
accepted by the carrinr. Tt1is is done when the master of the ~~t1ip 
or a shipping agent signs the document and h-;sues it to the shipper. 
Paranrapt1 thrmJ of Article IV rule 5 rernodies a situation, 
possibly with nJtrospt~cUvity, 1111here the pm-shipment conditions, if 
any, are not satisfied, or tt1e hiuher valuatinn stipulated is incmT-
ect or too low. It is ntl\/erthele~1s open to the shipper and the carr-
ier or his agent, by agrcmment, to fix "another maximum amount" pro-
vided it is not h=Jss than that permitted bv thE~ Ha~]ue F~ules.18 
The liability of the carrying \/e~__:;sel to pay rJama~JF.~s bByonc1 the 
18. For pro\/isiorm IAihich st.r·ike do1111n agrm'!mcmts aimed at rmi-
ucin[~ tim ~:;hip's or carl'ior1!3 liability IJelow Lht:J statutory 
limit, seB Article III r·ule 8. 
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"per package" compensation is sutJject to two exceptions. The vess-
el will be full\,>' cJischarged From liabili tv f'or arw cnrt=JD loss or damaw'! 
if the nature or value of the car~N hus ber:!rl knowinglv mi~:;stat~:~d bv 
the shipper in tho bill of lading. Usuall \f bills of lading stipulating 
a higher cargo valuation entail thr:! pavment of irlcreasl::Jd freiq!lt. A 
similar pro\/ision is found in Article 6 l~ule h of the Hamburg Rules. 
(4). The distinction bet\!li£""en common ami private CL-1rriers is 
d t . . T' [~ l' h H 'd 19 rawn JV D1xon, J., m )ames \J. 1 ne _,mnrnomvea t . e sal : 
"The rmlding out or profession of the ch<Jracter of comm-
on carrier mav tJe expr·essr:Jd. or it mew be, and usuallv is, 
implied bv a courst_~ of business or other conduct. It is 
in everv case a quEJstion of fact ~\illr"ther the character 
of a common carrier has been assumed ... If, in~1tead of in-
\iiting all persons without discrimination to usP his ships 
or vehiclPs, he reservr:!s thP right of choosing among them, 
independently of the suitabilitv of thPil' goods for his 
mt_~ans of transpurtation Emd ~lithout rPgard to the room 
or spacE! he has availatJle, then he is not a common can+· 
Pr. II 
Contracts of carriage governt:!cJ bv thP Hague f~ules are ~>ubject to 
an overritjin~l con~mquenc~.?. Ir1 tllE-3 f?\/f.mt of an unju~:;tifiPd cJeviation, 
the carriee is relegat:ed to the position of a common careier and in-
surPL Apart from the common law t:)XCeptions, EJ.~J. act of c;od, 
Queen's enmnies and inherent vice in tho qoorl:3, he cc-:~nnut take ad-
. . . - ?0 
vantage rJf the 1rnmumt1es undm· thE' Hac:~ue Ru lF)S. This means that, 
in respect of tim loss or darnagR sustainerj, t:e i~3 not entitlBd to 
limit his liabilitv under Article l\1 !'ule l). TI1H decision in Encvclop-
_aedia Britannica Inc. v. TIIEo "Honq f'\ong Prociucel~ 11 and Universal ~1ar­
ine c:orpn~ 1 furnishes an illustr;::1tion. T11e Unitf:Jd States Court of 
Appeals held that an unauthorised stowage of cuntainers on deck 
constituted an unjustified deviation. Consequentlv, the shipper was 
a\!llarded the full amount of damagps sustained. 
In tht_~ High Court case uf F. K<mPmatsu & Co. Ltd. v. Hm Sr1ip 
"Shahzada"22 the hides, shippf:od ur1dE-JI' two bills of lading subject to thR 
19. (1939) 62 C.L.R. 339, page 368. 
20. It is queslionable ~1hethPr, in thf~ light of the widc_:llv-worded 
provision in Article III rult_~ 6 (i.e. ''rn am; rNent...~=Jhr~uld ha\/e 
been delivered"), a carriee can reh; on the om~-vem· lirnit,-
ation period. As to justifiable deviatior1~1, ciee f-\rticle IV rulP 
4. 
21. [1%9] 2 Uovd's RPp. 538. 
Z2~ (1956) 3G-/\.L.J. L,7H, whc~rr=J thP High Court Si]t as a Colonial 
Court of Alimiraltv. 
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SE~a -Carriage oF C]oods J\ct 192!~ (Comth.) wen~ carried on deck and 
damaged bv l'llater. It was not disputed that the unauthorised on-
deck cacriage constitutec1 a dmtiation. In the admiraltv action ill_ 
rem, it \Alas ablv argued on behalf of the plaintiff cargo OIAJner that -
nTh at breach ... er:ti t1t-:d it to rE~scind the contracts of 
carriage as from the time of the breach ... and thereupon 
left the rights and liabilities of the par·ties to be deter-
mined as if the plaintiff's goods had ~n in the hands of 
thEJ shipowner as a common carrier. ... "-
Tavlor J. 's judgment shows that t:J1e principles which impose strict 
liabilitv on common carriers is part of Australian lmJ\1. HowPver, the 
action was dismissed on the ground that the case fell outside 
section 6 of the Admiraltv Court Act 1861 (Imp.). 
It is submitted that a carrier's right to limit his liabilitv is 
abrogated in a number of other· situations. These include smious 
delav in pBrforrnin~] the IJOI)age~4 voluntarv departure from the can-
t t t 
25 k. h. t 26 d f 'l d l" . ~ rae rou e, t.a lrlSl a s 1p on .mJ\1 <:m wrong Ut y e l vermg tJ 1e 
goods carried to a person who cannot produce the proper documents 
of title~7 The term "deviation'' \Alas considered by Windeyer, J. in 
Thomas 1\lational Transpmt (ME!ltmume) Ptv. Lt.Q. v. Mav and f3aker 
0-'\ust.) Pty. Ltd~8 He held that it has come to mean departures not 
onlv from a caLTier's geogl'aphical route, but also other radical 
breaches of t1is contract. 
23. Ibid., p. l181. 
24. Brar1dt v. Liverpool, [3rmil and River Plate ~3. N. c:o. [1924] 
1 K.B. 575, at p. 601, tJill' Aitkin, L.J.; p. 592, eN Bankes, L.J.; 
Verren v. 1-\nglo-Dutch Brick Co. (192l.) 3i~ Ll. L.R. 210, p. 212, 
l2ill' Scrutton, L.J. 
25. Rio rinto Co. v. Seed Shipping Co. (1926) 24 Ll. L.R. 316. 
26. Scarr:Jrnanga v. Stamp (1880) 5 C.f-l.D. 295, p. 299, per Cock·-
burn, C.J. 
D. Kum an? J\nothE~r v. Wah Tat Bank Ltd. and Another [1971] 
1 Uov~ s r~ep. 439. The Privy Council held that delivery of 
flOCJd:i ~n such circumstances amounted to z~ conversion bv 
the shipown.~r. 1n ?ze Hai _Tong Bank v. Rambler Cvcle Co. 
[195~], 3 /\~l t::.R. 182, the P:'lVV L:ouncil lleld that; deli\/erv of 
~ooos. to_ d person ~ho f_ml~d to produce the bill of lading 
constituted a quast-clmllatmn. 
2fJ. '•0 A.L.J.R. H39. 
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1~ recent decision of the Canadian Exchf~qum' Court in Club 
Coffef] Co. L tci. \J. f':loorr~-1"1cCmmack LinEJS, Inc~9 if followed in Aus-
tralia, t~lill prm;ide a new basis for increasing the liability of the ship 
or carriee beyond the limit imposed bv Aeticle IV rule '). Under a 
bill of lading, purportedly subject to the _carriaqe of Goods Act 
1936 (U.S.), the plaintiff had on board the Moemach;le 250 bags of 
coffee foe delivery at Montreal. The plaintiff was obliged under the 
Canadian customs legislation to pay duty on the goods shipped into 
Canada even though they were not delivered. Thev were ~:;hort deliv-
ered to the extent of ninety-two bags. Thurlow, J., gave judgement 
for the plaintiff against the carriers for the cost of non-delivered 
goods, insurance and freight, as well as the customs duty paid 
thereon~0 
Although in cases of unjustified deviation or quasi -deviation 
the ship may be liable for loss or damage beyond the "per package" 
cw "per unit'' amount, the shipowner or the carrier may limit his 
liability under the Nmlig_ation Act 1912-73 (Comth.). :)ection 10 (1) 
of the Sea-Carriage of Goods Act 1921~-1973 reads: 
"Nothing in this Act shall affect ... the op~:~ra tion of' any 
other Act for the time being in forcE? lirniting the liabil-
ity of the owner of sea-going vessels." 
We shall, in due course, look at the circumstances where as a result 
of actual fault or privity on the paL't of shipm~mers Dl' cl1arterers, 
which caused the loss or damage, tile statutory protection under the 
Navigation Amendment Act 1979 (C:omth.) is unavailatJle. It is not en-
tirely clear as to when a deviation will be held to constitute actual 
fault or privity. This issue is particularly irnportc:mt where an action 
in ~n is instituted against the ship. 
29. [1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep. '103. In TilE' "Citv of Colombo" [1978] 
2 Lloyd's Rep. 587, the plaintiff tlill of lading holder paid 
customs duty on fifty tlales of merchandise, of which only 
~Jixteen ~Amre delivered. He obtairmd judgment against thEJ 
defendant carriers in rPspect of the customs duty paid on 
the missing bales. The decision of the trial court was unan-
imously upheld by the~ Canadian Federal Court of Appeal. 
30. It is relevant to mention that under the "Gold Clause J\gree-
rnent" (British Maritime Association Agreement of 1st August, 
1950) shipowners' liability was limited to £2rJL1 (stnrling) per 
package or unit. As a rr"sult of the amendment made on 1st 
July, 1977, the amount has been raisecl to £400 (sterling) 
Per packa~~e or unit. But it is inapplicable to cmv bill of 
lading contmct subject to the Brus~>Pls Protocol 1968. 
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III. POLLUTION OF WATERS BY OIL 
It will be recalled that strict liability is imposed by State 
anrj Commonwealth legislation on shipDwners and, in some cases, on 
ships' masters for pollutiDn by oil. Except where the statutory imm-
unities are successfully invoked, few shipm111ners and masters have 
the financial capacity of CDpin[~ with the consequences of a major 
oil spill. The International ConvBntiDn on Civil Liability for Llil Poll-
ution Damar,)e 1969, \JIIhich impose~J no-fault liability, is the first Con-
\mntion to limit the liability of m111ners of oil-carT\/irlD ships. From 
the comparative vievJpoint, the Merchant Shipeing (Oil Pollution) f\ct 
1971 (U.K.) has incorporated into the law of th1::1 UniLF!d f'\ingdom many 
prmlisions of the 1969 Convention. It was not until the yr~ar·s 1972 
to 1973 that the State Parliaments of New South llJales, QuBensland, 
South Australia and Victoria gave effect to thB kBrnel provisions 
of the Convention.31 It was only on 5th February, 1984~2 that the 
.Protection of the Sea u::;b,Lil Liability) Act 1981 (ComttL), to 1~1hich the 
Convention is schedulnd, carne into operation. In Tasmania and Ltles-
tern Australia, the anomaly remains that there ls no State lE~uislation 
to limit the liability of shipowners for pollution damage. It appears 
tt1at the difficulty is removed Lw section 7 (1) of tho 1981 /\ct 
(Comth.). Part II will apply to trading ships procemJinD on any inter-
State voya~]e or Au~:itral ian fi~3hing \/essels prncm:Jrlin~J on a nnn-m;-
erseas \Joyage~:~ The rBascm is that in these two States Part II is 
operative to the extent that State law has not given effE!Ct to the 
appliBd PI'mrisions of the 1969 Comnmtion. 
1. State Enactments 
The Prevention of Oil Pollution of Navigable L1Jaters Act 196D 
(N.S.W.), as arnended;4 applies to the waters 1111it.hin the jur·isdicticm , 
any part of the coast and any reef of Ne1111 South Wales. It confBrs 
protection by limiting the liability of thE~ tanker where the discharge 
31. See Chapter Fh;e. 
32. Proclamation in Cornmon1111nalth of Australia GamttEJ No. s. 
31, 1st FEJbruary, '198/L 
33. See s. 7 (11). 
3l,. By Pm\Jf.mtinn nf Oil Pollution nf NavigablE! ltlaters {Arrmnd-
ment) Act 197.3 (1\l.S.W.). 
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of oil or mixture containlnD oil clid Jlot occur as a result of the ac-
tual fault or privity of the ov..inor.35 In tL'3rrns of the expenses or 
other liabilities incurred by the Maritime Services Boarc1 in prt:!vent-
ing, reducing or removing pollution damasJe, the maximum liability of 
a tanker is limited. Under section 7E (5), the maximum amount recov-
erable in respect of a singlEJ incirJent is either $12,600,000 or calcu-
lated by multiplying $'120 by the tanker's tonnage factor. 
The liability limit also applies to <:1 person's claim where prop-
ertv loss or damage is caused biJ a ~;imilar discharge from a ship, 
including expenses incurred to prevent or mitigate tt1e loss or dam-
age:6 This benefit avails even though the discharge is the result 
of the actual fault or privity of the shipm'liners or come from 
two or more ships~7 Unlike the Maritime Services Board?8 a person 
seeking to recm/E:I' compensation and ttle r,:xpenses incurr't:Jd is not 
entitled to a charge on)and detain,the ship or ships, 
In most respects, the PDiluticm of !llaturs tJV Oil Act 1973 (Qld.) 
corresponds to its New South Walo~; counterpart. But there are a 
number of important differences. section 25, expenses or liabil-
ities incurred by the Crown or ;:Jny Pf:H'Sllfl in pr'evEmting or mitigat-
ing the consequences of a disct1ai'gr~ from a tanker and the loss or 
damage sustained are recoverable. lh<:: limitation of liability has no 
application unless the expenses o !' prevmJti\Je measures taken and/ 
or the loss or damage sustaim~d have resulted from an incident which 
occurred without the actual fault or privity of the Ol'liner. On proof 
of absence of actual fault or privity, ttle master of a tanker, when 
sued, is also entitled to the PI'Otection~ 9 The 'v'\JOrds "for tile purp-
oses of anv action apart from this Act11 in ~;ection 30, 'vvhich limit the 
liabilitiJ in relation to a tanker or ship, semn to uxtend to pollution-
damage claims based on maritime and common lc.1w principlf!S. 
35. Ibid., s. 7E (3). 
36. Ibid., s. 8/\ (1). 
37. Ibid., s. BA (3). 
38. For Board's statutor'v powers, see s. 7E (3). 
39. 1973 r"ct, :=;s. 24 (3) and 30 (1). 
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SE!Ction ?7 of tho !\JavigatJlo lliatf~rs (Dil Poliution) /\ct (Vic.)~0 
applies only to the escapn of oil from a r:,hip carrying oil in bulk as 
cargo. TtlE1 owners are liable for (i) any F.D<PEmses or liabilities in--
d h . . . l- k' t. 111 '") J curTe by t r~ i"lmister m •~a 1nq proven .. l\19 measun~s. ~u c amage 
caused to the erl\!ironment or a Sti:lt.e resource by rE'ason of contam-
ination, and (iii) an1; loss or damag~} duo to contamination suffered 
by a person. It is inadequate in that no provit1ion is made to auth-
orise private property mvners to take pn'lventive measur8s and to 
recover the costs incurred. In the absence of actual fault or priv-
ity of tt1e shipowners~2 the maximum amount recoverable in respect 
of a single incident is the same as in the other two States. 
The South Australian legislation43 follows a different philoso-
phy "vitrl regar·d to the limitation of liability. Section 7cl (3) provides 
for the same liability limit. It will only E>pplv in respect of costs or 
E!xpenses incurred by the !V1inistm· t\Jhere the discharge of oil from a 
ship carrying oil in bulk as cargo l..Jas "wholly causPd bv the neglif:J-
ence of some other person." 
2. Commom.vF.!alth Legi~ilutlcm 
LLJe shaH look at tt1e limitc:Jtion uf liability under th£1 Protec-
tion of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 198'1 (Cornth.). Section 8 (1) spec-
ifies tllose provisions of the 1969 Convention IAJhict1 lla\/e thP forcu 
of lmv as part of the Commonwealth law. f\ltrmugh paragf'aph 1 of 
Article l of U1e 1969 Convention confines its application to ships 
actualll} "carrying oil bulk as cargo11 , FJart II of tllr~ l\ct has a IAJtde 
scope. Subject to section 7 (1), Part II does not apply to a trading 
ship proceeding on an intra-State voyage and an Australian fishing 
vessel proceeding on a non-overseas voyage. Apart from certain ex-
ceptions, the Act is applicable to all ships, whether Australian or for~ 
elgn. Express pro11isions 2re mnde to covEJr Em e~3cap£~ or disctmrge 
40. No. 6705 Df 1960, a~; amended tw 1\j;:wigc:1ble lJJat8rs (Clil !3 ollu-
tion) (!\rnendment) Act (Vic.) of 1972 and 197r). 
41. Unless tilB preventivE~ mBa~;ures an~ t.:]kE'm or !:!xpensps 
incurred by the ''appmpriate authority11 dt!finE!d in s. t1 (1), 
or bv Um Mini~1tBr or em l1is orcJers, therp is no ri~)ht of re-
courso or recovE!ry under thn Victoi'ian /\ct 196(1. 
42. Act 1960 (Vic.). s. 27 (3) and (5). 
1!3. Pre\/ent.ion of Pollution of LLJaters by Oil Act 1961-1975 (S.A.), 
as amended by Pl'evention of Pollution of Waters by Oil Act 
Amendment Act (SA.) (No. 21~ of 1979). 
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of oil immlving tiA;o or more oil-carrying ships ~vhere one or more of them. 
arE~ on an intra-State voyaqe amj the othE!r ship or ships are on an 
inter-State or O\Jers~3as voyage. 44 By /\n:Jcle IV of the 1969 ComJen-
tion, \1\/here pollution damage is caused, unless exonerated under .i;r-
ticle JII, the O\JIIners of the ships involved will be jointly and SE?ver-
ally liable for all the damage that i~> not reasonably separable. 
Paragraph 6 of Article f ghiE'!S tnrm npollution damagf31' a 
broad meaninq. IL means loss or damage caused outside the ship by 
contamination resulting from the oscape or di~>chargB of oil from the 
ship, including the costs of preventive mnasuros and further loss or 
damage caused by preventivo rmmsures. Ttlt:J issue as to l111hetller 
the escape or discharge was the result of the "actual fault or priv-
't 11 f' th h' . . 145 Wh th . 'd t d 'tt 1 ,y o e s 1powner 1s cruc1a . · erE~ - e tnc1. en occurre w1 -,_ 
out his actual fault or privity, he is entitlBd to limit his liabilitv in 
respect of any one incident to an aggregate amount cf 2,GOO francs 
for each ton of the ship':j tormaqe. The maximum amount recoverable 
does not exceed 210 million fr·ancsr; 6 Hm ~3t:ututory rwotPction is 
conditional upon the shipowner' df:;po~iiting IAJlt,h Lhe couf't of a Con-
tracting State, where the actiofl is bmugh l.) an acJequatB limitation 
'' fund or a bank guarantBe acceptable to tho cuurt~' 1 
ft IN'ill be recalled that wide-ranqin~J ui~:;cretionarv powers are 
vested in the i"'linister bv tht? ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
ti'lkEl fTlf!8SUI'f~S 
Convention to pmvent pollution uf the Sl"!a by oil t~S Lmd (ii) otherwise 
than under the 1969 Convention or the Protocol to prevent similar 
11 . b 'lh9 po utron · y m . Undt=.:r Part IV of the 
il Uabilitv) /\ct 1981 (Comth lvhere E?xpt:msE!S m· other liatJ.ilities are 
4h. See ProtectiDn of ti-m :18El rcivil LiaiJilit\;) Act F:J81 (C:omth.), 
s. 7 (2). 
L.S. The question a~j to l•Jho has the lH.trdEm of proof will be con-
sidf:.Jf'Bd srmrtlv. 
t,6. As to the convr!rsion of francs into national currency, 
see infra. 
L,7. SctJBdule L /\rticle V rule 2. S8e EJl~1o /Ul.E. PClpp, ''Liability 
and Compunsation fm Pollution Damage causEld bv Ships f~ev­
isited - f~epOI't on an InternaLiorH::ll Conference" [19W:il 1 L. 
M.C.L.Q. 118. 
Ml. Seu s. 8. 
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incurred in BXRtcising the POIIIIPI'~\ Diven, thl~\) CDm1tiLUtC:J 8 delJt due 
to the Commonwealth by the mMrler nf the ~jhip involved. 
In respect of expE!nstc~s oe other liabilities incurrerJ in relation 
to two or more ships 1 thr~ Ohlnm·s Df thB ships are jointly and se\ter-
allv liable~0 The ~\c t does not apportion Uabili tv according to the 
quantity of oil clischargecl from eAch of the ships, even \llitlere the 
pollutants are reasonably separable. It .is grossly unjust to rmld a 
shipowner solely liable for all expensGJS .incurrEJd in the preventive 
measures taken on the ground that a ~;mall part of the oil happem'ld 
to have come from his ship. 
An observation should be made by r·eference to the Internat-
ional Convention for the Unification of Cr~rtain Rules with respect 
to Collision 1910. This deals ~'liitr1 the clivi::;ion loss according to 
the degree of fault. The provisions of Convention, to which ef-
fect has been gi\/en by the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comtt1.) 51 and the 
cz 
legislation of three States;)· onlv app!v to loss or damage resultirtg 
from collision and not l'rum oit pollution. Consequently, umler Part 
IV of the 1981 1'\ct (Comth.) a stlipowmH' can be compelled to pay in 
full the expEmses or liabilities inctHTPd in taking the pr8\/Drltive mea-
sures. In respect of any arnmmt pC:lid in r:xcoss, it app~3ars that t1e 
is not entitled undm· the Commomvenith nr ~itatr~ le~:li~;lation to rr~­
cover any contribution from the other shipo~Atner, who was also at 
fault. There! ~H:?ums to be a qap in LhP >1981 Act (Comth.) whkh should 
be rectified. 
In respect of the ~"JXpfmm=:s cw Jiabilitir!s lncurred by the l'-1inis-
ter under tile Pmtection of l.hr.4 ,fina (f 1 m\JB['S of rntenmntion) ActJ981 
(Cornth.), the shipowner ls protectmL .l:ly S(c:!Ctiun 20 t3) of the ;.....:;...;:::.,.:;:,;.;::..:;;:_ 
tion of the Sea {Civil Li<:1bilit.y) i\ct '1981 (Comtn.), 1n trm absence of 
~ 
actual fault or prh;ity orl thE! part of the shipowner, llis lisbllitv in 
respect of an incident is limited. lt is oqual to (i) tho product of 
the \/alue of 133 special drawing rights ami Lrlt:? tonnoge factor app-
licable to the ship; or (ii) thE' value uf fomUJf?n million sppcial cJrawing 
50. Erotection of t:hc~ Sea (f::i\Jil Uatlilitv) Act 1981 (Comth.), 
SchcnjuJe I, i\rticlr:! IV. 
51. l~laviqation Act 1912-73 (Cornth.), :;:>. ;?')9-263 and s. 396. 
52. i\Jamelv, \/ictnrir:l (Supnc!rne Court f\cL l()')B, ~i. 6L1), We~;ten1 
Australia (Suprerm~ Cour·t i\ct 193'i- 1979, :>. 26) and ~!nuth 
Australia (fhJPl'enn:! Court Act 1935-1 · s. 111). 
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rights, wh1chevc~r IS the le~\~'ler. 1 he 
defined by reference to the meaning of 
rlrawing rights are 
term as used in section 
3 {1) of the ';.!.!.!::.::...:...;~~~...:...:.::!.!..!.:;~~...:....:;:;.;:.:;..;;;;~.:;;:.;...;..=-.:...=.o:. 1947-73 (Comth.). 
3. Non-delegable Obligations 
Anti -pollution lElgislaticm passecl by State and Commonwealth 
Parliaments has adopted the maritime law concept of "actual fault 
• • II --1' , ' h b t t f 54 or pr1v1ty to u1stmgu1s etween l\10 ·ypes o consequencos. 
legislative policy is that, w11ile a shipowner cannot be held wholly 
responsible fm· the acts or negligence of his Dmployees, he is bound 
to make full compensation for any loss or damage due to his actua1 
rJefault or nerJlc~ct. The use of this concept indicatDs the Parlia-
ments' intention to impose certain duties on shipowners in their per-
sonal capacity. In Asiatic Petroleum Company Ltd. v. Lennard'~.J 
CEJrnJing Comp;=mv Ltd., Ruckley, L.J., referred to the natuee and 
.breach of such 1juties as follmvs:IJS 
"The words fnult or privitv' in rny judgment infE~r 
somethinq to the owner, something blameworthy 
in him ... If tt1e mvner be guilt.v of an act omission to do 
something l'llr1ich he ougr:t to l1avr:: dom], he is rm lEJss 
guilty of an '<lctual faule than if the act had been one 
of commission ... It is not neces~klry tu sllm'IJ knowledge. If 
he has means of knowlE>dge whid1 he ought to ha\le used 
and clm'ls not avail himself of them his ornis::Jirm so to do 
may be a fault, and, if so, it is an actual fault and he 
cannot claim the protection of the 11 
[t submitted that the CH'Cumstances in which the duties ari:cm 
are closely related to meaning of "incident". One shortcom-
ing of the anit-pollution tion is the absence of a prm;ision 
53. ~let:~ Protection of the ~3ea CCtvil Liability) Regulations 1983, 
para. 11. /\s to the ad\;antages of tr1is mE:~thod of convert-
ing francs into /\ustralian dollE.trs, seB ""1onetarv Aspects", 
:nfra. 
5l,. However, in the of an authoritati\/e decision it is 
uncertain l.Jhether thl'l pollution damage claimant has the 
onus of proof. reason is that a shipownor's right to 
limit liability in Scht>.dule I, ArticlP V rulB I lliJ.t. expressed 
to be subject to proof of ab~;ence uf actual fault or priv-
ity. If ttm claimant fl<]S to discharfJB the burden of pmof, 
it will place on him a virtually impossible task. f\nowl&Jdge 
uf huw a marine ty occurs i:J generally confined to the 
shipowner. The decision in The "f\rmJco r::<:JcJiz" [1984] 2 UovcJ'~.; 
Rep. 304, which concerns pollution damage in French territ-
miEJl waters, is not helpful. As the ca::m t~1as heard in the 
United Stat8fj, whictl at the rnatt:-:risl tlmo had not adopted 
the Internation Con\lention on Civil Liability for !Jil Pollu-
tion 195'9, theJ issutJ as to thG burdm1 of proof considered 
t~~Jas not relevant. 
55. (191'•] 1 K.B. 419, p. 432 (English Court of Appeal). 
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vvhich gives a comprehensive definition of this key 11110rd. It is un-
clear wllet.ller, for tile limitation of liability to apply, the incident 
tlllhich results ln the discharge must fall 1.11Jithin the navigation or man-
agement of the ship, or can come witf1in any part of the ship's oper-
ations. fhe incident may occur during berthing, pilotage, tranship-
ment, loading. or discharge of goods. 
The narrow \Jiew that a shipowner c<3r1 only limit his liability 
where the incident is related to the ship's rwvigation or management 
affords IAJider protection to marine environment and the interests of 
third parties~6 One gravE~ economic disadvantc:lge is that the unreas-
onably harsh responsibility and the risk of unlimited liability thrust 
upon a shipowner will have to be covered by third-party liability in-
surance. The expensive premiums payable will be passed on to ship-
pers, consignees and oil consumers. 
There are a numbt=]r of reasons why a broad viet~v is preferred 
and should be the correct approach. State anti-pollution enact-
ments prevent the discharge of oil and mixtures containing oil by 
making it obligatory for every ir1tra-State ~3hip to be fitted with cer-
tain equipment and to comply with the requirements prescribed.57 
The extensive obligations imposed by [ommomveLJlth legislation to 
prevent pollution by oil are of two types. First. there are specific 
requirements to be met under thE.~ Protection of the Sea (Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships) Act (Comth.).58 They include the special sur-
veys for oil tankers and ships in excc~ss of cef'tain gross tonnage, 
provision of oil di~;charge monitoring and control system, installation 
of oily-water separating equipment, and tile pumpin~J. piping and dis-
charge arrangements as providt:)d.59 Second, Following upon a maritime 
casualty or acts relateci thereto, as part of the measure to prevent 
m reduce the danger, the r'1inistor may issue din3ctions to the owner 
or master of the ship concerned. The directions may render it oblig-
atory for some act or thing to be done in !'elation to the ship or ller 
56. Cf. Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Cornth.), 
Schedule 1, Article V. 
57. See e.ij. Prevention of Pollution of Waters by Oil Act 1961 
(S.A.), ss. 8 and 9; Prevention of Oil Pollution of Navigable 
Waters Act 1960 (N.S.W.), ss. 8 and 9; Prevention of Pollution 
of LtJaters by Oil Act 1960 (W.A.), ss. 8 and 9; Navigable Watf~rs 
(Oil Pollution) Act 1960 (Vic.), ss. 9 and 10: Pollution of Waters 
by LJil ACt 1973 (l~ld.), ss. 32 and 33. 
58. No. 41 of 1983. 
59. ~3clledule 1 (Annex 1) chapter 1, regulation '~. chapter 2 regula-
tion~3 16 and 18, etc. 
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cargo, or prohibit t11e cioing of am; ~:;ud1 act or thin~J~O It is 5ub-
rnitled that such rr~quirenmnts, both in tnrrns of technical r:Jquipments 
and dirm;tion~> to be cornplifJd with, are irnposr~d b1,1 legislation on the 
shipo\,vnm' in his personal capaci tv. If the n~asoning i~> correct, it 
means that the ne~'\J obligations EU'e in addition to thosE dutir:~s which 
have lon~J be£-Jn recognised lw maritime lcll!li as pr'Jrsonal to the :.;hip-
owner. fn dE:termining the issuE! as to a shipowner's actual fault or 
privity under ~)tate and Commonwealth lenislation, regard should bo 
gi\/en to the qur~~>tion ~\Jilethee ttm incident has I'esulted from a 
IJreach of anv of those maritime la1t11 cjuties and mandaton; n~quire-
ments. 
Part IV of the ProtRction of thE' SE~a (Civil Liabilit~) 1\.ct 1981 
(Comth.) is largely concerned IAJith the recovery against tho shipowner 
oF EJxpenses or other liabilities incurred by ttm i"1i.nister in taking 
prevPnthm measures. Take the case of an oil tanker invol\/r::d in a 
maritlrne casualty where the incic]ent does not come within any uf the 
exceptions in soction 20 (Z), ancl 'v\lflE~re pollution damage is bound to 
t I S t~ . . t . . d. t. 61 ' ' t th h' E!ven -ua :e. up pose .1e nnms ;ena1 u·ec .tons 15SUfm o e s lP-
owner or ma~;ter are disn~garcJed and widespread pollution damage 
occurs. It appears that undt=!r S!~ction 20 (3), the shipowner ~vould be 
unable to limit hic1 llabill tv. This dh3onti tlmnent - it is submitted -
should nut pn~ver1t t1im from t;:Jking aLivantage of othf~I' prmiisions. if 
applicable, which limit his lia!Jilitv. The pmvisions in Pal:'t II of the 
Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) i\ct 1981 (Comth.) and, 1r1hero the 
pollution damage is actionable at common law, the pmvisions of Part 
VIII of the Na\/igation f\ct 1912-73 (Cornth.~P2 rnav I:Je applicable 63 
There mav be situations l'..'here a non-nil carrying shirJ can rJPn-
efit from the limitation of Eat)ility. Suppose that, n~i a result oF i.l 
collision for which a tanker and a sl1ip aro equally to tJlame, oil 
escapes fmm the former. Umh::n' ttu~ --~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
60r Protection of tht! SPiJ (PoiAit:lrs of IntEJf'\Hmtion) /\ct. '1981 
(Cornth.), ss. a, 9 ancJ 10. 
61. Ibid .. s. 11. 
62. Ibid., 20 (6) prm;ides thnt s. 20 will not "affect thr~ opera-
tion of Part \/III of the Navluation /\ct 1912 (Comth.)", v.Jhicrl 
is deemed to include thP. arn~::mdments. 
6). For position in the United Kingdom, see i.o..f.J.:.f1 
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Liability) J\ct '1981, the tanker Ollliner l.vill be answorable for Hm entire 
pollution damagfJ. Where the incident occurs 1/\li thout the owner's ac-
tual fault or privity, im is entitlE~d to limit. his liability under para-
graphs 1 and 2 Df /\rtic:le \/ of the 1969 Convention. The tankfJr own-
' . h f 64 I t . d . t. . er s ng t o recourse, w 1et 1er exercise m an ac wn 1n rem 
against the ship or 1£l personam i3gainst the ~;hipowner, should E!xtend 
to mcovering half the amount paid under thE~ 1981 (Comt.h.). 
It appE~ars that th£;) omount payablE'.! in contribution may be fur-
ther reduced if t!l8 ship is of lm.v tonnage and her OIAiner is able to 
limit his liability undm' Part \/HI of the Navi~Jation i\ct 1912-73 
(Comth.). 
The \/\lording of Article 1 (b) of the 1957 Convention, givFm the 
force of law in Part VIII. appears wide enough to cover pollution darn-
age which is actionable at common la\,\1, It is doubtful whether, under 
maritime la\i\1, the expenses of prevcmtive rnecJsu>es and clean-up 
costs incurred by third parties can be reCO\iBr'ed against the t~;rong­
doing ship. Anott1er issue is whether such expenses and costs, whicl1 
may be very substantial, if recoverable, are subject to the limita-
tion of liability as provided by Article 1 (b). Leqi~3lation is urgently 
needed to clarify the position. 
On the other hand, the United Kingdom Parliament has adopted 
a realistic r:Jpproach. Section 15 of l':he l''lerchant Shipping (Clil Poll-
ution) .Act 1971 (U.K.) has clused a C1CJP in the law. It applies where 
the pollution damage caused and trm measures takon are not within 
section 1, I.e. not covBred tJy thEJ International Conventlon on Cil!il 
Liability fm' Dil Pollution Oamago 1969~ri The c~o~1ts of measures "rea-
sonably taken" for tile purpose of pnNnntinq or rmlucing pollution 
damaqe in thfJ United Kingdom ure l'PCO\IGI'CJtJle. The ~ita tutcrv indem-
nity provided is fairly wide. It oxwnds to the costs of such measures 
61,, i\rticle III para. 5. 
65. Its prm;isions are giv~m thB force of law in the United 
Kingdom by fVIerchant Shipping (ClU Pollution) Act 1971 (U.K.). 
i1,s to chansl8s in the laiAI on limitation of liubilit.v, sf~e Mar-
sden, Thr~ Law of Collisions at Sea (3ed t:'d. Cum. Supp. to 
11U·l ed. 1973). para. 201.. For claims in l'espE~ct of liability 
incurred under f"lerchant. Shiprlng i\ct FJ71 (U.K.), s. 1, wh!d1 
CJrt) excluded, see Mm·chant Shippin!-J Act. 1979 (U.K.), Sched-
ule '•· Purt II para. '• (1 ). 
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taken bv a pprson not for thE! protection of his interests but 
also in tr1e performance of a dutv?6 
/\nother uncertaintv been rPmm;ecL ~3oction 15 (2) prov] rJed 
that the liabilities or cm;t~3 incurrod ~vuuld be deemed to be damag~Js 
in respect of such loss, rJarnage or n~Jc:rnent flS l>\Jas witt1in the 
meaning Df section 503 (1) (d) uf the f"lerchant Shipping Act 18% (lrnp.). 
Section 15 (2) has bBen amende!j h~; pr:u·aqr:Jpil 6 (?) of SchEdule 5 to 
the Meect1ant Shipping Act 1979 (U.K.). The liatlilities or cost~; incurr-
ed are deermJed to be clairm:; 1.vithin Article :Z (1) of Part I of Schr-:Jd-
ule '• to the 1979 Act (U.K.). 
Further diffp,nmces het~lierm the la"'Js of tho two countries, 
as a result of the passing of thr:: Marchant Shippin~.J ,'\ct 19/9 (U.K.), 
will be considered in due cour~>o. 
IV. IMPERIAL LEGISLATION TILL 1900 
t:::ommon lmv am! the "qonerHl law rnnrltirne" conferred on 
.1' l' t '1' t p t t· I l•'t f'' . 1 'I t () 7 0Wfl8l'S no limitation Ot" 10 lll V TOl' Of',~). n 'lf~ t,<3[', uCl1f.Hl81l, 
Lore! Stm.Jell saicl: 
"Anciently, the [ship] Ol.!lmecs wPre ~meier tho gener·i::Jl lm>li, 
civilly· an!:lvverable for tiH'! toLiJl ucca~;ium?d by the 
negligtmcr'! or unskilfulm!ss of t,hr~ P<Jrsorl!> U1ev ernploy-
ed."6U 
We hm1e seen that, at common imv, snipmvm::n·~• <J!:i common carriers 
were, apmt from certain excr3ptions, su!Jjr!ct tu a strict Uahili in 
respect of anv loss or damagl! sw:;taim)d the goods .in Lh<~ir charg{"!. 
Although under the Joint Stock Curnpnnius l~f~!JlStrotion and 
Regulation Act 1Sl!4 (Irnp.)~9 thB c:orporaw statuti could LJe attained 
bv having the company's constitution registered, the rnernbers 
did not enjoy the benefit of limitation of liability until thB UmitE!d 
Liabili t\f f\c t 1855 (Irnp]0 \..\Jas . F::vm1 \A;l th tho pas~.ing of 
66. ~0erchant ::ihipping (Dil Pollution) Act 1971 (U.I"\.), s. 15 (1). 
67. Case of [3ritish ves::;el run dm.vn bv Cl ~1wt~dish vessel; 
decided ori 2Uth !\JO\/BrnlJer, 1821; 2 Hagg. /\cL Rep. '186; 3 
Hagg. 186. 
68. Citmj ~vith C:~ppr·oval bv ~1ir W. Page U.Jood, V.C. ir1 \t. 
Dol1ert\{ (1858) 70 E.R. 15t~, p. 158. 
69. 7 & 8 \lie., cc. 110 dnd 111. 
70. 18 P. 19 \Jlc., c. 133. 
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Limited Pai'trlF~rship Act 1907 (ImP. )?1 only the dormant partners are 
protected. Before the LirnitEJd Uabilitv Act lsr'.i5 (Imp.) and th(~ Limitprj 
PartmJrship Act 1907 (U.K.) IAIBre Emactml, ImPl'Jrial legislation had pro 
vided for British ship;3 to be registBrecl in the names of the owners 
or part-owners?2 
In this context, thr3 rt:Jasons for 5tatutory intervention are 
fairly obvious. It fjeerns, howe\Jer, that thE:! concept of limiting the 
liability uf shipowners was first adoptpd bv the British Parliament 
from Holland and other maritime countriel.3 ThFJ prBambles to thr::! 
Responsibility of Shipmvners /\cts (Imp.) 74 highlighted the policy of en-
couraging British merchants to own ships so as to enlarge the 
British merchant fhmt. The Acts also sought to remove from ship-
owners tr1e haunting fears and r.isks of unlimited liability imposed by 
both common law and the general maritime la~n1. Dr. Lushington prob-
abh; had in mimi the British Empire-building strategy when he sair/5 
"The principle of limited liability is that full indemnity, 
the natural right of justice, shall bE~ 8bridged for polit-
ical reasons.'1 
The Responsibility of Shipowners Act 1734 (Imp.), th<~ first in 
the series, came into force on 24th JU118 of that year. t!.lflBI'P any 
gold or precious stones or other goods carried IAJere lost or clarnacJecJ 
due to the embezzlemont or m<Jking away t'llith bv anv crr:Jw, shipoWIIEH'~i 
were protected in certain circumstances under tt1e Act. Or1 
shipowners that the loss or damage occurred without their "privity 
and knowledge", they were not liable beyond the valuEJ of U1e ~-;hip 
with all her appurtenances and the full amount of the Freiqht "due 
or to grow due for and during the \/oyage" concerned. 76 
71. 7 Edw., \III, c. 21 •. For Australian State legislation, see Mercan-
tile Act (Qld.) (No. 36 of 1867); Limited Partnerships Act(t as.) 
(No. 6 of 1908); Limited Partnership Act (WJ\.) (No. 17 of 1909). 
72. See Chapter Four. 
73. Tt1e Dundee (1823) 16G E.R. 39, 44; Cope v. Doherty (1858) 70 
EX 154, p. 158. --
7'•· (1734) 7 Geo. II, c. 15; (1736) 26 Geo. III, c. 86; (1813) 53 Geo. 
III, c. 159. 
75. The Amalia (1863) 8 L. T. (N.S.) 805, p. 807. On appeal to the 
Pri~ Council, the judgment of Dr. Lushington was affirmed: 
ibid., p. 810. 
76. (1734) 7 Geo. II, c. 15, s. 1. 
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The 1734 Act (Imp.) had a narrow compass and only gave relief to 
shipowners wr1ere the loss or damage resulted from fraudulent acts 
or designs of tt1e crew, over which the former had no physical con-
trol. It modified the liability arising under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior and the general maritirnr:? law. nm 1786 t\ct (Imp.) extt:mded 
till'~ valuable pl'otectiml of shipov.Jilers in two v.1ays. Firstly, in thn 
abscmce of privity and knO\tvlec!~lB of thEJ shipmvnoes, it applind irres-
poctive of t>\Jhr~tfmr thE! loss m· damage due to embt:Jzzlernent, making 
awav 1111itr1 or robbery l'l!as committed by the crr-lw or any stranger.77 
SPconclly, section 3 imposed on the shipper of gold, :3il\:er, watcl1es 
and precious stor1es certain conditions to be met at the time of :3hip-
ment. !\Jon-fulfilment of such requirE:Jments would totally exonerate 
the shipo\A!flers or master of the ship from any liabilitv few the loss 
or damage. P1 number of signlf:cant ctlan(Jes to the statutor~; relief 
,,.,;as made by the '1813 .1'\ct (Imp.). They v.JerrJ not all one-Fjided. In the 
Db~ience of fault or privity of tile ~lhipowners, the limited liability 
lA:ould apply IAJhere loss or damage \Alas caused to any goods or other 
thing cari'ied by reason of any act, negJect or omission?8 Shipown-
ors \~Jere thus protected Jn resp('!Ct of loss or damage due to a wider 
range of occunences. In two situation~'· the interest:3 of cargo own-
81'S were regarded as prepomjEJrant. The privilege of limiting liability 
l'l!a~; unavailable to the owners of Gnv lighter, bai'g£:! or vessel used 
solely in rivers or inland navigation, or of any ship not registenKl 
79 
according to law. Section 3 iJddressocl the problems cmated where 
the loss or damage was causE:~d tJy more than om~ separate and dis-
tinct act, neglect or omission, or on more than one occasion during 
the vovage, or after the end of any voyage, and before the comm-
Emcoment of another voya[~e. In re.spect of everv such loss or dam-
agel, compensation was recoverable up to the sc.=nne liability limit 8~> 
if no otller loss or damage had occurred on tllat voyage or at any 
other material time. 
Tile right to limit liabilltv onlv 8\/ailed ~:;hipowrwrs for loss of 
or damage to valuables, e.g. gold and prr:!cious stonE!S, and ordinaf'y 
goods carried on boarcJ. lllhen maritime trade and transportation 
77. 26 Geu. III, c. 86, s. 1. 
J[J. Ceo. III. c. 159, s. 1. 
79. . s-:- 5. 
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became rEJcognised as an important sourcE:1 of wealth, ttle ports, nav-
igable waterways and ocean lanes in manv parts of the ~AJorld ~,Jere 
frequent~ed bv carqo, fishing ancl passen~]er \;essel!-3. Again prior to 
the enactment of the Umited Liability /.\ct 1855 (Imp.) and the Limited 
Partnership Act 1907 (Imp.), shlpo\-vners no protection against 
certain consequencr:Js arising from , collisions at st:la. Thr::JV were 
subject to unli.mited liability for personal injury or dBath negligent-
lv caused to crmv members and other pnrsons, including passengers, 
carded in ship~>. Consistent with its policv of promoting British own-
ership of merchant vessels on an Empire-wicle basis, the British Par-
liament intervened. This ll1d to <::xtEHlded protection being conferred 
under section 504 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (Imp.). In the 
absence of actual fault or pri\/ity of the shipowners, they were not 
liable beyond the statuton; limit where sll or any of the following 
events occurrod, viz.: 
"(1) Where drl\/ loss of li or personal ir1jurv caused to 
am; person cmTit~d in sucll ship; 
(Z) lllhere any damage or I os~3 is caused to any qoods, mer-
chandise, or ot11er U1ir1us wht'lL:JorJver or1 boElrd any 
such ~;hip; 
(3) Where loss of lifr::; or prc!I'S(lllC:Jl injury i~; by rea~3CHl of 
the improper on of such se<J-SJDirlq ~illip as 
aforesaid cau~ierJ to <mv persun carrimi in am; u tr1er 
sr1ip or lJoat: 
(i,) WhC're anv loss or darnage is by reE!son D I' am; ~>Udl 
improper navigaticm of such sea-qoi11q a~; d fom-
said caused to Emy othBr 5hip or boat., or Lu am; goods, 
mBrchandise, or othar things whatsoe\/m, ur1 tJoard any 
other ship. 11 
In respect of 8\Jf~ry such los~; :Jf' life, PPI sonal injury and/or loss of 
or damage to goods arisinu on tc!ach ~;eparatn occa~;ion. rJ plaintiff 
was entitled to reco\/er up tn the statuLor·~, limit:. 
Part JX of t.he ME1 l'Chant :>ilipping r\ct ISLJl) (Imp.], wlrich dealt 
with the limitation of liability of shipo\AHH:>rs, Wd'i ~;tatmJ in sE=:ction 
502 to apply to ti1e wl1olu of H<Jr l'1e:1jestv'~; uurninion:1. Certain gaps 
in section 504 W8re bmuqht to light. Ir1 crmsirJerinq thB t:Jpplication 
of the /\ct (Imp.) to for'f::Jiqn :;tl Dr. Lushingtcm had ~;airJ: 80 
''Tht1 power uf this cnu11try is t.u i~ilntP for Dwn sub-
jects clll 0\Jer the world; and as to f'oreiqrmr~; ~,,J!Ulln its 
jurisdiction, and nD rnore. 11 
80. The Znhmrein (1856) 2 Jur. (i\i.S.) 1,?9, p. 1,29. 
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A similar issue 1./\las raised in v. Doherty. Sir Page Wood, V-C, 
adopted Dr. Lushington's proposition and refused to extend the bene-
fit of section 504 to American shipowners. He said:81 
"Prima facie, therefore, it would not be the true con-
struction of the clause presented for my consideration 
that it is applicable to foreign ships on the high seas -
matters themselves entirely beyond the jurisdiction and 
scope of the Legislature of this country.'' 
Section 504 would apply to collisions between British ships on the high 
seas~2 and also between British ships ancJ foreign ships IAiithin British 
jurisdiction, i.e. within three miles of the coast of Her Majesty's Dom-
inions~3 But~ fell short of protecting British shipowners wl1ere loss 
or damage ~'lias negligently caused by their ships anywhere outside the 
three-mile jurisdiction to a foreign ship, including any person or 
goods carried thereon. The reason was that, without express words 
to that effect, Imperial statutes were not to be construed as depriv-
ing foreign shipowners of their full natural rights again~:;t British or 
other shipowners. 
By parity of reasoning, the section would not m;ail a foreign 
shipowner. This was demonstrated in the case of The "llJild Ranger"~4 
Due to improper navigation, an i\rnerican \Jesse! collided with a Brit-
ish vessel on the high seas. The American shipowners sought to limit 
their liability under the British legislation. Thew ba!cmd their argu-
ment on the doctrine of reciprocity in that under American Jaw re-
lating to collision British shipowners, if placr~d in similar circumstan-
ces, were entitled to the benefit of limited liability. Dr. Lushington 
refused to grant the declaration on the ground that the British Act 
did not apply to owners of foreign vessels on the high ~>eas. 
There was probably c=mother unsaLisfactory a~;pect. Tt has 
been observed that Imperial legislation, which provided the benefit 
of limiting liability, was aimed at increasing the tonnage of British 
81. (1858) /0 E.R. 1SL,, p. 157. 
82. v. Laurie and OU1F!rs (1826) 108 E.R. 'JB. 
83. General Iron ScrE?W Collier Co. v. Schurrnrmns CIB60) 70 E.F( 
712, p. 717, .P..er Sir W.P. Wood, V.C. He gave as <J basis of 
the proposition the c3d\/ancemE!nt of Briti~;h ~:>hipping and 
encouragement of commerce. 
cV~o 7 L.T. Rep. (N.S.) 725. 
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merchant fleet. This statutory protection was clearly not .intf:mcled 
to extend to foreign shipm\Hlers. It admitted of no exception e\/en 
though the collision damage negligent! \f caused by a foreign ship occ-
urred, and the suit was also brought, in Her Majesty's Dominions.85 
Two of the glaring defects in the legislation brought to light 
were its inapplicabili tv to collisions between British and forei~Jn ships 
occurring outside Her Majesty·'s territorial jurisdiction, and the lack 
of reciprocity. A change in Imperial policy was made for the purpose 
of dealing 1111ith these problems. Section 54 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
A.mendment Act (Imp.) 1862, for tht-J first time extended to the "owners 
of any ship, hJhether British or Foreign," the privilege of limiting liabil- ' 
ity conferred by section 504 of the 18SL, Act (Imp.). Its historic implic-
ations are twofold. There was assumption by the British Parliament 
of legislati\/e competence beyond Her l"lajesty's Dominions. Owners of 
foreign ships, which had negligently run into,or caused damage to, 
British or other foreign ship~.; in international waters, would resort to 
tile English Court of Admiralty to obtain statutory protection. Brit-
ain was,therefore,able to capture a laf'f:lB share of the profitable lit-
igation work in maritime matters. 
An importEmt landmark in furthering British policy is the Pri\/Y 
CouncJl decision in The Amalirf6 In l\1ay 1863, a collision occurTed in 
the !"1editerranean Sea "out of British territorial jurisdiction," bett.veun 
tile British steamship Amalia and the Belgian steamship l"larii:l 
---~--
ant. The latter and her cargo wen:1 sunk and some persons on board 
were drowned. All those affected, narnelv, the sllipownr:?rs, cargo-own-
ers and victims including the master and cn~w. IA;ere citizens of Belgium. 
Dr. Lushington granted a declaration Emught by the British shipowners 
that they were, by reason of section 5lf of the 1fl62 f\ct (Imp.), c:mtitled 
to limit their liability to the statutory maximum. fhe High Court of 
Admiralty decision was affirmed. Lurd Chelrm:iforc1, who delivered the 
Pri\/Y Council jud[]ment, pointed out that 11 the intt:?ntion of the Legis-
lature, so far as can be collected, from the lar1guage employed, ~merns 
to be to place British and foreign ships em the ~>arne footing." 87 The 
decision embodied a political elr:;ment in that rl<:Jtional interests in 
85. Imperial legislation was clearly based against foreign ships. 
86. (1863) 8 L. T. (N.S.) 805. 
87. Ibid., p. 809; seEl also p. 810. 
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shippinq matter~3 wenJ allowed to ~;upm·sedB the rule of international 
law and interfere l'llith the rights of foreigner's 1-vith regard to the 
quantum of damages rBcoverable. 
The Merchant Shipping J\ct 1851, (Imp.) was repealed, and section 
SOL,, as amended bv the 'l8il2 Act (Imp.), IAtas consolidated in sectiun 503 
of the 1894 Act (Imp.)~8 Succeeding amendments had continumj the 
expanionist policv of encouraging British subjects to own ships and of· 
promoting shipbuilding industries in the !3ritish Empire. The limitation 
of liabilitv under sections 502 to 509 of the 1894 Act (Imp.) had been 
extended to the owners and builders of, including other person:1 inter-
ested in, anv ship built in anv part of Her Maje~Jtv's Dominions. Sub-
ject to the maximum duration of three monttls after the launching, the 
protection became: operative frorn,and including 7the launching of such 
ship until her registration under the Act (Imp}9 It covered claims for 
loss of life, personal injurv and clamaqe. 
Before the end of the twentieth centurv, a number of serious short-
comings became apparent. The limitation of liability onlv applied where, 
as a result of improper na\/igation, death or injury was caused to peo-
ple on board a 11r~sse1, or whore los~> or damago 1..vas caused to goods or 
property on board a vt~ssel, or tD another vessel as such. It did nDt 
applv wherB such dor::Jtll, injurv or damage arose not from improper 
na\iigation but from negiigent management of the ship. Nor 1..vould it 
avail where, without the~ actual fault or privity of tfK! owners, the 
ship negligentlv ran into amj darnnged a wharf, an oil rig, a bridge or 
anv floating object not being a ship. Tho qaps in the protection were 
closed bv section 1 of the 1'1erchant ~)hipping ruatJilitv of Shipmvners 
and Otllers) /\ct 1900 (lmp}0 This was an unprec£"dEmted extension of 
the limitation of liabilitv of s!1ipmvners under e>ection 503 of the 1894 
Act (Imp.) to cover loss or damage caused to floating objE?cts, goods 
or other things. It applied whore, without the dctual fault or· prh1itv 
88. Ss. 502-509 in Pc:wt VIII replaced IJV Com1E:ntion on Limitation 
of Liabilitv for Maritime Claims 1976. Se(" MEH'chant. Shipping 
1979 (U.K.) (c. ~3. 17 and Schedule 7 Part 1. 
89. f\'1erche:mt Shipping Act 1898 (61 & 62 \lie., c. 1l,), s. 1. 
90. 63 & 64 Vic., c. 32, s. 2 (2) ami (3): repealed bv Merchant 
ShippinSJ /\ct 1979 (U.K.), Schedule / Part 1. 
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of shipowners and by reason of improper navigation or management 
of the ship, loss or damage was causr~d to property of any kiml, 
whether on land or in water, or whether fixed or mm;able. 
The Cl'Ucial question concerns the applicability to Uw /\ustral-
ian colonies of the abm;e British legislation limiting the liability of 
shipowners. By section 1 of the Colonial Laws \/aliclitv Act 1865?1 an 
Imperial Act or any provision thereof shall extend to any colony when 
it is made applicable thereto by express words or the necessary in-
tendment. It has been generally assumed that the R£~sponsibil1ty of 
· ~ners Acts (Imp.), 1734, 1786 and 1813, passed prior to the Aust-, _, 
ralian Courts Act 1828 (Imp.), operated as part of the laws of Australia. 
Part IX of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (Irnp.),which provided for the 
limitation of liability of shipowners,was expressed to apply to "the 
whole of Her Majestv's Dominions." The expression embraces tt1e Aust-
ralian colonies. The "limitation of liability" provisions were re-enacted 
in Part VIII of tt1e Merchant ~)rJipping Act 189ft (Imp.). Before its repeal, 
section 509 had provided that, subject to contrar~t prm;isions in the 
text, this Part was to "extend to the whole of Her lvlajesty'~J Domin-
ions." In Fact,the opening words of section 503 ("The owmH'S of a ship, 
British or foreign") and section 504 ("lJJhere any liabili tv is ... incurTed 
by the owner of a British or foreign ship") ::;hawed the nece~iSEH'V in-
tendment of the Br'itish r'arliament for the purpose. 
One aspect of the question is whethE!I' th£:~ widr:Jr relied conferr-
ed by section 1 of the Mercr1ant ~1hippinq (Liability of ~ihipowner~; and 
Others) Act 1900 (Imp.) l'\JOUld appiy to Australia, where the property 
damaged belonged to the Crown. :::;evf::ral matters relating to the ques-
tion arose in Chinci Ocean Shipping Co. and Others \1. 
92 f\ustralia. The case stated was rmnoved from tile ~.luprernu CotJc't of 
South Australia tu the High Court~ of J\ustralia. A st1ip had damaged a 
port installation in South ,\ustralia and was sued by a Mini~iter of the 
Crown in right of the State under tht:l Harbor·s /\ct 1936 (S.f\.). Llne 
of the plaintiffs, as shipowner, sought rr'!lief undr'!r sr'!ction S04 of the 
f'-1erchant Shippinq Act 1894-1900 (Imp.) so as to limit his liability under 
st:Jction 503. Barwick, C.J., GitJbs, Stephen and Aickin, J J., held 
that the Pl'ovisions of ~;actions 503 and 504 of the 1894 Act (Imp.), 
91. 28 & 29 Vic., c. 63. 
92. (1979-BQ) 27 A.L.!~. 1. 
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as extended by 1 of the 1900 i\ct (lrnp.), applied in ~3Duth ,L'\us-
tralia at the time of the collision. Barwick, C.J., made it ear· 
"the 1900 Act was effective to include in the operation of s. 503 of 
the 18914 Act damage done to port and installations.n 93 /\lthough 
the 1900 Act (Imp.) contained no pro\Jision corresponding to 
509 of the 1894 Act (Imp.) as regards its application, the Court qmn~ 
effect to section 5 which required the forrnPr to be comtrumJ as one 
with the 1894 /-\ct. 
Anotl1er raised t111as whether 503 and 50ll ~;vould 
operate to curtail the rights of the Crm,1n to full compensation t.vhere 
its propertv was damaged by collision. The rule is that the CrUIAin is 
not bound bv a statute,unless expresslv named therein or unless it 
is bound bv necessarv irnplication:4 Gibbs. Stephen and 1-\ickin, J J .. 
were of the view that the 1894 ancl 19DO f\cts (Imp.) did not oi' t11c~ir 
own force bind the Crown in right of the State of South t'\u~;traliCJ 
either Bxpressly or necessary implication. In his di~:;senting 
ment, Barwick C.J., said:95 
nl can think of no polic\J· rea~3on IN'h\J an owner shoulcJ LJe 
exposed to unlimited liabilitv to the- Crown i:1S well a:; lim-
ited liabilitv to those interests wt1ich may tJe involvc::Ll in 
the collision ... the worcJs of ~!. 503 are so univrJr~-;al in r~har­
acter; and there is no difficulty in includin~J Uw C~t·owrl 
within the description of 'per~Jon' in a statuiA:)." 
His construction more in liml with UlB po 
1912-73 (Comth.). By section 2i\, the /\ct i~> nxpn~~;sed to "hind 
Crown in right of Commonwealth 1 of of the States and of 
the Norther·n Territory."96 SEJction 65 (1) of tile Navi~Fltion 1\rnendrnent 
Act 1979 (Comth.) substituted a new F)art vm on thrJ limitEJtion and 
exclusion of shipmvners' liability for the old f-1 cwt VIII of LhP 
·...;.;.;;;..;;..;;..:,.:..;;;;_ 
tion Act 1912-73 (Cornth.). The Crown is,Ulf.:rpfm·e,bound by thcJ prov-
isions of Pm't VIII. 
93. !bid., p. 8. 
94. lnterpretation Act 1889 (U.K.) 
also Crmvn Proceedings Act 1%7 
ss. 31 (1) and 40 (2) (f} 
95. (1979-80) 27 A.L.R., pp. 13-14. 
& 53 Vic., c. G3), s. 50; Set! 
.K.) (10 ?, 11 r;mJ. \/[, c. lth), 
96. J\s amended bv Navigation AmDndrnent Act 1980 (Cornth.), s. !1. 
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V. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1900 
1. Imperial Legislation 
Murphy J.'s dissenting judgment was obviously incorrect. He 
held that the Merchant Shipping Act 18% (Imp.) had ceased to operate 
in Australia when the Commonwealth \rJas formed on 1~3t Januarv, 1901 
or on the ground that the _Na\Jigation Act 1912 (Comth.) had put an 
end to its operation~7 Barwick, C.J., highlisJhted the paramountcv of 
the 1894 /\ct based on the Colonial laws Validitv Act 1865(lrnp.), when he 
'd 98 sat : 
"The historical, political and legal realitv is thot from 1901 
until some period of time subsequent to the passage and 
adoption of the Statute of Westrninister [1931]. the Common-
wealth was no more than a self-governing colonv though 
latterlv having a dominion status." 
Before the Statute of IJJestrninster Adoption l\c"t 1%2 (Comth.) was 
passed, the powers of the Imperial Parliament to legislate for the col-
onies were expresslv reserved ir1 thf3 [olonial Laws Voliditv Act 1865 
(Imp.). Indeed such powers hmi been fr8quently 8Xercised to deal with 
defects in the law which would othor~Jise undermine Britain's plan to 
expand her merchant fleet and shipbuildinq industries. 
In the case of The Hopper No. 66?9 a ship while undBr a demise 
charter was involved in a collision. Bargrc:JVe, J., IAI!m tried the action, 
held that the charterers were not owne1·s of the ship IAiithin sections 
503 and 504 of the 1894 Act (lrnp.). On appeal to tho House of Lords, 
the decision of the trial court and that of the Court of Appeal were 
unanimously reversed.1 All thBii' Lordships IAJen? of thB view that the 
word "owners" in the two sections should be given a broader interpret-
ation which it bore in other parts of the Act. Lord Lordburn, L.C., 
ablv pointed out the twofold mi~'chief 1.1\Jhich sectiDn 503 was intended 
to provide against. His cuncern for charterers by demise was ex-
2 pressed as follows: 
97. 
'J8. 
"And we must ... conclud!c1 that the policy of the present 
section was simply to prevBnt ruinous damc:1~1es from being 
99. Sir John Jackson Lirnitt?d v .. Dwnors of thrJ Stearmhip 
"Blanche", Her Mnster and Crow. and OU1ers. [1908] A.C. 126. 
1. [1906! P.. 34 and [1907] P. 25h (C./\.). 
2. [1908] A.C. 126, p. 131. 
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irlflictGd upon an innocent principal as the t:onsequer1Cf~ 
of an err Dr of judgment ir1 a dii'ficul t and dangerous ilu~;­
iness bv his agents in charqe of a ves~;el. I can pr:ru:i\Je 
no reason whv the present appellant~1 shDuleJ lJE! ~>uhjr?ct 
to unlimited liabilitv that does not equallv iJPPlv to thE" 
reqistered ownGr. I cam1Dt doullt that if charterc;rs bv 
demise are to be so subject there will be ;:m r:md of ~3uch 
charters .... " 
Following the undesirable decision bv Elargrm/8 Dee:m, J .~ thr? f"lrJrr:h<:mt 
Shipping Act 1906 (Imr.)o which applied to the whole? of f lor r"lajE-:~1tv'~3 
Dominions, was passedh tD remove the difficulty. Hv ~1r~ctim1 Jl of the 
Act, sections 502 to 509 of the 1894 f\ct (Imp.)5 wr::n! to tJr; "n?ad so 
that the word 'owner' shall be deemed to include dfl\/ d1e:wtr:n?r' Lo 
whom the ship is demised." 
The word "owner" was giver1 nn even wider meaninq bv the Hiqh 
Court of 1-\ustralia in Mcllwrnith McEdch<:Jm Ltd. \J. fl1e ~i~1Pll Company 
of Australia I td.6 Damaqn was cnused to thE? cDllil'I' HPUor1 ~);cmk c15 a 
result of thee! improper navigatiun of till? tuq Hcmnir~ Ht~ll amJ LIH" liqh-
ter lashed to it. The~ FuJi [ourt uf t11e SupremP l:ourt; CJf 1\ll!w ;)OlJth 
l!Jales held that Shell [o. Llcl. llllil~3 er1tillr:rJ l~CJ limit its liahilitv <wcm·d-
ing to the combim;d torlfliJqE~ of t/1P two craft. filE' Cl\AJI1HL'~J uf thr: HPJ-
ton Bank appealed Rgaincit thi~j deci~iion. :3twll [~U. Ltc-J. llillJ rJirmJ thee! 
lighter under a pilrol mTe:mcwrnmJt. IL vva~; ccmtt"ndr"u U1at, ~;irwe Shell 
Co. Ltd. was rlot iJ charlf~rer tJ\/ demise of U1e lisJrltr::~r. it was r10t en-
titled to limit its liability uncll~r Sl'!ctimt 'J(J3 uf t11e W% /-\ct (Imp.). 
The High Court of /\ustralia touk into accCJurJt tiH? I'PC1litv oF the hir'-
er's position as presente:>d by thP facts, amJ C:lcJopted a broad cons-
truction. Dixon, J., sairJ: 7 
" ... I think it remains correct that in s. 'JD3 of the Act of 
189L+, or more accuratelv, in relation to this case, s. 1 of the 
Act of 1898, "owner" includes a person who has immediate and 
exclusive possession of a ship eithE~r indp finitr~lv or For a 
term and has responsibili t~; of its control and management 
3. On 21st December. 1'JOIJ: [19061 P. 31,, It was affirmed by tr1e 
English Court of Appeal on 25th March, 19CJ7: [1907] P. 254. 
L,, CJn 21st December', 19llfi (G Edw. \/II, c. 4Cl). ThP qop in the 
statutorv pmtection was treated tJV th~~ Llritisl1 Par·tiamr~nt 
as a matter of serious concern. 
5. Repealc~d and replaced bv s. 1/ and SchE~ciule /4 fldrt I, Mer-
chant Shipping Act 1979 (U.I\.). 
6. (194ri) 7[) C.L.R. 17S. 
7. Ibid., p.;- 21 S. 
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by t1imself and his ser\Jants. In other IAiords, it includes 
as l'\Jell the special property as the general property in a 
ship." 
It was further contended that, even if the lighter was a ship, Shell 
Co. Ltd. was not entitled to limit liability on the ground that 
was not registered. The weight of English authol'ities8 and section 
742 of the l'-1erchant Shipping Ac~ 1894 (Imp.) led their Honours to de-
cide that the lighter was a ship. The relevant provisions relating to 
the issue were examined. By section 2, every British ship, unless ex-
empted from registry, must tJe registered under the Act. If a ship is 
required to be registered and is not registered, "she shall not be 
recognised as a British ship." Section 1 of the Merchant Shipping 
(Liability of Shipowners) Act 1898 (Imp.) was amended by section 85 
of the Merchant Shipping Act 1906 (Imp.). The effect t'lias to extend · 
the privilege of limitation of liability to the m.vners, builders and 
other parties interested in any ship built in any port or place in Her 
Majesty's Dominions "from and including the launching of such ship 
until the registration thereof under section 2 of the Merchant Ship-
Act 1894." The proviso in section 1 of tile 1898 Act (Imp.), which 
·-..:.:.---
restricted the benefit of that pwvision to a period of ttwee months 
from the launching of the ship, was l'epealed tJ\; section 85 of and the 
Second Schedule to the 1906 Act (Imp.). It was t1eld that, as a r'esult 
of the repeal, sections 502 to 509 of the 1891. Act (Imp.) enatJled the 
owners, build£3rs and parties interested in am; ship tJuilt in Her Maj-
esty's Dominions to claim limitE1tion of lialJi one&? she was launched 
until she was regh:;tered. Dixon, J., took thf~ \/iEJw that 11 upon regis-
tration the 'parties interested', as distinguished from 'owners', lost their . 
ei~1ht to llmit."9 Obviously ttw "parties interesterJ" would include the 
builder and mortgagees by bill of sale. Th8 E:lPpeal was unanimously 
dismissed. 
The legal and political significance of t:ho decision is this. By 
B. In The Harlm'li [1922] P. 175, the barges fitt£:1d with rudder's 
and not propelled by oars were hel(j to be ships within the 
meaning of the H394 Act (Imp.), ss. S03 Fmd 742. By reason 
of the 1898 Act (lmp.) ~3. 1 and the 1906 Act (Imp.), s. 85, 
Schedule II, thev did not require registration; the plain-
tiffs were held to be entitled to a cJucr'ue of limitation of 
liability. In The Champion (19341 P. 1, a barge not hein~J 
propelled by oars was twlcl to be a ship within the meaning 
of the J\dmiralty Court Act 1861 (Irnp.), s. 2. 
9. (1945) 70 C.L.R. 175, p. 213. 
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giving a ltc~ide meaning to the ""orrJ ''oiAJner'' r:md following t;he t:nglish 
approach, the High Court of /\ustralla had in large measure contribu-
ted to consistency in tllo t'lritist1 stlippinD policy. Up to this ~;t;aqe of 
history, there had bc'!en harmony tmt\lliBl'ln Britain and /\ustrali.a in the 
maritime legislation and the judicial attitude toward~; the defpcts 
brought to light. 
In other respects, the protection in terms of limitation of liability 
was found to be inadequate. Clm? of tt1e probl!c;m~> was first fon~shacl­
owed in the case of Scruttons Ltd. v. l"'idland SiliconRs Ltd:o Tn 1957, 
while discharging goodr:i fl'Dm a ship. the stevcc!don;s negli!wntly 
dropped a drum. The damage causr:!d <1mCJuntf3d to £593 12s. 2 d. The 
bill of lading was subject to the Carriage of [)oods by Sea Act 1936 
(U.S.), which limited the liabilitv of the carriers for loss or damage to 
500 dollars per package. It was held that tho stevedores were exclud-
ed by the doctrino of privity of contract from taking advantage of 
the limitation of liability. In vir::w of the ~serious situation which would 
arise if the decision was eventual affirmed on appeal to the rlouse 
of Lords, legislathm measures ~\JerE~ necE:ssar·v to I'!:!mecJy LIJB anDmaly. 
Bv reason of the decision, a claimant cuuld avoid the effect of sections 
503 and 504 of the 1894 Act (IrnP.) by suing in negligence tile ma~iter, 
CrBIAJ or ott1er senmnt direct! v responsiblE; for ttle lo~1s, damage or· in-
jurv caused. 1'1oreover, in China Ocean Shippinq Co. and Dthers \/. 
State of South Australia; 1 E3<:Jrwick, C.J., [][bl1s, Stephen and Aickin, 
J J., had held that a ship's ma:JtBr was not entitled to limit his liabil-
ity under suction 503 and to bring proceeclings under section sot, of 
the Act 1894-1900 (Imp.). 
t\nother grave shortcoming was the absm1ce of protection for 
shipowners and their servants rr::~wect of injuries and deaths caust.~d 
by improper navigation or negliqt'lnt rnanagnrnent of the ship to per-
sons not carried tt1erein. 
The International Con\/ention relating to the Limitation of 
bility of Owners of Sea-going Stlips 1957 was frJl'mulattJd to deal 11\/ith 
the problems llirJhlighted abmJGL Although it was ratified or acceded to 
by tim United Kins1dorn and thirtv-two other cDuntrif.~s. Australia was not 
included among them. By the Merchrmt ~1t1ippinq (Liabilitv nf ::Jhipml\/flH~> 
10. [1962} 1 f\ll E.R. 1 (House of Lords). 
-11. (1979-80) 27 A.L.R. 1, p. 1~. 
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and [Jthers) Act 195~2the United Kingdnm gavE~ effect to it. 
2. Commonwealth legislation 
It is interesting to ascertain how closely Australia kept pace 
with developments in English maritime law after she attained full na-
tionhood in 1942~ 3 Two historic decisions of the High Court of Aust-
ralia had given rise to important reforms in the law. 
We shall briefly look at the back~wound incidents that led to 
the first decision. Section /L11 of the IVJerchant Shipping Act 1894 
(Imp.) reads, "This Act shall not, except 1.vhere specially provided,apply 
to ships belonging to Her Majestv". The Crown's liability in tort under 
English law was enacted for the first time by section 2 of the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1%7 (U.K.). For the purpose of limiting Her Majesty's 
liability as regards Her Majesty's ships, section 5 has extended the 
protection of section 503 of the 18%-'1940 Acts (Irnp.)~ 4 However, in 
New South Wales, by reason of legislation passed by the colonial leg-
islature}5 U1e Crown 1!\las under a liability in tort. Soon after its for-
mation. the Commonwealth was rendered suable in tort by the pa:3~~ing 
of the Claims Against the Commonwealth /-\ct 1902 (Comth.). The prov-
isions ha•Je been consolidated in sections 56 to 67 of the Judiciarv !\ct 
1903 (Comth.). Since the Merchant Shipping Act 18% (Imp.), includinq 
section 7LI1, operEJted throughout Her i"lajestv's Dominions, it was rNili-
ent that, in Australia) the CrOIAIIl would not be entitled to limit its lia-
bility in respect of Her fVIajesty's ships. Tu remedy the situation, 
section 80 of the Merchant Shlppinq ,L\ct 19fJ6 (lmp.) Wcl~3 passed. It 
provided: 
(1) Her Majesty may by Urder in Cuuncil make res1ulatiuns 
with respect to the manner ir1 tllihich Co\iernment ships 
may be registered as Britisr1 ships, fur the purpose of 
the Merchant Shipping ,L\cts, and thosE~ Acts ... shall apply 
to Government ships registered in accordance with those 
regulations as if they were registered in manner provided 
by tho~5e Acts." 
12. 6 & 7 Eliz. II, c. 62. As to the extent of repeal, see Merchant 
Shipping /\ct 1979 (U.K.), Schedule 7 Pc3rt I. For position in 
Australia, see infra. 
13. f\fter· the Statute of l1Jestrnir1~'ter /-\cJoption Act: 1942 (Comth.) 
was passed. 
14. Crown Proceedinqs Act 1947 (lJ.K.), s. S)amemJed tJv Schedule 
5 para. 3, Merchant Shipping f\ct 1979 (lJ.I"'\.). The provisions 
of 17 and 1H ancJ Schedule 4 of U1is /\ct applv in relation 
to Her--Majestv's ships. 
15. ~3ee New South Wales Act (39 Vic. No. 38); in Fame!! v. Bowman 
(1889) 12 App. Cas. 643, the FJrivv Council dffirmed the Sup-
reme Court of New South Wales decision that the Govern-
ment of th!:" colony was liable in tort under the Act 39 Vic No 38. . . . 
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On 8ttl DecernbE3r, 1924, an [Jrder in Council16 was made under section 
80 for thf=J registration of ships belonging to th&1 Commonwealth Gov-
ernment. Under the Order, the pruvisions,which wero excluded from 
applving to Government ships so t"egistered, did not include those in 
Part VIII of the 1894 Act (Imp.). 
In /\siatic Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. •,1. Commonwealth of Aust-
ralia1? mving to impmper navigation of the British ship River Loddon, 
though without actual fault or privity of the Commonwealth, damage 
bv collision \ruas caused to the ship Shar,zada. The owners of the lat-
ter appealed to the High Court against the decisi.on of Tavlor, J. who 
held that the Commomvealth, as m111ner of th£c• River Loddon, was entit-
led to limit its liability under· soction 503 of the 1894 Act (Imp.). 
According to Dixon, C.J., Mcriernan and Williams, J.J., sections 75 (ill) 
and 78 of the Commonwealth Constitution and sections 56 and 64 of the 
Judiciary Act 1903-1955 (Cornth.) were applicable to the case. They 
were held to have the consequence of imposing upon "the Cummon-
t-\Jeath a substantive liabilitv in tort ascertained as nearly as may be 
bv the same rules of lmv as should applv bet~-\Jeun subject and subject." 
The effect was to extend the operation of section 503 as part of the 
law applicable to the liabilitv of the Crown in Australia. Their Hon-
ours arrived at the samE! conclusion based on the operation of section 
80 of the f\1erchant Shipping ;.\ct 1906 (Imp.) and the Order in Council 
(1924) made thereunder. Thev rejected the argument that the words 
"as if they were registered in manner prm1ided by those Acts" in sec-
tion 80 (1) would bring in only those provisions of the Merchant Shipp-
ing Acts (Irnp.))which applied to a British ship,bv reason of registra-
tion. In dismissinn the appeal, their Honours further stressed the 
legislative purpose of section 80 as follows: 18 
"What seems to be its concern is to undo the effects of 
s. 741 where there is an Order in Council and registration 
of a Government ship and to undo it nothwith~1tanding that 
16. S.R. & 0., No. 1.391 of 1924. 
17. (1955-1956) 96 C.L.R. 400. 
18. Ibid., p. t1ZD. 
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registration is not in accor'd lruith the Act of 1894 ... The 
policy of the provision seems to have been to empower 
the authorities to except by the Order in Council IAJhate\Jer 
provisions appeared unsuitable or undesirable but other-
wise to submit Government ships to the advantages and dis-
advantages of the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 
just as if the ships were registered thereunder." 
That such fine and circuitous reasoning was necessary to reach the 
decision shows the oversight of the Commonwealth Parliament. The 
gaps in the Navigation Act 19'12 (Cornth.) were closed in 1958 lllihen pro-
visions along the lines of section 5 of the Crown Proceeding~1 Act 1947 
(U.K.) were intmduced. An amendment was mado to Part VTII of the 
Navigation Act 1912 (Comth.). It extended the benefit of sections 502 
to 504; 9 including the other sections am:illary thf-Jreto, of the 1894 
Act (Imp.) to the Commonwealth or a State as owr1er of anv ship, the 
manager of sucll Government ship ami also any demise or sub-demise 
charterer thereof. Moreover. IAJhere any ship was built at any port in 
a Commonwealth country for or to the order of the Commonwealth or 
a State, the provisions of the l"lerchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) re-
lating to the limitation of liability of ~:>hipowners would apply. The 
protection would cease when deliver·v of the ship was taken under the 
building contract. Part VIII of the ~avigation Act 1912-73 continued 
to applv to Government ships until it was replaced ~JV the nmv provis-
ions under section 65 (1) of the Navigation Amendment Act 1979 
20 (Comth.). 
Seldom in maritime historv had the United f\in~Jdom Parliament 
passed legislation which destroved consistencv in the application of 
Part VIII of the 1894 Act (Imp.) in Her Majesty's Dominions. ThE:: dist-
urbing consequences of disconformi t\/, IAJhich the move had givEm rise 
to, were exemplified in Bistricic v. Rokov ar-Jd Dthers~ 1 B, a member 
of the crew, sued the owners of the ship John Long in the Supn-Jme 
[ourt of New South Wales, claiming damages for personal injuries ~;us­
tained when the ship was in Sydnr'J\f Harbour'. Sumuel:3, J., granted trm 
19. See Navigation /\cl 1912-73 (Comtt1.), ss. 331- 33'). 
20. The Navigation Act 1912-73 (Cornth.) is exprE:::isE!d to bind the 
Crown. See s. ZA and s. 3341 as amended by 1\lavigation Amr>.mi-
ment Act (Comth.) (No. 87 of 1980), s. 4 and s. 93. respectively. 
21. (1976) 11 A.L.R. 129. 
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dEcJclaration sought by the defencJant shipowner th<~t their liDL!ili t~; 
was limited according to S(~ction 503 of thEJ Mr~rdvmt Shippinq 1\cl~ 
1894 (Irnp.). The Ne\AJ South LLJale~; Court of Appr~al unanirnousl v il ff'inn-
ed the cjecision. In the appeal to the His1h Coul't of .1\ustralia, the 
rnajor issue raised was \AJhether section 2 (4) of the MerchEmt ~3hippinq 
(Li<1bilitv of Shipowners and Others) Ar:t 1958 (U.l'\.) applied in i\Jpw 
South lJJales. It read: 
"Nothing in the said section fh1e hundn~d e:md t,hrPP ~3hall 
apply to any liability in mspec t of l m::3 of 1 i t'f:J or per~mne1l 
injury caused to ... a person V~Jtlo is on board or Prnplm;mJ 
in connection with the ship undr')r a contrDct nf ~3ervice 
\AJlth all or any of the person~; \AJhosr:J licJtJilities are lirnitF~cJ 
by that section, if that cor1tract is gm1ernecJ by the li.:Jlv 
of any country outside the United f<.ingdorn and that 
law either does not set anv lirnit to that liabilitv or suts 
a lirnit exceeding that set to it Lw that section." 
The injuries occurred on board a 1\lr~VII ~iouth l.Llal<1~3 rt=1gistm·r;rJ ~1hip in 
New South lJ.Jales waters. The appellant 13 '";as ernplm;mJ umJPr' a crm-
tract of service govemed by 1\lew South l1J<:1le~1 lccl\AI Uv1t ~>Pt rm limi L 
to the liabilities of the employers. 1-\dmittr'cJh;, tJv red~iCHl nl ~)f!ctiun 
4 of the Statute of lJ.Jestminster 1931. acJoptc~d lJV U1e :itnUJLr; ()J' 
.!!Jestrninster Adoption Act 1942 (C:ornth .), !iPctior1 2 (/•) of t.hP 1 1J'Al ,\ct, 
(U.K.) did not extend as part of thr::~ law of the [onmHHlWHal ttl. l flE? 
reason was the absence of a declaration requir'l~d Lly ~:1uctirm 1, uf the 
1931 statute (Irnp.). It lJ\Ias ably contcmded that c1ection 1, cJid not 
apply to the Australian States, and that an Act of the United Kin~idom 
not containing such declaration rnight nevertheless Dpply to the Statc!s. 
Their Honours rejected the contention for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, by section 10 of the Merchant Shippin~J (Lidllility of Shipowner~i 
and Others) Act 1958, the Act extended to North(?rn Ireland. Section 
11 empowered Her Majesty by Order in Council to dimct that the pro-
visions of the Act and the "existing limitation enactments" woulcJ ex-
tend to the Isle of Man, any of the ChannB! Isl<Jnds and c:my colony or 
country outside Her Majesty's Dominions. Tf1e VIJOrds 11Gny colony" in 
section 11 has no application to any Australian ~]Late. By section '11 
of the Statute of lJJestrninster 1931 (Imp.), the expression "colon~r'' in 
any Imperial Act passed after the operation u f the fmrner would not 
include a Dominion or anv Province CJI' State forrnlnq part of a Dnrnin-
ion. Secondly, no Australian State i~3 regarderJ as a countrv outside 
Her Majesty's_Dornillions. Thirdly, the policy evolved over a long his-
tory of constitutional development is that, for a statute of the 
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LJnit.~:Jd Kingdom to extend to an /\ustra.lian State, it would have to 
contain an express provision to that t?ffect. On similar ground lftJas 
rejected the argument that, the 1894 ,L\ct (lmp.) enunciat£~d tlln 
law for New South Wales, any armmdment to that Act should be approa-
ched on that footing. 
In underlining the anomalous situation that could arise from the 
difference betwPen English and Australian lmllis in this area, Jacobs, J. 
'd22 sa1 . 
"Assume a collision bet\A.Jeen two ships with personal injur-
ies to members of the cre\-V of 8acr1 ship. /\n action is 
commenced in the United Kingdom for limitation by the 
owners of tJoth of the ships ... The plaintiffs \vhose service 
on board their ship was under a contract governed by the 
provisions of s. 503 vis-a-vis their owner. The plaintiffs 
\,\!hose service was on board the other ship are not bound 
bv the provisions s. 503 their owner." 
Section Z (lt) of the 1958 Act (LJ.K.) favourE!d shipowners by discrimina-
ting against those engaged on boarcl whose contract of ompl oyrnent 
was subject to thE! law of the United Kingdom. The pnwision reflects 
a significant change in legislative thinking. This is in markud contrast 
to the policy which underlav the Privy Council decision in fhe f\malicP 
and the Merchant Shipping Armmdrnent /\ct 1£362 (Imp.). Tt1e Imperial 
Parliament then had assumed juri~;diction by limiting the liability of 
British and foreign ships in internati011al ~vaters. Section 2 ( 4) on) v 
operated in Britain, Nortllern li'eland and certain placD~3 in HE?r Majes-
ty's Dominions and applied to pBrsorls employBd in ships. 
The r(wlacement provisions of the i'1erchant :3hipping i\ct 1979 
(U.K}4 follow the rational approach set bv ~lection 2 (l,) of the 1958 
Act (U.f'\.). They distinguish seamen and other ernplovr~Ps from good~> 
and passengers carried on board. nlFJir laudablfc} object is to take 
cognizance of the rights of ship's employees acquired umior non-
United Kingdum law. MoreoV£:)r, it qrossly unE!thical for thE) Unitml 
f'\ingdom or the Commonwealth [:Jarliament to pa~>~:; a law which lessens 
the quantum of damagos recnvPratJlB by an ernploveF: under a f'orf?ign 
22. Ibid., p. 136. 
23. (1863) 13 L.T. Rep. (N.S.) BU5; see al~m p. 810 when: t!1e applic-
ation of Merchant :JhitJPinq /\rnendment Act 1fl62 (Imp.), s. Slf, 
was considered. 
24. ~)BE! SchedulE~ 4 Part I. /\rticle 3 para. (l!). 
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law or a contract of ~mn;iC!1 with a foreign employer. 
Furtht:!r reference t;o the anomah; highlighted Jacobs, J., 
helps our undt:!rstanding of the problem. Suppm,rJ that an injured sc-m-
man was employed under a contract of servicF.! subject to a foreign 
law which did not limit the liability of his employer. If he sued in an 
Engllsh court, thEm Uy rBason of sEJctiun 2 (4) of tim 1958 Act (Imp.), 
section 503 of the 1894 P•,ct (Imo.) was rt:mderE~d inapplicable. His rights 
under the foreign law, which was presumatJl v Um proper lav.1 of the 
employment contract, would remain intact. If, on the otrlef' hand, hf::1 
had sued or his employer haci initiated proceedings to limit his !iabii-
itv in an Australian court, it was certain what the outcome tvould have 
been. Since section 2 (4) of the 1958 Act (Imp.) did not extend to 
Australia, the operation of ~"Jection 503 was therefore not excluded. 
The undesirabl!:-3 outcome ti>Jas that in an /\ustralian court the damages 
awardeti to an accidr::!nt vlctim would be subject to tht? limitation of 
licibilitv. Unfortunately, thr~ current po!3ition uncler Australian law 
has not changed. 
The 1\lavigation Amendment F\ct 1979 rc:omth.) !1as given effect 
to the International Convention relating to tll8 limitation of Liabili 
of Shipmvners of Sea-qoing \./es~mls E,Vj7. ~3oction 6!) (1) repec.~ltJcJ Part 
VIII of the •\Jmduat.ion 1\ct 1912-73 (Cornttl.) <:md ::>ubstituted a m:Jw rJart 
VIII. This Part pro\/ ides for the limitation aml e><.cJ us ion of tho lia-
bilitv of shipowners. 
The far-reaching eff£::ct!:; of t.hf~ r\Javiqntion /\rnmtt1rnEmt .L\ct 1979 
(Comth.) on the development of Australian maeitime law am furthr::!r 
considered. Bv section 104 (3), Part \/Ill uf t;he !t:l9t, /\ct (Imp.) was 
repeaiecl. l1Jith Um exception of parnL]r<:wh 1 (!;] of ArticltJ I, the pm-
\lisions of the 195/ ComiEJntion are, unckr sHcticm 333 of 
1912-73 (Corntll.), given "the fore(~ of law as part of the lavJ of 
the Commonwealth." rn the recent epoch-making casr:J of Kirmt:·mi v. c812-
tain Cook CruisBs Ptv. ~.td,~.S tL<m crm:3tituti;::me:1i questions of import-
ance were raised. The first question concElrrmcl tr1e validity of Lhr::! 
repeal of Part \/III of t!m 18% Act (Imp.) tJv Sf}Ction Hl4 (3). The second 
was whethPr the Commonwealth Parlir:Jrnent ~.<~1as cumpr?tent to Gnact 
shipping lt:1Dislation on limitation of liat1ilitv 1,vhich extended to the 
St<Jtes. Pur~;uant to section 40 of U1e )udiciai'y Act 1903 (Cornth.), th£o 
25. (1985) 59 A.L.J. 2fi'J. 
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case ~Alas rernm;ed fmrn the District Court uf l\101111 ~1outf1 lllalr::!s to thE: 
High Court." ThP Far:ts which gavB rise to thB Elction ~'llere fairlv 
st.raightfor~JvarcJ. On 9th August, 1961, while bBinr.:J carriecJ on a cruisu 
in SvdnPV HartJour in Captain Cook II, a ves:~el o\.AJnt:!d bv Uw defBmJ-
ant companv, the plaintiff K suffered personal injuriF~s. These were 
alleged to have beBn causBd bV the negligence of thB defendant corn-
panv. LlJhen sued for damages, the defendant comp<-mv claimed to be 
EmtitlPd to limit its liabilitv under srJction 5fJ3 of the 18% ,1\ct (Imp.). 
The plaintiff contendE!d that the section had been repealed on 31st 
January, 1981 ~6 when section 104 (3) of the Navigation Amendment Act 
1979 (Comth.) carm-J into force. Sc,:cUon 2 (2) of the Statute of [!Jest-
minster 1931 (Imp.) and section 51 (xxix) of the Commonwealth of Aust-
rnlia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp.) (dealing exterr1al affairs) wei'e held 
to empower and authorise the Commonwealth Parliament to repeal Pai't 
VIII of the 189li /\ct (Tmp.) by section 101, (3) of the 1979 Act (Cornth.). 
Apart from the 1111idt:: scope of the legislative pm\lers conferred bv 
section 2 (2) of thr:! 1931 statute (1mp.), the adoption of the 1957 Con-
vention under section 333 of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), 
as amended, is clearlv 1111ithin the~ "external affairs". provision. A fea·-
ture of the decision which haci a vital bearing on the development of 
Australian law is this. Capte:1in Cook II was, and had alwavs been, an 
intra-State) and not a sea-goir1g,vessel. The persDnal injurJE!s wPr8 
allegedlv sustained t.vithin i\!ew South lllales internal waters. ~3ection 
334, as amended, provides that certain ships, not b1::1ing sea-going VE?ss-
els, t~Jere to lle troated as though thev were sea-going vessel~; for trm 
purposes of Division 1 of the new Part VIII of the Navigation Act 1912-
13 (CornU1.) and the applied provisions of the 1957 Convention. The~ 
section has beE~n further arnend(~d bv section 93 of the Navigation 
Amemlment Act ·1980 (Comth.) to embrace an intra-State pleasunJ 
craft. Mason, 1'-'lurptw, Brenn<Jn, ami DeanP, J J.~7 held that the PDI!I!er 
of the CommonwL"!alth Parliament extended to the nC?peal of the opm'-
ation of Part \/III of the 18% ,C\ct (Imp.) nut onlv a~3 part of Cumrnun-
wealth law but also as part of the law of each of ttle Au~>tralian 
26. Tbid., p. 278. 
27. Wilsun, J. 's dissent onlv related to irJti'a -statE? vessels which 
are not sea-going vessels. 
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?8 States: rf bv reason of the repeal, the provisions of the nRW Part 
\irii were held to operate merelv as Commonwealth law and not also as 
part of the Stat:o laws, grave flaws and uncertaint.ies ~tJould arise. 
lllilson, J., 1·1as highlighted the situation in these words?9 
"It migtlt be said thCJt ... the lack of any protection would 
endure onlv until the StatE: legislatures, now freed by reD-
son of the repeal of s. 503 from thr:~ constraints of the 
Imperial Act, passed their own legislation. That may be 
so, but the lack of protection in the intervening period 
could be very serious indrmd. This 1111as recognized by the 
Parliament in respect of intrastate vessE!ls whictl go to sea.'' 
The problem tlas been overcome by section 332 (3), as amended. It 
provides that Division I of Part VIII will not apply to an intra-State 
vessel to thB extent that a law of a State or of the Northern Territ-
ory applies the provisions of the 195/ Convention in relation to that 
vesseL The historic High Court decision does not depri\Je the Parlia-
ment of a State or the Northern Territory of the competence to give 
effect to the 1957 Convention. 
We sr1all look at tht:i otJmr changes introduced bv th~1 r\luviga-
tion AmendmEmt /\ct 1979 (Comth.). Under 1\rticle I paragraph I of Um 
1957 Convention, limitation of liability applies to claims arising frorn -
loss of life of, or personal injury to, anv person bEc1ing 
carried in the ship, and loss of, Dr damage to, nnv 
propertv on board the ship; 
(b) loss of life of, or personal injury to, any other person, 
whethnr on land or on water, loss of or rJamage to anv 
other propE~rtv or infrinnernent of arw right;:; caused 
bv the act, nc!glect or dc~fault of anv person m1 board 
tt18 ship for whose act, neglect or cJefauit the owmlr 
is responsible or anv person nut on board the ci!"iip fm' 
whose act, neglect or default the owner is rE!sponsible: 
Provided hmvever that in regard to the act, neqlect 
or default of this last class of per'son, the owr1er shall 
only be entitled to limit his liability when the act, 
neglect or default is one which occurs in ttJG navic;Ja-
tion or the management of the ~3hip or in the loading, 
carriage or disct1arge of its cargo or in the embark-
ation, carria~l8 or disernbar·kation of its pnsseri[Jers." 
fhe protection avails in suits brought against the ship and a wide 
class of persons. rhese include the charterer, manager and operator 
28. fhe Solicitm's-[;tcmeral nnd 1\ttorneys-General of NBw South 
lllales, G)ueunsland and ulestern Australia intervenerJ on LKJ-
tlalf of trl8 States r1amed. 
29. (1985) 59 /\.L.J. 255, p. D9. 
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of the ship ami alsD the master, creiAI memlJer·s ami other servants of 
the owner, charterer, manager or operator of the ~~hip. However, 
apart from the master and crew members, each of the other persons 
INill only be entitled to limit his liability IAJhere the losses have occurr-
ed without his actual fault or privity.30 Under the Navi~~ation Amend-
ment Act 1979 (Comth.), the category of persons whose liability in 
connection with a ship is limited is wider than that under Part VIII 
of the 1894 Act (Imp.) at the time of the repeal. The protection has 
been extended to cover claims for personal injury or death caused 
to any person and loss or damage caused to property - outside a 
ship in each case. 
An outstanding benefit to shipOINners, chartm·ers and operators 
based in Australia lies in the reduced PL'emiums charged for third-par-
ty liability policies. 
VI. RESPONSIBILITY OF SHIPOWNERS 
1. Relationship between Actual Fault or Privity and Unseaworth-
im~ss 
It will be recalled that the expression "fault or privity" was 
first used in the f~esponsibillty of Shipo1Nners Act 1B13 (Imp.). This 
modification of the vicarious liability of shipowners for the acts ur 
defaults of their servants reinforced the Imperial shipping polic'.,>'. 
Except for the addition of ''actual",31 the expression has been con-
sistently retained as part of Australian rnaf'ltime law. 
The exPression has never been definerJ in the Imperial Acts 32 
and the 1957 ConvenUon?3 An anal~/Sis of the case authorities is 
30. '1957 Convention, f\rticle \/1, para. 2; cf. para. 3. 
31. 53 Geo. III, c. 159, s. 1. The words "privity and knowledge of 
... OIAiner" 1.vere used in the Responsibility of Shipm~mers Acts 
of 1734 (Imp.) (7 Geo. II, c. 15), s. 1, ancJ 1786 (Imp.) (26 Geo. · 
III, c. 86), s. 1. 
32. See ss. 503 and 504 (repealed) of 1854 Act (Imp.); ss. 502 
and 503 (repealed) of 18% Act (Imp.). 
33. See the International Convention relatirlS.J to the Limitation 
of the Uabilitv of CJwners of Sea-going Ships, '1957, Article 
1 para. 1. The expres~iion, however, has been abar1doned b\/ 
the Convf::!ntion on Limitation of Liability for Maritime ClairT;s 
1976. It favours ''pm'sonal act or omission, committed t"lth 
the intent to cause such loss, or mcklessly and with know-
le~ge that such .lo~s would probably r-esult" as the conduct 
wh1d1 bars the limitation of liabilitv: Merchant Shipping Act 
1979 (U.K.), Schedule 4, Part I Article 4. 
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necessary in order to ascBrtain its nmanlng imd application. It enab-
les us to evaluate the reliFJf con fBrn-JrJ on ~;hipOIAJnEJI'S early in his-
tory and other persons at thr~ later :>tages. 
In The Spirit of the OcearJ}'1 Dr. Lushington spoke of section 504 of 
the Merchant Shipping A.ct '1854 (Imp.) as being applicable when the ship-! 
owners "have not incurred any blame a::i to the collision in question." 
He added that "it is personal tllarno \1\Jrtich is the ground of tho forfeit-
ure of the exemption from liabllitv." 35 The ;:;hipmvners wBre hr~ld liable 
as principals for the negligent navigation of the master. Butt, J., in 
The Wal'kworttf6 said that "the words ['actual fault or privity') shew 
an intention to reLieve the shipowm:r 1A1hen c!amage has been caused 
by the fault of his servants and he himself has not betm in any lt\la\f 
to blame." In The Diamond, the cargo carried was damaged by Fin:: on 
board the ship. Judgment was given for thE' shipowner on the ground 
that the matter fell within section soi7 of the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1894 (Imp.). Ban:-Jrave, Deane J;~s said that the "owner is not liable 
unless he has himself bf~en guilty of some fault or privv to the matters 
which caused the damage." Ome inference to bD drci\A;'n from the judi-
cial pronouncements is this. lt the lntPntion of the legislature cmd 
convention formulators to difft--Jr'(mtiate the f<::iult or pri\/itv of ship-
owners from that of their employees. nm provi~;ions distin~~uish bet-
ween the responsibility of shipowners for their own acts or defaults 
and their liability for· the wrongful or rm~digen t conduct of their ser-
vants. The object of the law is to limit; tneir liability according to 
the tonnage of the ~1hip. ;"\ rather similar construction was placed by 
Hamilton, L.J., on the expression in section 502. wh£m he said:39 
"Actual fault neqat.ives that liabilitv which arisc:::s solely 
undDr the rule of superior'. In that sensl'J it 
34. (1865) 12 L.T. (N.S,) 239. 
35. Ibid., p. 239. 
36. (1883) 9 P.O. 2D, p. 21, confirmed on appeal; citE~d v,Jith app-
roval by Hamilton. L.J., in Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. 
ard's Carrying Co. Ltd. [191iiJ 1 1\.B. 419, p. 437. 
37. Replaced bv i'1erct1ant :3hioping /\ct 1979 (U.K.), s. 18: see 
also Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), s. 338, as arm~nded bv 
[\lavigation Amendment Act 1976 (Comth.), s. 65 (1). 
38. (1906] P. 282, p. 287. 
39. [1911~] 1 K.B. 419, P. 436, :Jupra. 
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com1eys the idea of PEH'sonDl fault, tJut it clew~; not nec-
essarily mean that thE: m<\lner must have laid the train or 
set the torch himself." 
From the comparative aspr::ct, it is relE,\Jarlt to COrl~iicJer the 
relationship bett<\leen the pi3rsonal respon~;ibilitv of thE! shipowner 
under the Merchant Shipping Act 18% (Imp.) or the NFJ\/iqation Act 
1912-73 (Comth.) and the seaworthiness ubligatirm of thEe! carrier under· 
the Hague Rules:1o Rule 1 Df i\rticle IIJ of the Hague Rules provides 
that the carrier shall be bound, befDre ami at the be~Jinning of the 
1/0\jage, to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthv in those 
respects required. The House of Lords decision in Riverstone Meat Co. 
Pty. Ltd. v. Lancashire Shipping Co.41 makes it clear that due diligence 
must be exercised by the carrier as Li personal obligation. It is non-
delegable in that he is responsible for the acts or negligence of every 
person employed by him to render thr=' ship ~if}<-3\I\ICJrthy. Suppose that 
due to the negligence of a compass nwairer the ship came into collis-
ion with an oil rig or due to the default of a survevm a fire broke 
out on board. If. as a result uf the ship's unseaworthiness at the 
commencement of the voyage, cargo is r:larnaslf~d ir1 each case, the 
Hague Rules carrier is liatJle1!2 It is LlLJE!~7tionable whc'!ther failure to 
fulfil this seaworthiness obligation woulcl constitute "actual fault Dl' 
privity" undPr sections 502 and 503 of tho 18% Act (Imp.) amj the cm·-
responding pn1vlsions of the 1\Javigaticm i\ct 1912-/3 (Cornth.). The 
carrier under thE) Hague Rules is ofter1 thE' demise charterer or owner 
of the carrying ship, who may be protected under thr~ Imperial or Com-
monwealth Act. It appems that non-fulfilment of the seaworthin-
ess obligation, whether at common latJv m· urHler the Hague F~ules,of'ten 
cormotes a less serious breach than "actual fault or privity" or1 th~3 
40. Scheduled to Sea-Carriage of (3oods Act 192L~-73 (Comth.) and 
also to Carriage of f3oods bv Sea Ar:t 1921+ (U.K.), rep~]clled 
t1\/ Carriage of CJoor:ls by Sea 1\ct 19/1 (U.K.). 
lfl. [1961] A.C. 807. In f\1axiw3 Footwear 11. [arwliian C1ovemment 
Merchant Marine [1959] A.C. 589, pp. GfJi-603, Lord Somenmll 
pointed out: "Article III Rule 1 is an CJVEJrTiding obligation. 
lf it is not fulfilled ancl the non-fulfilment causes the dam-
age, the immunities of J-\rticle IV cannot be relied upon .... " 
42. SeB L;rlion oF ImJiii 11. 1\J.\/. RPmJPrij /\rn~;t:Pnli:Jm [1963] 2 Lloyd's 
Rf~p. 223. 
464 
l3 
part of the shipo111mer or demise charterer .1 
44 In Louis Dreyfus & Co. \J. Tempus Shippinq Co., the bunker 
coal was unfit For the vm;a!::)e. A dangerous firr::! broke out on board 
the ship. She put into a port of refuge. Expenses for the benefit of 
the ship and cargo tillere incurred. The unfitness of the bunker coal 
constituted the unseaworthiness of the ship and therefore a breach 
of the contract of carriage. However·, the House of Lords found that 
the loss of or damage to the goods occurred by reason of fire, without 
any actual fault or privity on the part of the shipowners. The ship-
owners were held to be entitled to complete relief under section 502 
of the 1891~ Act (Imp.), and to claim contributior1 from the cargo own-
ers in respect of the general average expenses incurTed. 
The reasoning of the House of Lords would equally have applied 
to a similar situation arising under a contract of carriage governed 
by thr:J repealed t;;;_arriage of Goods bv Sea Act '19211 (LJ.f<..). Section 6 
(2) read: 
"Nothing in this Act shall affect the operation of sec-
tions ... five hundred amJ two and five hundred and three 
of the Merchant Shipping Act 18%, EJS amended b\/ am; sub-
sequent enactment, or the operation of any other enact-
ment for the time being in force limiting the liabilit\/ of 
the owners of seagoing vessels." 
The unambiguous wor·ding underlined the l3ritish legislative intention 
to continue intact cvhat had been a cardinal feature of English mari-
time law. Under the Hague Rules,it is immaterial whether the unsea-
v.Jorthiness is the result of any default or omission of an independ-
ent contractor e.g. ship repairer engaged by the carrier, or the ac-
tual fault or privity of the carrier. A bn'!actl of the seaworthiness 
obligation does not automatically imply actual fault or privity within 
the meaning of the repealed section 502 of the 1894 Act (Imp.)45 or 
43. The position u~der English law is well stated in Scrutton on 
Chart£~rpartiGs, op. cit., (19th ed. 1984), p. 238. According 
to its learned authDrS: "The exemption under this section 
[s. 502] is not conditional upon the fulfilment of the implied 
warranty of s8aworthiness. Therefore PI'Oof that the fire 
was caused by unseaworthiness will not destroy the statu-
tory protection .... " As will be seen ~•hortly, it is probable 
that this rule does r1ot apply in /\ustralia. 
44. [1931] A.C. 726; also in the earlier case of \/irgir1ia Carolina 
Co. v. Norfolk S.S. Co. [1912] 1 f<..B. 229, the English Court of 
Appeal held that a shipowner ~t.Jas not d~JPI'i\/ed Df the pro-
tection _gf s. 502 merely becEJUse the fire was caused by the 
ship's unsec:1worthiness in breach of the warranty implied by 
law. 
45. Rt'c'placl~d by fvlerchant ShippinD Act 1979 (Imp.) (c. 39), ~3. 18 
( 1). 
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46 . bl section 338 of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Cornth.). It 1s argua e 
that a canier, who would otherwise be liable under the old 
-----47 
of Goods by Sea Act 1924 (U.K.) for cargo damage caused bv fire on 
board resulting from the ship's unseaworthiness, would not be pre-
cluded From invoking section 502. The prerequisite for the statutory 
protection was absence of actual fault or privity and r10t the exer-
of dut-; diligencD. 
Two furttlf3r inferences may be drawn rpgaeding the relations 
between a shipowner's responsibility under section 502hS and a carri-
er's obligations under the Hague Rules. First, since the ~weater em-
braces the lesser, actual fault or privitv of a shipowner as carrier 
should include a breach of the sr:.:Jawortlliness obligation under Article 
III rule I. Second, actual fault or privity resulting in fire damage to 
cargo IAiill pre\/ent a carrier from imJDking the immunity in Article IV 
rule 2 (Ql. This defence of "fire unless caused by the actual fault 
or privity of the carrier" will therefm'B not avail as an excFJption to 
the "cargo care" obligation in Article III rule 2.49 It is submittecj 
that, like the position under the repE!aled section 502 of the 1894 
Act (Irnp.), or section 338 of the Navigation .Act 1912-73 (Cornth.), the 
burden of proving the absence of actual fault or privitv under th(~ 
exception in Article IV rule 2 (b) rests on the CarTier. 
HowE~ver, despite the English decisions?0 tht.::re is a Privv 
Council jud~]merlt which goes the other way. In 1"1axine Footwear Co. 
v. CanarJian Government Merchant Marine,51 which was gm1ernerl by 
Canadian law, the carrier l!llas held responsiblt.:: fm fire damage!. It 
war; found that the shipowner's servants rmd not exercised due dili-
gence tJBfore and at the commencement of the voyage. The decision 
can bl? explained on this ground. Under the Hague Rules, where the 
46. As armmded. See Navigation i~\mendrnent /\ct 1979 (Corntt1.), 
~l. 65 (1). 
L,f3. i\Javigation /\ct 1912-73 (Cornth.), s. 338, as mnemJr~d. 
L,9. SmJ alsn 192l,-73 (Comth.). 
----~~~~~--~-----
Louis Dreyfus & Cu. v. ---'---.,.--:""7"---'--'----""'--- [19)1] A.C. 
; \iiff]inia Carolina Co. [1912] 1 K.B. 229. 
5U. 
51. [1950] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1!J5. 
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seaworthiness is not met, the carrier cannot rPli.J on the defence in 
Article IV rule 2 (b). However, a learmJd author is of the view that 
under English law-; different decision would have been reached?2 It 
is submitted that, with regard to loss or 
ition under the Hague Rules differs from 
due to fire, the pas-
at common law. 
Admittedly, there was some uncertainty as to the effect of 
the repealed section 502 on the "due diligence" obligation imposed 
bv Article III rule 1. It appE:ars that>to remoV!3 the difficultv,tho 
Commonwealth. Parliament opted for a provision which differed from 
that in section 6 (2) of the repealed Carriage of Goods by Sea 1\ct 
1924 (U.K.). The n:!ason is that, prior to the r:mactment of the Na\/i-
gation Amendment Act 1979 (Comth.), Part VIII of the 1"'1erchant Ship-
ping Act 1894 (Imp.), including sections 502 and 503, applied to the 
Comrnunwealtt1 <:15 part of its lat'.l. Section HJ (1) of thn -:..::..~;;.;.;;;;.;;...;;..;;.;;;;....:.:;;;. 
of Goods Act 1924-73 (Comth.) reach: 
11Nothing in this Act shall affect thB operation of Divi~3-
ion 10 of Part IV of the 1912-192() DI' the 
operation of anv other /\ct heinq in force 
limiting tim liabilitv of the ol!\ners of seaqoinq vessels." 
The Dmission fmm tile sub-section of referenr:e to s8ctior1 SfJ/' of 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1B% (Imp.) i~:; f:Jiunificant~ 3 lt indicates 
the intention of thR Commonwealth Farliament to prc""vent iJ 
l~1ho is liable under the Sea-Carriaqe of C:Joods Act 1912-13 (Curnth.) 
for fire loss or occurrinq on board dut" tn UlEl ship's unsea-
worthiness, from invoking section 502 of the 1 WJL, 1\ct (lrnp.)~)/4 
With regard to the limitation of liabilitv, there is as a matter 
of principle inconsistencv between the 
-=~-=~~~~~~~~-
1921~-/'3 (Comth.) and Part VIII uP the Navi~;)atiC1n Act 1912-/3 (L:ornth.). 
Under the former f.\ct, a carrier's !iabilitv is lirnitmj to two hundred 
52. W. Tetlev, Marine Csrgo Claims (2nd ed. 1978), p. 190. Cf, 
Sir .A. !VJocatta. Sir M. Mustill and S. Bovd, Scruttnn on-
_Charterearties and Bills of l arling (191Jl DeL 198l!), pp. llhS-
449. 
53. Cf. Carriaqrl of Goods Llv Sea 1-\ct 192LI (LU~.), ~>. 6 (2) (re-
pealed). . 
54. Pm~ VIII c: f the Mf;rchant Shipping /\ct 1094 (Imp.), as armmd-
ed, mcludmn sectwns 502, 5fJ3 and 5Ut4, has been repealed 
bv Naviqation l\mendment Act 1979 (Cornth.), s. 104 (3). Part 
VIII has ~een substituted bv 65 (1) of the 1979 Act (Cornth.), 
supra. 
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Australian dollars per package or unit of the goods lost or damaged. 
This liability limit applies irrespective of whett-JBr the breach of the 
"seaworthiness" or ''cargo care" obligation is the result of actual fault 
or privitv of the sl1ipowner ur charterer as carrier, or the neglect 
. . . 55 
or om1sswn of h1s emplovees. 
As a policy matter, an attempt was made by the Brussels Pro-
tocol 1968 to differentiate betweer1 the actual fault or privitv of 
the carrier and the neglect or omission of his servants as the cause 
of the cargo loss or damage. Ob\Jiousl y, in drawir1g the vital distin-
ction between the two types of fault, the Protocol had adopted the 
underlving philosophv of sections 502 and 503 of the 1894 Act (Imp.)~ 6 
It is unfortunate that, in distinguishing between the two tvpes of 
fault, the formulators of the Protocol had not opted for consistencv 
bv using the expression "actual fault or pri\;itv." Article 2 (e) of 
the Protocol reads: 
''Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be entitled to the 
benefit of the limitation of liability .. .if it is proved that 
the damage resulted from arl act or omission of the car-
rier done with intent to cause damage, or rE!cklesslv and 
with knowledge that damage would probablv result." 
The Hague Rules, as amended bv the Brussels Protocol 1968, are 
scheduled to the Carriage of Goods bv Sea /\ct 1971 (LJ.I\.), which has 
been in force in the United Kln~]dom since 23rd June, 1971. 
Furth£=Jr differences betwmm the law of Australia and that of the 
United Kingdom have arisen. Under the latter law, the limitation of' 
liabilitv will in normal circumstances avail the carrier or the ship-
owner in an admiralty action in rmn, except where the damage is 
caused intentionally or knowln~~lv. l\rticle (2) (g) expresslv rJeals with 
those situations where the statutory pmtection is unavailable. If 
the court applies the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
in construing the pmvision, it rnav E')XC lude the application of the 
common law doctrine of deviation or quasi-deviation. The effect is 
55. Except of course where an unjustified de\/iation or quasi-
deviation has occurred, atJrogating the special contract. 
See supra. 
56. Substituted by MBrThant Shipping Act 1979 (U.I\.), ss. 18 ami 
17, respectivelv. 
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that unjusti fiecJ deviations or quasi -deviations will no longer break 
the limit of liability except IAJhen the conditions of 1\rticle 2 (e) are 
satisfied. Moreover, its wording and the ingredients to be establish-
ed show the onerous nature of the burden of pr'oof to lw disrhorged 
by the cargo claimant. 
The Ha~Jue Rules scheduled to the Sea-Carriar~r~ of []oods Act 
1924-73 (Comth.) permit the limitation of liability to be abrogatr~d in 
instances of unjustified de\liation or quasi-deviation at cmnmnn laiAJ. 
Such fundamental breaches of a contract of carriage will enable a 
cargo claimant to recover up to the limit set bv the ~aviqation 
Amendment Act 1979 (Cornth.). Recovery bevond the statutmv limit 
is only possible where the cargo loss or damage is caused by the ac-
tual fault or privity of the shipovJner, charterer or ship operator. 
As will be seen later, contrary to the current position under the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1979 (LJ.K.)';7 under 1\r'til:le 1 (1) of UlE~ 1957 
Com;ention the owner of a sea-goinq \Jf!~:>sPl ha~:i UlF! l1urden of prov-
ing the absence of actual fault or privity <3s thr~ c<Ju~m of th~e~ loss 
or damage. This rule of evidencE!,rlCJ doutJt, favuurs cargCJ claimants. 
In practice, however, certain difficulties arP encountered tJy cargo 
claimants under the Sea-Carriage of lJoorb Act 1912-73 (Comth.). It 
is unclear whether, in every case of unjusti fiecJ deviation or quasi-
deviation at common law) a car~-=Jll claimant i~i Pntitled tu presumt3 
that it has occurred as a result of actual fault or pri\Jit\/ uf the 
shipowner or charterer. It is submi tteci that a cargo claimant 
should be given the benefit of such a presumption, leaving it to the 
carrier or shipowner to prove otherwise. 
2. Personal Blamm'liorthiness of Shipownel' 
In James Patrick ancJ [CJmp<mv L tcJ .. v. rtw L Jnion ~3 teamship Com-
pany of New Zealanli Ltd:,8 Dixon, J., identified the amas in L'llhich 
1 b "l't th t • I • 59 cu pa 1 1 y on e ~' 11powner s paet can anse. He said: 
"The primary responsibili tv of a shipowm~r is for the ~3ea­
worthiness of his sl1ip, the ~,;ufficier1cy of her manning, 
trm selection of t1er master and officers and the supply 
of all proper furnishings and provisions." 
57. See Schedule 11 fJDrt I, Article /4. 
58. (1938) 60 C.L.R. 6SO. 
59. Ibid., pp. 670-671. 
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In practice, a shipowner often has to entrust the discharge of diff-
erent aspects of this onerous dutv to his servants or agents. 
ure or omission bv such persons or independent contractors emploved 
bv a shipowner to carrv out the t.'llork rnav not render him personallv 
culpable. 
Actual fault or pri\;ity mav be attributed to the neglect or 
imprudent act of a shipowner, although the defect was present in 
the ship at the time of her acquisition or as a result of the ship's 
The facts of House of Lords case of Standard Oil Com-
. 60 h •t pany of New York v. Clan Lme Steamers Ltd. are somew at unusua . 
A vessel of the turret type \Mas unseaworthv in that she could not 
safelv undertake a vovage with a homogeneous cargo unless her lower 
tanks were filled with at least 290 tons of water. In 1909, a sister 
ship on a vovaoe from Australia to South Africa,laden with flour and 
grain~overturned and sank in fine weather, \1\Jith the loss of fortv 
men. Shipbuilders had sent out to owners of such ships a series of 
instructions as to the precautions to be taken to pre\/ent the recur-
rence of similar misfortune and to secure their stabilit,;. On leaving 
New York, the Clan Gordon was laden with a cargo of homogeneous 
character. Her master ordered two water tanks to lH~ r~mptied. The 
vessel heeled over, turned turtle, and was totally lost with her car-
go. The instructions had nm;er been comrnunicatG:d to thB ~;hip's 
master. In n:~spect of the cargo owners' claim, the House of Lords 
had no difficulty in holding that the shipowner's ~, . ,mre not entitled to 
Limit their liabilitv under section 503. fhe shipowners WEJre in breach 
of their personal responsibility in two respEJct~3. rhev sent to sea a 
ship which they knew was unfit for thP particular vuvaoe, and had 
flagrantlv omitterJ to pass on to the master those instructions which 
could have prevented the 
To constitute a breach of the principle of personal rosponsib-
ility, it is not necessarv that shipowners at the time uf ~•ending the 
60. [1924] A.C. 100; see Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. \/. /\sia-
tic Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1915] A. C. 705, where the eft'ec~ 
cause of the fire was the ship's unsemvorthiness in that 
the boilers were defective. The shipowners were unable to 
r'ely on s. 502 because they failed to discharge t11r:1 onus of 
establishing that fire occurred without their actual 
fault or pri\/itv. 
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ship to sea should have had actual knowledge of her unseaworthy 
comJitior1. In The Bristol City~ 1 an unfinished ship was sent by the 
plaintiff shipowners and builders in tow of two tug~> from f3ristol to 
Cardiff. She had on board only one anchm, m1 cables, no windlass 
and no hawsers. After taking on board her engines at Cardiff. ~;he 
v.Jas taken back bv a single tug. The tow rope, being in a rJefective 
condition \IJhich was unknowr1 to the plaintiff~i, parted. As tlw Rri~1-
tol City's onlv anchor could not hold, she clriftr=!d and cEJusre!cJ exten-
!3ive damage to the John Ena. The plaintiff~3 sought to limit their li-
ability under section 503. Both the trial judqe rmd the l::nqli~1h Cuul't 
of Appeal found that the IAJant of rroper l]round tacklP \AI[JS the rc~al 
cause of the accident. The appeal was unanimouslv disrnissml. ln 
delivering the judgment, Lord Sterndale, MJ~. macJf-~ the poi~t that 
shipowners and shipbuilders "must br~ taker1 to km1w smnethinq i:ltmut 
their business, and the equipment m~ces~>arv to make a \JBS~>el ~iFJa­
worthy."62 Thus neglect or failure t1v sr1ipowners to equip a ship 
sufficiently and constructive knowlmJcw nf t1er unc>f!a~Aiorthiness ~3uf­
ficed to constitute actual fault ur privit\1 for the purposE! of sr~ction 
503. 
To ensure safety in navis~aticm and maritime transportation, 
international conventions oftc~n requirf:> !3ea-~]oirlg ships to be in-
stalled with certain equipment~ in tJ1e rn<mner prescribed. Bv section 
94 of the Navigation Amendment Act 1979 (Comth.) effect is given to 
the Convention on the International RE'!qulations for Preventing Coll-
isions at Sea 1972. Rule 1 (a) prm;ides that the "Rules shall applv to 
all vessels upon the high seas ar1d in all waters connected therewittl 
nmrigable bv seagoing vessels." The regulaticms doal with the posi-
tioning of lights and sl1apes, sound and light signals and other appli-
ances to be installt:!d 011 the ship. 1'1oreover, the Naviqation Act 
1912-73 (Comth.) contains a number of provisions making it obligatory 
for ships to carry compasses, to b8 installf:!cJ IIJith radio equipments 
and to obsen;e the collision regulaticms. For example section 234 
reads: 
"If a ship is not equipped with compasses in accordance 
with the regulations, or the compasses 011 the ship ha\re 
not been adjusted in accordance with the rr~gulations, 
the ship shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed 
to be unseaworthy." 
61. [1921] P. L144 (C.A.). 
62. Ibid., p. 4'J1. 
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It is reasonable to presume that these statutory requiremen t.s are 
imposed as part of thE~ personal responsibility of shipowners. 
Most of the above provisions are fairly similar to those enac-
ted under the Merchant ~]hipping Act 18% (Imp.). That the presump-
tion seems to be correct is borne out bv. the English decision in The 
Truculent~3 On 12th January, 1950, a collision occurred in the 
Thames Estuary between the H.M. Submarine Truculent aml the Swed-
ish steamship Divina. Botrl vess~]ls were to blame. The Truculent 
sank almost instantly with the loss of sixty-four' lives. Those in 
charge of the Divina alleged that the lights exhibited on The Trucu-
lent were not in accordance vJith the Regulations for the Prevention 
of Collision at Sea enacted under section 418 of the 1894 Act (Imp.). 
Section 741, however, exempted His i"lajestv 's ships from the opera-
tion of the Act. But by C::hapter XVJ of the King's Regulations and 
Admiralty Instructions. provisions idE?ntical IAJi th the collision regu-
lations were applicable to His rrlaiesty's ships. Those in charge of 
the Divina were misled by the lights on The Trl!culent. The onl\f 
lights visible on the latter, viz. tile green and 1/\lhite, appE~ared ver\f 
close together and both ver\f low, giving the impression that the 
approaching vessel was something vmy small, such as a motor launch 
or yacht. The King's Regulations and Instructions wel'e published to 
the world at large. Willmer, J., COITt~ctlv l1eld that the f\dmiralty 
had acceptecJ on behalf of His Majesty's ships the same dut\f to obey 
the collision regulations as was imposed on othet~ vessels. He found 
that there had been a brEJach lly The Truculent of such dut\f owecJ to 
other vessels, ~· the Dlvina. It was tr1e omission or neglect of the 
Admiral tv to issue arw notice warning of sutJrnahnes navigating on 
trm surface at night. Bv reason of section 5 (1) uf tht:) Crown Pro-
ceedings Act 1947 (Imp.)~L, the Admiralty which were in the position 
of owm?rs of The Truculent applied to limit His Majesty's liability 
under ~>ection 503 of the Merchant Shippir1q /\ct (Imp.). E\;idence 
showed that the Third Sea Lord, with the authori tv of the full Boar·d 
of the AcJrniralty, had appro\/ed plans for Um positioning of submar-
ines' lights which were not; in accordance tile collision r·esJulations. 
The clairn on behalf of His Maje~>tv for the limitation of liability \Alas 
62. Ibid., p. 451. 
63. [1952] P. 1. 
6L1. ~3. 5 sulJstituted bv ~:lchedule 5 para. 3, Mm-chant ~)hipping 
Act 1979 (U.K.). 
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clismissEJd. It is clear that thE! principlp, imposing personal respon-
sibility on shipowners was breached. This occurrcCJd when the Third 
Sea Lord's approval was given for the installation of those lights 
in contravention of the collision regulations,and the Admiralty 
failed to issue warning notice. 
In determininEJ whether the /\dmiralty could tJe fixed with act-
ual fault or privity, the learned judge applied the principles laid 
down by Viscount Haldane, L.C., in identifying the "directing mind" 
of a limited company.65 Thus,the Third Sea Lord 11vas to the Board 
of the Admiralty what tho managing director, as an alter or the· 
board of directors to the company. 
During the last two decades, the concept of actual fault or 
privity has been given a broader scope, probably in the~ light of 
nm"1 technolony and de\Jelopments in business practices. One con-
sequence is to impose on shipowners a higher standard of personal 
responsibility. Actual fault occurs through failure to make them-
sel\Jes aware of what they ought to know. It may consist in being 
privy to the neglect, unskilfulness, improper act or omission of a 
ser\Jant or agent. In each case, the loss or damf.l~ie must have occ-
urred through want of appropriate steps being taken to rectify the 
situation. 
The two types of bmach by shipowners are exemplified in the 
English Court of' Appeal decis.i.on in Arthur ()uinness, Son & Company 
(Dublin) Ltd. v. The Fre~1hfield (Owners) and Otht:~rs~6 rhe Lady 
Gwendolen owned by the appellants collided with, and sank the ;_;;_.;;.c::...._ 
field which was at anchor. The collision occurred in dense fog with 
the Lady C)wendolen going at full speed. It was fmmd that r~. the 
marine superintendent, and B, the traffic manaqer, were unaware 
that for years the master had "hatJi tually navigated the \/essel in 
fog at excessi\Je speed." Apart from attendins1 a rarJar observers' 
course, thEJ master had no experience of !adar and not received 
65. [1952] P. 1, p. 21; see <Jlso Lennard's Carryir1g Co. Ltd. v. 
Asiatic Petroleum Co. ltd. [19151 A.C. 705, pp. 713-714. 
66. [1965) P. 294. 
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any instruction in the proper use of radar in connection with navi 
gation in fog. R and B made no attempt to draw his attention to 
notice l"l,published by the Ministry of Transport in December, 1960, 
ri.'Jlating to nm1igation with radar in poor visibility. Moreover, as 
R and B were totally unaware of the rnaster 1f3 t1abit of going at full 
speed in dense fog, they had failed to 1..\Jarn him of the grave risks 
involved. That the personal responsibility of shipowners had been 
breached by the managing director, B, and f~ was clear. 
They had failed in their responsibility to make themselves aware of 
the navigational problems in the use of radar, to emphasise to the 
master the urgency of these problems, and to take steps to ensure 
the safe navigation of the ship. The English Court of Appeal unan-
imously upheld the decision of the trial judge that the shipowners 
were guilty of actual fault and tvere therefore not entitled to the 
decree of limitation of liability. 
It is interesting to note, in the judicial reasoning)ndications 
of a modern approach to the problems of omission, default or neg-
lect by those in\/olved in discharging the personal responsibility of 
shipowners. Willmer, J., was of the \/iew t.11at ttwre was a lack of 
managerial control over the nc=wigation of the appellants' ships, 
and that improper management had contributed to the collision. 
3. The Management Concept 
It is immaterial whether U1e management. of a ship is under-
taken by her owners or by a tJody corporate. The courts ha\Je 
moved in the right direction by taking cognizance of the changes 
in the pattern of ship operations and shipping practicc~s of the 
second half of the t\JI)entieth century. In adopting UHi concept of 
ship management as a new critBrion, the courts ar·e really re-defin-
the persunal responsibility of shipowners. Included in the prn-
\Jince of ship management are certain matters wllich,in the past) 
were deemed to be part of a master's duties. f\pparently> the first 
case where the ship management doctrine was applied in relation to 
. r· . t ~ . 67 h a speer 1c equ1pmen was TtlB Norman. T e House of Lords threw 
67. Northern Fist1ing Co. (Hull) Ltd. \1. Eddorn, lhc: Norman [1960] 
1 Lloyd's Rep. 1 (House of Lords). 
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fresh light on the extent of the managerial duties of owners and 
managers, particularlv ~11ith regard to the pmvision of navigational 
information and publications to the ship. This decision represented 
a nm'll approach. It was no longer permissible for shipowners or 
manager~; to lE~a\Je all matters of navigation completely to the un-
assisted discretion of ships' masters. Another decision which supp-
orts the doctrine RBderij Erven H. C1roen and Groen v. 
l ,,, 68 h ' . t ll d and (Owners). For t e coll1s1on between t 1e m. v. l\ etta owne 
bv the plaintiffs, in the limitation action, and the m.v. "England'' owned 
by the defendants, the former were found to be four-fifths to 
blame. The issue was lruhether G, the managing owner of ·.:..;,;,;;:,.;_..;.:.;;.:;..;;;..= 
was guiltv of actual fault which had contributed to the collision. 
He had failed to take anv proper steps to ensure that the ship's 
master t1ari on board and available ·for use ttle latest Port of London 
River bve-laws. The Court of Appeal the decision of the 
Admiraltv Court and held that G was guiltv of actual fault in 
respect of such failure. In delivering his judgment, Sir Gordon 
Willmer said:69 
''It seems to me that anv companv ~vhich embarks on the 
business of shipowning must accept obligation to 
ensure efficient management of its ships to enjoy the 
Vf:rv considerable benefits conferred bv the statutorv 
right to limitation." 
A fairly recent authority which endorses the management 
trine is the House of Lords dr~cision in ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
v. Norpipe A/S and Others?0 While weighing anchor at Teeside the 
appellants' Liberian tanker, the Marion, negligentlv fouled and sev-
erelv damaged a pipeline on the seabed carrv ing oiL l_;ndoubtedlv, 
the immediate cause of thr~ damage was the nBgli~.Jence of the Mar-
ion's master. He na\Jigated the tanker· tJv rE~ference to a long ob-
solete chart on which tile pipeline was not shown. f\n English com-
panv (FMSL) had bEmn delegated the manaqement and opera-
The Liberian Bureau Maritime Affairs 
68. [1973] 1 Uovd's Rep. 373. reversing 
[1972] 1 Llovd's Rep. 375. 
69. [1973] 1 LlovcJ's Rep. 373, p. 3£33. 
70. [1984] 2 All E.R. 31~.:;. 
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court decision: 
an 
inspec r,orate report on the 1"1arion cont<:Jining the dm;astating com-
ment "Nav. charts for trade of vessel corrections obmitterj [sic) 
for several vears." Six weeks after receiving the report, G, f:rn-
ploved bv FMSL in a managerial capacity, wrote to the Marion's 
master. However, the master failed to complv with G's written re-
quests to take steps to ensure that ali charts and navigational 
publications were regularlv updated as required. There \.1\/as no ef-
fective follow-up on the matter bv G and L (G's other managerial 
colleague). D, the managing director of FMSL and who had been awav, 
became aware of the inspectorate report onlv after the pipeline 
damage. The owners of the Marion were found guiltv of two actual 
faults. These were attributed to D's failure to have a proper svs-
tem of supervision in relation to charts and to give L and D suffic-
ientlv clear, precise and comprehensive instructions as to the mat-
ters about which he v.;as to be kept informed during his absence. 
Both failures are seen as managerial faults. It is submitted that 
nefficient management'\ which is suff'icientlv flexible, should now be 
adopted as the sole formula to evaluate the proper exercise and 
discharge of shipowners' personal responsibilitv. The new doctrine 
is founded on the words of Lord Brandon t-vho delivered the single 
House of Lords judgment. He said?1 
"1"1y Lords, I am of the opinion that what Sir Gmdon Will-
mer there described as 'The relativelv m~w approach' tJe-
gun bv your Lords' House in The Norman in 1960 and con-
tinued ... in The Lady GwencJolen in 1965 and Th£3 EnqlamJ 
in 1973, should now tJe regarded as the cormct approach 
in law to the problem of actual fault of ~3hipowner·s or 
ship managers in contested limitation actions." 
Our reliar1ce on English authoritic:-Js for the stucJy of the cjev-
t~lopment of this aspect of Australian law is unm10idable for sev-
eral reasons. Until the repeal and l'eplac("ment of' Part VI!I of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) (including sections 502 dnd 503) by 
the provisions of the Navigation ArnE'ndment Act 1979 (Comth.), Part 
VIII had operated as part of the la1"' of the Cummcmweal th. Austral-
ian decisions tJased on ~3ection~; l)02 and 503 are not manv in numbt=:r 
and naturallv tend to follow thE.~ judicial pronouncements of English 
judges. The adoptior1 by the Navigation Amendment /Act 1979 
(Comth.) of the International Convention relating to the Limitation 
of the Uablli tv of Sea-going Ships 195 71 as Cmnrnonweal th lav.;, is 
71. Ibid., p. 347. 
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unlikelv to produce a situ<Jtior1 ~r~there Austr<:1lian judges t<\lill r:onstrue 
the words "actual fau It or pri vi tv" dl fff:orer1tl v from thr~i r English 
counterparts in the past. Tile reason is that the United !\ingdom 
and probablv m;er thirtv other countries had also given effect to 
this 1957 Convention in their national laws:2 To achieve the dGsired 
goals, the trend had been towards harmony and consisterlC\f in the 
interpretation of those kev words. 
Undoubtedlv, the majm' probh~m confrontinrJ o~r~tners and man-
agers of ships in limitation actions is the burden of proof. Neither 
the 1957 Convention nor the pre-converltion legislation mane anv 
provision as to the party required to meet it. In the High Court of 
Australia case of James Patrick and Companv Ltd. v. The Union 
n Steamship Company of New Zealand Ltd_.,- the owners of the s.s. 
Caradale sought to limit. their liabilitv under sections 503 and 504 
of the fV\er'Chant Shipping /\ct. 18% (Imp.) for collision damage caused 
to another ship. Dixon, J .. expmmrJed '"''ith remarkable claritv the 
onus incumbent upon thl=! applicar1ts when he said/L1 
"r:or the burden of proof ir1 thE:; present proceedings is 
upon the opposite partv, the owners of the Caradale. 
Unless thev dischaL'ge the tJurden of excluding actual 
fault or pri\;itv on their part, thev cannot obtain a de-
creo for the limitation of their liabilitv, and, if a given 
fact or c3tat~j of facts would ~;tamJ in the ~r~Ja\f of their 
doing so, it is enousJh that its cc;xi~3tf?nce appears prob-
able or m;en to be a reascmablGl supposition. It is not 
necessarv that it should be pos i tiVE:)l v found." 
The first State ~)upreme Court case, which deals with a similar issue 
after the 1957 CorlVention bE:Jcame c::ommonwealth law, is Ga~19in v. 
75 Moss. ThE~ vacht Selathia at arichm belonging to the respondents 
was negligentlv struck and sunk bv the fishing vessel Madonna owned 
bv the appell<mt. The trial crJUI't directed the judgment to be en-
tered against the appellant shipownGr for $76,947 and the master 
of Madonna for ~B24,802. Ejv virtue'! of' f\rticle 6 ()) of the 1957 Con-
vention, which vJas brought into force under the Navigation Amend-
ment Act 1979 (Cornth.), the mastE~r was entitled to limit his liability. 
72. A~> to the list of countries that harJ ratified or acceded to 
it, see Regi:,ter of ConvFcmtion~1 and Other Instruments con-
corning Intomational Trade Law (19/3) vol. .n, p. 169, 
United 1\Jations. 
73. (1938) 60 C.L.I~. 650. 
74.lb.i.d..._, p. -tJ5L~o M.LtJ. Forde, "CornrnEmts on Limitation of Ua-
bilitv; r:ault und Pri\;itv in Marine Claims" (1981~) 14 Q. Law 
~)oc. J. 255. 
75. [198:11 2 Qd. R. L186. per McPherson, J. 
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This relief is available even where the occurrence) whkh gave rise 
to the claim,l"lad resulted from his actual fault or prh;ity. The trial 
judge held that the appellant shipowner was not entitled to limit 
his liability under Article 1 (1 ). He was not persuaded that the 
casualty occurred without his actual fault or privity. The appeal 
l , . } I' . d76 brought by the appe lant sh1powner was unammous y msm1sse . 
Despite the operation of the Convention, tile decision show::> no 
change in the attitude of Australian judges as to the burden of 
proof. In tile House of Lords case of Standard Oil Co. of New York 
v. Clan Line Steamers Ltd., Viscount Haldane observed?7 
"It is now well settled that those IAiho plead the section 
as defence (scil. s. 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act) must 
discharge the burden of prm;ing that they come within 
its terms. That is to say, they must show that they were 
themselves in no way in fault or privy to what occurred!' 
In v. Gagqin and Another?8 CampbelL C.J .. and Connolly, J., 
of the Full Court of Appeal of Queensland Supreme Court adopted 
the proposition of Viscount Haldane and that of Dixon, J., cited 
above. Connolly, J., (with whose view Campbell, C.J., agrEmd) said?'9 
"The burden of proving the absence of actual fault or 
privitv was on the appellant throughout. 1Je cannot ciis-
charge that burden bv ~3aying in effect that he accupts 
that the immediate cause of thf} casualty t>\las faulty nav-
igation on the part of the master lea\Jing at larsJEJ the 
nature of that fault." 
An important fBature of the limitation decree is that it oper-
ates upon claims that rt3St upon the original cau~m of action and 
those that hm;e passed into judgment. A defendant shipowner, when 
sued for the collision damage, is not obliged <'lt tim same proceed-
ings to seek the statutmy relief by setting up a counter-claim~0 
He is not precludecj from instituting an independE~nt action on a 
subsequent occasion to limit his liability. 
76. See Gaggin v. Moss [198h] 2 Qd. R. 513. 
n. r 192 41 1\ . c . 1 oo, P. 113 . 
78. (1983-StJ 51 A.L.R. 721. 
79. Ibid., p. 729. 
80. Ibid., p. 724 where t11e proposition of Dixon, J., in James 
Patrick & Co. ltd. v. Union Steamship Co. nf 1\low Zealand 
Ltd. (19~8) 60 C.L.I~. 550, p. 673 was cited with apprm;c:Jl. 
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The 1957 Convention permits a logical demarcation line to be drawn 
between employees and managem(mt personnel. This distinction is 
crucial if the master or a member is at the same time the owner, 
co-owner, charterer, manaDer or operator of the ship. By Article 
6 (3), the limitation of liability will nevertheless apply where the 
act, neglt?ct or fJefault, which gives rise to thE: casualt~;) is committ-
by the person in Ills capacity as master or crmtJ member only. 
The prmtision, though l'_)xtendecl to all management personneL is an 
enactment of a rule of interpretation attributed to Dr. Lushington 
in the second t1alf of the nineteenth century. lr1 Th8 Clbey,81 he 
found that the master, who was also a pmt-owner of thtc1 ~>hip, ~.vas 
not [=JUilty of any fault which was the cause of the collision. He 
said that "to say that, because the master is a part-owner you can 
charge the other owners with blame, \ll!ould be conr,rnrv to all rea-
son and principle." 82 The construction arosE! out of section "Jl1 of 
the'! English Merchant Shippinn 1\rnendment /\c~ 18b2 (Imp.) dealing 
with the limitation of liability. 
It is uncertain how far by givin~~ Hffc?ct to thl'! 19/6 Convon 
tion, the Merchant Shipping /\ct 19/9 .1"\.) will upurat£~ to furthPr 
the management doctrine. UncJoutJtecJ!y, U1is Uuctrirm coulcJ ilmte 
some application in cieter'rnining the type of culpablu conduct that 
'll t > t' 1· · t · t · · · b ·1· \ · t fn w1 preven · a person rom um .Hl[J H~> 1 lil 1 1 ty. r r·Llc 1::1 1, · !'8 
specifically to the nature and burrJun of proof to LJe rnet. ihe dis-
entitlement arises cvhere "it is proved that the lo~3~3 n?sultl~d from 
the personal act or umi~:lsion, committed with the int;rmt to cause 
such loss, or recklesslv <md with knowlt:dge t.hat sucl1 lo~>s would 
probably result:' Again in tl1e 1976 C:ml\.i(mtlon, tim clairn~J subjoct 
to limitation and the conduct tmrring 1imitatlor1 are rJealt with under 
two separate Articles. The allm1e factors ll?arJ cmc~ to infer that 
claimants seeking to recovor cornpr~nsation in t:lXCPss of the limita-
tion fund must discharge the heavy emus roquln:d in Article t~. If 
our reasoning is correct;, then this is another rnatE?rial rJifferm1ce 
81. (1866) 12 Jur. (N. 817. 
82. Ibid., p. 818. 
83. Schedule 4 Part I. 
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between the laws of Australia 84 and the United Kingdom. It means 
that the principles relating to proof by shipowners, chmterers or 
certain other persons that the loss or damage occurred without 
their actual fault or privitv is no longer part of the United King-
dom's law~5 
4. Extent of Vicarious Liability 
On the presumption that the burden of proof incumbent on 
shipowners has been discharged to the court's satisfaction, there 
still remains to be worked out the quantum of damages recoverable 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. It will be recall eel that 
the Responsibility of Shipowners Act 173LI (Imp.) was probably the 
first of its kind to introduce a formula for limiting shipowners' lia-
bility. Thus where the loss or damage occurred without the "priv-
ity and knowledge" of shipowners in certain situations, the limita-
tion of liability would apply. They were not answerable beyond 
"the value of the ship or vessel, with all her appurtenances and 
the full amount of the freight due or to grow due for and during 
the voyage" 86 concerned. With minor exceptions, the formula was 
virtuallv retained for over twelve decades by successive legisla-
tion~7 Between the first settlement of New South Wales in 1788 
and the passing of the NavigAtion Amendment Act 1979 (Comth.), Im-
perial legislation had operated as part of Australian law. 
Two difficulties were presented bv the formula. A!3 the "val-
ue of the ship" was nowhere defined in any of the Acts (Imp.), claim-
ants were placed in a disadvantaged position. To promote certain-
ty, all three judges of the Court of King's Bench held in Wilson v. 
Dickson,88 decided in 1818, that the expression meant "the existing 
value at the time when the loss takes place." The mode of ascer-
taining the value was still not a clear-cut matter. If the ship did 
84. See Article 1 (1) of' the 1957 Convention which, apart from 
Article 1 (1) (c), has been given the forcE~ of law by Nav-
igation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), s. 333, as amEmded. --
85. Dv reference to Merchant Shipping Act: 1B% (Imp.), ss. 502 
and 503 (repealed); see Also Merchant Shippinq Act 19/9 
(U.K.), ss. 17 and 18 and ~3chedule 7 Part I. 
86. 7 Geo. II, c. 15, s. 1; 26 Ceo. III, c. 86, s. 1; 53 [)eo. III, c. 
159,s.1. 
87. Src~e Merchant Shipping Act 1B54 (Imp.), ss. 504 and 505. 
88. 106 E.R. -2'68, p. 273. 
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ultimately arri\;e, tJv asscssin~l hr:~r \!<llllt? <Jt L11c~ rlc?~;tirl<lticm. it. ~~~,l~> 
possible to find the value Elt the time of Uw lu~is. lr1 CJthr'r c:cJ:ic"~i. 
when the exact time of thr~ loss or ca~>LJCJ!tv 1"-'ilS uncc:rt<Jin. cl<Jim-
ants would present a prima-facie case <Js !'l~CJ<Jrds hr'r \IilitH' <Jt UlF? 
time of sailing.89 Shipowners. as cJefEmdEmts, tl<HJ U1c: mlLJ:; of pnJ\J-
ing that since the time in qw~stior1 tt1e ~1t1ip h<1lJ clcpr·c'Ciilt.c'c1 ir1 \lill-
ue. A llispute arose in The "nundr-lE!nlJU irl\/ol\;inq ti1P linlJiliLv of Ul8 
owners of ~'l Greenland fishing \Jl'~~>sel for rJ<HnnqF; clnr1c: tu ;mothr!r 
British ship. The former was [!quippr:?d for a wtld I i nq \JCJV<1qe with 
fishing stores. Section 1 of ttm I~E?~;pon~;itJility of ~ihipowrmrs Act 
1813 (Imp.) mentioned only thP ship anrJ f'reiqht. rtH~ :iuit I;I)<JS comm-
enced in the Court of Admiralty by an m·r·u~3t of the \Je~>sel, tackle, 
apparel and furniture only. Lord ~3towell rm\/E!rt.heless held that, 
since the fishing stores IAiere part of tlw :;t1ip, tJH?\f wHr'P apptn·ten-
ances within the meaning of thF' Act. 
One flaw in the stututorv pro\/i~;icm~; !'or· CJ~icPrtainin~] the 
liability limit is obvious. Shipowrmr~' couiu easilv arrange with 
charterers and cargo shiPPEH'S fur tile t'reiqt1t: to be paid am; time 
before or after the voyage. IL would uppear ttlaL hirc'l for the 
charter of a ship bas~Jd on tirnt? pur·iods,rather than on individu<:1l 
voyages,would fall outside thP fonnuia. 1-tm courts pl<J\fed a sig-· 
'f' t 1 91 . . t . f m 1can ro e m protectmg t lP mLt?I'ests o cl,:Jimant~i tJy pre\/ent-
ing shipowners from fre:1udulentlv reducing the limitation fund. Thus 
in Wilson v. DicksonP2 the common luw judges held that, in calculat-
ing the value of "freight due or to s!row due:", mom:y actually paid 
in advance was to be included. In Canr1an and Others \/. i"'leaburn 
and Dthers~3 an action was brought again~;t a shipowner fur the 
loss of goods carried. The cumpleticm of the voyage was prevented 
89. See Cannan and Others \1 . . Mea burn and Othc::!rs (1824) 1 
Bing. 465, infra. 
90. (1823) 166 E.R. 39. 
91. If the true amount reprE:sentinsJ thP value of the ship, 
appurtenances and freight was not paid into court, further 
payment would be required; moreover, the r:ourt was £~m­
powered to take measures to ascertain the value of the 
ship, etc.: Responsibilitv of Shipowners f\ct 1813 (Imp.), 
ss. 8 and 10. 
92. (1818) 106 E.R. 268. 
93. (1824) 1 Bing. 1~65. 
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by the tortious sale nf t-,he !ihip bv hm· master. Lord Gifford, C.J .. 
held that the extent of the shipowners' liabilitv would include the 
amount of freight she would havE? earned had she cornplet£~d her vov-
age}and not the amount of frr=3iSJht calculated at the commencement 
of her vovage. The recurring problems,which related to the meaning 
of freight} were largelv due to the furtive and d£~vious dealings of 
shipowners. Thev led to the inclusion of section 505 in the Mer·chant 
Shipping Act 1854 (Imp.). This provision comprehensivelv defined 
freight to include thr~ value of tllf? caniage of anv goods or merchan-
dise belonging to the shipowner, rassage monev and also the hire due 
or to grow due under anv contract. The definition seems wide 
enough to embrace virtuall v all forms of a ship's earnings. Express-
lv excluded from it was hire for time charter which would not begin 
until the expiration of six months after the ship's loss or damage. 
It is interesting to note that a different approach to the con-
cept of limiting shipowners' liabilitv was introduced bv the 1854 Act 
(Imp.). The pre-existing mode of computing liability was retained to 
applv to claims for loss ur damage caused to goods carried and to 
arw ship bv reason of improper na\Jigation. and For injurv or loss of 
life caused to anv pprson on boc':lrd arw ship. HoiAJBver. the rmw for-
mula IAJas used to limit liatJilitv for personal ir1jurv or loss of life 
d t 9LJ Tl . . d f t" . cause o anv passenger. 11s met11o o compu mg compPnsatwn 
based on the product of fifteen pounds CJrld the ~>hip's registered 
tonnage has distinct advantages. It reliE:ves the passPnswr Llr his 
personal representative of somr:l of U1e problems Faced bv claimants 
previouslv. 
Owing to the ease and certaintv with whic1·1 shipowners' maximum 
liabilitv could be worked out, the new method was alone adopted by 
the Merchant Shipping Amendmf?nt Act 1862 (Imp.). Where personal in-
jurv Dl' loss of life was caused to <:mv person carriecj in a ship or7 bv 
reason of improper navigation of sud1 shrp, to any per~mn carTi8d in 
another ship, the aggregate amount recoverable was limited to fifteen 
pounds per ton of the ship's registered tonnage. In the casEJ of loss 
of or damage to goods carried, it was limited to Elight pounds PC'lr ton 
of the ship's regi~3tered tom1age:') With regard to steamships, the 
94. Merchant Shipping Ar:t 1854, pnJvi~'io to s. 504. 
95. See s. Sir. 
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gross tonnage was taken as the multiplying factor without deduction 
on account of the engine room. It is hiqhh; significant that thE! leg-
islators of the MEJrchant Shipping Pcts96 and the formulators of in-
ternational maritime Convention~7 have endorsed this method of 
computing liability. The giving of effect to the 1957 Convention by 
the .Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act 1958 
and the Navigation Amr:mdment Act 1979 (Comth.) ensured uniformity 
in the method of computing damages under the laws of the two coun-
tries. We shall, in due course, consider wt18ther any difference in 
the amount of limitation fund existed. 
Under the 1957 Convention, the net tormage of the ship is to be 
taken as the multiplying factor. With regard to steamships or mech-
anically propelled ships, for the purpose of calculating the net tonn-
age there must be deducted from the gross tonnage the addition of 
. 98 
any engme room space. By section 97 of the Navigation Amendment 
Act 1979 (Comth.), effect has been given to the International Con-
vention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships 1969 ?9 
One obvious si10rtcoming of the 1957 Convention is tr1e lack of 
provisions to cover collisions invot\/ing a tug ancJ/or her tow on the 
one hancl and another ~;hip un thE! other hamt If claims ore brought 
by the mvners Df a third vessel, doubts can ari~>e as to whethBr, 
for the purpose of the limitatiun fund, the tonnage of the tug alone 
or the combined tonnage of both is to bE! taken. /\s regards the pre-
Convention position, /'lustralian law CHl the subject was based on 
Imperial legislation and English case authorities. 
96. Merchant Shipping f\ct 1 f394 (Imp.), s. 503 (rtJpealed): Merchant 
Shipping (Liability of Shipown~:~rs anrJ [Jthecs) Act 1958 (U.f\.), 
s. 1 (1) (repealed). 
97. International Con\/ention l'elatinD to the Limitation of the 
Liability of D1Mners of SE!a-goin~~ Ships, l9cj/, Article 3 rule (1); 
Corl\Jentiorl on Limitation of Liability for i'-'laritime Claim~3 1976, 
1\rticle 6 rule 1. 
98. Article 3 ru h~ 7. 
99. This ensure~; that U1e method used in 1-\U~::itraiia for rm!asurinrJ a 
ship\> gross tonnage is ~>irnilar to tl1at applied E?l:::;ewherD. 1'1ore-
Dver, the Mm·chant Shipping .L\d 1979 (Imp.), Schodult-1 4 Part li, 
rule 5 (2) pro\/ides for fl ship 1s gross tonnage to bt-J calculated, 
so far as practicable!, acr:ording to the r·egulations in i\mlox 1 
of the IntPrnationai Convontion on Tonnage Measuremr:mt of 
Ship;3, 1969. 
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In The Quickstee~ the tug failed to carrv a second masthead 
light to indicate that it was towing. r:onsequenth;, the steamer 
Charles Dickens carne into collision with the hopper barge and sus-
tained extensive damage. The hoppee barge carried a proper light 
and had two men on board. It was admitted that there was no inter-
ference by those on board the hopper barge with the navigation of 
the tug. The barge owners were held to be exempt fl'Drn liability for 
the negligence of the crew of the tug. Whett1er the creiAI of the tug 
were to be regarded as the servants of the owner of the vessel in 
tow was dependent upon the circumstances in each case. No general 
rule was laid down as to the liability of a vessel in tow for a collis-
ion between her and another \Jessel due to the negligent navigation 
of those on board the tug. 
The Hm·low2 is a classic case where the claim of the owner's of 
a third vessel against the owner's of a tug and her tows \Alas limited. 
The Harlow and the barges in her tow, belonging to the same owner 
and being navigated by different persons, were solely to blame for 
the damage caused b\f collision to the steamship Dalton. In the lim-
itation action, the owners of the Dalton objected to a decree being 
granted limiting the plaintiffs' liabilitv under section 503 to an 
amount to be measured bv the tonnage of the Harlow alone. The iss-
ue before the court was the extent to which the plaintiffs could lim-
it their liabilitv. It was established that the Harlow and all the bar-
ges were improperly navigated. The findings, however, showed that 
the damage to the Dalton was caused bv the Harlmv and two of the 
barges in her tow, Silver and Solotu. Sir Henrv Duke held that the 
plaintiffs "are entitled to limit their liability ... to an aggregate amount 
made up of £8 per ton of the several tonnages of the Harlow, the dumb 
barge Silver and the dumb barge Solutu." 3 He appears to have adop-
ted the concept of immediate or effective cause as the criterion for 
determining the liability limit of owner's of the tug and a number of 
barges in her tow. 
A similar rule was applied in the Tasmanian case of Willlnrns Hol-
Y:mfln & Sons Pty. Ltd. v. The Me:1rine Board of Launceston.4 The tug 
"Wvbia" and one of the four lighters in tow - all belonging to the de-
fendant - negligently collided with the plaintiff's steamer 11l1Jareatea". 
1. (1890) 15 p ·12-· 196. 
2. ['1922) P. 175. 
3. Ibid., p. 187. 
!4. (1929) 24 Tas. L.R. 6!1. 
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Here none of the lighters were manned by any crew on hoard. 
Inevitably, the master of the "Wybia", the defendant's servant, hlas 
deemed responsible for the navigation of both the tug and ligt1ter 
concerned. There is some authority fof' the proposition that, in such 
circumstances, where a tug is negligently navigated and collision 
damage is caused to a third vessel by the tug and her tow, the tug 
and her tow will be treated as a single unit? Clark, J., held tt1at, 
under section 503, the plaintiff t.vas entitled to recover up to a maxi-
mum amount based on the combined tonnage of thD "Lllybia'' and the 
lighter~ 
llle shall look at the situation where the barne is nDt to blame. 
In the English Court of Appeal case of The "Bramley Moore"/ a coll-
ision occurred between the rn.v. Egret and the Millet, one of the two 
dumb barges in the tow of the tug Bramlev Moore. Both ttu:~ 
and the tug were equally to blame for tJm collision. Tile tu~J <:md UlE! 
barge belonged to different owner~3. Un behalf of the appellant own-
ers of the it was forcefully arnuPd til<Jt it was UlCJ nF!~JliLJence 
of those on board the tug that comJt.itutmJ thr~ imprnpE~r navi(Jation 
of the IVJillet. An ingenious arnurmmL t'\Jas rai~>BcJ n~qarding section '503 
(1) (d) (ii). lt was contend£'!d that, once it IAIElS l1rdd that thE! ser\Jarlt:3 
of the respondent owners of the tug irnpropE:Jrly na\/iqated the barge, 
the latter could not limit their liability. In £:Jctinq thE:: arguments, 
5. The Ran; The Grayg<:H'trl [1922] 1:1. 80, pp. 86-Fl/. Lord Denning 
doubted the correctness of tt1e decision: Tho "Bramley" 
Moore" [1963] 2 Lloyd's Rep. L1Z9, p. ld6. 
6. In Mcilwraith McEacharn Ltd. \/. The Sr1ell Cmnparw of Aust-
ralia Ltd. (191,5) 70 C.L.R. 175, a tug t'l!ith a lighter lashed to 
her starboard side negligently collided with, and occasioned 
damage to) a third \Jessel. The tug was chartered to the 
plaintiff in the limitation suit,and at the material time was 
under the control of t1is employees. The plaintiff was also 
the hirer of the lighter. Tt was held by the Full Court of 
the Supreme Court of New South lllales that the rlaintiff was 
entitled to limit his liability under s. 503 but only by ref-
erence to the tonnage of both the tug amJ the lighter. nm 
decision was uphtcJld by the fiigh Court of /~ustralia. 
7. [1963] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 429. For differences in appmacll be-
tween Engli::;h and American laws, see L.J. f\ovats. "Tug and 
Tovv - Limitation of Liability - The Flotilla lssue" [1977] 1 
L.M.C.L.Q. 19. 
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Lord Denning, M.R., used the "effective cause" criterion when he :3aid: 8 
"And in a case where those on the tug are negligent, and 
those on the barge are not, the cause of the damage is in 
truth the improper navigation of the tug, not thf) improp-
er navigation of the barge. It is the tug which is the cause 
of all the trouble." 
In Lord Denning's view, the result of the amendment of section 503 
(1) (d) by the Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) 
.Act ~958 (U.K) was to dispel the "logical difficulty." 9 Thus where the 
tow collides with another vessel due to the negligence of those on 
board the tug, then the damage is caused through an "act or omission 
of an person on board the tug" within the provision. The English 
Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the trial court decision that the 
respondents' liability 11\Jas limited according to the tonnage of his tug 
alone. His Lordship reiterated that the limitation of liability "is a 
rule of public policy which has its origin in history and its justific-
ation in convenience."10 Dbviously by construing the provision in a 
broad sense, effect is given to the object of the 1957 Convention 
which extends the limitation of liability. 
Suppo~;e that the tuq and the tow belong to differ-
ent owners. If, as a result of the combined negligence of the master 
of the tug and the crew on the lighter, the latter comes into collis-
ion with a third vessel, the owners of the tug and the lighter can 
limit their liability according to the tonnage of their particular ves-
sel. His Lordship is of the view that where the damaged vessel makes 
claims against both, their liability is limited to the combined tonnage 
of the two vessels. indeed, he went so far as to say that the 1958 
Act (U.K.), which amended section 503 of the 1fJ94 Act (Imp.), "makes it 
clear that the previous practice was right. 1111 He meant that the 
1958 amendment had made no change in English maritime law so far as 
the rules for limiting the liability of tug-m"HlE!rs and barge-owners 
8. Ibid., p. 1136. 
9. Ibid., p. 437. Unfortunately, there is nothing in the Convention 
on Limitation of Liability For Maritime Claims 1976 to deal with 
the matter. 
10. Ibid., p. t,37. 
11. IbicL, p. 437. It is reasonable to presume that the lat'li laid 
dmvn prior to the passing of the MEJrchant Shipping .Act 1979 
(U.K.) would continue to applv. 
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Wflre concerned. Moreover, sectior1 503 of tho 1894 Act (Imp.), as am-
ended, retained the word "5hip" which had been construed widely to 
include a tug, dumb barge and lighter. 
In directly incorporating the 1957 Convention as part of the 
Navigation Amendment Act 1979 (Comth.), Commonwealth Parliament 
was faced with one problem. This was the rather narrow scope of 
protection available in many instances. f\rticle 1 (1), which provides 
relief, begins with the words: "ThP owner of a sea-going ship rnay 
limit his liability in accordance with /\rticle 3 .... " The expression 
"sea-going ship" is not defined in Lhf-~ 1957 Convention. By section 
deemed to include a ship which \.Vas engaged in trade or commerce 
with other countries or among the States or with the Territories, and 
a ship under construction which \~Jas int~:mded to be usecJ for such 
pursuits. For the purpm;e of protection under the Convention, the 
meaning given the Commonwealth lenislation to "sea-~]oing ship" 12 
was more restrictive than U1at given i:c1h law to ''ship11 • The 
term ''sea-going ship" was not '>vnonvrnou~3 with the the word "ship" 
as used in section 6 (1) of the Navi}Jation f\ct 1912-73 (Comth.). 
Obviously manv of vessels are not ''sea-~:Jolng shi[Js" ancJ would 
not come within the meaning of ~;ection ))L1 (1) (a). Non-seagoing ships 
include boats, ligh barges, ri\/er-qoinD craft, fishing 
hm'bour-going launclles and some tU!:.JS. If thn reasoning is correct, 
the owners of such vessels - whether S£J,l f-[Jropelled or in the course 
of being towed would be unable to limit ttwir liability. 
Fortunately, the proLJlern,which woulcJ ot11erwise be a 
ing blow for owners ancJ operators of non-seagoing \Jes~->el s, r1as been 
rectified bv section 93 of the !\Ja\!lgation Anmndment: /\ct 1980 
(Comth.). It reads: 
"Every ship that is not a ship to in [section] 2 (1) 
(a), (b), (c) or (QJ and is not a sea-going ship shall, for the 
purpose of this Division anrJ the applied provisions of the 
Convention, be treated as if it \>liere a sea-going ship." 13 
12. Registration, however, is not a prm·equisi te for' entitlement 
to the statutorv protection. 
13. Fm s. 2 (1) as amencJecJ, Sf'!e Nauigation f\memlmE:mt Act 1980 
(Comth.), s. 3. 
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The amendment seems wide enough to cover virtualh; everv tvpe of 
non-seagoing ship, including a tug, barge, inland waterwavs vessel, 
and pleasure craft. Unlimited liabilitv, however, mav nevertheless 
arise in a collision involving the tow and a third ship. A commonplace 
example is where an object, viz. a life buov, beacon or pontoon, in 
the tow of a ship, collides IAJith and damages a third ship. The tug 
owner will probablv be answerable to the full extent of the damage 
if it is proved to have been caused bv the failure of his servant, 
tending the object in tow, to give proper instructions to the tug's 
master. The reason for the unlimited liabilitv is that the object that 
wrongfullv causes the damage is not a ship within the meaning of 
section 93 of the Navigation Amendment Act 1980 (Comth.). 
Bv giving effect to the Convention on Limitation of Liabilitv 
for Maritime Claims 1976, the United Kingdom Parliament has enlarged 
the statutorv protection in an unprecedented wav. Unlike the posi-
tion in Australia, the 1976 Convention confers the benefit of limiting 
liabilitv under two different articles. Apm't from the exceptions: 4 
Article 2 provides for claims subjl~ct to the limitation, whatever the 
basis of liabilitv. Apparently, no distinction is made between the 
acts, neglects or omissions of a shipowner and ttmse of his servant 
or employee. The protection avails whf::!re a plaintiff's claim comes 
within Article 2 (1) Cill to (f) of Schedule 4 Part 1 of the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1979 (U.K.). Subject to Article 2, Article 1 extends the 
statutory protection to any person connected with salvage work,and 
also to anv person who is the owner, charterer, manager or operator 
of a seagoing ship. This is defined bv Schedule 4 Part II,paragraph 2, 
I 
of the 1979 Act (U.K.) to include any ship "whether seagoing or not." 
5. Monetarv Aspects 
We come now to the shipowner's liabilitv under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior in monetarv terms. The language of Article 3 (1) 
14. For claims excluded from limitation, see Merchant Shipping 
Act 1979 (U.K.), Schedule l1 Part I, Articles 3 and 4, and Part 
II, para. L1. 
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of th(~ 1957 Corwentiorl is clt~ar as to the amounts to which the slliP-
owner rnav limit his liabilitv. For propE~rtv claims, the aggregate 
amount is limited to 1 ,000 francs. and for personal claims the aggreg-
ate amount is limited to 3,100 francs, per ton of tllFJ ship's 
respectivelv. The latter aggregate amount also applies where 
occurrence gives rise to both property and pei'sonal claims. Jn such a 
case, however. the Fir~;t portion cmnprisirlg t~vent\/-Dm1 out of thirty-
one parts (21/31) shall be appropriated to prCJrsonal claims, whilP the 
second portion comprising ten out of tJJirtv-omJ parts (10/31) be 
appropriated to propertv claims. TtJP.re i;3 a clear proviso in /:l.rticle 
3 (1) (f) that where the first portion is inarJrJquate to pay 
claims in full, the unpaid balance of such claims shall rank rateably 
with the propertv claims to be paid out the second portion. 
The wording of the repec=Jled section 503 (1) of the 1894 Act 
(Imp.), as amended bv section 2 (1) uf thr:J 19'58 /\ct (U.K.), was insuff-
icientlv clear as to how. in the evPnt of personal injury and proper-
tv damage being thE~ aggreqate Emmunt was to be appor-
tioned. To maintain international uni forrni tv and consi~1tency in this 
aspect of the law, section '503 ( 1) ~>houlrJ bE: construed bv reference 
to tt1e official text of the CorlventiDn!'j 
Unlike the pre 1979 UnitmJ 1'\ingcJom's law, Commonwealth 
lation does not provicJr~ fur direct conversion ir1to Aust;ralian curren-
cy of the francs as used in the Com1ention. To ~;afequard thB rights 
of claimants,as victims of marine duvaluation and 
other international monetary problems Australian currency, 
well- coordinated measures have bef.m introduced bv the Common-
wealth Parliamer1t. F3v paragraph 5 (1) of Na\;iqatiorl (Limitation of 
Shipowners' Liability) RE:qulations 1981 (Comtll.), fifteen francs are 
"to equal one drm'llinsJ right" within the meaning of t.he IntE~r-
16 --
national Monetary AgreemEmts Act 1947-1973 mnth.). Th£3 
drawing rights are to be convt:~rted into l\ustralian currency at the 
15. By /\rticle 16, the English and 
tion are equally authentic. 
16. See s. 3 (1). 
489 
tDxt~.; of the Conven-
official pxchange rate on the Liav on which the lirni tat ion fund is 
constituted bv thEl court's order under the amended section 335 (1) 
of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.); 7 Under the Regulations 
(Comth.) the Heserve Bank of Australia is empowered to determine the 
official exchange rate prevailing on the day in question. The Aust-
ralian approach is equitable as it seeks to ensure that, despite anv 
fall in the exchange v<:-1lue of the Australian dollar, claimants will be 
paid an equivalent amount in Australian currency. Further explan-
ation mav help. The special drawing rights are lar~1elv determined bv 
a basket of four or fi\Je major currencies of the world, including the 
U.S. dollar. A fall in the exchange value of tile Australian dollar will,, 
result in the claimant recovBring a larger amount as the equivalent. 
Ti\BLE SHOWING THE RELATIDNSHIP BETWEEN S.D.R. AND AUSTRALIAN 
CURRENCY 
Exchange l~ate of Australian 
dollars for Special Drawing 
Right (S.D.R.) at different dates 
Jan. 2,1985- $A 1.1932 for 1 
:).D.R19 
Dec. 31, 198tf- $A 1.1841 foe 1 
S.D.R. 
Dec. 31,1983- $A 1.1731 foe 1 
S.D. R. 
(Sav) ship's tonnage - 300 tons. 
f~ate for propertv damage - 1 ,000 
francs per ton. 
1\lurnber of S.D.R.'s- 300,000.: 1s18 
·.~ 20,000 
i\rnounts payable in Australian 
ctHTPncv. 
$A 23, 864.00 
$A23, 682.00 
When value of Australian curTBncv falls, clrlimant is compensated with 
a larger amount. ~~~~~----------------------------
The Commonwealth Parliament is consistDnt in its "currency-
conversion" po licv. Apart from the date For determining the value 
17. [\Javigation (Limitation of Shipovvners' Uabilitv) f~egulations 
1981, para. 5 (2) (c). 
18. Ibid., para. ~ (1) (§.2 .prov~des that fifteen francs ar·p equal 
to one spec1al drawmg nght. 
19. Information regarding the exchange rate of Australian doll-
ars foe the special drawing rigr,t was obtained from Mr. Phil ~raeme, ~n off~(er of RE~serve Bar1k of 1\ustralia, Hobart. · 
~· L. Brtstow, Gold franc-t~eplacement of Unit of Account" 
[19781 1 L.M.C.L.Q. 31. 
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of the special drawing rights, the same method is applied in comput-
ing the liabilitv of a Bhipowner under Parts II and III of the :....:...:=;;..:;:._ 
tion of the Sea (Civil Uabilitv) Act 1981 (Comth.). Bv paragraph 3 (1), 
fifteen francs are equal to one special drawing right, and special 
drawing rights are to be converted into Australian currencl0 It mav 
be recalled that tht=l Minister is authorised to incur expenses or other 
liability under sections 8, 9 and 1(] of the protectiDn of the Sea (PmAJers 
of Intervention) Act 1981 (Comth.). Where an incident did not occur 
as a result of actual fault or privity of the shipowner, the amounts 
prescribed for the purposes of section 20 (3) and Cbl1 are the 
equivalents of 133 drawing rights and fourteen million special 
drawing rights, respecti\Jel/2 In each case, the amount in Australian 
currency is calculated according to the value of the special drawing 
rights applicable on the first dav of the incident and to the method 
of valuation applied by the International Monetarv Fund~3 
The Navigation (Limitation of Shipowners' Liability) Regulations 
1981 (Comth.) and the Protection of the Sea (Civil liabilitv) Regula-
tions 1983 (Comth.) provide the same method for converting francs 
into Australian curTencv. The advantage of this method is that it 
allows for fluctuations in the exchange rate of Australian currency, 
without diminishing the rights of claimants in recovering equivalent 
amounts. 
Until the Merchant Shipping Act 1979 (U.K.) was passed giving 
effect to the 1976 Convention~4 the United 1'\.ingdom Parliament had 
adopted a rigid sterling-oriented approach. Section 1 (1) of the 1958 
Act (U.K.) provided for the amounts of fifteen pounds and eight 
pounds as the equivalent of 3,1 DO francs and 1,000 francs, respect-
ively. Despite the fall in the exchange value of the sterling and its 
20. Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Regulations 1983, para. 
11 (1) and (2). 
21. Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Comth.). 
22. Protection of the SEla (Civil Liability) Regulations 1983, 
para. 11 (1) and (2). 
23. Ibid., para. 11 (3). 
24. See Schedule '• Part II, para. 7 (1) and (2). 
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devaluations, only periodic measures had been taken to adjust the 
amount of sterling payable to compensate for its depreciation. 
Some of the problems encountered by claimants under English 
law are reflected in The "Abadesa".25 The plaintiff owners of the 
tanker "i\badesa" sought to limit their liability for damage caused by 
collision on 25th February, 1963, to the tanker Miraflores. By the 
Merchant Shipping (Limitation of Liability) (Sterling Equivalent) Order 
1958 the sterling equivalent of £23 13s. 9 27/32 d. was declared for 
1 ,ODD francs. It was not until about nine years later that the equiv-
alent of £27 12 s. 9% d. was substituted by the 1967 Order for 1,000 
francs. Fortunately for the defendant owners of Mir'aflores, although 
the writ issued by the plaintiffs was dated 8th February, 1966, it was 
only on 21st February, 1968, that the order of the Admiralty Registrar 
was made. As the limitation fund was computed according to the con-
version rate specified in the 1967 Order ancJ not, as the plaintiffs 
contended, according to that in the 1958 Drder, they appealed against 
the decision. The appeal was dismissed. It submitted that, under 
the pre-fixed conversion-rate system, the argument raised by the 
plaintiffs was rational and forceful - namely, the conversion rate 
existing on the date of collision or the issue of the writ should apply. 
In view of the frequent fluctuations in the sterling exchange value, 
the 1958 Act (U.K.) should have been amended to bring the conver-
sion r'ate into line with Article 3 (6) of the 1957 Convention. 
If Article 3 (6) l1ad been given effect fully as the United King-
dom's law, the plaintiffs in The "Abadesa" would have been liable to 
pay a larger amount calculated according to the conversion rate 
existing on 21st Februarv, 1968, and not on 24th November, 1967~6 
25. [1968] 1 Llovd's Rep. 493. As to competence of English courts 
to give judgments in currencies other than sterling, ~jpe D.H. 
Hene, "Judgments in Foreign Currencies" [1975] 1 L.M.C.L.Q. 19, 
pp. 23-21+. As to admiraltv practice and claims in tort, see S.l. 
I~>aacs, "Foreign Currency Claims and the English Courts" 
[1977] 3 l.M.C.L.Q. 356, pp. 363-.364. 
26. The reason is that the plaintiffs had failed to constitute a 
limitation fund or provide any guarantee prior to 21st Feb-
r~ary, 1968. As to the current position, see IY!erchant Shie-
pmg Act 1979 (U.K.), Schedule 4 Part I, Article 8 and Part H, 
para. l (1). 
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Another fla\tJ in the pre-1979 United Kingdom's approach is 
evident. The long intervals, Lvhich elapsed between the currencv 
equivalent orders, we1·e bound to producE! unjust results in rnarw in-
stances. A limitation fuml constituted according to the same con-
version rate in force for the past nine vears would bt-~ much 
less than one constituted soon after a new currencv equivalent 
order came into effect. 
To alleviate financia] hardships inflicted on the plaintiffs in 
limitation ~:;uits, an important provision was made in section 1 (4) of 
the 1958 Act (UJ'\.). It read: 
"Where monev has been paid into anv court ... in respect of 
anv Habilitv to which a limit is set as aforesaid, the 
ascertainment of that limit shall not be affected bv a sub-
sequent variation of the amounts specified under subsec-
tion (3) ... unless the amount paid or consigned IJ\Ias less than 
that limit as ascertained in accordance with the order 
then in force under that subsection." 
According to Lord Eveleigh~ 7 the primarv object of sBction 1 (4) was 
to harmonise the new limitation basis of assessment Lvith rules of 
court permitting a partv to pav monev into court. /-\part from 
relieving a shipowner of the anxietv of anticipating a new exchange 
rate which might be prescribed before tt1e limitation decree, hr~ 
would be able to ascertain in advance llis ultimate liabilitv. The 
English Court of Appeal held that trHJ purpose of the provision was 
to give a shipowner, who paid money into court, a measure of protec-
tion bv freezing his limited liabilitv. Tllus bv paving the amount cal-
culated according to tim conv£~r~3ion rate prescribed bv the existing 
currencv equivalent order, 1-18 was protected against any fall in tile 
value of sterling in relation to gold francs. 
It is subrnittec1 that umi~]r Australian maritime law the same 
protection is available. At or soon after the commencement of the 
limitat.ion suit, a plaintiff can pav into court an amount of monev 
representing his ultimate liabilitv. It is calculated based on the 
27. Polish ~)team Ship Co. v. Atlantic Maritime CD. and Dthers 
(The Garden Uty) [1984) 3 All E.R. 59, p. 64. 
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official exchange rate "on the date on which the shipowner shall 
have constituted the limitation Fund, made thE~ payment or given the 
guarantee ... " as provided by Article 3 (6) of the 1957 Convention. If 
at t11e date of the grant of the limitation decree there is a fall in 
the value of Australian currency vis-a-\lis the special drawing rights, 
the plaintiff should not be required to pav more in terms of Austral-
ian dollars. Section 5 (1) of the Navigation (Limitation of Shipowners' 
Liability) Regulations 1981 (Comth.) provides t!lat the official exchange 
rate shall be determined bv the Reserve Bank of Australia on the dav 
on which the limitation fund is constituted by an order of the court 
under section 335 c1l8 It is submitted that, since the court has dis-
cretion under this provision to make "such order or orders as it 
thinks fit", court permission could be obtained to pay in an "accep-
table" pre-decree amount. 
One highlv relevant issue is whether shipowners are liable to 
pav interest in addition to the limitation fund. LtJith the exception 
of section 13 of the Responsibilitv of ShipDwners Act 1s·u (Tmp.), 
neitJ1er the Merchant Shipping Acts (Imp.) nor the 1957 Conven-
. 
29 k · . f . I th . h t10n ma es provision or 1ts pavment. t appear's at,m t e earlv 
davs, the Court of Admiralty had acted on the principle of civil law 
IAihich differed from the rule of common law. According to the form-
er, interest was alwavs pavable to the obligee when pavment due was 
not made on time. Under the old law, the practice of the Court of 
Admiral tv WCJS to limit the shipowners' liabili Lv to the value of the 
ship at the time of the loss and the freight she IAJould have earned if 
she was laden with cargo. The intere~it on the ship was based on the 
estimated value of the ship at the time when she would probablv have 
arrived at the destination. The reason was that. up to the probable 
date of arrival, frPight less the expenses in earning it was calculated 
tD make up for inter'est on the ship's estimated value. Where thE~ 
ship was wrongfullv sunk with no cargo on her, interest on her 
28. As amended tw Navigation Amenriment Act 1979 (C:omth.), s. 65 
(1). 
29. Including thF~ C:onv~1ntion on Limitation of Liabilitv for Mari-
time Claims 1976. 
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estimated valuR was allowed from the date collision. In \1. 
Hartland~0 Vice-Chancellor Wood observed that the~ "Court of Admir-
alty says very truly, that interest is not given by t.vay of inrlemnific-
ation for loss, but because the loss was not paid for at the proper 
time." Sir R. Phillirnore justified the award on the following grouncls: 31 
"Indeed the equity of the thing is the other way, for to 
refuse this interest would be to diminish still further the 
natural right of the sufferer to full compensation for the 
injury which he had sustained." 
Under modern legislation on limitation of liability, the old practice 
of allowing interest from the date of col1ision has been followed. 
Courts administering the Merchant Shipping Acts (Imp.) have consis-
tently imposed interest on the limited amount of liability of ship-
owners. The rule applies to loss or damage caused to any ship, goods 
carried or other property, as well as to personal injury and loss of 
life. In The "River Loddon"?2 decided by the High Court of Australia 
in 1955, Taylor, J., felt bound to apply the four per cent Englisll rate. 
He was of the view that uniformity of practice should be followed in 
order to provide a fair return over a long period. 33 
ln giving statutory effect to the 1957 Convr:mtion, the Merchant 
Shippinq (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act 195B (U.K.) had not 
altered the basis on whicl1 interest was awarded. It has been a jud-
icial concept that interBst is given for loss incurred by a sufferer 
who is kept out of his money. fhe loss is of a diffBrent description 
from the physical destruction of the goods carried or of the ship 
due to colllsion~4 In The "l\b;:Jdesa"~5 the liability was limited under 
section 503, as amended by the 1958 Act (U.K.). It interesting to 
30. (1865) 11 L.T. (N.S.) 622, 623. He ordered payment of 4% 
interest on the amount oi' damages from thcCJ of collis-
ion. At the time of the loss, the ship was in ballast. 
31 The Northumbria (1870) 21 L.T. (N.S.) 681, p. 683. 
32. Commonwealth of AustrAlia v. Asiatic Stearn Na\/igation Co. 
Ltd. and Others [1955] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 503. 
33. On appeal, Taylor J.'s judgment was affirmed by five 
Judges of tht.; High Court: (1955-56) 96 C.L.R 397. 
34. 5 N.R. 164 (Note). 
35. [1968] 1 Uovd's Rep. 493. 
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note that Karminski, J., allowed the intel'est rate of four per cent, 
which had prevailed for over a century, to be raised to five and a 
half per cent. 
The Case of Ga~min v. Moss36 indicates a recent Australian app- 1 
roach to the award of interest. The defendant shipowner failed to 
obtain a decree for the limitation of his'. liability under section 333 
of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), as amended, for the wrong-
ful sinking of the plaintiffs' vacht. Judicial consistency was main-
tained when cognizance was taken of the prevailing commercial rate 
applied in The "Abadesa" and other recent English decisions. How-
ever. due probably to the different conditions prevailing in the 
economy and money market in Australia,a more generous figure was 
allowed. In delivering the Supreme Court of Queensland judgment, 
McPherson, J., said:37 
" .. .I will award interest at the rate of 10% p.a. for two years. 
This was the rate adopted in a recent collision case in 
Admiralty in this Court: Markwell v. Markwell Fisheries Pty. 
Ltd. (No. 1937 of 1978: unreported)." 
He followed the English practice of awarding interest for the period 
between the date of collision and the judgment. One aspect of the 
judgm~mt is unsatisfactorv. Unlike the loss of personal effects, ex-
penses incurred by the plaintiffs in travelling and accommodation 
following the loss of their yacht were allowed without interest. It 
is submitted that the distinction between the two types of loss is 
illogical. 
Th t d . . . 38 e recen ec1s1on tn The Garden City highlights the con-
struction English judges put or1 the 1957 Convention with regard to 
interest in the hands of the court. On 27th April, 1978, the plaintiff 
36. The trial court decision, as reported in [1983] 2 Qd. R. 486, 
that the defendant shipowner was not entitled to limit his 
liability under the !\Javigation Act 1912-73 (C::omth.), s. 333, 
as amended, was unanimously upheld: [1984] 2 Qd. R. 515. 
37. [1983] 2 Qd. R. 486, p. 500; cf. Practice Note No. 25 [1982) 
2 N.S.W.L.R. 42. 
38. [1984] 3 All E.R. 59. 
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shipowners commenced an action under section 504 of the 18% Act 
(Imp.). It was For relief and to determine thl~ amount of their liabil-
ity for the loss of the defendants' vessel and most of the cargo on 
board. The loss occurred in 1976 as a result of a collision)for which 
the plaintiff s~1ipowners were held partly to blame. On 28th April, 
1978, the plaintiffs paid into Court two sums of money, viz. £395, 341 
and £297,559. The former amount represented the limitation figure 
computed according to section 503, as amended by the 1958 Act (U.K.), 
and the latter represented simple interest on the limitation amour1t 
from the date of collision until 30th April, 1978. The limitation fund 
comprising the two sums was invested at the plaintiffs' request. By 
November, 1982, the interest earned amounted to £534,904. The plain-
tiffs appealed against the or·uer of the Admiralty Court judge that 
all the interest accrued on the limitation fund be paid to the defend-
ants. In reversing the decision, a strong English Court of Appeal laicJ 
down a number of important rules. In a limitation suit, the plaintiff 
is entitled to direct that the limitation figure paid into court he in-
\/ested so as to maximise the amount, and to any interest acceued on 
the payment in. t\/erleigh, L.J., was somehow constrainecJ to construE~ 
section 1 (4) of the 1958 Act (U.K.) in the li~Jht of Article 3 (6) of the 
1957 Convention~9 The fund is cJeemecJ Lo be comtituted within the 
meaning of the Con\/ention or1 the date of the pavment into Court. 
Since the Com;ention does not stipulate that t11e fund constituted 
must contain interest, their Lordships held til at th£c:!re was no oblig-
ation on the plaintiff to pay in a sum of monev rupresenting interest 
in order to limit his liability. The defemJar1ts IAJere unly entitled to 
simple interest on the limitation figuee from the date of collision un-
til the cJate of the limitation decree. 1'-'loreo\/er, an English court 
exercising admiralty jurisdiction has no power' to award compound in-
terest. The remainder of the funds in court was held to belong to 
the plaintiffs. In keeping with the practice of the English Commercial 
Court, interest on the limitation figure wa~3 eaised to eight and a 
quarter per cent. 
Except for the lower interest rate awarded, it is reasonable to 
presume that an Australian court seized of a case with similar fcJcts 
will follow their Lordships' reasoning. 
39. Ibid., p. 67. 
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6. Contracting Out 
fhere is nothing in the 1957 Convention or Navigation Act 1912-
73 (Comth.) that prohibits a shipowner or carrier from contracting 
out of the benefits of the limitation of liability. The position in 
Australia has, therefore, remained unchanged. In the absence of Aus-
tralian cases, English authorities are analysed in order to ascertain 
the ways in IAihich the statutory protection may be excluded. 
II' ' II LJO th f In the House of Lords case of The Satamta , e owners o 
two yachts entered for a race, each owner undertaking to observe 
the club rules. The rules rendered any yacht owner acting in breach 
of the same liable For "all damages arising therefrom." Through im-
proper navigation, but without actual fault or privity of her owner, 
one of the yachts contravened a sailing rule. She ran into and sank 
the other yacht. In affirming the Court of Appeal decision, their 
Lordships construed the words "all damages" as excludin~] the opera-
tion of section 54 of the Merchant Shipping AmE'!ndrmmt Act 1862 (Imp.). 
The entire decision was based on contractual considerations alone. 
Lord Herschel! 's clear reasoning in support of his judqment is this. 
The club sailing rules created, as br~tween the two yacht-owners, a 
contractual liability which is distinct fr'om tr1e li<lbility arising at 
common law, i.e. under the law of tort. 1\ccordir-lgh;, section 54 which 
applied to tortious liability was inapplicable to dama~ws flowing from 
a breach of contract. Lord Halsbury, L.C., Clttributed to the words 
"all damages" the literal meaning of excluding a person from the ben-
efit of limiting his liability under the Merche:mt Shipping Act 1894 
(Imp.) for disobeving the sailing rules. 
We shall consider) and distinguish betwEmn) the effects of the 
two forms of contracting out, as propounded bv their Lordships, 
namelv, the "contractual obligation" method and tt1e "exclusion" 
method. 
Exclusion clauses are often incorpomted in charterparties and 
bill of lading contracts. Since the same principle~3 would applv in 
40. [1897] A.C. 59. 
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relation to section 503~·1 case authorities dealing with section 502 
are examined. In tile Virginia Carolina Chemical Co. v. Norfolk and 
North American Shipping Co~.2 a bill of lading clause was relied on 
as excluding section 502. It read: 
"The shipmvners and/or chart(']rt~rs are not n1sponsible for 
any ... damage to the [~oods ... occasioned by any of the foll-
owing causes, .. fire on tloard ... or by unseaworthiness 
of the ship at cornrnencement ... of the voyage, provid-
ed all reasonallle means have bmm taken to provide against 
such unseaworthiness, or by any other cause whatever." 
Buckley, L.J., held the clause was dividc~d into two parts. 
d t . . . 11If According to him. the first part expresse t ns rrmamng, v1z. my 
ship is seaworthv, mv contr<:1ct is that I shall not be liable for fire 
on board ... and that exemption from liability is to apply not only in 
cases mentioned in s. 502 of the statute but in any case whatever." 43 
This part - it is submitted - is in line w1th the "exclusion" method. 
second part t.vas construerl as h<winq this meaning, viz. 11I will 
be liable for unseaworthiness if I have not taken all reasonable 
t 'd I . "41' A 't t . d means o prov1 e unseawort nness. s 1 , con ame an 
affirmative undertaking, it is consistent with the "contractual oblig-
ation" concept. The Court of .1\ppeal held that sBction 502 was imp 
liedly excluded by the terms of the bill of lacling. It i~3 ~;ubmitted 
that the real reason was that the contractual undertaking embodied 
in the clause was not subject to the section. 
I T 45 n Ingram & Royle, Ltd. \J. SPnJicrcJs iV!aritirneB Du 1 ruport, Ltd., 
the plaintiffs claimed darnanes for the gooc!s as a result of ex-
plosions and fire on boaro. Their argument based on the approach in 
Virsinia case failed. The clause in que~3tion not only contaim'!d 
different words but had no corlcludirlg part which gave rise to a con-
tractual duty. Moreover, in serJking to E:JstablisLl that the defendants 
had contracted out of the statutory protection, the plaintiffs WE!re 
t,1. Substituted f'1erchant Shipping Act 1979 (U.K.), s. 17; see 
Navig~tion .Act 1912-73 (Comth.), s. ?33, as amendc~d. ~3. 502, 
sub~ttt~teo tJy l"lerchant ShiPPing ,L\ct 1979 (U.K.), s. 18; see 
f\iavtgat10n Act 191:;:'-73 (Comth.), ~3. 338, as amencJecl. 
L12. [1912] 1 f\.B. 229. 
43. Ibid., p. 240. 
44. Ibid., p. 240. 
45. [1914] 1 K.B. 541. 
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unable to rely on the "exclLJ~:;ion" rnPthod. The decision in no ~A.Ja\f 
weakened the reasoning and construction applied in the Virginia case. 
Towage agreements com;titute anott1er area where the methods 
of contracting out are vital in determining the tow-owners' liability. 
In The "Kirknes" ,46 while towing the Kirknes, the tug Hillman collided 
1111ith her and sank with the loss of four of her crew members. The 
towage contract was on the United 1\ingdorn Standard 
Conditions, which were commonly incorporAted in towage contracts 
made in Australia. plaintiffs, as tow-ownees and hirers of the 
Hillman, admitted liability but sought to limit theie liability under 
section 503 of the 1894 Act (Imp.). Willrner, J., rightly considered that 
clause 3 of the conditions dealt with two different matters. The 
first part of the read:47 
"The tugowner shall not. whilst towin[J, bear or be liable for 
damage of any description done by or to the tug, or done by 
or to the hirer's vessel, or for loss of oe damage to any-
thing on baaed the hieer' s vessol, or loss of the tug 
or the hieer's or for any personal injury or loss of 
life, aeising from any cause. including negligence at any 
time of the tugowner's servants or . - unseaworthin-
ess, unfitness or breakdown of tug .... 
rJne of the tug-owners' claims was for damages. This suit was in neg-
li~Jence aeising out of the improper navigation of the tow. The first 
part, being exemptive in charactm', was hel£j to be insufficiently 
to exclude section 503 from operating in favour' of the plaintiffs. 
The second part read: 
"a~d .the hirer shall pay for all loss or damage and person-
al InJury o.r loss of life and shall also indemnify the ~ug­
mvner aga1nst all consequences then~of .... " 
Following Lord Herschall's vil~w~8 the learned judge accepted the tug-
owners' argument that the second part imposed a contractual lia-
bili tv on the plaintiffs to pay for all loss or caused to the 
tug. It had the effect of placing the plaintiffs in the position of in-
surer's of the tug. Hence the "contractual obligation "method had 
operated to render inapplicable section 503. l.Llhat seems inconsistent 
46. [1956] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 651. 
47. Ibid., p. 654. 
/18. The "Satanita" [1897] A.C. 59, pp. 64-65. 
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in ~lis judgmtmt is He found that the tuD-owners had contract-
ed for themsehms also as agents for mastf~r and crew. He 
that the claims in tort brought on behalf of thl~ deceased were 
neverthelf]SS subject to the operation of 503. It ls submitted 
that this aspect of the decision is unfounded and unduly restricts 
the parties' freedom to contract out of the statutory limitation of 
liabili t'y. 
For completeness, '.AlB shall look at exclu~1ion provisions 
of legislation which have far-reaching consequences in Australian 
maritime law. A summary of thE! facts of the House of Lords case 
Stone 1\lo. 1 (Owners) v. l"lanchester Ship Canal Co. and Dthers49 serves 
to provide the background information. As a result of irnpropee nav-
igation but without the owners' actual fault or privity, the appell-
ants' barge sank in the fVlanche~>ter Ship Canal and became an obstruc-
tion in the fairway to vossels navigating therein. Section 32 of the 
Manchester Ship Canal Act 1936 (U.K.)50 empowered the company to 
cause the vessel to t)e or removed, and to recover frorn her 
owner "all expenses incurn~d ... in connexion IAJith tt1at vossel. 11 In 
respect of the expenses incurred, the appellants claimed to be en-
titled to limit their liability under sections 1 and 3 of the Merchant 
Shipping (Lic:1bilitv of Shipowm~rs amJ Others) Act 1900 (Imp.). In un-
animously affirming the Court nf ,L\ppea1 decision, the House of Lords 
was l clearly of the view that ::mctions 1 and 3 only operatGd to limit 
liability in tort, i.e. it lay in damage~J. Lorrl Tucker explaim~d 
the reasons for rejecting the appellants' claim as follows: 'J 1 
"Under section 32 thB f"lanchester Ship Canal Act, 1936, 
however, the right to recover as a debt tile expenses of 
raising a sunken is gi\Jl'ln irrespective of any liabil-
ity based on injury or damage. It is a differr-mt cause of 
action altogether." 
Thus shipowners wDuld be exposed to unlimited liability where t,he 
claim was brought on a other than negligence. 
fhe gap is Closed by the 1957 Convention. The right to limit 
t,9. [1956] A.C. 1. 
50. 26 Geo. V & 1 Edw. VIII, c. 12LI, 
':l'l. [1956] 1\.C. 1, p. 13. 
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liability is extended to claims whether ttmy are founded on quasi-
contract or legislation. Article 1 (1) (c) reads: 
"The owner of a sea-gain[] ship may limit his liability .. .in 
respect of claims arising from ... any obligation or liability 
imposed by any lmv relating to the removal of any wreck 
and arising from or in connection with the raising, remov-
or destruction of any ship which sunk, stt'andnd OI' 
abandoned (including anything which may be on board such 
ship) and any obligation or liability arising out of damage 
to harbour works, basins ancj navigable waterways." 
Onn significant differenco bBtween the laws of Australia and the 
United Kingdom is this. Bv section 2 (2) of the ~lorchant ShippirlQ_ 
cz (Llabilitv of Stlipmvners and Others) .Act 1958 (U.K.);· statutory effect 
was gi\/en to the Article. It is probable that, by nJason of recogni-
tion of State and port authority rights, the Commonwealth Parliament 
has not given the force of la~tv to the entire Con\/ention. Section 
':13 333 of the 1\lavigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) · excludes "sub-paragraph 
(1) (c) of Article I of the Convention as part of tho law of the Comm-
onwealth." The protection7 which is excluded>relates to two types of 
claim by port and harbour authorities. First, in respect of the expen-
ses incurred in remo\/ing, raising Dr destroying a vessel sunk in a 
fairway, her owner is under a quasi -contractual liability at common 
law to reimburse51• and/or under a statutory liability to indemnify such 
authorities. second, 1.\Jith regard to collision darnage to beacon, in-
stallation and other harbour works, /\ustraliEm legislation, by which 
harbour boards and similar borlies are l?stablished, has imposed strict
55 
unLimited liability on the mastBr and the owm?r of the ship concerned. 
The harshness compounded by the mandatory requirement to hm;e 
a pilot on board particularly where the ship is within a port area or 
proceeding along a waterway. Section 410 B (2) of the ~\laviqation 
Act 1912-73 (Cornth.) imposes vicarious liabil in circumstances where 
52. LargE'?ly repealed; see Mcc;rchant Shipping /\ct 1979 (U.f<..), 
Schedule 7 Part I. 
53. As amended by i\la\/igation /\mendment /\ct 1979 (Comth.), s. 65 
(1). 
54. /\s to the circumstances where a right to tJB reimbursed 
may arise, :;ee R. Goff and G. Jones, Ttl8 Law of RfJstitution 
(1966), pp. 221-222. 
55. See o.g:, The l~eelong Harbour Trust Commissioners v. Gibbs 
f~r1gt1t ~-o. (1973-7!~) 129 C.U~. 576: in China Ocean Shipping 
Lo. \/. ~1t.ate of South Australia (1978-7~ 27 A.L.f~. 1, p. 9, 
t.~:e .~m·burs 1·\ct 193~ C,S.l\.), s. 124 was held to impose absolutn 
l!cJbilJty ~pon the shtp s agent for damage done bv the ship to 
any port ms tallation. -
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the ~t-1ip is navigated under compulsory pilotage accordin~J to a law 
of a State or Territory. The owm;r or master of a ~3hip is answerable 
for anv loss or damasJe cuused bv the ship or bv faulty na\/igation of 
the ship, in the ~3arne manner as if pilotage wer·e not compulsorv. 
VII. NEW MARITIME CONVENTION 
The ConvrJ,ntion on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 
1976 \Alas formulated to update and replace the 1957 Convention. [n 
terms of interr1atiorml status, it will enter into force on the fir~>t 
day of the month, one year after the date on which twelve States 
have become parties to it. As of 19th [Jctober, 1983, there were sev-
en State parties, 11\/hich do not include Australia~6 
f=rom the viewpoint of Australia as a "shipping service" user, 
the 1976 Convention is preferrrc1d to Um 1957 ConventiDn, ~1ince the 
former prm;ides higher limits of liability.57 Under the 1976 Conven-
tion a person, inclurJing a shipownE!r, is not entitled to limit his liab-
ilitv in cer·tain circum~3tanc(~~3. However, a heavv onus has to be met 
bv pt·oving Lhat the "loss cc;sulted from his personal act or emission 
committed with Lhe intenL to l'cJuse ~3uch loss, or· reckless!\; and with 
knm,Jledge that such loc1S wouJcj probably n~sult.'''JB Commonwealth 
law cJiffers from that of t.he lJnit8d 1\ingdom in two resp~:!cts. The 
latter has ljiscaroed the concept of "actual fault. or privitv" and ha~; 
~.Jhifted thE~ burden of pmof to thE! claimant who ~;eeks to break the 
limit of liability. 
For further cumparisun~;. referPncr'! is madE? to the new reliefs 
provided under Article 2 of the 1976 Commntion. lt covers a variety 
of claims resulting from, m· arising in connection with. sr1ip operation, 
salvage operations, including consequrmtial loss, delay in the carria~w 
of cargo, pa~;sengms or their luc~gago, and the removal or destruc-
tion of any cargo carrif?d ot' a shlp that is sunk)wreckecJ or abandoned. 
The Merchant Shippir1g .Act 19/9 (tJ.K.) confers wider n~lief' th<:m its 
56. Infor·matlun obtained fmm Mr. D.G. 1\i:n;. Marirlf-J Clperations 
Division, Department of Tram"iport, Canberr<J. 
57. See Scr1ed~le 4 Pae~ I, Article 6, Mercl1ant ~)hipping Act 1979, 
currcmtlv m force m the Unitecl Kinqdorn. 
58. Ibid., Article L~, 
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Commonwealth countorpart. 
Another distinguishing feature is that, aside from Ct:)rtain cases 
of remuneration under contract, the limitation applies to claims under 
Article 2 (1),whatever the nature or basis of the liability. The pro-
tection extends to claims based on, or arising out of, negligence, sal-
vage, subrogation, indemnity or any statutory right to recover, as a 
sg 
debt, the expenses or costs incurrr::~d. -
It is worth illustrating om'l new aspect of the relief available 
to salvors. In the Tojo MarJ0 -it may be recalled-a diver under 
water attempted to cover a gaping hole in a tanker with a wlde plate 
by firing bolts from a Cox bolt gun. Tt1is operation was carried out 
before the adjoining tank was rendered gas-free. The result was an 
explosion which caused extensive damage to the tanker. As the coun-
terclaim exceeded the salvage claim, the sal\lors sought to limit their 
liability under section 503 of the 1894 Act (Imp.). Their limitation suit 
failecJ. The House of Lords held that the negligence of the diver' in 
firing the gun was not an act "in ttltcJ nuvigation or management11 of 
the tu~J; nor was it an act done by any person on the tuq. IF similar 
facts and mishap were to recur, the zealous lJut. negligent salvor, r1is 
employer and the salving tug IAIOUlcJ be entitled to limit their liability 
under the 1976 Convention.61 Needless to sav, implementation of the 
provisions of the 1976 Convention as part of the law of the United 
Kingdom has conferred on shipowners and other persons an unprecP-
dented protection. 
59. E.sJ. it will cover a situation in Stone No. 1 (Owners) v. IVJan-
chester Ship Canal Co. ancl Others [19~'j6) A.C. 1. There t~ 
claim against the owners of a sunken ship was in the nature 
of a statutory debt. Apparently the provisions of Article 
2 (2) are wide onouqh to embrace claims founcJed on quasi-
contract. 
60. [~971] 1 All E:R. 1110. See also D.R. Thomas, "Salvorial Neg-
ligence and 1ts Consequences'' [1977] 2 L.M.C.L.Q. 167. 
61. Sct1edule ~ Part 1, /\rticles 2 para. 1 (a), 6 para. t1 and 9 para 
1, of Merchant Shipping Act 1979 (U.K.). · 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The limitation of liability is one of the areas with regard to 
which Commonwealth and the United l<:ingcJom's laws differ markedly. 
A number of anomalies in Commonwealth law, which have been high-
lighted, should be rectified, since they have adverse effects on Aus-
tralian shippinq trade. 
The principle that cargo claimants have to rely on the common 
law doctrine of unjustified deviation or quasi-deviation in order to 
r·ecover more than the "per package" or "unit"62 amount under the 
Sea-Carriage of f.:loods Act 1921~-73 (Comth.) is illogical and obsolete. 
Proof of unjustified deviation committed by a carrier or shipowner 
does not in itself automatically constitute evider1ce of actual fault 
or privity. Thus where a large consignment of high-valued cargo is 
lost or damaged, cargo claimants may have to clear t\..\lo onerous hur-
dles under Commonwealth law before they could recover full compen-
sation. Overseas importers of /\ustralia goods, whether carried by 
Australian or foeeign ships, are therefore disadvantaged. 
This anachronism has been removed in the United Kingdom. Both 
the Hague Rules, as amended by the Brussels Protocol 1968, scheduled 
to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (U.K.) 63 and the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1979 (U.K) 64 have adopted a similar burden of proof to 
be discharged by claimants. The growing importance of maritime trade 
to Australia's economy justifies an evaluation of the merits of 
adopting the 1976 Convention. In the interests of Australia's export 
trade involving the shipment of goods overseas in containers, it is 
imperative for statutory effect to be given to the Brussels Protocol 
1968. 
Moreover, Commonwealth legislation is necessary to deal with an 
existing anomaly. It should provide that discharge of the burden of 
proof required under the Protocol is deemed sufficient evidence of 
actual fault or privity of a shipowner within the meaning of Part VIII 
of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.). 
62. Article IV rule 5 of the Rules scheduled to the Act. 
63. See Article IV rule 5 (g). 
64. Schedule L, Part I, Article 4. 
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We have seen that section 333 of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) 
has excluded the provisions of Article 1 (1) (c) of the 1957 Con-
\lention from operating as part of the law of the Commonwealth. It 
means that shipowners and other persons cannot limit their liability 
in respect of damage negligently caused to harbour works or water-
ways and expenses or liability incurred in raising wrecks or removing 
sunken vessels in tt1e fairways. This disentitlement puts Australia 
based ships at a disadvantage. The reason that, since Australia-
based ships use such port and harbour facilities and waterways more 
frequently than foreign ships, the former are more likely to be sub-
to unlimited liability than the latter. 
In another respect, ships are placed under a more onerous lia-
bility under Australian law than under English common law. In 
---
Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad"~5 a dredge while 
digging a deep water channel at Botany Bay damaged a pipeline wl1ich 
was used to carry oil to a terminal owned by Caltex. Although the 
pipeline belonged to anoUH:.J.r party, the damage made it necessary for 
tex to make alternati\18 arrangements for transporting the oil. 
The expenses incurrerj by Caltex amounted to $95,000. Despite the 
English authorities66 which do not allow purely economic loss to be 
recovered under the rule in Donoghue v. the High Court 
of Australia unanimously found for the plaintiff on the special facts 
of the case. To 1 enable Australia-based ships to compete success-
fully with overseas-based ships, legislation is necessary to give eff-
ect to Article 1 (1) 
In the introduction, reference was made to the search for a 
formula which would enatJle the risks of maritime transportation to 
distributed among the parties to the adventure. The past twenty-
five decades have witnessed many such risk-sharing adjustments. 
65. (1976) 51 A.L.J.H. 270. 
66. :ee Electrochrome Ltd. v. Welsh Plastics Ltd. [1968] 2 All E R 
205· S Tt1omson 11N · I' - · · 
- ' · _ - , eg 1gence and Economic Loss" (1977) l o M F~. 714; P.F-. Cane, "Recm;ery of Purely Econom1'c 1 cJsC' 1·n 1A .L. tralia" (1977) 9 ·· ·· - CJ us-
, , .. L.Q.R .. 333; D. Partlett, "Recovery of Economic 
Loss for N~~gllgence m Australia'' (1980) 9 Syrt Law R. 121. 
67. [1932} A.C. 562. 
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Under tile Responsibility of Shipowners Act 1731{ (Imp.), a ship-
owner's maximum liability for loss or damagE~ caused without the 
''privitv and knowledge" of the owner was limited ~~ the value of the 
carrying st1ip, her appertenances and the freight. Although the 
same underlying risk-sharing concept was used, tt1e Merchant Shipping 
/J.ct 1855 (Imp.) applierJ two methods of computing compensation one 
for property damage and another for personal injuries and loss of 
lives.69 Under the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) and the Naviqation 
/0 
Act 1912-73 (Comth.), as amended, computation of damages according 
to the product of the ship's tonnage and a statutory figure in francs 
is another instance of re-adjusting the risks. The Hague Rules 
scheduled to the Sea-Carriage of Goods Act 1921~-n (Comth.) contain a 
similar risk-st1aring arrangement. In the absence of deviation or 
quasi-deviation, a carrier's liability is limited to no rnore than $AZDO 
per package or unit. /\ classic re-structuring of the formula is 
found in th£~ Brussels Protocol 1968 and the Convention on tile Limita-
tion of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976. The elements of consent 
reached between the parties concerned are clearly reflected in the 
new formulae embodied in the 1968 Protocol and the 1976 Convention. 
71 
Tl1us payment of a higher compensation is seen as a trade-off for a 
more onerous burden of proof to be discharged by claimants seeking 
full compensation. 72 
The concept of "actual fault or privitv" has been consistently 
used in Australian legislation to distinguish between two types of lia-
bilitv of shipowners. This fjxpression is retained in the anti-pollu-
tion legislation, both Commonwealth and State, the 1\Javigation Act 
68. 7 Geo. II, c. 15, s. 1. 
69. Proviso to s. 504. 
70. By the Navigation /\mendment Act 1979 (Comth.). 
71. See Article IV rule 5 (a) of the Rules scheduled to the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (U.K.); Schedule L, Part 
I, Article 6 para. 1, Merchant Shipping Act 1979 (UJ\.). 
72. Carria:Je of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (U.K.), Schedule, Art-
icle IV, rule 5 (g)_; l"lerchant Shipping Act 1979 (U.K.), Sched-
ule 4, Part I, Article 4. 
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1912-73 (Comth.), as amended, and Article IV rule 2 ib) of the Rules 
scheduled to the Sea-Carriage of Goods Act 1924073 (Comth.). In 
giving effect to the Brussels Protocol 1968 and the Convention on 
Limitation of Liabilit\/ for Maritime Claims 1976, the United Kingdom 
Parliament has,in factJadjusted the risk-sharing formula. This 
difference between the laws of the two countries could in some 
cases offer claimants an alternative forum for recovering higher 
compensation. 
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CHAPTEF: NINE 
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION 
1. PREV IE\~ 
Early colonial legislation had played a kfW role in the initial 
1 promotion of mari trade anrJ conmmrcf?. CJur survey of the growth 
aclrniraltv jurisdiction begins with an analysis of tho colonial en-
actments. The otJjoct i~; to ccmsider the means provided for enforc-
ir1g thr~ ri~1ht~> created by the Bm£~rging maritime law. t\n evaluation 
is of thB jurisdiction exnrcisable by the Jw>tices of the P;:~ace 
and thB Supreme Courts ovBr the cliJim;; commonly brounht against 
British and foreign ships. 
The next pllast:; of tj(~\je}opment was characteriscc?cl by thB 
establishment of the Vice-Admiralty Courts in flis Majesty's Dominions 
mJerse["l~; t.o adjudicate upon maritime These Courts were the 
forerunnerr3 of the Colonial Court::3 of Admiralty. The jurisdiction ex-
ercisable b\t the Vice-Admiralty Courts shows the pmt playE~d by 
Imperial policy and legislation in laving the framr:Jwork for administer-
ing En~Jlish admiralty law in the Australian colonies and elsewhere. It 
was Britain's long-tm·m plan that th£~se Imperial Court~; should eventu-
ally attain an equal ~;tatus with ttw High Court of l\drnira1ty. This 
goal was achieved by the passing of thu Colonial Courts of Admiralty 
1"\ct 1890 (Imp.). 
It is interesting to consider how f\ustralian courts havB been 
affected in terms of the new juriscJiction and status conferred on 
them. The reorganisation of the courts was another Imperial strategy 
to empower the Colonial Courts of Admiralty to administer the mer-
ctmnt shippinn legislation3 on an EmpirEJ-wide basis. So lor1g as the 
1. See Chapter Two. 
2. ~upreme Court (,A.dmiralty) Act 1B32 (Imp.) (2 Wlllams IV, c. 51); 
Vice-Admiralty Court~' /\ct. 1863 (Imp.) (26 & 27 Vic., c. 211); 
Vice-Admiralty Courts Act Amendment Act 1867 (Imp.) (30 & 
31 Vic., c. 35). As to the contribution!3 made by Vice-Admir-
alty Courts, see J.M. Bennett, fh~1 Vice-Admiralty Court of 
New South Wales, Law Faculty Project, Universitv of Sydney, 
1968-69,pp. 112 et. 
3. the Merchant Shippinq /\ct 18L)4 (Imp.), ss. 189, 191, 2110, 
486 and 490 conferred jurisdiction on \/ice-Admiraltv Courts. 
'For provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 189!1 conferr-
ing jurisdiction on Vice-Admiralty Courts or Colonial Courts 
of .A..dmiralty prior to the amendment by the Merchant Ship-
ping Act 1970 (U.K.), see ss. 76, 167, 472, 554, 556 and 561. 
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heads of admiraltv jurisdiction remain fixed uncJer the 1890 /.l,ct (Imp.), 
the Cornmomvealtll Parliament had to enact the Navigation /\ct 1912 
(Comth.) alonEJ the lines the Imperial legislation. The 1890 Act 
(Imp.) l1as tlmrefore opmated to determino the pattern of Australian 
shipping legislatior/1 and also a~> the mechanism for the reception of 
English mad time lal!ll into Austealia. 
The 1'\/ide g<w that cuerently exists between the admiralty laws 
of Australia and the United 1'\ingdom is th~:? result of prolonged fail-
ure bv thEJ Commonwealth Parliament to n:merJy the situation. Many 
of the problems previously highlightPd will be dealt t'llith bv reference 
to the proposed legislation which is long overdue. 
II. LEGISLATION OF AUSTRALIAN COLONIES 
lt will be recalled that, until the passing of the i\drniralty Court 
Acts (Imp.), 1840 and 1861, the jurisdiction of the Hinh Court of 1\cJmir-
alty \Mas rather limited. The Courts of f'\ing's Bench, Cornrmm Pleas 
and Chancery exercised jurisdictions over a broad range of maritime 
matters - once the province of the High Court of Admiralty: We saw 
in Chapter One that, after the Supreme Courts had beon established 
in the Australian colonies, Imperial and colonial legislation empowered 
them to adjudicate upon similar maritime causes. 
The early initiati\tes of the colonial legislatures to provide a 
framework in the Au~;tralian colonies have been examined in Chapter 
Two in relation to seamen and navigation. A closelv related aspect 
is the mechanism for enforcing compliance with colonial enactments. 
The historical significance is that they represent the early attempts 
by colonial legislatures to confer on Australian courts jurisdiction 
over a limited number of maritime matters. 
Apparently, the New South Wales Act of 183fi was the first move 
in this direction. Under section '!5, two or more Justices of the Peace 
4. With minor exceptions, the provisions are mainly modelled on 
the 1894 Act (Imp.). 
5. See Chapter One. 
6. 2 Gul. IV No. 10. This New South Wales Act did not apply to 
Tasmania which had become a separate colony in 1825. 
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were empowE~red tD hear complaints searm:m or passer1gor~> against 
the masters or cornrn;:mrJors of ships arriving rr·om abroad in any part 
of thl~ colony. Their jurisdiction related to claims for wagps and 
breach of contract, and also to damages for assault and violence. It 
1~1as limited to easElS l.vhere the amount involved did not excm~d ten 
pounds. An inexpt:mshm and sumrnarv remedv for the redr·ess of com-
plaints wm.; thus provided. If one criterion of ar1 admlraltv action in 
rem is th13 E:HTest and salt:1 of the rrJs so that the procr::Jeds thereof 
can be W5mJ to meet t11e plaintiff's claim, the jurisdiction exercisable 
by the Justices of the Peace would,in a limited sensB,l!:~acl to similar 
results. Payment of the amount, togethm with the co~1ts of the summ-
ary pruceecJings a\Aiarded, could be enforced by warrants vvhich dirPc-
ted the:; goods and chattels of the ship's master or commander to be 
levied. ln so far as ttle goods and chattels lEvied bv distress could 
br? sold to pr'ovicJe a fund, the Justices of the Peace were setm as 
exercising a modified form of admiraltv jurisdiction? 
Another aspect concems the power to arrest ships arrivin~1 in 
New South Wales from abroad whilst on their wav to anv place outside 
the colony. The object of section 14 of the 1832 Act (N.S.l1J.) was tu 
protect the rights of seamen who would otherwise be unable to en-
force their wage claim once a foreign-going ship had left ttm colony. 
However, to prevent: vr?xatious suits. before anv arrest order was 
made bv a judge of the Supreme Court or the Court of Vice-Admiralty, 
four stringent rt?quirements t1ad to be met by a seaman suinq as plain-
tiff. Hm wages claimed must t1avf~ been earned on board the ship 
during the current vovage. He had to discharge the burden of prov-
ing that there was a probable or reasonable cause for arresting the 
ship. There must have been no unreasonable delav in issuing the pro-
cess against the ship. Security had to be furnished to the satisfac-
tion of the judge for the payment of costs. Hmvever, the section 
fell short of empowering the judge to order the sale of the ship after 
judgment was obtained. 
The New South Wales Act of 18498 confDrred a similar jurisdiction 
7. Ss. 15 amJ 17. There is little doubt that Vice-Admiraltv 
Courts had power to sell tho ship and goocJs under the 
rmne Court (Admiralty) Act 1832 (Imp.), s. 6 tu satisfv wage 
claims. 
8. 13 No. 28. 
1 1 
to safeguard the rights of seamen engaged on ships eegisterPd in the 
colony and owned by tlritish subjects. When~ _a wage claim was less 
than twentv pound~3, a ~;ingle Justice of the Peacr~ was competl"mt to 
summon the party, who had defaulted, to appear before him. An ord-
er for payment would be made forthwith. If the order t.vas not obey-
ed within tiAIO days, section 15 empowered the Justice of the Peace to 
issue a warrant to levy the amount of wages awa1·ded, including the 
cost~3, charges and expenses incurred in the action, by distress ar1d 
sale of the goods and chattel~> of the defaulting party. Alternative-
ly, the levy could be imrosed on the ship, or1 which the seaman's ser-
vice had beer1 rendered, and the tackle and the apparel thereof. By sec-
tion 19, admiralty jurisdiction to entertain suits against the ship was 
conferred on the Vice-Admiralty Court or the Court of Record. The 
section extended to situations where the wage claim exceeded twenty 
pounds, the shipowner was bankrupt, the ship was under arrest or 
ordered to be sold b~; the Vice-Admiralty Court, or where neither 
the shipowner nor the master resided at the place of the seaman's 
discharge. It applied irrespective of whether the wage claim was 
brought by a seaman or the ship's master. The underlying object of 
the colonial legislature in enacting the section was to ensure that 
the 1111ages of ~3eamen and masters were paid according to a high ord-
Gr of priority recognized in maritime law. 
Section 10 of the Water Police Act 1853 (N.s.w} provided a 
summary mode of recovering wages earned and also compensation 
where a seaman was discharged in breach of the agreement before 
the voyage commenced. In each case, the jurisdiction exercisable by 
the Justice was limited to the award of not more than one month's 
wages. 
The Seamen's Laws Consolidation Act 1864 (N.S.W.) 10 rationalized 
the colonial maritime law and in several respects extended the admir-
alty jurisdiction. One of its commendable objects was to establish a 
single Llody of law which applied to both foreign-sJoing ships and New 
South Wales-re!.:Jistered ships owned by British subjects. Wages up to 
9. 17 Vic. No. 36. 
10.27 Vic. No. 13. 
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fifty pounds and the costs of proceeding could be recm;ered in a 
~Jummary manner t1ufore two Ju~-;tices of tht:J Peace. This right of en-
fDrcing such payments was exter1cled to any apprentice or person who 
\AidS duly authorismJ. The provisior1 of seclim1 50 was significant in 
that it auU1orisl?d the? master in certain circumstances to incur liabil-
ity and expenses For the bem~fit of the voyage. Jurisdiction was cDn-
ferred on the Court of Vice-Admiralty to entertain suits by the master 
based on arl\j lien he had on the ship for unpaid wages, the right of 
~>et-off or any counter-claim, and the settlr-'!ment of accounts aris-
ing between him and til£) shipowner. 
Nf']W South l.LJales enactments lm the subject passEJd before 1851 
and H359 operated as part of the laws of Victoria and Queensland, 
respectively, IAihen they became separate colonies. 
The first Tasmanian enactment,11 IAihich prm;ided a summary 
mode nf recovering wage~i not exeeding twenty pounds together with 
chargt:Js and expenses incurmd in the prDceedings before a Justice 
of thP Peace, was passed in 1837. With minor exceptions, this jurisdic-
tion to enforce payment corresponded to that exercisable b\/ the New 
South Wales Justices. Default by the shipowner or party adjudged li-
able to make the payment for two days empowered the Justice to issue 
a warrant to levy the amount of wages a\AJarded by distress and sale 
of the goods and chattels belonging to the shipowner or party invol-
ved. Where no goods and chattels were available, the Justir:e could 
order ttle wages awarded and the amounts incurred to be levied on 
the ship "or her tackle and apparel." 12 The right to invoke this sum-
mary procedure was open to any person £3mployed in whatever capac-
ity on board, including the master. Although in conferring the juris-
diction no distinction was made between foreign-going ships and loc-
ally-registered st1ips, the tenor of the .tkt seems to suggest that it 
was intended to apply only to seamen engaged in Tasmania. 
l-t . . f . h 13 . 1e provisions o · t e Seamen Act 1859 (Tas.),- which empowered 
Justices of the Peace, the Supreme Court and the c:ourt of Vicr]-Ad-
miralty to exercise admiralty jurisdiction were adopted from the 
11. B Wrn. 4 No. 10. 
12. Ibitj., s. 20. 
13. 23 Vic. No. 7. See e.g. ss. 49-53. 
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Merchant ShippinsJ Act 18L)4 (Jrnp.). ln essonce. they sot the pattern 
for the Seamen's taws Consolidation Act 1864JN.S.W.). This fact gives 
rise to tr1e inference that the jurisdiction provisions of colonial Acts 
were largelv. ancl indeed necessarilv, moc1ellecl on Imperial legislatior1. 
Jn SoutJ1 Australia, the i"larine Board and Navigation Act 1881
14 
was the fir~;t enactment which pmtPcted the rights of seamen, salvors 
and others. The jurisdictiorl 5 exercisable tJv the Justices of the 
Peace, the Supreme Court and the Court of Vice-Admiraltv to enforce 
pavmEmt of vJages and claims based on disbursements were similar to 
that conferred bv the Tasmanian and New South Wales Acts! 6 
Jt was historic in that it gave to colonial Justices and the Courts 
unprecr~dented jurisdictional competence to deal IAiith a number of 
maritimo causes. The Supreme Court and the Court of Vice-P,dmiraltv 
were empowererJ bv the Act 7 to adjudicate upon disputes, claims and 
other matters arising out of salvage. Bv section 371, the jurisdiction 
exercisable bv anv Court or Justice extended to anv ship or boat ly-
ing or passing off the coast within the limits of the province of such 
a Court or Justice. One notable aspect of the jurisdiction was the 
wirle powers given to the Court, Justice or any magistrate. Pavment 
of any amount could be levied bv "distress or pounding'' and, if nec-
essEn·v, "bv the sale of the ship and t1er tackle."18 What was remark-
able was the admiralty jurisdiction exercisable over anv foreign ship 
for damage or loss occasioned in whatever "part of the world" to 
propertv of Her Majestv or of any of Her subjects. Upon the receipt 
of an application made summarilv, a judge of the Supreme Court or the 
Court of Vice-Admiraltv was ernpmAJerPd to order the arrest of such a 
ship if found in anv port, or place within three miles of the coast, of 
the colonv. The ship would remain under arrest until compensation 
the damage or loss caused was paid or security, approved bv the 
14. 44 & 45 Vic. No. 237. 
15. Jbid., ss. 88-90 and 92. The amending Act (1\lo. 917 of 1904), 
s. 6 (3) extended the jurisdiction to disbursements or liabil-
ities incurred bv the master on the ship's account, the right 
of set-off, counter-claims and settlement of all accounts 
arising between the parties concerned. 
16. Seamen Act 1859 (Tas.), ss. 49, 5(] and SeamRn's Laws Con-
solidation .£\ct 1864 (N.S.W.), ss. 48-50. 
17. Marine BDard and NavlgatiDn Act 1881 (S.A.). 
18. ltJid., s. 372. 
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judge, was SJiV!3n to cov8r th~~ damaaes and costs that might be 
evenLuallv awarclPd. A~> a practical safeguard. a foreign ship could 
. 19 
LH? detaim?d tJv a customs officer when directed bv court order. 
Moreover, if it appeared that before an order for arrest could be 
issued th(? foreign ship in question would depart beyond the three-
mile limit of Lim colonv. it was lawful for the Marine Board to de-
tain ttm ship so as to provide enougll time to obtain such an ordel.0 
In terms of development in jurisdictional matters. Western 
Australia was far behind the other colonies. We have seen that 
her legislaturi1 imported into the colonv the provisions of Part 
II of the Imperial Merchant Shipping Act 189/4 (Imp.). Thev related, 
inter alia, to the rights and remedies of seamen and masters. A 
number of Western Australian enactmentl2dealing with harbours and 
pilotage were passed. None of them were concerned with the confer-
ment of power on tl1e court to enforce wage claims or other rights 
against the ship. The onlv power which resembled admiraltv jurisdic-
tion was given in section 6 of Harbours and Pilotage Act 1873 (W.A.l3 
Where, after a survev and inspection had been carried out, any ship, 
hulk or vessel was found to be unfit for sea service, unsound, unsafe 
and a likely obstruction to navigation, the harbour master could require 
the owner or master to have her removed. Non-compliance with the re-
quirement would entitle the harbour master to cast off or break the 
chain by which she was moored. The expenses incurred were recov-
erable by detaining her until they were paid, or from the proceeds 
of sale of the ship. Provision was made for the master or owner of 
the ship, hulk or vessel to ct1allenge the result of the survey and 
inspection. Within the time period allowed and subject to sufficient 
security being given to cover the expenses of her removal, if nec-
essary, an appeal could be taken to the Supreme Court~4 
l!Je shall revert to the effects of post-1890 colonial and State 
enactments after evaluating the contribution made by the Vice-Ad-
miralty Courts. 
19. Ibid., s. 378. 
tO. Ibid., s. 379. 
21. See Merchant Shipping Act Application Act 1903 (W.A.) (3 Edw. 
VII No. 7), as amended by Act (W.A.) (No. 23 of 1919). 
22. 9 Vic. No. 10; 14 Vic. No. 2; 16 Vic. No. 15; 18 Vic. No. 15 
and 37 Vic. No. 114. 
23 .. 37 Vic. No. 14. 
24. Ibid., s. 6. 
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III. VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS 
Chapter One deals with the irnportaticm into New South llJales 
of thP principles of maritime law and admiralty practice. By Letters 
Patent, tht! Vice-1\dmiraltv Court was invested with jurisdiction 0\/-
zr: 
er certain rnaritirne causes. J Fra~~mentary rf1cords, which have sur-
\/ived, !3how that as an Instance Court its jurisdiction in r:.gm was 
rathElr limitf:ld. 
1. Early Conferment of Jurisdiction in Rem 
To remove doubts as to the \/aliditv of the judgments in mari-
time causes given by, and to extend the admimlty jurisdiction of, 
the Vice-Admiralty Courts in Her Majesty's overseas possessions, 
section 6 of the Supreme Court (Admiralty) Act 183226 was enacted. 
For the first time, it specified the matters upon which the Vice-
Admiralty Courts could adjudicate. As a prerequisite, the ship or 
her master had to come within the "local limits" of their jurisdiction. 
Virtually any person could commence proceedings in suits for "sea-
men's wages, pilotage, bottomry, damage to any ship by collision ... 
salvage and droits of Admiralty." Extraterritorial jurisdiction was 
conferred in the sense that it was immaterial whether the cause of 
action arose within or outside the local limits of a Vice-Admiralty 
Court. 
In the early years of their juridical role as maritime law courts, 
their competence and the \/alidity of their judgments were often 
challenged by shipowners and masters whose ships and other related 
interests were the subject of admiralty proceedings in IJml. Three 
cases suffice to illustrate some of the typical problems encounter-
ed by these Courts in the pre-1850 period. 
In June 1844, the vessel Caroline27 was arrested in an action 
25. ·For letters Patent constituting the Vice-Admiralty Court, 
see G.B. B~rton, History of New South Wales (1783-1789), · 
· vol. I, ~.53!. The Court was empowered, inter alia, "to award 
executwn of the offenders convicted and attainted as afore-
said according to the civil law and the methods and rules of the 
Admiralty .... ": ibid., p.538. . 
26.2 Williams IV, c. 51. Its long title read: "An Act to regulate 
the Practice .. .in the Vice-Admiralty Courts abroad, and to 
obviate doubts as to the jurisdiction." S. 6 began with 
these words: "And whereas in certain cases doubts may 
arise as to the jurisdiction of Vice-Admiralty Courts .... " 
27. Syd. Morning Herald, 14th December, 1848, p. 3, sub nom ex 
parte Hunter. -- -
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In rem brought by om-J Bolton in the Vice-Admiralty Court. The 
ship's master applied to the Supreme Court of_New South Wales for 
an order of prohibition against the judge of the Vice-Admiralty 
Court. Apparently, in line with the authority exercised by Common 
Law Courts in re!'.itraining the High Court of Admiralty, thc-J Supreme 
Court held that, as the contract under dispute bet~.veen thn partiEJs 
was a specialty, the jurisdiction of the Vice-Admiralty Court was 
oustect8 The order of prohibition resulted in the release of the 
Caroline. It may be regarded as an exercise by the Supreme Court 
of its supervisory role in relation to the function of an Instance 
Court. It is arguable that, where the conditions in section 19 of 
the 1849 New South Wales Act9 were satisfied, the Vice-Admiralt~/ 
Court or the Court of Record was competent to entertain a wage 
claim 1whether or not it arose out of a specialty:o 
Another important relating to tt1e jurisdiction of the 
Vice-Admiralty Court over foreign vessels arose in The Asa Packe~1 
In the action in I.:filll brought by the ship's surgeon for unpaid wages, 
an American ship was arrested. The master objected on two grounds 
to the Court's assumption of jursidiction. Firstly, the plaintiff had 
not signed the ship's articles. Secondly, the Court lacked jurisdic-
tion over a foreign-registered ship. Support to the objection was 
also given by the United States consul's intervention in the action. 
The judge followed the propositions laid dm.vn by Dr. Lushington in 
The Golubchich32 and several American decision~~ and gave judgment 
for the surgeon. In asserting juridical authority, he said:4 
28. See Howe v. Napier (1766) 4 Burr. 19l~5; also Chapter One. 
29. 13 Vic. No. 28. 
! 30. The case was heard before the New South Wales Act bearing, 
' the date 2nd October, 1849, was passed. 
31. N.S.W. archives 4/7599. See also The Ocean Queen (1879) 1 
N.S.W.R. 99 . 
. 32. 1 Robinson 143. 
33. The Jerusalem and The Aisah referred to in Syd. Mornin9_ 
Herald, April 2, 1950. 
'34. SycJ. Morning Herald, 18th April, 1953, p. 2. 
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" .. .in t11ese cases the Court has jurisdiction altogether 
independent of am; consent of the representative of the 
foreign power to which the ship or searmm may belong; but 
notice is required to be given in all cases ... in order that 
information may be obtained as to the propriety ... of the 
jurisdiction being exercised." 
The pronouncement entitling seamen to sue for their wages in foreign 
courts is consistent with the legislative policy of both Imperial and 
local Acts. Thest:'J Acts were largely geared towards enabling seamen 
to recover their wages. It Sf3ems that the giving of notice to a 
"foreign powe~'representative was intended to comply with a princi-
ple of international law that a ship belonging to a foreign sovereign 
d d . t . 35 A or foreign government could not be procee e agams In ~· n 
exception applies where there is submission to the court's jurisdic-
tion. The practice of Vice-Admiralty Courts, when administering Im-
perial laws, of obtaining such information was not a prerequisite 
under local laws. Section 15 of the 1832 New South Wales Ac~6 
which empowered two or more Justices of the Peace to adjudicate 
summarily upon seamen's suits for wages against masters or comman-
ders of ships arriving at the colony from abroad, was not subject to 
the giving of any such notice. No reference was made to any such 
notice or information in the Seamen's Laws Consolidation Act 1864 
(N.S.W.)~7 which invested Vice-Admiralty Courts with in !:.§!!!. jurisdic-
tion over ships, whether British or foreign. 
Another interesting case invohting the intervention of the 
Supreme Court was Lyons v. Elyard:s The whaling barque Jane was 
----- ----
arrested under a warrant issued by the Vice-Admiralty Court. Des-
pite the owner's efforts to put her in readiness to sail, the marshall 
placed a bailiff on board. The owner instituted proceedings in the 
Supreme Court against the marshall for damages for trover and tres-
pass. As there was no evidence to go to the jury, the Chief Justice 
I 
135. See The iTorvaete [1922] P., p. 226 per Bankes, L.J.; p. 271, 
. .e£r Scrutton, L.J.·; p. 275 .Per Atkin,l.J. 
36. 2 Gul. IV No. 10. 
37. 27 Vic. No. 13. See also Marine Board and Navigation Act 
1881 (S.A.), s. 379, which empowered the arrest of foreign 
ships. 
i 38. (1846) 1 Legge 328. 
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directed a non-suit and founcl for the defendant marshall. The 0\/\lfl-
er appealed to tile Full Court of the Supreme-court on the ground 
that there was evidence of conversion. Upon the issues which arose 
from the special plea, a verdict was entered for the plaintiff with 
nominal damages. The Full Court held, however, that the arrest of 
the barque by the Vice-Admir;:)]ty Court officer was not strictly con-
version. It was found that there was concurrent possession in the 
plaintiff and that there had been no taking of the ship inconsistent 
witll the owners right of possession. The marshall's act was held to 
be merely an assertion of his right or that of his agent, the bailiff, 
to remain on board until certain fees were paid or some other con-
dition was met. Cognizance was U1us taken of the authority of the 
marsllall in carrying out his duties as an officer of the Vice-Admir-
alty Court. 
Before the close of the nineteenth century Vice-Admiralty 
Courts r1ad already been established in many parts of the British 
E . 3~ A t f mp1re. warran or establishing a Vice-Admiralty Court in Van 
D. I L j . d l ' '~ 0 1emen s am was 1ssue ear y on 1st September, 1825. It is quite 
probable that by the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth 
century every Australian colony had a Vice-Admiralty Court set up 
to adjudicate upon maritime causes. We have noted that Part II of 
the MBrchant S!1ipping Ac~ 1854 (Imp.), which included provisions on 
ship mortgages, applied to tile ~vhole of Her Majesty's overseas pos~ 
sessions~1 By this time British ship registries had been set up in 
most capital cities and centrally-located ports throughout Austmlia. 
The Imperial Act prm1idecl for registration of ship mortgages to be 
effected at appropriate ship registries, and safeguarded the inter-
ests of ship mortgagees. For decades, the Imperial merchant shipping 
39. The \/ice-f\drniralty Court Act 1863 (Imp.), Schedule f\, con-
tained a List of forty-five British possessions or colonies, 
including the names of six Australian States, with pre-
existin~~ \/ice-1-\dmil'alty Courts. 
40. H.R.A. Ser. III, vol. lV, p. 598. The Letters Patent for 
establishing the Vice-Admiralty Court in New South Wales 
was dated 25th May 1787: H (R) N.S.l.Ll., \/Ol 1, p. 542. 
1~1. See s. 17 and s. 91 as regards the application of the Mer-
chant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.), Part I. -
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legislation had sought to promote shipbuilding, ship-repairing and 
ship-chandlino industries in tr1e t:rnpire. These aims were achievable 
only if financiers, suppliers of necc;ssaries, repairers, st1ipbuilders 
and others were sufficiently prot.ectc~d under the laws of their ter-
ritory. Few local merchants would run the risk of pro\/iding, on 
credit, stores or services to ~:>hips whose owners resided outside the 
colony, and conducted their business from overseas bases. It was 
impractical and often impossible for local merchants to institute 
personal actions against debtors who resided outside the jurisdic-
tion of the colony's Supreme Court. 
The preceding considerations, when seen in the context of 
Britain's Empire-building policy, weighed heavily in f8\10ur of inves-
ting Vice-Admiralty Courts with enlarged jurisdictions. It was ess-
ential for them to entertain admiralty proceedings in rem with re-
gard to mortgage, towage, pilotage, disbursements, claims founded 
on contr'acts for the building, equipping or repair of ships, any 
question arising between registered shipowrmrs, and claims for nec-
essaries supplied. 
The Court of Admiraltv Acts (Imp.), 1840 and 1861, restored to 
the High Court of Admiralty a substantial part of its ancient juris-
diction, previously taken away by Common Law Courts. At the time 
of their enactment, neither of the Acts applied to Vice-Admiralty 
Courts~2 Fortunately, the gaps in the jurisdictional competence of 
the Vice-Admiralty Courts in all Australian colonies along with 
others elsewhere43 were filled by the Vice-Admiralty Courts Act 
1863 (Imp.) and the Vice-Admiralt~ Courts Act f.\mendment Act 1867 
(Imp.f.4 In particular, the 1863 Act (Imp.) was an epoch-making ev-
ent. It confirmed the validity of the past proceedings of these 
Courts, amended their practice, upgraded their statu!:; as specialized 
42. Their long titles and exclusive reference to "the High Court 
of Admiralty of England" clearly indicate this fact. ' 
ld. As to the list of such Courts, see Schedule A to the 1863 
Act (lrnp.) (26 & Z7 Vic., c. 24). 
44. 30 & 31 Vic., c. 45. 
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tribunals, and empowerf:)d them to adjudicate upon a larger categorv 
of maritime causes and matter·s. Foi' L11e tirne, the Registrar 
of a Vice-. 1\dmiraltv Court was empowered to fidminister oaths relat-
ing to anv matter in dispute. In collision suits, the judge could, on 
the application of eith£H' partv, direct cross causes to be heard at 
the same time~ ancJ on the same evidence. /'... joint action would save 
the parties time and expensn, <:md avoid confusion as exemplified in 
the Privv Council case of J\.S.N. Compam; \1. Smith and Others, Smith 
and Other!:> \1. A.S.N. Cmnpanv~5 Here the cross causF!s were brought 
at common law bv owners of the twu ships invulved in the collision, 
and were dealt with in separate trials. Moreover, und£::;r section 22 
of the 1863 Act (Imp.), with the judge's permission, an appeal from a 
final sentence or ordE~r of a \/ice-Admiraltv Court v.muld lie to Her 
Majestv in Council at the apex of the colunial judicial hierarchv. 
Unless Dtherwise y excludE!d in section 13, the Court was 
empowen"!d to adjudicate upon those matters or causes within its 
competence. It was immaterial whether thev arose within or bevond 
the limits of the colorw. 
It is r1oteworthy that the new powers given to \/ice-Admiraltv 
Courts were in addition to "the Jurisdiction conferred upon any 
Vicr~-Admiralty Court by any Act of Pmliament" or "anv other Juris-
diction now la1,vfully bv arw such CourL"MJ 
2. Extensiun of Jurisdiction 
The improved court machinerv provided bv the 1863 and 1867 
Acts (Imp.) marked the br~ginning of a period of significant s1rowth in 
colonial maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction. 
CJne of the Imperial goals to be achieved was to render \/ice-
Admiraltv Courts capable of administering the 
Act 185!~ (Imp.) on an Empire-wide scale. 
the first case concerning section 187 of the Act (lrnp.) to come be-
fore the Vice-1\dmiraltv Court in VIctoria. Apart from certain ex-
ceptions, the section prohibi tt=Jcl mw seaman from suing rem for 
wages under fiftv pounds in EJ \/ice-Adrniraltv Court. /\ suit was 
brought jointly by six seamen for wages and compensfJtion for wrong-
ful disrni~Jsal. The amount claimed by each seaman exceeded, but 
45. (1889) 6 W.N. (N.S.W.) 3. 
M'i. --'-''-'-_;;;;.;..;.;.;;.;'-=""-'-...;;;;.;;=.;;;.;;:...;...;;;;;.;;; 1863 (Imp.), s. 12. 
!~7. (1882) B V.L.R. 1. 
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was rr3duced to less than, fifty pounds, although the total amount 
came to £203 19s. 8d. . W.F. Stawell dismissed the suit on the 
-< 
ground that the court had no jurisdiction where none of the seamen 
was entitled to a minimum of fifty pounds. The narrm"J literal con-
struction put on the section, if upheld, would deprive seamen of the 
advantages of bringing a joint admiralty action in rem against the 
ship in such circumstances. [Jn appeal to the Privy Council, the de-
cision was reversed. Their Lordships applied the Interpretation Act 
(Imp.)48 and held that ''the singular number shall include the plural." 
Thus section 189 was to read: "No suit or proceeding for the re-
covery of wages under the surn of 501. shall instituted by or on 
behalf of any seaman or seamen." It was to construed reddenda 
. 1 . 1' 49 Th ' smgu a smgu 1s. e1r Lordships held that since the total amount 
due to the six seamen was £203 19s. 8d., the judge had jurisdiction 
under the provision. Where a choice existed, the decision would en-
courage colonial seamen to sue under the Imperial Act. 
In The Mary Campben?0 a suit foi' wages was instituted by the 
master in a Vice-Admiralty Court against the ship's mortgagee 
in possession. The judge held that by section 191 of the Merchant 
! Shipping Act 1854 (Imp.), the mortgagee claiming the right of a set-
off was in the same position as the shipowner. He therefore had 
benefit of payments made on account of wages and also of all 
other sums which the shipowner' was entitled to deduct from the 
master's claim. It is true that the jurisdiction conferred by section 
191 was sufficient to dispose of the issues raised. But suppose that 
the ship had to be sold and the proceeds of sale were insufficient 
, to pay off the mortgage loan, the master's wages and the disburse-
ments. The claims involved would fall outside the scope of tne sec-
tion. The Court was not empowered to pay those claims out of the 
fund according to their order of priority. It was to fill the 
gaps in the jurisdiction that the yice-Admiralty Courts Act 1863 
(Imp.) was passed. Moreover, many provisions of the 1854 Act (Imp.), 
which created valuable rights and provided for their exercise, made 
no rncmtion of the tribunals whict1 were competent to assume the 
48. 13 & 1ll Vic., c. 21; see the Interpretation Act 1889 (U.K.), 
s. 1 (1) (b). which is a re-enactment of the existing rule. 
For Privy Council judgment, see (1882) 8 V.L.R. 8. 
49. It means 11!]iving each to each." 
50. (1871) 10 S.C.R. (N.S.W.) 261. 
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jurisdiction. Such uncertainty, if left unr•:!moved, I.Aiould result in 
time-consuming litigation and t:)xpem:ii\Je appesJ-~1. 
rhe extEmsion of admiralty jurisdiction under the 1863 Act 
(Imp.) fulfilled a further object of Imperial policy. It operated as a 
mechanism for the reception into the Australian and othm· colonies 
a crucial body of principles of maritime law developecl by English 
courts. Obviously some examples drElltJfl from local decision will ill-
ustrate the enormous lx~m'!fit~3 which Australia ha~' dt:!ri\/ed. 
In ThlJ Tyburnia (No. 1);1 tht:? ship tAJas sold uncler an 
made in 1887 by Vict::-Admiralty Court of New South Wales. .Apart 
from the wages owing to the rnastm· and seamen and disbursements 
incurred on account of thE~ ship. there INEH'G other expense items, 
e .. costs of salt?, subsistence mone\1 and return fare for the crew. 
The extended jurisdiction meant consistonc\1 in the law. Judge Com-
missary, F. Darley, C.J .. imported English maritime case law to 
determine the nature and status of the claims. According to the 
equitable principles adopted, the master was allowed the expenses 
of \Aiaiting here (or detention money) to protect his interests until 
the case was finally decided. Subsistence money for mariners from 
the time of leaving the ship until their return home, the oxpensc~s 
of the journe\1 horne amJ costs of the action were held to have the 
sarne ranking as their wages. Thus subject to prior payment of the 
marshall's charges, costs of suit and costs of sale of thEJ ship, the 
balance of the proceeds was applied in paving seamen's wages which 
had a higher priority than the master's wages and the disburse-
ments. ln view of the number of case authorities followed, 
the decision stands out as a classic instance of direct application 
of English principles to maritime cases tried in the colonies. 
ln evaluating the contribution made by Vice-Admiralty Courts, 
it equally vital to examine how the provisions, particularly those 
in section 10, of the 1863 Act (Imp.) were construecl. 
Referring to the purpose of the Imperial Parliament in enact-
' 
. t 'd 52 ing the Court of Admiral tv Act 18MJ (lrnp .), Dr. Lus nng ,on sa1 : 
51. (1887) 8 N.S.W.R. 1 (In Vice-1-\drniralty). 
52. The .Alexander, 1 W. Rob. 360, cited with approval by the 
Vice-.Adrniralty Court judge in ThP Nicaraguan Barque Cour-
ier (1879) 13 S.A.L.R. 124, p. 133. 
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"I may observe that when the recent statute conferred 
upon this Court a jurisdiction in these matters, or rather, 
perhE1PS, revived an ancient jurisdiction-long prohibited, 
it never was nor could be intended to alter the law, but 
merely to give a new remedy which was rendered necrlssary 
in the peculiar cases of foreign ships .... " 
The jurisdiction was exercised by Vice-Admiralty Court judges much 
in the light of thr~ pre-1840 decisions and doctrines of the High 
Court of Admiralty. In the South Australian case of The Nicaraguan 
BarquE! Courier, decided in 1879, a ship on arrival at Wellington was 
fraudulently and furtively sold by· her master. The purchasers 
appointed M as master and sent the ship to Adelaide, where repairs 
on her were made on M's orders. Proceedings were instituted by the 
shipwright against the vessel for the value of the repairs made. 
Judgment was givr,;n for the true owner who defended the action. 
He had in no way recognised the sale. To answer the question whether 
i the repairs made would giiJe rise to a maritime lien on the ship, 
the judge delved into English legal history. His research showed 
that U1e maritime lien was available in England to persons making 
repairs upon, or furnishing supplies to, a ship until the time when 
the Common Law Courts ousted tht:J Court of Admiralty of its juris-
d. t' 53 lC IOn. Section 6 of the Court of Admiralty Act 1840 (Imp.) con-
ferred admiralty jurisdiction over claims, inter alia, "for necessar-
ies supplied to an\; foreign ship or seagoing vessel, and to enforce 
payment thereof." Or. Lushington had r1eld in Ella A.Clark 54 tr-lat 
the section gave rise to a maritime lien. The decision was admitt-
edly based on the fact that clc-:Jims for necessaries were included in 
the section in the same collocation with other matters which carr-
ied maritime liens. It is submitted that Or. Lushington had the inten-
tion of restoring the lien which had existed prior to the reign of 
Charles II. The Vice-Admiralty Court judge in the South Australian 
case had doubts that section 10 of the 1863 Act (Imp.) would give 
rise to a maritime lien for necessaries supplied. He held that, on 
the facts of the case, the true owner was not responsible for the 
acts of M, the master, whose possession of the ship was wrongful. 
Further suppoi't. for the view that Vice-Admiralty Courts looked 
53. (1879) 13 S.A.L.R. 124, p. 129. 
54. Br. and L. 32. Howe\Jer, it was held by Mellish, L.J., in Two 
Ellens. L.R. 4 P.C. 161 that no maritime lien was created by 
Admiralt\;' Court Act 1861 (Imp.). 
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to pre-1840 authorities in inter'preting the sections of the 1863 1\ct 
(Imp.) is found in The Macgregor - Heselton's Clairn.55 In an action 
for towage, a steamship was arr·ested in Octooer, 1874, and bail was 
put in. One underh;ing question was whether section 10 of the 1863 
/\ct (Imp.) invr:~sted the Vice-Admiralty Court with jurisdiction to en-
tertain proceedings in rem to enforce towage claims. The Judge 
Commis~>arv found that prior to 18'•0 there had been adjudications 
upon towage or1 the high seas~6 "of which the case of Isbella57 i~i an 
instance." Although the suit instituted there was an action in rem 
for salvage, the a1111ard made v.Jas merely for towage service. 
One h?ature characterised the approach of Vice-Admiralty 
Courts v.1hen adjudicating upor1 maritime causes. In the absence of 
pre-1 fl40 decisions, these Courts would follow the interpretation 
placed upon the corresponding provisions of the _Admiralty Court 
Acts (Imp.), 1840 and 1861, by the High Court of Admiraltv. In this 
respect, the construction placed on various sections of the 1863 
Act (Imp.) had an Imperial flavour. It was obvious that Vice-Admir-
alty Courts functioned as an extension of the High Court of Admir-
alty. They were set up in Her Majesty's colonies to administer Eng-
lish maritime law for the convenience of overseas claimants. 
In The Ferret?8 the ship was seized bv the government of 
Victoria in April, 1881. An action in rem was instituted against the 
ship by certain seamen to recover', inter alia, wages and compensa-
tion for wrongful discharge before the termination of the agree-
ment. Counsel for the shipowners argued that a claim for damages 
for wrongful discharge could not be added to that for wages. It 
was contended that the Court had not the inherent jurisdiction of 
the Court of Admiral tv and that section 10 of the 1863 Act (Imp.) did 
not confer jurisdiction over such ~a claim. Sir W.F. Stawell, however, 
had no difficultv in overruling the objection by relying on the wide 
ruling of Sir Robert Phillirnore in The Blessing.59 The latter had held 
55. (1876) 14 S.C.R. (N.S.W.) 107. 
56. Ibid., pp. 109-111. 
57. 3 Hagg. Adm. Rep. 427. 
58. (1882) 8 V.L.R. 1. 
59. 3 ~"J.D. 35. In The Great Eastern, L.R. 1 A & E 384, the court 
entertained the claim for compensation in the nature of 
damages for wrongful discharge of a seaman before the 
agreement expired. 
525 
that U18 \Aiords "claim for wage~>" im:luded a claim for wrongful dis-
missal apart from wages. 
-" 
The case of The MBcgrer-;Jor - Ht'!selton's Claim60 has been con-
sidered. It is significant that the Judge Commissary treated section 
10 of the 1863 Act (Imp.) as being in pari materia with section 6 of 
the Admiralty Court Act 18t~o (Imp.) so far as conferment of juris-
d. t' d 'd61 Ic ·1on was concerne . He sat : 
"Since the passing of tht:"? 3 and 4 Vic., cap. 65, there have 
been many suits in rem for salvage in which the Court pro-
nounced for towage ooly. The Princess Alice is one of 
them. There have been cases in which vessels have been 
P!'O~eded against exJ:Jressly for towage, such as the Chris-
tm!§!L and the Martha?3 By the 1Oth section of the Vice-
Admiralty Court Act ... jurisdiction is given to the Vice-Ad-
miralty Courts over (amongst others) claims in respect of 
towage. This can mean no other thBn jurisdiction in ~-" 
About eleven years later, in Stokes and Others v. The Conference?4 
the plaintiff in pursuing his claim relied heavily on the "similar 
meBning" doctrine. As shipowner's agent, he had paid premiums for 
the insurance on the ship and her freight. The question before the 
Vice-Admiralty Court in New South Wales was whether, in respect of 
the money paid, he could in the action against the ship claim for 
necessaries. In support of his contention, the case of The Riga65 
was cited. There Sir Robert Phillimore made no distinction between 
necessaries for the ship and necessaries for the voyage, and held 
that insurance for freight 1111as a necessary within the meaning of 
section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act 1840 (Imp.). His judgment in 
The Riga was based on the authority of Lord Tenterden in Webster v. 
Seekamp~6 In the latter case, the brassfounder sued the shipowner 
at common law to recover the amount due for the coppering work 
done on the order of the master. The action succeeded on the 
ground that the coppering work was found to be necessary to the 
60. (1876) 14 S.C.R. (N.S.W.) 107. 
61. Ibid., p. 111. 
62. 3 W. RotJ. 27; S.C. 6 Moore P.C. 379. 
63. 1 Lush. 314. 
64. (1887) 8 N.S.W.R. 10 (In Vice-Admiralty). 
65. (1872) L.R. 3 Ad. & Ec. 516. The word "necessaries" was widely 
defined by Dr. Lushington in The Perla (1858) Swab. 353. See 
Also Roscoe, Admiralty Practice (5th ed.), p. 203. 
66. 4 B. & Ald. 3")2. The definition of "necessarie~c," was aclopted 
by the Privy Council in Foong Tai & Co. v. Buchheister and 
Co. [1908] A,. C. 458, p. 466. 
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ship engag£')d in the Mediterranean trade. UndoubtecJlv, monev ad-
\Janced to a master to enable him to purchase~necessaries would be 
held recoverable in an action against the ship. However, in the 
Henrich Bjorn?7 a fine and somewhat illogical distinction was drawn 
Lletween (1) repairs made~ to, or things provided for tilE! equipment 
of, the ship and (2) insurance of the vessel. The former were held 
to be "necessaries" within the meaning of section 6 of the Admiraltv 
[ourt Act 1861 (Imp.), while the latter wa~> regarded as something 
extraneous to her equipment For sea and for the shipowner's pro-
tection. Accordinglv, Sir James Hannen expresslv held that insur-
ance premiums could not be regarded as necessarie~~.68 Following 
the decision in U1e Henrich Bjorn, the Judge Commissarv in Stokes 
and Others v. The Conference69 ordered the proceedings instituted 
bv the plaintiff to be set aside. The pi'Onouncement of Sir James 
Hannen is unfortunate. It introduced an unwarranted distinction, 
caused the raising of insurance premiums more difficult and expen-
sive, and undulv restricted the jur·isdiction of the court?.0 
An interesting aspect of the jurisdiction exercised is seen in 
71 The Ocean Queen. Section 10 of the Vice-Admiraltv Court Act 
67. (1886) 11 App. Cas. 270. 
68. It is submitted that the problem could have been avoided 
if the liabilitv had been incurred bv the master on account 
of the ship. It should have been recoverable as disburse-
ment under the Vice-Adrniraltv Courts Act 1863 (Imp.), s. 10 
(2). ~ 
69. (1887) 8 N.S.W.R. 10 (In Vice-Admiraltv). 
70. Even though the goods supplied were necessaries, the 
right to bring an action in rem against the ship would be 
lost if at the time of the action the ship had been trans-
ferred to a new Ohmer: The Henrich Bjorn (1886) 11 App. 
Cas. 2/0 (H.L.). 
71. (1879) 1 N.S.LtJ.R. 99. 
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1863 (Imp.) \Alas applied in line 1111ith the Imperial policy which favour-
ed seamen. The plaintiff was a foreigner who sou~Jht to enforce a 
wage claim against a foreign vessel in an Australian colony. ,!he \liew 
was expressed that thu prm1isirm onh/ empowered the Vice-Admiralty 
Court to administer English maritime Jaw to the exclusion of 
any foreign law. There the plaintiff, a French subject, had been 
employed under French law on board a French vessel as providore 
and steward. He instituted an action in rem to recover wages due 
---
and the amount for necessaries supplied to the ship. Objections 
were raised on a number of grounds against the action. The French 
vessel was the property of an insolvent French company. By French 
law, the wages of a person serving on board any French ship outside 
the French dominions could only be paid to the French consul. More-
oveL in the circumstances of the case, a creditor v..1as prohibited from 
pursuing any remedy against the property of an in sol vent company. 
fhe only action allowed was against the Syndic of the Insolvent Es-
tate. Wind eyer, the Deputy Judge Commissary, brushed aside the 
objections based on French law. He was of the view that, since the 
proceedings were in rem, "it is immatei'ial in 1/\lhom the property in the 
h . . t d "72 S IP IS ves e . 
In one crucial I'espect, the jurisdiction conferred on Vice-
Admiralty Courts differed fmm that exercisable by the High Court 
of Admiralty. Section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act 1840 (Imp.) inves-
ted the High COLJI't of Admiralty with jurisdiction i~ rem in respect 
of claims for necessaries supplied to foreign vessels only. The app-
ai'ent discrimination against foreign vessels somehow produced a 
disadvantage for British vessels, particularly those trading between 
Britain and the colonies. This anomaly in the jurisdiction meant 
that, as a matter of business prudence, necessaries of whatever 
form would only be supplied on credit to British ships under a diff-
erent ai'rangement. To bring the claim within the High Court of 
72. Ibid., p. 103. Cf. The Cissie (1914) 10 Tas. L.R. 124. Here 
a 1\Jorwegian ship was involved and the Norwegian acting-
consul protested against the Supreme Court of Tasmania 
e~tertaining the suit. The ship's articles provided that 
disputes between seamen and the master should provision-
allY be. settled by the consular officer and eventually be 
d~termme~ by a Nonvegian court. In exercising his discre-
ti.on, Do~bie, J., t.1eld that the suit should not be proceeded 
With, reliance bemg placed on the authority of The Nina 
(1867) L.R. 2 P.C. 38. 
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Admiralty's jurisdiction exercisablE) in rem, necessaries men would 
[Jener21lly insist on certain security to be given, e.g. a bottomry 
-· -bond or mortgage of thf] ship. The illogical distinction between 
foreign and E3ritish ships was later removed?3 The High Court of 
Admiralty, t1owev~c;r, was precluded from entertaining any action in 
rem for necessarirls where they were supplied to a ship at her port 
of registry or where at the time of instituting the action any owner 
or part-owner of the ship was domiciled in Englar1d or Wales. The 
reason for the exceptions is that in such situations the creditors 
would enjoy sufficient recourse against shipowners by instituting 
actions at common law. 
Section 10 (1 0) of the Vice-Admiralty Courts Act 1863 (Imp.) 
which conferred admiralty jurisdiction in ~ in respect of claims 
for necessaries was narrowly couched. Its exercise was subject to 
two conditions being satisfied. Firstly, the philosophy of its Imper-
ial counterpart thlas partly followed. It was inapplicable where the 
owner or part-owner of the ship was domiciled in the colony or pos-
session "at the time of the necessaries being supplied." Secondly, 
the necessaries must have been supplied in the colony or possession 
in which the Vice-Admiralty Court was established. No distinction 
\.\las rnade between British and foreign vessels. The provision con-
ft=Jrred better protection on claimants than section 5 of the J\dmir-
alty Court Act 1861 (Irr1p.)?4 
Some of the difficulties faced by creditors were exemplified 
in the Victorian case of The "Albion", decided in 1872?5 The facts 
were rattler unusual. Before D was placed on the registry as the 
ship's master, he advanced $5,000 to pay off and discharge the crew 
for insubordination. The ship, which had been transferred to, and 
registered in the name of, the brother of the former· owner, was 
arrested in Melbourne. First, D was unable to recover the $5,000 as 
disbursements because at the time of the advance another person 
73. Admiralty Court Act 1861 (Imp.), s. 5. 
74. One way of defeating a necessaries man's right to bring 
an action in rem under s. 5 was to have the ship's regis-
tration transferred to the port where the necessaries 
were supplied or for a part-owner to be domiciled there 
at the time of the action. 
75.(1872) 3 V.L.R. 1. 
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was still officially ernployE!d as master. Second, his alternative 
claim for rc~covering the amount as necessaries failed on the ground· 
that the money ~Atas not supplied in Victoria. The Vic£:?-Admiralty 
Court had no jurisdiction under section 10 (10) to entertain the ac-
tion. Third, D was not allowed to offset the amount in question 
EJgainst a debt owf~d by him (for freight received) to the owner. Sir 
llJ.F. StawE:;ll?6 
"If I were to allow these necessaries to be raised a~.; an 
answer to a set-off, I should, in fact, adjudicate thereon 
in plain opposition to the section (i.e. section 10 (10)] .. .! 
do not think I have liberty to do so. It may be said that 
this is only another form of stating that debts must be 
mutual." 
The proposition that an advance made or liability incurred could 
not qualify as disbursements unless the person making or incurring 
it had been officially appointed ship's master worked injustice. It 
unduly limited the court's jurisdiction under section 10 (2) at the 
expense of the master who, prior to his appointment, had advanced 
monev or incurred liability for the benefit of the ship or her own-
ers. It appears that, subject to the qualifving words "so far as the 
case permits", section 1 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1889 (Imp.) 
was introduced to enable a master to recover in the same wav as 
his wages " disbursements properlv made" and "liabilities properly 
incurred by him on account of the ship." Even if the section had 
been in force when the advance was made, D's action for disburse-
77 
ments would still have been unsuccessful. 
76. Ibid., p. 11. 
77. In The Louise Roth [1905] S.A.L.R. 107, Gordon, J", held that 
a mate had no maritime lien on the ship for wages paid to 
the cmw for overtime nor for necessary disbursements 
made by him at the master's request. As he was not the 
ship's master at the time when the payment and disburse-
ments were made he was not protected by Marine Board 
and Navigation Act Further Amendment Act 1906 (S.A.), s. 
6 (3). Moreover, he was not entitled to invoke the Merch-
ant Shipping Act 1889 (Imp.), s. 1, later incorporated as s. 
167 of the 1894 Act (Imp.). 
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IV. COLONIAL COURTS OF ADMIRALTY ACT 1890 
Unquestionably, the construction of the Vice-Admiralty Court 
~ 1863 (Imp.) largely according to the mBaning given by the High 
Court of Admiralty to similar provisions in the Admiralty Court Acts 
(Imp.), 1Bl,O and 1861, had brought colonial court decisions into line 
with English admiralty luw. less than three decades after the 
groundwork for unifying admiralty jurisdiction was laid, the Colon-
ial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 (Imp.) was passed to reorganise the 
colonial courts administering maritime la\AI. Indeed Lord Merrivale 
pointed out that the true intent of the 1890 Act (Imp.) was "to 
define as maximum of jurisdictional authority for the Courts to be 
set up thereunder, the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court in 
England as it existed ut the time when the Act was passed."78 
The establishment of Courts of Admiralty under one common 
system to replace the pre-existing Vice-Admiralty Courts was an im-
portant development in Imperial-colonial relationship. By the 1890 Act 
(Imp.), self-governing colonies are empowr~red to decide, within 
defined limits. the extent of the admimlty jurisdiction exercisable 
by their courts. Another difference between the old and new sys-
tems is this. Previously a judge of a Supreme Court of a British 
possession was made Vice-Admimlty Court judqe by reason of an 
appointment from the British Admiralty. Hi::; jurisdiction was \JeStt::Jd 
in him personally. although under the Vice-Adrniraltv Courts Act 
Amendment Act 1867 (Imp.) he was empowered to appoint one or more 
duputy judges to assist or repn~sent him in executing the judicial 
79 powers. However, by section 12 of the 1890 Act (Imp.), the jurisdic-
tion is vested in the Court. 
Except in the case of those British possessions namEJd in the 
First Schedule~ to the 1890 Act (Imp.), the Vicc~-Admimlty Courts in 
various parts of the Empire were abolished by section 17. The four 
British possessions so namf::d were Nm111 South Walr:Js, Victoria, St. 
Helena and British Flonduras. By !:>ection 16 (1) (CJ), the Act (Imp.) 
would come into force in the four British possessions when directed 
78. The Yuri Maru The Woron [1927} A.C., p.915. See C.W. 
O'Hare "Admiralty Jurisdiction" (Part 2)(1979-80) 6 
Mon. L. Rev., pp.207, et seq. 
79. 30 & 31 Vic., c. 45, s. 5. 
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by an [JrdPr of Her l"lajesty in Council. An Order irr Council dated 
L,th May, 1911~0 was made to take effect from_1st July, 1911. New 
South Wales and Victoria were the only two Australian colonies in 
which U1e Vice-Admimlty Courts were retained until that date~ 1 
Another comparative aspect is worthy of note. In Australia, many 
of the more important maritime causes were adjudicated upon in the 
two possessions. It is likely that the exclusion of the two possess-
ions in the 1890 Act (Imp.) was intended to provide a transitional 
machinery for· appeals to be taken direct to Her Majesty in Counci~.2 
Accordingly, for over a decade, litigants in Australia had a choice 
of two different forums, appeals from which could go either to Her 
Majesty in Council or to the Full Court of the Supreme Court~3 
By section 2 (1) every court of law in a British possession 
which is declared, as provided, will be a "court of Admiralty" with 
the jurisdiction conferred by the 1890 Act (Imp.). Alternatively, 
where no such declaration is in force in the possession, the court 
with original unlimited civil jurisdiction will be such a court of ad-
miralty. By section 2 (2), the jurisdiction of a Colonial Court of 
Admiralty is the same geographically and otherwise as the admiralty 
jurisdiction of the High Court of England at the time of the passing 
of the Act~4 
Prior to 1914, no declaration undel' section 3 of the 1890 Act 
(Imp.) had been made of any Australian court as the Colonial Court 
of Admiralty. Consequently, by section 2 (1), the High Court of 
Australia and every State Supreme Court, having unlimited civil jur-
isdiction, were deemed to be Colonial Courts of Admiralty. The High 
Court established under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Comth.) became a 
Colonial Coul't of Admiralty in 1903. 
A serious uncertainty occurred regarding the status of the 
State Supreme Courts as Colonial Courts of Admiralty when the 
80. No. 440 of 1911, Statutory Rules and [Jrders. 
81. Hl8 1890 /-\ct (Imp.), s. 9 (1) expressly reserves to Her Majesty, 
by Commission under the Great Seal, to establish in a Brit-
ish possession any Vice-Admiralty Court or Courts. 
82. Vice-Admiralty Courts Act 1863 (Imp.), s. 22. 
83. The right of appeal from a single judge sitting in a Colonial 
Court of Admiralty to the Full Court of the Supreme Court 
is affirmed: Mclhvraith 1'-lcEacharn Ltd. v. The st-,ell Company 
of Australia Ltd. (1945) 70 C.l_.R. 175, p. 191, r2ff Latham, C.J. 
84. Ibid., p. 188. 
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Judiciarv Act 1914 (Comth}5 was passed. Bv section 3, the following 
provision was inserted as section 30!\ of the JurJiciarv Act 1903 viz.: 
"The High Court is herebv declal'ed to be a Colonial Court 
of Admiraltv within the meaning of the Imperial Act known 
as the Colonial Court of Admiraltv Act 1890." 
The problem was aggravated bv the fact that the Commonwealth was 
for the purpose of section 18 (2) of the Interpretation Act 1889 
(Imp.) a British possession~6 It implied that the Supreme Courts in 
the Australian colonies wen~ no longer Colonial Courts of Admiraltv 
within the meaning of section 2 (1) of the 1890 Act (Imp.). 
The validitv of section 30A was rigorouslv challenged in John Sharp 
& Sons Ltd. v. Hle Ship Katherine Mackall~7 In an action bv a bill of 
lading holrJer against a ship for damage caused to the timber carried, 
Lh£" quesUon raisr2d was ltJhE!ther the High Court had jurisdiction. It 
"WFJ3 proved that the Ju[.j[ciarv 1'\ct 1914 (Comth.) was assented to bv the 
Governor-General on the 29th October, 1914, instead of being reser-
ved for the King's personal assent as required bv section 4 of the 
f,olonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 (Imp.)~8 On 7th September, 
1916, Roval Assent was gi\;en to the proposed law. This fact was 
notified by publication ir1 the Commonwealth Government Gazette: on 
16th Nm;ember, 1916, of a copv of the King's Order in Council. In 
his classic judgment, Isaacs. J., highlighted the grounds for holding 
the Judiciarv Act 1914 (Comth.) to be invalid. The two conditions of 
section 6[) of the Commonwealt;h of Australia Constitution Act 1900 
(Imp.) were not satisfied. First, tr1e notification in the Commonwealth 
Govemment Gazette of 16th November, 1916, was not a speech or 
message to the Houses of Parliament or a proclamation. Second, the 
period of two years was exceeded, since the Governor-General's 
original assent was given on 29th October, 1 911~. The inefficacv of 
section 30A of Judiciarv Act meant that "no such declaration is in 
force in the possession" for the purpose of section 2 (1) of the Col-
onial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 (Imp.). Since the Commonwealth 
is a British possession and the High Court is a Colonial Court of 
85.No.11 of 1914. 
86. (1945) 70 C.L.R. 175, p. 189. 
87. (1924) 34 C.L.R. 420. 
88. This section was repealed bv the Statute of LlJestminster 
1931 (Imp.), s. 6. 
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Admiraltv, their Honours unanimouslv ruled that it has the jurisdic-
tion. 
Nothwithstanding the Higl1 Court decision in 1924 that the 
Judiciarv Act 1914 was voicj, it was the repeal of section 30A in 193~9 
that removed all the doubts. Moreover, Mcllwraith McEacharn Ltd. v. 
Shell Co. of Australia Ltd~0 went on appeal from the Supreme Court 
of New South LIJales. The High Court of Australia held that, as a 
result of the repeal, the High Court and the State Supreme Courts 
are Colonial Courts of Adrnirc.1ltv. The decision confirmed that thev 
are competent to exercise the admiraltv jurisdiction as the High 
Court and as the Supreme Courts, respectivelv, and not as distinct 
91 Courts created bv the 1890 Act (Imp.). 
The Act also confers the power to make rules for regulat-
ing the procedure and practice of Colonial Courts of Admiraltv in 
the exercise of the jurisdiction. Under the proviso. to section 7 (1), 
such rules, when made, would not come into operation until thev 
have been approved bv Her Majestv in Council. However, since the 
adoption in 1 91-!2 bv the Commonwealth Parliament92 of the Statute 
of Westminster 1931 (Imp.), the proviso has ceased to applv. Section 
6 reads: 
" ... and so much of section 7 of [the Colonial Court of Admir-
altvl Act as requires the approval of His Majestv in Council 
to anv rules of Court for regulating the practice and pro-
cedure of a Colonial Court of Admiraltv, shall cease to have 
effect in anv Dominion as from the commencement of this 
Act." 
The Commonwealth of Australia comes within the meaning of the 
expression "Dominion" in section 1 of the Statute of Westminster· 
1931 (Imp.). Section 6,read in conjunction with section 1 )suggests 
that, while the rules relating to admiraltv proceedings in the High 
Court will be exempted from the requirement of such approval, 
those relating to similar proceedings in State Supreme Courts might 
89. Bv. Act (Comth.) (No. 43 of 1939). 
90. (1945) 70 C.L.R. 175. 
91. This fact is reiterated bv Pope, J., in Lewmarine Ptv. Ltd. 
v. The Ship "Kaptavanni" [1974] V.R. 465, p. 468. 
92. See Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Comth.). 
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not be. There is, however, a DPneral tendencv to regard sPction 6 
as applicable equallv to ttw States individuallv. /\n example is 
· · · · "u- ·" 93 Th Ad r'r'-found m Swrft & C,o. Ltd. v. The Shrp S.S. r1eranger . e m 
altv Rules enacted under section 7 were notified on 1st September, 
1952, and according to their terms, carne into force on 1st Januarv, 
1953. Tl1ev were not reserved for the approval of the Queen in 
Council. The r·ule-making bodv of the New South Wales Supreme 
Court apparentlv assumed that such a requirement no longer applied. 
Interestinglv enough, neither of the counsel raised the point that 
the omission had rendered the rules invalid. This fact led Macfar-
lan, J., to decide that section 6 of the Statute of Westminster 1931 
(Imp.) llad amended section 7 of the 1890 Act (Imp.), rendering the 
roval approval no longer necessarv. 
Another vital facet of the 1890 Act (Irnp.) concerns the number 
of appellate courts that mav be invested with the jurisdiction. It 
is bound up with the number of times a case mav go on appeal within 
the hierarchv of courts in a British possession before the appeal 
lies to Her Majestv in Council. Section 5 reads: 
11Subject to rules of court under this act, judgments of 
a court ... r:~iven or made in the exercise of the jurisdiction 
conferred on it bv this act, shall be subject to the like 
local appeal, if anv, as judgments of the court in the exer-
cise of its ordinarv civil jurisdiction, and the court having 
cognizance of such appeal shall for the purpose therE~of 
possess all the jurisdiction bv this act conferred upon a 
colonial court of admiral tv .11 
In Mcllwraittl McEacharn Ltd. v. Shell Co. of Australia Ltd. Latham, 
C.J., touched on the underlving principle of the Act (Irnp.). In his 
opinion, "a decision of the State Supreme Court in the exercise of 
jurisdiction conferred bv the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act is a 
decision of the Supreme Court in everv sense." 94 We have seen that 
a colonial court with unlimited civil jurisdiction is given full and 
complete admiraltv jurisdiction. Section 5 confers on the Full 
Court of the Supreme Court in its appellate sittings all the juris-
diction of a Colonial Court of Admiraltv. In that case, it was admitted 
that there is a local appeal from a single Supreme Court ,iudge 
exercising admiraltv jurisdiction to the Full Court of the Supreme 
93. (1965) 82 W.N. (Pt. I) (N.S.W.) 540. 
94. (1945) 70 C.L.R. 175, p. 191. 
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Court. It wEJ~ arguf:~d that the section did not permit an appoal to 
the Hiqtl Court on the ground that it was not a "local" New South 
lllales court but an "1-\u~;tralian court". The Justice construed 
the term "local apperll" in section 5 to mean an appeal from a par-
ticular localit'l/. This meant a British possDssion where the appeal 
arosEJ From a Colonial Court of Admiralty located therein. In this 
crmtext, the British possession is Australia. not New South Wales: 
and the High Court is a court within that not the Sup-
reme Court uf Nr:=!VJ South Wales. It was held that the inferior court, 
to IAihich "local appeal" is cjefined by section 15 could be brought, 
was the Hiur1 Court~5 Dixon, J., correctly pointed out that there 
is no sufficient ir1dication" in sections 5 and 6 an intr:mtion to 
limit the number of appeals:6 Their Honours took the 
vieiAI that tiH? 1Br1DUElfJC:' of section 6 (1) appeared to give the right 
of appeal tn the Pri\1y Council from the last "decision on local app-
eal", i.P. from a judgment of thr? High Court exercising admiralty 
juriscJictiml under the 1890 Act (Imp.). LLJhat their Honours have made 
clee:w thi~>. Under tt1t~ Act (lmp.), the Full Court of any State 
E1upreme Court, the Hic:Jh Court of i\ustralia and the Prh;y Council 
<HT' Jm;estecl lAiiU1 admiralty juri~3diction. 
ThPl'Ec! were other reason:; which led to the I'eorganization of 
tho courts in Hc:r Majesty's po~:;sessions and colonies overseas. 
can be better understood reFerence to English legal history. 
It ~:mems certain that the SurwPm(~ Court of Judicaturt3 Act 1873 
(U.K.) had set the process in motion. The Hii:Jh Court of /\dmiralty 
~'lliU1 it~> specialistic jurisdictions, proceoure and was incor-
porated into the newly-formeci "Probate, Di\mrce and Admiralt.y Div-
ision" as part of the High Court?7 Unhealthy conflict between 
Common Law Courts and High Court of Admiralty , to some 
duplication of ings wpre avoided. The causes which 
resulted in the reforms and the judicial co-operation following the 
amalgamation must have ted the passing of 
Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 (Jrnp.). This Act was 
the merger of the existing Vice-Adrniraltv Courts and colon-
ial court~; c:1drnini:3tering common law into a single juridical svstem. 
The goal was undoubteclly with the abolition of thE! Vice-
Admiralty Courts and the \Jesting of jurisdiction in 
of .l\ustralia and the State Supreme Courts. When 
lligh Court 
with mar-
itirrm causes, tht:Jse tr.ibunals ~>it as Colonial Courts of Admiralty. 
95. Ibid., pp. 191-193. 
96. lbid., p. 206. 
97. 36 & 37 Vic., c. 66, s. ~.K 
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V. COLONIAL COURTS OF ADMIRALTY 
1. Hoads of Jurisdiction 
l!Je shall consider the juridical competence of such tribunals 
in relatior1 to the nature.! and types of causes upon which they may 
adjudicatE!. Section 2 (2) of the 1890 Act (Imp.) empowers a Colon-
ial Court of Admiralty to exercise the "Admiralty jurisdiction of the 
High Court of England, whett1er existing by virtue of any statute or 
otllBI'\Mise ... in like manner and to E:JS full an extent as the High 
Court England." 
Prior to 1B40, the subjects of admiralty suits in the High 
Court of Admiraltv were confined to collisions betiA1een ships at 
sea, certain sah;age agreements 1hypothecation of ships and wage 
claims arising under ordinary contracts:8 The Admiralty Court Acts 
(Imp.), 1840 and 1861, were passed to improve the practice and ex-
tend the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty of England. 
Accordingly, under section 2 (2) and (3) of the 1890 Act (Imp.), a Col-
onial Court of Admiralty has jurisdiction over the following9~ name-
1. title to or ownership of any ship or vessel or the pro-
ceeds thereof' in the Registry arising in any action relat-
ing to possession, salvage, damage, wages or bottomry; 
?. claim in the nature of salvagl'l; 
3. damage received by any ship ur sea-going vessel; 
4. claim in the nature of towage; 
5. claim for necessaries furnished to any foreign ship or sea-
goirlLl \Jessel; 
6. cloim for necessaries supplied to any ship other than in 
the ship's port Df registry, unless it shown that at the 
Urne of the institution of proceedings her owner or part-
owner is domiciled in the British possession; 
7. claim for the building, equipping or repairing of any ship, 
prm;ided it is under arrest ot the time of instituting , the 
proceedings; 
98. See Chapter One. 
99. These heads of jurisdiction are deri\/ed from the major pro-
visions of the two Imperial Acts, 1840 and 1861. The Vice-
Admiralty Courts Act 1863 (Imp.) and the Vice-Admiral~ 
Courts Act Amendment Act 1867 (Imp.) were repealed by the 
:s9~ ~ct (Imp.); see s. 18 and the Second Schedule. For jur-
ISdictwn under s. 2 (2) and (3) of the 1890 Act (Imp.), see 
D.J. Cremean, Jurisdiction in Admiralty in Australia, Ph. o. 
Thesis, Monash University, 1980, pp. 60 et. seq. 
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8. claim for damage to goods carried into any Australian port 
undc'lr a contract of carriagEc; coven:;d by a bill of lading; 
9. claim for damage done to any ship; 
10. claim for wages of seamen; 
1 '1. claim for wages of the master and disbursements made by 
him on account of the ship; 
12. claim in respect of any mortgage registered under the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1851~ (Imp.); 
13. claim for life salvage from any British ship or bocJt am;-
lhihere, and life salvage from any foreign ship or boat 
wholly or· parth; in British waters; 
1 L1. matters relating to any British ship or share therein in 
respect of which the High Court of Chancel'Y has power·s 
under sections 62 to 65 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 ,(Imp.); 
and 
15. all questions arising between the co-ownms or any of them 
concerning the ownership, possession, employment and earn-
ings of any ship registered at any Australian port or any 
share thereof, settlement of all accounts outstanding 
betwe~n1 the~ parties, and the sale of the ship or any share thereoF. 
ThFJ jurisdiction outlined above under the various heads is not 
exhaustive. A number of gaps, which would otherwise undermine the 
administration of maritime law, wen::> filled by subsequent Imperial 
and Commonwealth legislation. 
2. Removal of Master 
The High Court of Admiralt'/ had. in a cause of possession, 
ancient jurisdiction to take a vessel from a wrongdom· and deliver 
it to the risJhtful owner. Thi~> power was later· formally conferred 
under section 21~0 of the Merchant Shipping f\ct 1854 (Imp.) on any 
"Court tlaving /-\dmiralty Jurisdiction in am; of Her Majesty's Domin-
ions." Two of the conditions to be met were the presence of the 
ship within th~ court's jurisdiction and proof that the removal of 
. 1 II• II c• th rl II • II a the shlP s master lS necessary . omce 1 18 woru necessan; ltJ s 
not cJeflned, the courts werP able to construe it in the light of thB 
particular problem presented ir1 each case. ln Tile !=airport~ the 
master took the ship to sea against the wishes of the ship mortgag-
ee who had taken possession of the same. His act was held to con-
stitute E1 misconduct. In exercising its jurisdiction fm his removal, 
1. Re t3lansharrj ('1823) 2 B ?.r. C 244. According to Halsbury 's 
Laws of' England (4th ed.), vol. 1, para. 313, suits of poss-
essicm were t:'ntertained by the Court of Admiralty in the 
exFJrc isl! of it~> inhererlt jurisdiction. 
2. (188')) 1ll P.D. 13. 
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the court ruled that he v.1as not £mtitled to compensation for dis-
missal before the c~xpiration of the employment contract. Obviously 
a master's rerm1\lal is necessary where, by his-act or conduct, dam-
age or injury is maliciously caused to the ship, other property or to 
3 persons. J-\nother situation where the power is exercisable is ex-
emplified by the facts of The Nicaraguan Barque Courier~ The Vice-
Admiralty Court in South Australia restored the ship to the right-
ful owner. The master appointed by the purchaser who had no title 
to her was removed. Section 240 also empowered the court to order 
the suspension or cancellation of a master's certificate, and to re-
quire security in respect of the costs in the matter to be given. 
The provision was reproduced, virtually verbatim, in section 
472 of the MP.rchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) and also in section 385 
of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.). Section 385 has been 
amended to read: 
"Any Court having jurisdiction may remove the master of 
any ship within the jurisdiction of that court if it thinks 
h 
necessary to do so." :J 
3. Dangerous Goods 
Section 449 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) makes one 
of the few post-1890 additions to the list of admiralty suits. It 
applies to the improper sending or carriage of "dangerous goods", 
and to any attempt to carry them on board any ship, British or for-
eign. Section L149 (1) is breached where such goods are not marked 
as required or bear a false description, where a false description 
of the sender or carrier is given, or where the necessary notice 
has not been given. Any court having admiralty jurisdiction may 
declare the goods to be forfeited. l1Jhen forfeited, the goods may 
be disposed of as the court directs. It is remarkable that by sec-
tion 449 (2) such powers are exercisable at the court's discretion 
even though the goods-owner has not committed an offence under 
the Act relating to dangerous goods, is not before the court, and 
has no notice of the proceedings~ The wording of section 1~46 (3) 
3. The "Ida" (1860) Lush. 6. 4. (1879) 13 S.A. L.R. 124. 
· 5. Navigation Amendment Act 1980 (Comth.), s. 98 (1). 
6. Article IV rule 6 of the Hague Rules scheduled to the Sea-
Carriage of Goods Act 1924-73 (Comth.) applies to the ship-
ment of physically dangerous goods without the appropriate 
consent of the carrier. He incurs no liability for having 
1such goods landed at any place, destroyed or rendered 
innocuous. The shipper is liable for all damages and ex-
penses arising out of the unauthorised shipment. 
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appears to confimJ the cJE?finiticm of "dangerous good~3" to goods and 
commodities wllich are phvsicallv danger·ou~>. At common lalilt, thf" 
term has a wider meaning. The carriage of goods, which rendc-}rc3 the 
vovage illegal or might involve the ship in danger of forfeiture or 
delav, is analogous to the shipment of '8angerou~> cargo which might 
cause the destruction of the ship." 7 The common law meanirl[~ ex-
tends to goods which, bv reason of improprc:)r or insufficient packing, 
cause loss or delav to the carrving vessel, damage to propertv or 
l . . . 8 persona lrlJUI'les. 
There is, however, some doubt about the ~3phere of operation 
of section 449. Neither the section nor anv provision in Part \1 of 
the Act (Imp.) states that the! pmver conferred is exercisable bv 
courts in Her Majestv's possessions and colonies. 
The provisions of the 1\Ja\tigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) relating 
to the carriage of dangerous goods and their forfeiture in certain 
circumstances are Imperial in origin. The pmver exercisable under 
section 252 to order forfeiture of dangerous goods in certain situ-
Eltions is conferred on "anv C:ourt havlrlD Admir'altv jurisdiction." 
Thus the High Court, anv State Supreme Court and the Western Aus-
tralian Broomf=' Court?, being Colonial Courts of Admiralt\,1 under the 
1890 /-\ct (Imp.), aT'e invBstecl \tJith new jurisdiction. The languagE) of 
section 2'J2 doe~; not indicate an attempt bv the Commonwealth Parl-
i<Jmerlt to confer on Australian courts original jurisdiction to deal 
't~ ''Ad . lt j · · " 10 Wl 11 rmra ,\f am mant1me causes. 
4. Beneficial Iflterest 
The decisions in Follett \1, Delanv 11 and The Liverpool Borough 
7. Per Atkin, J., in Mitchell, Cotts v. Steel [1916] 2 K.B. 610, 
p. 614. As to contraband cargo, see The Diamond [1920] P. 56. 
B. Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (19th ed. 
1984), op. cit., pp. 102-104. 
9. The Broome Local Court of Admiraltv Jurisdiction Act 1917 
(W.A.). For' a brief discussion on this Court, see Research 
Paper No. 1 - 1-Jn Australian Admiralty Act; The Ambit of 
Admiralty Jurisdiction (November 1984), p. 25. 
10. Within the meaning of the Commonwealth of Australia Con-
stitution Act 1900 (Imp.), ss. 76 illD and 77 (iii). 
11. (1848) 17 L.J. Ch. 254. See Chapter Four. 
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Bank v. Turr1er12 are recalled. Thev demonstrate the unjust result~; 
which followed when courts wen! pre\mnted fmm applving thu prin-
ciples of equitv to transactions ir1\Jol\!ing ships or shares therein. 
In consequr=mce, section 3 of the Merchant Shipping Act AmEmdment 
Act 1862 (Imp.), later expanded and re-enacted as section 57 of the 
1894 /\ct (Imp.), was passed. The provision has remedied defects in 
the law. It takes cognizance of beneficial interests, thus empmAJer-
ing the court~; to entertain claims founded on principles of equitv 
and contract. 
The Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Comth.) Pl'ovides for the 
recognition ar1d enforcement of certain equities. Section 47, which 
is largelv modr:~lled on ~;ection 57 of the 1894 Act (Imp.) reads: 
"Subject to sections 41, 1_.5 and 46, beneficial interests mav 
be r=mforced bv or against the owner or mortgagee of a 
ship or· a share in a ship in respect of his interest or share 
in the same manner as in respect of anv other personal 
propertv." 
Despite the repeal of Part I of the 1894 Act (Imp.) as part of the law 
of the Commonwealth~ 3 section 1_.7 operates to retain ttle pre-exist-
ing position. Whr:m exE-1rcising jurisdiction with regard to beneficial 
interests or claims in equitv, Australian courts are bound to give 
effect to certain statutorv rights. Subject to the exceptions im-
rl 14 t 15 f h. 1- th . . poseu, an OI.Atner or mor gagee o a s 1p or anv S11are erem 1s 
entitled to dispme of the ship or share therein and to give effect-
ual receipts in I'espect of the disposal. 
5. Loss of Life 
We have seen that the expi'ession 11damage done bv anv ship" 
in section 7 of the Admii'alty Coui't Act 1861 (Imp.) had pi'oduced 
much litigation. The controvei'S\f as to its scope of application was 
finallv I'esolved bv the House of Lords in The Vei'a CI'uz : 6 An 
action in ~ was brought bv the administi'ati'ix of S, against the 
Spanish steamship Vem Cruz, foi' damages occasioned bv the death 
12. 29 L.J. Ch. (!\!.S.) 827; affii'med 30 L.J. Ch. (N.S.) 379. 
13. See Shipping Re(Jisti'ation Act 1981 (Comth.), ss. 3 (1) and 4. 
14. Ibid., s. 45. 
15. Ibid., s. 41 (1). For insertion of subsectior1s, see Shipping 
Registration Amendment Act 1984 (Comth.), s. 15. 
16. Mai'y Seward v. Vei'a Cruz (1884) L.R. ·10 C.P. 59. 
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The owner of the \/era Cruz wm> ne\Jer in England and not served 
with a writ pm'sor1alh;. The Court of Appeal held that, sincE! the 
real cause of action was "in fact pecuniary loss'' affecting the in-
tPre~:;ts of the deceased's family, "it is not a cause of action for 
anything done by a ship" within the meaning of section 7. As the 
purpose of tile action brought by the representative of thFJ de-
ceased was to recover damagEJS for loss of life caused by "wrong-
ful act, m:nlect or default,'' the proceec1ings should have been in-
stituted under Lord Campbell's Act (U.K.).17 On appeal, the House of 
Lords unanimously affirmed the decision on the ground that section 
7 did not give the Court of Admiralty jurisdiction over claims for 
damages for loss of life arising under Lord Campbell's Act. 
With the exception of Nm'll South Wales18 and Queens1and; 9 it 
\,\tas not until after 193l~ that the remaining Australian States passed 
le!;Jh3lation similar to Lord Campbell's Act. -r:ne common law rule that 
causes of action in tort, which were vested in the person at his 
death, wenJ extinguished by his death l\las therefore altered 
Australian State legislation. 
Th•? International Convention for ttm Unificaticm of certoin 
Rules of Law with resp~:Jct to Collisions betweer1 Vessels, 191cf.0 con-
tains a provision which appears to ha\/e tho object of char1~~ing thr~ 
common law Article 4 states. alia, U1at "In of 
damages caused by death or personal injuries, tho vessels at fault 
are jointly as well as severally liable to thircJ partie~:l .... " Takr"n in 
its plain literal sense, the provision seeks to introduce a uniform 
rule in those countries which are signatories to the Convention. 
The purpose it: is submitted - is to confer a right to compensation 
for loss of life or personal injuries negligently caused two or 
more vessels. It is idle to talk of the joint and several liability of 
the vessels at fault if the right to recover damaf)BS does not sur-
vive the death of a victim in fa1;our of his e~3tate. Section 260 (1) 
17. (181.!6) 9 & 10 Vic., c. 93. 
18. Compensation to Relatives /\ct (N.S.W.) (1\Jo. 31 of 1897), s. 3. 
19. Common Law Practice Act 1867 (Qld.) (31 Vic. 1\Jo. 17), s. 12. 
?Cl. We sali\1 in Chapter Seven that effect was gh;en to it in the 
Unitt::!d Kingdom under the [jaritirne Convnntion Act 1911 
(Imp.). For position in Australia, see the Navigation Act 1912 
(Comth.), ss. 259-265 and s. 396. 
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of the Navi~Jation Act 1912-73 (Cornth.), 1111hich gives effect to thP 
provision, makes the position even clean~r as foliows: 
"Where loss of life or pel'Sonal injuries are suffered by 
any person on boc~rd a vessel owing to the fault of that 
vessel ar1d of any other vessel or vessels, the liability 
of the vessels shall br'" joint and several." 
Whether admiralty jurisdiction to award damages in respect of loss 
of life or personal injuries is conferred by Commonwealth legislation 
is an important question~ 1 It is interesting to note that not long 
after section 260 (1) was enacted, section 30 of the Judiciary Act 
1903-1912 (Comth.) was amended to read, inter alia, "in all matters -
... (b) of Admiralty or maritime jurisdiction."22 Section 30A, which 
\Alas insert~C;d at the same time, declared the High Court to be a Col-
onial Court of Admiralty within the meaning of the Colonial Courts 
of Admiralty Act 1890 (Imp.)~3 It may be recalled that by a New 
South Wales Act the Crown was rer1dered suable in tort~4 Later, 
the provisions of this colonial Act was consolidated as sections 56 
and 58 of the Judiciary Act 1903-1973 (Comth). Moreover, until sec-
tion 405A (1) of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth .) was introduced 
. 1 5825 . m 9 , 1t. was competent to institute proceedings in ~ against 
ships or cargo belonging to the commonwealth or an Australian 
State. 
It is arguable that tt1e preceding developments evince a legis-
lative move towards allowing claims for loss of life to be brought 
under Commonwealth law. Due to the invalidity of the Judician; Act 
1914 (Comth .f.6 which inserted sections 30 (b) and 30A, and their sub-
sequent repeal~7 the Commonwealth Parliam~nt apparently suffered 
21. The principle that, apart from statute, the death of a human 
being per se is not actionable is well established as part 
of thecommon law: The Amerika [1914] P. 167; [1917] A.C. 38. 
22. Judiciary Act (No. 11 of 1914) (Comth.), s. 2. 
23. Ibid., s. 3. 
24. We saw that in Farnell v. Bowman (1887) 12 App. Cas. 643 the 
Privy Council affirmed the judgment of the Chief Justice. It 
was held that under the New South Wales Act (39 Vic. No. 38) 
the government of the colony could be sued in tort. 
25. InsertecJ by the Act (No. 36 of 1958) (Comth.), s. 191. 
26. For reasons, see John Sharp & Sons Ltd. v. The Ship Katherine 
Mackall (1924) 34 C.L.R 420, pp. 429-431, £§[ Isaac, J., in par-
ticular; see also Union Steamship Company of New Zealand 1 td. 
v. The Sr1ip "Caradale" (1937) 56 C.L.R. 277, p. 281, P..ill' Dixon, J. 
27. By Judiciary Act (No. 43 of 1939) (Comth.), ss. 2 anc1 3. 
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a setback in its efforts to confer on the High Court "original jurh3-
. l 't' ' ' d' t' " 28 diction ... (Q) in all matt£1r~3 of Adm1ra tv 01' marJ_·Jme JUrls 1c wn. 
The ar~]Ument seems to be supported bv the clear wording of 
section 262 which was part of the Navi9ation Act_ 1912 (Comth.) when 
it was first passed. It reads: 
"Anv enactment which confers on anv Court Admiralty jur-
isdictiorl in respect of damages shall have effect as though 
reference to such damage included references to loss of 
life ar1d personal injuries, amJ accordingly proceedings in 
respect of such damages mav be brought in [§1.!} or i..Q egr-
" son am. 
It is submitted that the "enactment" referred to in section 262, 
which confers admiralty juri~>diction, is the Colonial Courts of Ad-
miralt\/ Act 189LJ (Imp.). It is not unreasonable to suggest that, when 
sectior1 7 of the 1861 Act (Imp.) is construed in conjunction with 
section 262, the words "damage done bv a ship," in circumstances 
when! the ship is the noxious instrument, could include loss of life. 
Tf the reasoning thus far is correct, we have uncovered a unsucc-
essful attempt bv the Commonwealth Legislc:JturE' to provide redress 
for loss of 1 ife at the time lAth en none exi~:oted under the laws of 
four Au~1tralian States.29 What is clear i~' that some post-1900 steps 
wr:~re taken bv the Commonwealth Parliament to enlarge the FJdmiral-
t\; jurisdiction of the High Cour·t. 
6. Other Aspects 
Several other causes upon which an admiral tv court is empow-
ered to adjudicate are considened. 
The rigors of the Imperial policv which prohibits foreigners 
from owning British ships or anv share therein have been main-
tained. If anv unqualified person acquires as owner, otherwise than 
bv transmission, anv legal or beneficial interest in a ship using a 
British flag and assuming a British character, that interest shall be 
subject to forfeiture.3LJ Subject to certain exceptions, where a 
person uses a British flag and assumes the Br·itish character on 
28. Judiciary Act (No. 4 of 1915) (Comth.), s. 2. 
29. See, however, later State legislation to fill the gaps: 
~Jrongs Act 1958, Part III (Vic.), s. 16; LLJrongs Act 1936, Part 
11 (S.A.), s. 19; Fatal Accidents Act 1959 (W.A.), s. 4; Fatal 
Accidents Act 1934 (Tas.), s. 4. 
3D. i"'lerchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.), s. 71. 
544 
board a ship owned wholly or in part by an unqualified person, for 
the purpose of passing off as a British ship, the ship will be subject 
to forfeiture~ 1 Where any ship or any share~therein has become 
subject to forfeiture, she may be seized, rJetained and brought for 
adjudication "before the High Court of England ... any Colonial Court 
of Admiralty or Vice-Admiralty Court in HEH' Majesty's Dominions."32 
In the! absence of reasonable grounds for seizure and detention, the 
c:ourt is empowered to award costs and damages to the aggrieved 
party and make such other order as it thinks fit~3 The abm1e pro-
visions are contained in Part I of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 
(Imp.), which has been repealed by section 4 of the Shipping Regis-
tration Act 1981 (Comth.). It appears that Colonial Courts of Admir-
alt\; in Australia no longer have jurisdiction to entertain forfeit-
ure proceedings instituted under the 1894 Act (Imp.). 
Unlike the 1894 Act (Imp.), the Shipping Registration Aq, 1981 
provides for forfeiture only in two situations. Subject to certain 
exceptions, where a non-Australian ship improperly assumes Austral-
ian nationality, she is subject to forfeiture.34 Moreover, without 
parallel in Imperial legislation, section 33 pro hi bits the master or 
owner of an Australian ship from doing, or permitting to be done, 
anything which conceals the Australian nationality of the ship. 
Except where the proviso applies, the ship is subject to forfeiture. 
One obvious defect in the laiAI is the absence of any pro\Jision which 
enables an aggrieved party to recover costs and damages where t11e 
ship ha~; been seized or forfeiture proceedings have been instituted 
without sufficient groundJ.5 Despite the serious nature of forfei-
ture proceedings, there uncertainty as to which court may ass-
ume jurisdiction in such matters. 
With regarcj to claims relating to registered ship mortgages36 
31. Ibid., s. 69. 
32. Ibid., s. 76 (1). 
33. ' s. 76 (2). 
34. s. 32. 
35. There will be heavy financial loss caused to shipowners 
and great inconvenience to owners of the goods carried 
because of delay in transit or the transhipment r'equirect 
36. The Admiral tv Court Act 1861 (Imp.), s. 11 confers jurisdic-
t , . f I! 1on m respect o mortgages duly registered according 
to the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854." See 
also M.:J. Calder,~~"Footnote to the C.i"U. Questionnaire 
on i"laritime Liens and Mortgages;'M.L.A.A.N.Z. (March,1983) 
vol. 1 No. 1, p. 14. 
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and the limitation of liability of shipowners ar1d othm·s, the juris-
diction of Colonial Courts of /\dmiral t~/ was derived almost exclus-
ively from Parts I and VIII of the Merchant shipping Act 18911 (Imp.). 
k 
Currently irl the United Kingdom and certain British colonies, ship 
mortgages are registered according to the provision~; in Part I of 
37 the 1894 Act (Imp.). The repeal of Part I rendered Australian 
courts incompetent to adjudicate upon causes and questions arising 
out of such mortgages. The reason is that the 1894 Act (Imp.), being 
a consolidating legislation, has re-enacted provisions rather similar 
tcJ those of its precedessor. By section 38 (2) of the Interpretation 
Act 1889 (U.K.). the reference in section 11 of the Admiralty Court 
Act 1861 (Imp.) to mortgages rEc~gistered under the 185L! Act (Imp.) 
shall be construed as reference to mortgages registered under the 
1894 Ac L (Imp .)~ 8 It is arguatJle that the repeal of Part I of the 
1894 /\ct (lrnp.) involves the revocation of the jurisdiction previously 
conferred on Australian courts bv section 11 of the 1861 Act (Imp.). 
In [-Jenera! Credit~> (FinancE~) Ltd. v. _Registrar of Ships and An-
othRr~9 cumpetinq interests in thE! m.\J. l1Jhitsunday Wanderer and an 
application tmdPr cmctiun 59 of the Shipping Registration /\ct 1981 
(C:omttl.) frli' rectifice:ltion of UK~ register were involved. The Sup-
reiTm Court of l~uE?enslancJ held that the registered 0\Ainer m mort-
qaqBf~ of a ship has prioritv which may displace the rules of common 
law amJ E:;qui tv. There is nothir1g to suggest that in applying the 
provi~3im1e:; of the~ Commonwealth Act the Court was sitting in admir-
altv. Doubts Umrefore existed as to which courts were competent 
to exercise jurisdiction in rem t;o entertain claims arising out of 
the mortgages of ships or anv shares therein registered under this 
Act. This problem was, however, remedied when the Shipping Regis-
tration Amendment Act 1984 (Comth.) came into force.40 Sectim1 29 
37. Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Comth.), ss. 3 (1) and 4. 
38. See M. Thomas and D. Steel, The Merchant Shipping Acts 
(7th ed. 1976), QE., cit., para. 59. 
39. [ 1982) 44 A.L.R. 571. 
40. s. 94A has been inserted as a new provision in the Shipping 
Registration Act 1981 (Comth.). 
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reads: 
"~.iection 11 of ... the Admiralty Court Act 1861 shall have 
Elft'ect and sr1all be deemed to have had effect. .. as if ref-
erences in that section to mortgage duly re~]istered 
according to the provisions of the Merchant st1ipping Act 
1854, includt:!d references to a mortgage registered or 
deemE!d to have bf?en registen~d under this [Silippinct Reg-
istration] Act." 
lJne interesting observation is this. By enlarging the jurisdiction 
conferred by section 11 of tllr~ 1861 Act (Imp.) to embrace claims in 
respect of ship mortgages effected under the Shipping RerJistration 
Act 1981 (Comth.), the Commonwealth Parliament is relyin£1 on the 
Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 (Imp.). Accordinqly, admiralty 
jurisdiction over the mortgages of Australian ships or jsl1ares 
therein continues to exercisable under Imperial legislation, as 
amended bv the Shipping Registration i\mendment Act 1984 (Imp.). 
The repeal of Part VIII of the Merchant ShipPing Act 1894 
dealinu with the limitation of liability of shipowners and others and 
its replacement by Part VIII of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) 
t1ave been noted. By section 335 of the _Navigation Act 1912-73. as 
amended, where a claim is brougt1t in tt1e Supreme Court of a State· 
or l erritorv against a person for damage or loss sustained, he rnav 
apply to the same Court for an order limiting his liability. Even be-
fore any action is bmught against him, he can take the initiative 
of instituting a limitation suit in any such Court. The section does 
not prevent a Colonial Court of Admiral tv from adjudicating upon 
limitation suits.41 Some examples will help to explain the scope of 
the section and the jurisdiction conferred thereunder. Suppose 
that, for personal injury or property damage caused to X as a re-
sult of negligent navigation of the m.}[. Fairy owned by Y, an action 
. f d . . t't t d . 42 .![!_~ or arnages ts ms 1 u e m a State Supreme Court. Under 
the law as it stands at present, the proceedings are of such a nat-
ure that they can only be brought within the jurisdiction of the 
Court sitting as a Colonial Court of Admiralty. In the same Court, Y 
is entitled to apply for an order limiting t1is liability as provirJed by 
l11. " ... a decision of the Supreme Court in the exercise of jur-
isdiction conferred by the Colpnial Courts of Admiralt.v 
Act is a decision of. the Supreme Court in every sense": 
Mcllwraith McEacl1arn Ltd. v. Shell Co. of Australia Ltd. 
(191!5) 70 C.L.R. 175, p. 191, Latham, C.J. 
42. The principle equally upplies to an Admiralty action in per-
sonam. See Gaggin v. Moss [1983] 2 Qd. R. l186 and AdmTrait~ 
Court Act 1861 (Imp.), s .. 15 uncJor which Admiralty jurisdic-
tion is exercisable whether the pmceeriinRs are in rem 
or in personam. Moreover, it is convenient to empower 
the court to deal with the right to limit liabilitv in the 
action of the claimant against the ship: Gates_ v. Gaggin 
and Another (1983) 51 A.L.R. 721, p. 724. 
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. l . t. . t. Article 1 ('I) of ttw 1957 Corlvlmtion. · Alt&~rnatlve v, m an ,Jcipa .Ion 
of the neglig£mce ~:iuit a~]ainst him whethm' in a:drniraltv or at comm-
on law, Y mav apply to anv Supreme Court foran ordtJr limiting his 
liabilitv. S!e!ction 335 (1) (b) of the 1\lavigAtion J.\ct 1912-73,as amend-
ed, confer~; jurisdiction on a !:Jupn~mc~ Court r:md also on the High 
Court to Fmtertain lirnitatiml suits. 
There is om~ other aspect of the subject to be covered. Jud-
icial authorities have consistentlv enunciated this fact. The admir-
altv jurisdiction conferred bv the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 
1890 (Imp.) on S"Jtate Supreme Courts and the High Court "is the same 
as the jurisdiction of the High Court in England - onlv such jur-
isdiction the High Court in England as existed at the tirn8 of the 
passing of thr'l Imperial Act." 44 Thus in 1890, apart from thE-") statu-
torv jurisdiction exercisable under the /\dmiraltv Court Acts (Imp.), 
1840 and 1861, the High Cou!'t of Er1gland had certain inherent juris-
diction built up like thFl common law by judicial procedent ov&Jr the 
45 
. . d' t' . . d t h ' t d . vear!:i. TI1P latter JUrts JC ·10n 1s recogmse. ~CJ ave ex1s ;e 1n 
thrE~e areas. First, tht:> HiDh Court of f\clmiraltv claimed an ancient 
Emd inherent jurisdiction over wrongs committEld on ttH::'? high sea!3 to 
or bv British subjects. Due? tn pmhibitiuns from the Cornrnon Law 
Courts in Enql<mcl, thrCJ jurisdic 1A1as confined to certain causes 
arising outside the bodv of a cuuntv, !_&. on the high Sec-
ond, the inhc.:!rent jurisdiction IAJas exercised by proceedings in ~ 
instituted to enforce maritime liens which had attachecJ to thn re~f 7 
Its exercise invariably led to the formulation of important rules 
whidl apply to determine the order of priority among competing 
43. Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), s. 333, as amended. 
it'-!. The Ship Loretta v. Bubb [1971) 18 F.L.R. 1lt1, p. 142. 
45.)bid., pp. 142 and 145, per Neville, J. 
46. Union Steamship Company of New Zealanq v. Ferguson (1967) 
119 C.L.R. 191, p. 198. Barwick, C.J., held that the Port of 
Burnie could not be regarded as enclosed waters of Tasman-
ia. Hence he ruled that the respondent's injurv had 
occurred on the high seas. This fact was essential if the 
High Court was to exercise jurisdiction in admiralty in 
respect of the claim: ibid., pp. 208-209. See also Colonial 
Courts of Admiralt')L Act 1890 (Imp.), s. 2 (4). 
47. Considered in Chapter Seven. 
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maritime liens and other clairm. The~>e rules, as we hm1e seEm, are 
non-str1tutory and continue to operate as part of the laws of Brit-
-· 
ain and Australia. Third, therE~ is mtidence that prior to the enact-
ment of the ArJmiralty Court Act 1840 (Imp.), the High Court of Admir-
alty had entertained suits of possession. In Re Blanshard,Ml decided 
in 1823, Abott, C.J., acknowledged that the Court of Admiralty had 
"for a very long period of time" exercised jurisdiction to detain and 
take ships out of the possession or power of wrongdoers and restore 
them to the owners~9 Sir W. Scott made it clear in his judgment that 
the "dispossession of a master is in its nature, not an uncommon pro-
ceeding"~0 He emphasised, however, that where a master was also a 
part-owner his conduct must have been reprehensible before he 
could be remmted. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the 
powers of a Colonial Court of Admiralty established under the 1890 
Act (Imp.) trJould embrace similar aspects of inherent jurisdiction. 
VI. REFORMS 
1. Development in English Admiralty Law 
Attention is now focussed on the discrepancies between the 
admiralty jurisdictions of Australian and English courts. Judicial 
authorities have categorily ruled that the Colonial Courts Admiralty 
Act 1890 (Imp.) has conferred on courts set up thereunder the admir-
alty jurisdiction of the High Court in England as it existed at the 
time when the Act was passed. "Neither the earlv history of the 
overseas Courts, the course of rnodem legislation, continuity of pol-
icy, nor practical convenience ... require that the jurisdiction defined 
in the Act shall be declared to be that "'rfrom time to time existing' 
in the High Court in England." 51 
48. (1823) 2 B. & C. 241!, 248. 
49. Admiralty Court Act 1840 (Imp.), s. 4. 
50. The New Draper (1802) 4 Ch. Rob. 287, 290. It was later 
expressly incorporated in the Acts: Merchant Shipping Act 
1854 (Imp.), s. 240; 1894 Act (Imp.), s. 472; Navigation Act 1912-
73 (Comth.), s. 385, as amended bv Navigation Amendment Act 
1980 (Comth.), s. 98. 
51. The Vuri Maru The LtJuron [1927] A.C. 906, p. 915, per Lord 
Merrivale. See also Zelling, J., "Of Admiralty and 
Maritime Jurisdiction" (1982) 56 A.L.J. 101. 
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LegislathtP trends in Lhe United Kingdom, both before and after 
1890, show a significant departueP from the pattern of Australian 
adrniraltv law. lllay back in July 1868, the Countv Courts Admiralty 
JuriscHctlon Act (U.K.) was passed to ernpowm' County Courts in Eng-
land to entertain, int(3r claims for necessaries and damage to 
cargo?2 Except for the limit imposed as to amount In each case, 
the jurisdiction of County Courts over these causos was exercisable 
without the prerequisites to be met for similar claims under the 
miraltv Court Acts (Imp.), 184053 and 1861 ?4 Under the County Courts 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Amendment Act 1869 (U.I<.)~5 for the first time 
in legal histon;, the competence of County Courts was extended to 
cover several new causes. These included any claim arising out of an 
agreement relating to the use or hire of a ship and any claim relat-
ing to the carriage of goods in any ship or in tort in respect of 
goods carried in arw ship. The claims could be enforced by proceed-
ings in Ull!J. or i.!l eersonam:6 Where the amount irwolved exceeded 
.!::300 ancJ on other grounds, the causes could, by order, be 
transferred to the High Court of Adf\]iralty for r1earing and deter-
mination. In Co-oper·ative Dried Fruit Sales Pty. Ltd. v. The Shie 
"Terukawa Maru",57 it was contended that the claim arose uncler an 
agreement in relation to the carriage of goods in a ship. It was ar-
gued that the action was one which, by reason of an order rnade un-
der the 1868 Act (U.K.), would come witt1in the jurisdiction of the 
High Court of /\drniraltv, and so would fall within section 2 of the 
Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 (Imp.). The reasons given by 
Menzies, J., fl1r rejecting the argument confirmed the wider compet-
ence of the Courts in England. He sairJ:5a 
"The short answer .. .is that anv jurisdiction confereed upon 
the High Court of Admiralty by the Countv Courts Admir-: 
~~""'""'~~~~~'-'-'-u of 1868 is limited to a cause originat-
ing in a county couet hmting admiralty jurisdiction and the 
present action is not one of tt1at description. The County 
1~ourts Admiralty Jurisdiction Acts do not confec tt1e juris-
rJiction upon the Court of Admiralty ... to dt.~terrnine claims 
52. 31 & 32 Vic., c. 71, s. 3 (2) and (3). 
53.::;. 6. 
54. S. 5. 
55. 32 & 33 Vic., c. 51, s. 2. 
56.lbid., 5. 3. 
57. [1972] hf) A.L.J.R. 357. The action wa~; twou~Jht for damages 
for non-delivery of' ~Joods contracted to lw carried in a ship. 
')8. Ibid., p. 357. 
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ari~1ing out of agreements made in relation to the carriage 
of goods in ship~> generally, tJut onlv when such claims have 
been cornmencmJ in the countv courts and transferred by 
an appropriatB ordBr. 11 
Minor exceptions apm't, th~c? County Courts Act 1959 (LJ.KJ9 which 
gave a historic boost to the admiralty juri~;diction of Countv Courts 
was modelled on the Administration of Justice Act 1956 (LJ.I-<:.).60 
f\s an introduction to a more detailed study to follm"1, the 
growth of admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty is 
outlined. Subject to certain exceptions~1 in terms of the new heads 
of jurisdiction conferred, section 5 (1) of the Administration of Jus-
tice Act 1920 (U.K.) was to the High Court what section 2 of the 
County Courts Admiraltv Jurisdiction f\mendment Act 1869 (U.K.) 1111as 
to County Courts. Sl~ction 22 of tJ1e Supreme Court of Judicature 
(ConsDlidation) Act 1925 (LJ.K.P2 consolidated the existing provisions 
on the subject and extended the jurisdiction witl1 re~>pect to two 
nehl causes. Accordingly, section 22 (l) (ix) covered claims in respect 
not only of ship mortgages dul\/ registered under the Merchant Shipp-
ing Acts (Imp.), 18% to 1923, but also of any ship mortgage, or the 
proceeds thereof, under the arrest of the court. The expression 
"claims for darnagelt in section 22 (1) (a) was to be construed as ex-
tending to claims for loss of life or personal injuries?3 
The Administration of Justice Act 1956 (U.K.) was a landmark 
in the maritime policy of tt1r:! United Kingdom. It was a major legis-
lative effort to enable the High Court to come to grips with the 
problems of maritime law. Ships were rendered more vulnerable to 
arrests and proceedings in rem by creditors and other claimants. 
The jurisdiction was enlarr,]ed to cover claims in respect of pilotage~4 
65 66 . general average act, bottomr\/ and \llrtually all types of mortgage 
or charge~7 and also any claim for the forfeiture or condemnation 
of a ship or anv goods involved, for the restoration of the same 
after seizure or for droits of admiralt\/?8 1\ significant feature 
59. 7 & 8 Eliz. II, c. 22. 
60. 4 & 5 Eliz. II. c. lt6. 
61. 10 & 11 Gt-30. \/,c. 81, s. 5 (1) (!)and (jj). 
62. 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. t~9. 
63. See Supreme Court of Judicature (ConsolidatioQ) /\ct 1925 
(U.K.), s. 22 (2). 
64. s. 1 (1) (l). 
65. s. 1 (1) (q). 
66. S. 1 (1) (r). 
67. S. 1 (1) (£2 and (4) (£). 
68. S. 1 (1) (s). 
5 51 
of the 1956 Act (LU'\.) Wf!S the implementation as law of the Unitr~d 
1"'\ingdom mcmv of the provisions of the 1952 Arrest Convention.69 It 
is intm·esting to note that Part I of the 1956-:-t\ct (U.f'\.), which intro-
duced the changes de~>cribed, set in motion the passing of similar 
legislation in a number of British Commonwealth countries, .Q.J:t· Sing-
70 71 72 
apore, Malavsia and New Zealancl. · 
Except for several sections73 which dD not concern u~.l, the 
Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.) came into force on 1st Januarv, 1982?4 
Sections 20 to 2L. are mainl\,1 consolidating provisions. Thev I'f:)state 
English admiraltv law in a coherent and logical mannE!I'. Several of 
the changes are designed to accommodato and reinforce recent leg-
islative measures against oil pollution as a major haznrd. ~1ection 
21 (4) has, in certain cases, mmoved restriction:5 on proceedings in 
magainst a "sister'' ship b\,1 implementing to a greater extent the 
provisions of the 1952 Arrest Convention. 
2. Proposed 11eads of Jurisc1ictior1 in AdmiraltY' 
The admiral tv jurisdiction of .t\ustralian Courts, derived from 
Imperial legislation, has remained largely static since 1890?5 It is 
widely recognised that reforms in Australian admiraltv law are long 
overdue. What is uncertain is whether· thrw should be along the 
lim'!s, or go be\,lomJ the scope, of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.). 
69. See also s. 3 (4). 
70. High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act, Cap. 6, Singapore 
Statutes, Rev. Ed. 1970. 
71. Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Mal.). Bv s. 26, e\Jer\,1 Malay-
sian High Court shall have the same jurisdiction and auth-
oritv in relation to matters of admiraltv as the High Court 
of Justice in England under Administration of Justice Act 
1956 (U.K.). 
72. f\dmiralty Act (No. 119 of 1973) (N.Z.). 
73. I.e. ss. 72, 143 and 152 (2) \Aihich came into force earlier, 
i.e. on 28th Julv. 1981. 
74. As to extent of repeal of Administration of Justice Act 1956, · 
see Supreme Court Act 1981, Schedule 7. 
75. Noted supra. 
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(Jur focus now is on thP changes to be intrDduced based on 
h k " h t l' . . (' . . 76 w h' 11 t e wor or t 1e Aus ra 1an Law Rerorm CommiSSion. e s a con-
~"iicler how far the gaps and anomalies, which tlave been highlightPd 
in f\ustralian admiralty law, 1111ill be'! rectified undc~r thE! proposed Act, 
as an mterhauling measure. 
In many, thDugh not all, re~;pects the Draft Admiralty FJill77 
shares the features and philosophy of the Supreme Court Act 1981 
(U.I\.). For thE~ purpose of comparative study, references are made 
to provisions in both. The object is tD ascertain whether, in addi-
tion to dealing with the defects ar1d anomalies, the Draft Admiralty 
Bill seeks to confer further jurisdiction on Australian Courts. 
3. Proprietary Maritime Claims 
(1) Claim to possession or ownership of a ship or to thR ownership 
of any share therein. The Draft Admiralty Bill has adopted the ~vord­
in~J of section 20 (2) (ill of the Supr·eme Court Act 1981 (U.K.) with the 
add 't' f "t'tl t "78b f " . . " 1 lDrl o 1 e :o c~ ore or mvnersh1p of a sh1p. The addition 
brings it closely into line with Article I paragraph I (Q) of the 1952 
Arrest Convention. It will ob\;iously strengthen the position of the 
court when dealing with title rights to a ship acquired in equit/9 
or contracf;,o under a will, by transmission or as a result of a court 
declaration. 
Section 20 (2) (§] of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.), 
on which the prDPosed h8ad is basE~d. has an ancient history. It 
embDdies the inherent jurisoiction DrirJinally exercised by the CoL:Jrt 
of Admiralty in remmling ships DUt of the hands of wrongdoers and 
restoring them to rightful owners~ 1 In fact, it incorporates the 
76. The documents produced include the following: RE!search 
Paper No. 1 - An Australian Admiralty Act: The Ambit of 
Admiralty Jurisdiction (1984); Research Paper No. 2 - Adr.nir:-
2lty Jurisdiction in Australia: The Courts Exercising Orig-
inal and /\ppellate Jurisdiction (198/~); Research f:Japer 1\lo._] 
- Draft LPgislation: Admiralty Procedure and Rules (1985). 
Tl. SeR Research Paper N_g_, 3 - Draft Legislation: Admiralty 
.PrDcedun:~ and Rule~.(1985). 
78. Clause 4 (2) (~ j(i) and (ii). 
79. Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Comth.), s. 47; Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 (U.K.), s. 57. 
80. ln Batttwany v. Bouch (1881) 50 L.J.Q.B. 421, an agreement 
in writing to transfer a ship was held to be enforceable. 
81. See Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed.), op. cit., vol. 1, 
para. 313; Re Blanshard (1822) 2 B.& C.2411.- -
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provisions of several Acts (Imp.) on the subject,BZ thus extending 
the jurisdictional competence of the Court. Where a persor1, who 
has no title to a ship, gets her registered in his name, the Court is 
empowered to compel him to re-transfer her to the rightful owner, 
t:!ven though no fraud is committed~3 We hnve seen that in The Nic-
araguan Barque Courier~4 the Vice-Admiralty Court of South Aus-
tralia had exercised such power in restoring the ship to the right-
ful owner. 
Section 38585 of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), based on 
a similar Imperial provision~6 confers on Australian courts the pow-
l'!r to remove masters of ships. Unfortunatelv, it does not go far 
enough. Australian courts invested with admiralty jurisdiction do 
not possess the po1rver as given in section 30 of the Merchant Shipp-
ing Act 18% (Imp.). It seems that, under the Navigation Act 1912-73 
(Comth.) in its present form, a person cannot be restrained or pro-
hibited by court order, for any length of time, from dealing with 
any ship,or shares therein 7by selling m mortgaging the same or 
transferring the ship out of the registry~7 This gap may be filled 
by inserting in the Navigation Act (Comth.) an amendment which cor-
responds to section 30 of the Imperial Act. It is desirable for the 
power to be couched in general terms, or to be exercisable in con-
junction with this proposed head of jurisdiction. 
LJ.Jithout this proposed head, Australian courts will be unable 
to adjust effectively disputes arising between co-owners. For ex-
ample, a similar power was conferred by section 8 of the Admiralty 
82. Admiralty Court Act 1840 (Imp.), s. 4; Admiralty Court Act 
1861 (Imp.), s. 8; Vice-Admiralty Courts Act 1863 (Imp.), s. 10 
(9). 
83. Holderness v. Lamport (1861) 29 Beav. 129. In Brond v. 
E.1roomhall [1906] 1 K.B. 571, it was held that, by virtue of 
its inherent jurisdiction, the court had power to rectify 
the register by ordering the entry of a void transfer to be 
expunged. 
84. (1879) 13 S.A.L.R. 124. 
85. As amended by the Navigation Amendment Act 1980 (Comth.), 
s. 98. 
B6. Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.), s. 472; 1854 (Imp.), s. 240. 
87. Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltq. v. Farrer-Price (1964) 
82 W.N. (N.S.W.) (Part I) 337. 
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Court Act 1861 (Imp.). ln The Nelly ~~chneidm 88an action by the 
minority co-owners was instituted against a British ship. The plain-
tiffs alleged, inter ~. that accounts relating to Ullc} ownr~rship 
and earnings of the \mssel were outstanding and unsettled between 
them and the managing owner. Although the sale was opposod by 
the majority of the co-owners, Sir Robert Ptlillimore held that the 
court had a discretionary power under section 8 to order the sale 
of a ship proceeded against. /\ related problem between co-owners 
necessitating the uso of such power is exemplified in The Hereward.89 
The majority of the co-owners of a ship transferred their shares to 
a newly-formed limited company. In an action of restraint, the min-
ority co-owners sought a court order under section 8 for the app-
raisement and sale of the ship. Bruce, J., found for the minority 
co-owners as plaintiffs. In his view, the majority of the co-owners 
had no right to change the character of the ship without the con-
sent of all persons concerned. Here in the general interests of the 
parties concerned, the discretionary power was exercised in making 
the order which enabled the majority co-owners to take up the 
shares of the minority. 
That as a result of the struggles between the Common Law 
Court judges and those of the High Court of Admiralty the subject 
of charterparties fell outside the admiralty law of Australia has 
been noted. It is absolutely essential that under th8 proposed Ad-
miralty Act all types of charterparties are covered. In demise or 
bareboat charters, the charterers as £.!:..9. hac vice owners appoint 
the master and crew on board and have possession and control of 
the ship. Under' this proposed head, an Australian admiralty court 
should have jurisdictional competence to deal with matters relating 
to the control, possession and ownership of the ship. 
(2) Claim between co-owners of a ship relating to the possession, 
ownership, operation or earnings of the ship. Clause 4 (2) (b) of the 
Draft Admiralty Bill differs from section 20 (2) (b) of the Sup1,eme 
Court Act 1981 (U.K.) in two ways. The inclusion of thB IAJord "owner-
ship" before "possession" is in conformity with Article I paragraph 
(p) of the 1952 Anest Convention. A new aspect relating to the 
working, manning or possibly nm;igation of the ship is introduced by 
88. (1878) 3 P.O. 152. 
89. [1895] P. 284. 
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the insrJrtion of thP word "operation" before thE! phrase "or earn-
ings of the ship." lts referencE~ to ship operation as a modern-day 
terminology serves to update the court's jurisdiction. Otherwise 
the meaning of "employment" will have t.u lle strained to cover' new 
situations. The ovPrall advantage is that Australian courts will be 
empowered to adjudicate upon the wide-ranging claims and disputes 
arising between co-owners in relation to their ship. It is noteworthy 
that under English law most issues affecting ownership, whether in-
volving third parties or co-owners, are determined under the preced-
ing head. 
Apparently, tl1e wording of section 20 (2) (b) of the Supreme 
Court Act 1981 (U.K.) has been adopted in order to re-arrange or 
simplify thEJ provisions of section 8 of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 
(Imp.). Even before the Admiralty Court Acts (Imp.), 1840 and 1861, 
the High Court of Admiralty had asserted its authority by arresting 
and detaining a ship on the application of a co-owner who objected 
to her intended employment. In the action, he could compel the 
other co-owners to furnish security to thP full value of the ship 
for her safe return~0 
ThfJ growing need to extend the ancient authority of the Court 
bv section 8 of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 and its beneficial 
effects 1tJere borne out in a number of decisions. It is interesting 
to note how Court of Admiralty juclges, in their to ensure that 
no wrongs would go without redress, construed the scope and intent 
of the section. In The Idas?1 a part-owner of a British ship alleged 
that his co-owner, the ship's master~ had rendered false accounts. 
He petitioned the court to order an account to be taken in respect 
of the earnings of the ship, the disbursements incurred and the 
monev received under insurance policies effected on the ship and 
freight. The ship was lost before the date fixed for the Admiralty 
Court Act 1861 (Imp.) to come into force. It was held that section 
81 being remedial, was retrospective and therefore gave court the 
jurisdiction. 
90. The Appollo (1824) 1 Hag. Adm. 306; for enforcement of sec-
urity, see Degrave v. Hedges (1707) 2 Ld. Ravm. 1285; nom 
Grave v. Hedges, Holt K.B. 470. 
91. (1863) Brown & Lush. 65; 2 1\Jew Rep. 45. 
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The right to institute a suit under this proposed head should 
not dl'lpend on the plaintiff's continuing to remain a part-ovmer. 
The necessity of exercising this aspect of the jurisdiction is exem-
plified in ThB Ladv of ThE! Lake?2 The plaintiff part-owner of a ship 
had sold his share therein to a third partv. He brought an admiral-
ty suit in ~ to have an account taken between himself and the 
defendant in respect of the pmployment and earnings of the ship 
during the period when he and the defendant were co-owners. The 
High Court nf Admiralty helrJ that it had the jurisdiction to enter-
tain the suit al thnugh) when thr:! action was instituted) the plaintiff 
was no longer a part-owner. 
In Australia, the need to introduce this head jurisdiction is 
enhanced. It is true that property in an Australian ship, i3S in a 
British ship, may be divided into sixty-four shares. The Shipping Reg-
istration Act 1981 (Comth.) permits the maximum of sixty-four persons 
to be registered as owners of the ship, compared with the maximum of 
thirty-two persons under the Merchant Shipping Act 1891. (Imp.). 
l . 1 . f h. f h . h. 93 (3) _c arm re atmg to a mortgage o a s IP or o a s are m a s rp 
Prior to the Admiralty Court Act 18L1D (Imp.) being passed, the High 
Court of Admiralty was not empowered to adjudicatB upon claims of 
mortgagees, which had to be dealt with by the Court of Chancery.94 
The jurisdictional incompetence resulted in duplicating proceedings, 
expense and, in some instances, injustice to litigants. For example, 
in an admiralty action in [§!!! to recover wages, the ship might be 
sold under a decree of the Court. As the Court had no cognizance 
of mortgages, the surplus of proceeds would not be ordered to be 
paid to the mortgagee95 but would remain in the registry, subject to 
any order that might be made or come to the Court?6 Although un-
97 der an Act of George IV, passed in 1823, the modern concept of 
ship mortgage had emerged, the problems continued until the pass-
ing of the Admiralty Court Act 1840 (Imp.). The age-old Imperial pol-
icy, which prohibited foreigners from acquiring any property in 
92. (1870) L.R. 3 A & E 29. 
93. Draft Admiralty Bill, clause 4 (2) (a) (iii); see also clause 3 
(1). -
94. The Percy (1837) 3 Hag. Adm. 402. 
95. At least where he has not taken possession of the ship. 
96. The Portsea (1827) 2 Hag. Adm. 84. 
97. L1 GBo. IV, c. 41, ss. '•3 and 44; see Chapter Four. 
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British ships, operated to prevent the existence of any equitable 
interests in them or in any sharE; therein. A logical outcome was 
to construe the jurisdiction over mortgage in section 3 in a rather 
narrow compass, confining it to statutory mortgages. Although the 
law relatin~1 to the mortgage of ships or ,shares therein as sec-
urity had developed steadily over the years, the protEJction and 
J'ights enjoyed by mortgagees were strictly statutory. The High 
Court of /\drniralty did not appear to have had admiralty jurisdic-
tion over f::Jquitable mortgages or claims arising therefrom. This 
fact is sufficiently borne out by section 11 of the .Admiralty Court 
Act 1861 (lrnp.). lt reads: 
"The High Court of Admiralty shall have Jul'isdiction over 
any Claim in respect of any Mostgage duly regisr:er~d 
according to the Provisions of The Merchant Sh1ppmg Act, 
1854~ whether the Ship or thr.:: Procf~eds thereof be under 
' " 'the Arrest of the said Court. 
lJJe noted that the anomalies traceable to the Imperial policy and 
the earlier legislation were removed by section 3 98 of the Merchant 
Shipping 1-\ct Amendment Act 1862 (Imp.). It is submitted that the 
plain literal wording of this section did not invest the High Court of 
Admiralty with jurisdiction in fl.illJ over claims arising out of equit-
able mortgages. If our submission is correct, the Colonial Courts of 
Admiraltv Act _1890 {Imp.) does not empower Australian courts to en-
tertain actions in rem to enforce claims founded on equitable mort-
gages. 
Section 47 of the Shipping f~egistration Act 1981 (Cumth.) corr-
esponds to section 3 of the 1862 Act (Imp.). Tt is arguable that sec-
tion L+7, when read in conjunction with section 94A, is wide enough 
to confer on Colonial Courts of Admiralty in Australia jurisdiction 
i..Q.. ~ over claims relating to equitable and unregistered mortgages. 
Section 94A99 provides that section 11 of the .Admiralty Court Act 
1861 (Imp.) "shall have effect ... as if references in that section to a 
mortgage duly registered according to the provisions of the Merch-
ant Shipping 1-\ct 1854, included references to a mortgage registered 
98. 25 & 26 Vic. c. 63, s. 3 was passed so that "equities may 
be enforced against owners and mortgagees of ships in 
respect of their interest therein in the same manner as 
equities may be enforced against them in respect of any 
other property." 
99. Inserted by Shipping Registration Amendment Act 1984 
(Comth.), s. 29. 
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or deemed to have been registered under this Act." There is 
another reason in support of this view. Unlike sections 34 and 35 
of the 1894 Act (Imp.), sections 40 and '*1 of the Shipping Act 1981 
(Comth.), which provide for the rights of mortgagees, do not in-
clude the expression "registered mortgage". The omission of such 
words implies that holders of equitable or unregistered mortgages 
are also protected. 
On the other hand, the words ''mortgage registered or deem-
ed to have been registered under this Act" have a restrictive 
effect. The jurisdiction of Australian courts does not extend to 
charges or mortgages created over ships or shares therein 
under foreign law. 
The problem has been forestalled by a wide meaning given 
to ''mortgage" in clause 3 (1) of the Draft Admiralty Bill. The def-
inition includes "a hypothecation or pledge of, and a charge on, 
the ship or share,1 whether at law or in equitJ and whether aris-
ing under the la\rJ in force in a part of Australia or elsewhere." 
Its outstanding merit is its coverage of virtually every type of 
mortgage, whether effected under foreign law or Australian law. 
The facts of The Colorado; decided by the English Court of App-
eal, illustrate the wisdom of the Australian Law Reform Commission. 
In that case, the competing creditors were the Cardiff necessar-
ies men and a foreign bank claiming under a French hypotheque. 
By French law, claimants under a French hypotheque were mort-
gagees. In determining the order of priority, the English Court 
of Appeal recognised the French hypotheque, and held that the 
English necessaries men ranked after the French ~ypothecaires. 
The definition adopted by the Draft Admiralty Bill is wider 
in scope than its counterpart in the 1981 Act (U.KJ It includes 
1. The drafters seem to have incorporated some of the 
elements from the International Convention for the Unif-
ication of certain Rules relating to Maritime Liens and 
Mortgages, 1926, Article 3. 
2. Equitable mortgages and interests can be created in a 
number of ways; see M. Thomas and D. Steel, Temperley 
Merchant Shipping Acts (7th ed. 1976), op. cit., paras. 
62 and 63. Cognizance should be taken Of similar rights 
and interests created under foreign laws. 
3. [1923] P. 102. 
l,. Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.), s. 20 (7) (c). 
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a pledge which differs from a possessory lien. The reason is that 
a pledgee has not only possession of the chattel delivered to him 
but also the power to sell on the pledger's default. The power 
must be in re aliena and the right conferred is of a hypothec 
5 
character. 
In St Merriel~ Hewson, J., was correct in holding that the 
term "other charge" in section 3 (3) of the Administration of Jus-
tice Act 1956 (U.K.) did not include a possessory lien. Apparently, 
the term has the meaning given to the word "charge" as used in 
several provisions of the Merchant Shipping Acts (Imp} and the 
Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.).8 
(4) Mortgage of a ship's freight. This proposed head in clause 4 
(2) (iv) which is designed to confer jurisdiction in .!:.£!.!! is a novel 
concept. Its origin is not found in any of the international con-
ventions. Some initial difficulties may encountered. Clause 3 
(1) of the Draft Admiralty Bill defines "freight" to include "pass-
age money and hire." It does not embrace demurrage9 and dam-
ages for detention of a ship 10 payable by a charterer. The sec-
tions of the Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Comth.),11 which prov-
ide for ship mortgage registration, do not extend to mortgage of 
freight. 
The position of a freight mortgagee is governed largely 
by case law. Where a ship mortgagee takes possession of the ship, 
whether actual or constructive, t1e becomes entitled to "every-
thing which represents the earnings of the ship which had not 
been paid before" that time~2 On taking possession of the ship, a 
ship mortgagee's right to the freight cannot be defeated by an 
5. See E.I. Sykes, The Law of Securities (3rd ed. 1978), Q.P~· 
Qit., p. 549. 
6. [1963) P. 247. 
7. See 1894 Act (Imp.), s. 513 (2); 1906 Act (Imp.), ss. 35 (2) 
and 42 (1). 
8. See ss. 128 (2), 163A (2) (Ql and 289 (2). 
9. For demurrage, see Sir A. Mocatta, M. Mustill and S. Boyd, 
Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (19th ed. 
1984), op. cit., pp. 305-330. 
10. ' pp. 306-310. 
11. Ss. 38-47, as amended by Shipping Registration Act Amend-
ment Act 1984 (Comth.), ss. 15 to 17. · 
12. f'\eith v. Burrows (1877) 2 App. Cas. 636, p. 646. 
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assignee of the freight. Provided that a ship mortgagee took his 
securitv without notice of the assignment1,3 it is immaterial that 
the assignment was made before the ship mortgage was register-
ed:4 It is submitted that under this proposed head a freight 
mortgagee should enjov similar protection. 
Bv the English rules of procedure a warrant of arrest ag-
ainst freight mav be executed bv sen1ing the warrant on the car-
go in respect of which the freight is pavable or on the ship bv 
which the goods are carried, or on both~ 5 If, without notice of 
an existing freight mortgage, a cargo consignee pavs the freight 
due over to the carrier or shipowner, it is submitted that the 
cargo concerned is not liable to arrest. 
A freight mortgage is postponed to a maritime lien which is 
attached to the ship and freight. Moreover, it would appear that 
a freight mortgage is not within the meaning of "bill of sale"16 
and so such a mortgagee is not protected bv the bills of sale leg-
islation. 
This proposed head has no parallel in the Supreme Court 
Act 1981 Act (U.K.). To remove doubts concerning the rights and 
the position of freight mortgagees, appropriate amendments 
should be made to the Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Comth.). 
(5) Claim for satisfaction or enforcement of a .judgment given 
against a ship or other property in a proceeding in admiralty bv a 
court (including a court of a foreign countrv).17 Jurisdiction un-
der this proposed head mav onlv be exercised if judgment in an 
action in !:.§!!.!, as distinct from an action l.!l_ personam, has been 
obtained. A decision in !:.§.!!! determines the status of the !.:.§l§ it-
self and "binds all persons claiming an interest in the propertv 
13. Wilson v. _Wilson (1872) L.R. 1L+ Eq. 32. 
14. Brown v. Tanner (1868) L.R. 3 Ch. 597. 
15. 1-\. McGuffie, P. Fugeman and P. Grav, Admiraltv Practice 
(1964 ed.), QE.: ~it., para. 268. 
16. See, !.h9.:. Bills of Sale Act 1900 (Tas.) (64 Vic. No. 70), s. 
4 (1), and also E.I. Svkes, The La~\/ of Securities, Q£_. cit., 
pp. 455 ~· s~. 
17. Draft Admiraltv Bill, clause 4 (2) (£1 Bv Draft Rules, 
Order 70 (1), where a ship or other propertv is under 
arrest, a person who has obtained a judgment in anv court, 
Australian or foreign, mav applv to the court to determine 
the order of prioritv of claims against the proceeds 
of sale. 
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inconsistent with t.he judgment even though pronounced in their 
absence."18 Dicey and Morris have given a classic statement of 
the law in these words:19 
"A judgment in rem is a judgment whereunder Bither 
(1) possession-or property in a thing adjudged to a 
person, or (2) the sale of a thing is decreed in satis-
faction of a claim against the thing itself ... Foreign 
judgments in I.:§.!!! are freely recognised in England but 
rarely call for enforcement." 
We shall consider how the principle appliBs in relation to ships 
and other maritime property. 
The head in clause 4 (2) (c) of the Draft Admiralty Bill gives 
expression partly to the residual jurisdiction as found in section 
1 (1) of the Administration of Justice Act 19S6 (U.K.), and partly 
to the dicta of Sir Robert Phillirnore in The City of Mecca?0 In an 
action brought in the Portuguese Tribunal of Commerce, the plain-
tiffs obtained judgment against the master and owners of a Brit-
ish vessel for damages for injury caused by collision to the plain-
tiffs' ship. Before the Portuguese judgment was satisfied, the 
ship had arrived in England. Due to a mistaken assumption that 
the judgment was ill. rem, Sir Phillimore found for the plaintiffs in 
an action i.!l ~ in the Admiralty Division against the ship on the 
unsatisfied judgment. He explained the reasons for allowing the 
action in these terms?1 
" .. .it is the duty of one admiralty court, a duty arising 
from the intBrnational comity, to enforce the decree 
of another upon a subject over which the latter had 
jurisdiction ... I am of the opinion that it is the duty 
of this Court to act as the auxiliary to the Portuguese 
Court and to complete the execution of justice, which 
owing to the departure of the ship, was necessarily 
left unfinished by that Court." 
On appeal to the English Court of Appeal, Sir Robert Phillimore's 
decision was reversed on the ground that the Portuguese Court 
judgment was actually given in a personal action against the mas-
22 ter and owners of the shipowner. It clear from the decision 
18. Dullfus Mieg et Compagnia S.A. v. Bank of England [1949] 
1 All E.R. 946, p. 957, 12.ill' Jenkins, J. 
19. J. Morris, Dicey and Morris on The Conflict of Laws (9th 
ed. 1973), QE.: cit., p. 1013. 
20. (1879) 5 P.D. 28. 
21. !!lid.:, pp. 32-33. 
22. (1881) 6 P.D. 106. 
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that an English Court has the jurisdiction to, and generally will, 
enforce in an action in .!.:§.!!! a foreign judgme~t if obtained in an 
t . . 73 ac Ion m rem. 
In the recent case of The Despina G~4 the dicta of Sir 
Robert Phillimore were applied. The plaintiffs' cargo carried on 
board the defendants' ship was lost. In an action in r~ brought 
in a Swedish Admiralty Court, the plaintiffs had the ship arrested. 
She was released when the owners put up security. On the defen-
dants' failure to pay in full the damages awarded, the plaintiffs 
issued a writ in the English Admiralty Court against the ship in 
England. To obtain satisfaction of the Swedish judgment in res-
pect of the balance outstanding, the res had to be in the hands 
of the Court. The question arose whether the Court had juris-
diction to issue the warrant of arrest since she had already been 
arrested once and released after security was put up. Sheen, J., 
decided the question in the affirmative. 
Under English admiralty law, a plaintiff's right to ~enforce, 
or to the satisfaction of, a foreign judgment depends on an im-
portant condition being met. For the action in ~to lie, the 
ship or presumably the cargo concerned must, at the time of the 
arrest or re-arrest, remain the property of the judgment debtor~5 
In The Alletta~ 6 thE-! plaintiffs sought to re-arrest a ship after 
judgment and after her sale to new owners. Mocatta, J., held 
that the 1Plair1tiffs' right was lost because the cause of action 
had become merged in the judgment. It is submitted that this rule 
will also apply to claims brought under clause 4 (2) (c) of the 
Draft Admiralty Bill. In this respect, a beneficiary of a judgment 
!.!JJ..§.C!!_ is not in the same position as a maritime lienee who can 
pursue the ~ into whosoever's hands it may pass~7 
The principle relating to judgments obtained in proceedings 
23. The same principle applies when a foreign judgment in 
If.!.!! is raised in defence; see Castrigue v. Imrie (1870) 
L.R. 4 H.L. 414. 
24.'[19831 1 All E.R. 1. 
25. Ibid., The Despina G K., p. 5. 
26. [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 40. 
27. Cf. D. Thomas, Maritime Liens (1980 ed.), op. cit., p. 330. 
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in rem extends to a decree for possession grantod by a foreign 
~urt. It is followod as part of Australian jurisprudence~8 In 
~ 
the lllestern Australian case of S.S. Pacific Star \/. Bank of Amer-
ica National Trust and Savings Associatino.29 the plaintiff claimed 
as mortgagee of the tug Pacific Star. In the action in 
brought against the tug in Hong Kong, the plaintiff obtained a 
decree for possession. When the tug later appeared in Western 
Australian waters, Negus, J., allowed the plaintiff's claim to poss-
ession based on the Hong Kong Court decree. The Full Court of 
the SupremE! Court of Westem Australia,sitting as a Colonial 
Court of Admiralty, dismissed the appeal on the ground that the 
decrm; was a foreign judgment given in an action in against 
the res. Accordingly, it qualified for recognition and enforce-
ment. 
.D.. pre-1956 decisinn shows that the English Admiralty Court 
had exerci:1mJ jurisdiction in circumstances en\Jisaged by clause 
t, (2) (c) e\/on though the ship had not been arrested. In the in-
teresting case of Thr] Nautik~0 a warrant of arrest and a writ 
hacl benn issued, After she was served with the writ but before 
the \A/arrant could be sr?n;ed, she was clandestinely taken out of 
the court's jurisdiction by the master who put her to sea. It was 
llelcJ that ttu~ court had jurisdictinn, based on the ser\Jice of the 
writ. to pronounce judgment in an action in ~· It is true that a 
judqment obtained in tJm absence of tt1P r.:.£2_ is of little practical 
\/alue. If she puts into an Australian port, shP can bP arrested 
and the Englisr1 court judgment can be enforced against her with-
in clause h (2) (c). 
For thP sake of completeness, mention is made of another 
method of executing judgment obtained in an action in In 
The Gemrna~ 1 tile English Court of Appeal held that the owners of 
28. As to the rPcognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments in Australia, see E. Sykes and M. Pryles, Interna-
tional and Interstate Conflict of Laws (2nd ed. 1981), 
chapter 25. 
29. [1965] W.A.R. 159. 
30. [1895] P. 121. 
31. [1899] P. 285. 
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the foreign vessel had rendered themselves personally liable by 
appearing in an action in ~· Certain advantages may avail 
shipowners who pursue this course of action,-e.g. the benefit of 
limiting their liability, the defence of contributory ne~]ligence 
and so on. But if the amount of bail given for the release of the 
!.:§.§. proves insufficient to satisfy the judgment, payment of the 
balance may be enforced by a writ of fieri facias against the de-
fendants' goods and also against the ship, even though she had 
been released previously, if she is within the court's jurisdictior1.2 
(6) Claims for interest in respect of a claim within clause 4 (2) 
(a) - (c)~ 3 The concept is new in that it is not derived from the 
international conventions34 or any of the Imperial legislation. No 
definition is given of the expression "interest in respect of a 
claim."35 Apparently, it is not confir1ed to the amount payable at 
a certain interest rate or per cent arising from a loan made on 
the security of a ship or her freight, or from a share of the 
ship's earnings~ 6 lt is arguable that the expression could em-
brace a right or benefit which arises under a contract, trust, 
assignment, will or a judgment in rem, ~'\/hether obtained in an Aus-
tralian or foreign court. Equally, in a representative capacity, a 
trustee-in-bankruptcy, a company liquidator or receiver may ac-
quire and exercise similar rights. If the reasoning is correct, the 
expression will significantly increase the number of proprietary 
32. The Despina G K. [1983] 1 All E.R. 1 p. 5, per Sheen, J. 
33. Draft Admiralty Bill, clause 4 (2) (Ql. 
34. As to the lists of "maritime claims" recognised, see, e.g. 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 1926, 
Articles 2 to 4; International Convention (of same name) 
1967, Articles 1 and t,; International Convention relating to 
the Arrest of Seagoing Ships, 1952, Article I. 
35. The word "interest" even in this context can have diff-
erent meanings. 
36. As to interest rate after judgment and interest on costs 
under English admiralty law, see K. McGuffie, P. Fugernan 
and P. Gray, Admiralty Practice (1964 ed.), op. cit., paras. 
546, 584 and 585. Under Australian rules ofcourt proced-
ure applicable in admiralty, interests on debts are gener-
ally payable. E.g. the Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 
1932 (Tas.), s. 34, permits a maximum of seven per cent. 
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't' l . 37 man ·1me c a1ms. The effect could be that am; interest, what-
ever its nature,related to or derived from a~/ of the claims, 
within clause 4 (2), thought not strictly qualifying as such, will 
suffice to found an action i~ ~ against the ship. 
Hence to prevent vexatious proceedings or abuse of pro-
cess in ~ particularly, Australian Courts exercising such juris-
diction may have to determine what "interest claims" are consid-
ered too remote. Heavy damages may hmm to be imposed for 
wrongful arrests~8 A practical measure for shipowners, ship op-
erators and agents to adopt under the proposed law is to file 
caveats against the arrest of thelr ships~9 There no prohibi-
tion against further caveats being filed~0 
1,. General Maritime Claims 
(1) Cl<:.1im for damage done by a ship (whether by collision or oth: 
erwise.f1 We have seen that the words outside the brackets, as 
used in section 7 of the [\dmiralty Court Act 1861 (Imp.), have of-
ten been given a wide meaning. The object is to provide in rem 
remedies in cases of personal injuries and damage, wht=lther dirE'Jct. 
or indirect. Thus damage done by a ship to oyster beds 42 and 
submarine cables43 has been held to come within the head. We 
have noted the isolated and somewhat doubtful decision of the 
Canadian Exchequer Court in Outhouse v. The "Thorshaun"~11 There 
the remoter consequences of jettisoning oil from a ship were held 
to be within the section. A number of serious limitations never-
theless remain. 
37. For an explanation of the use of this term, see Research 
Paper No. 3 - Draft Legislation; Admiralty Procedure 
and Rules 1 ~ cit., p. 32. 
38. The matter seems to be well covered by Draft Admiralty 
Bill clause 35 (1). See ProfBssor D.C. Jackson, EnforcB-
ment of Maritime Claims (1985), p. 168 and pp. 178-179. 
39. Draft Admiralty Rules 1986, para. 6. 
40. Ibid., para. 12. 
41. Clause 4 (3) (a). 
42. The Swift [1901] P. 168. 
43. }he Clara f<.illam (1870) L.R. 3 l\. & E. 161. 
44. [1935] 4 D.L.R. 628. Here damage was caused to lobsters 
tJy oil, bBing part of the ship's cargo, whict1 had been 
pumped overboard. 
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The addition of the words "whether by collision or other-
wise'' in clause 4 (3) (a) of the Draft Admiralty Bill indicates that 
physical damage is not a requisite for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion under this proposed head. A mere contact between two 
ships, without damage being caused to either, will not give rise to 
a right of action~5 On the other hand, through the negligence 
or misconduct of the crews or master on board a vesseL another 
vessel may receive or cause damage.46 The former may be held 
liable under this proposed head in an admiralty action in [§!!1, ev-
en though there has been no actual collision or contact between 
the two vessels~7 Apparently the words within brackets in clause 
4 (3) (a) are intended to retain an appropriate part of the juris-
diction which has been split up under clause 4 (3) to enable claims 
to be brought under new heads. 
The United Kingdom Parliament llas adopted a different app-
roach in the Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.). By statutory exten-
sion, it has built upon the broad construction given by English 
admiralty judges to the words "damage done by a ship." This heacf8 
now embraces any claim in respect of a liabilitv incurred under 
the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 (U.K.) and also that 
falling on the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund in 
Part I of the Merchant Shipping Act 1974 (U.K.). 
(Z) Claim in respect of the liability of the owner of a ship arising: under ' 
the Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981. Part II or IV, 
or under a law of a State or Territory mentioned in section 7 (1) 
of that Act~9 In Chapter Five, we examined the various measures 
adopted and the penalties imposed by State and Commonwealth 
Parliaments to control, prevent and reduce pollution. There is 
only one instance under Commonwealth law where a ship may, bv 
45. The Margaret (1881) 6 P.O. 76. 
46. As exemplified in Monte Ulia (Owners) v. Banco and Others 
(Owners) The Banco [1971] P. 137, the facts of which will 
be discussed in due course. 
47. The Industrie' (1871) L.R. 3 A. & E. 303. 
48. Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.), s. 20 (5) (a) and (Q). 
49. Draft Admiralty Bill, clause 4 (3) (b). 
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ministerial authority, be detained until the amount duE is paid or 
satisfactory security is furnished~O However, neither the inter-
national conventions on pollution given the force of law in Aus-
tralia nor any State or Commonwealth legislation on the subject 
authorises proceedings in to be brought against the !:§§.for 
pollution damage caused or for the recovery of penalties imposed. 
The defects in the law dealing with pollution remain so long as 
only certain individuals1!h9: the owner and/or the master. can be 
held personally liable. 
Like its counterpart in the Supremn Court Act 1981 (U.K.), 
clause 4 (3) (Q2 of the Draft Admiralty Bill is historic. It will lead to 
a new and important development in admiralty law. The admiralty 
jurisdiction in !:!2.!!.! will be extended to claims based on strict lia-
bility and penalties imposed by the Protection of the Sea (Civil 
Liability) Act 1981 (Comth.) and also by State legislation in certain 
instances. The expressions "pollution damage" and "preventive 
measures" are widely defined:1 Property owners, fishermen, 
pearl divers and tourist trade operators, who are adversely aff-
ected by pollution, may have incurred costs in taking preventive 
measures. It is submitted that they should be entitled to instit-
ute proceedings in !:!ill!. against the ship concerned. It is unfor-
tunate that the proposed admiralty jurisdiction does not extend 
the right of instituting such an action against the rest of the 
cargo of oil on board. 
We have noted that State enactments, which deal with pollution, 
have given effect to the kernel provisions of the International Con-
vention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954. At 
present, it appears that no State enactment has given "the applied 
provisions of the Convention" the force of law within the meaning of 
section 7 (1) of the 1981 Act (Comth.). Those State enactments prev-
iously considered seem to be within the legislative competence of the 
State Parliaments. Apparently, the 1981 Act (Comth.) is intended 
to supplement the existing law in each State. Moreover, since the 
50. Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Comth.), 
s. 22 (1). 
51. See Article I paras. 6 and 7 of 1969 Convention scheduled 
to the 1981 Act (Comth.). 
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Commonwealth Parliament has not by legislation stated, "complete-
ly, exhaustively or exclusively, what shall be the law governin~J 
the particular conduct or matter,''52 it is subnrltted that the 
State enactments dealing with pollution are valid. 
As noted previously, compliance with the measures imposed 
by State enactments to control, prevent and minimise pollution is 
secured in a number of ways. First, heavy penalties of up to 
$50,000 may be imposed on the shipowner and the master for 
breach of certain provisions in the State enactments(3 though 
the penalties incurred under the State enactments for environ-
mental protection are less heavy .54 Second, by the creation of 
the statutory tort the Authority concerned in each State is 
entitled to obtain indemnity in respect of the costs, expenses and 
liabilities incurred in clean-up operations and the preventive 
measures taken:5 Third, property owners in New South Wales, 
Queensland and Victoria are protected by certain statutory rem-
edies which impose strict liability on tanker owners and their 
masters. Certain property owners, who suffer "loss of or damage 
to any property" or incur "expense or liability in preventing or 
mitigating such loss or damage'' are entitled to recover : 6 In these 
respects, the rights and interests of property owners are pro-
tected under the law in each of these States. 
The penalties, statutory indemnity and claims of property 
owners arising under State legislation have effect in supplement-
ing the civil and penal liabilities imposed under Parts II and IV of 
the 1981 Act (Comth.). It is desirable for this proposed head of 
jurisdiction to be extended so that the penalties and remedies 
provided by State enactments may be enforced by proceedings 
in rern against the tanker or ship concerned. 
52. Ex parte Mclean (1930) 43 C.L.R. 472, p. 483, egr Dixon, 
J. There is no intention on the part of the Commonwealth 
Parliament to occupy the whole field so as to displace 
the State Parliaments in that area. 
53. See Chapter Five. 
54. For penal provisions, see State enactments discussed 
in Chapter Five. 
55. See Chapter Five. 
56. See Chapter Five. 
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(3) Claim for loss of life, or for personal injurv, sustained in 
consequence of a defect in a ship or in the apparel or equipmen_t 
thereof. Clause 4 (3) (c) has subdivided the head of jurisdiction 
in section 20 (2)' (f2 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.). The 
section involves a change in English admiraltv law from the House 
of Lords decision in The Vera Cruz : 7 The proposed head, when 
given the forcEJ of Commonwealth law, will serve to remove the 
anomalies and jurisdictional limitations alreadv highlighted.58 
The subdivision has the advantage of claritv in focussing 
attention on anv defect in a ship or her rnachinerv as the causa-
tive factor. We saw that in Huddart Parker Ltd. v. Cotte;;9 a sea-
man's injuries were caused by the ship's defective equipment. In 
construing and applving section 59 of the Navigation Act 1912-73 
(Comth.), the High Court judges differed in their views as to 
whether the provision was intended to supplement or supersede 
the contractual dutv of care implied at common law. The difficul-
tv will no longer exist in future. The words used in clause 4 (3) 
(c) are wide enough to embrace anv fault or danger in the static 
or altered condition of anv part, machinerv or apparatus of a 
ship. Thev should extend to unseaworthiness60 and liabilitv aris-
ing from anv unsafe structure or premises in a ship. At common 
law, the seaworthiness requirement is a strict non-delegable oblig-
ation~1 Suppose that a ship's winches or machinerv are negligt:mtlv 
repaired bv an independent contractor rendering the ship unsea-
worthy. Injuries caused to anv person, whether on board or out-
side the ship, as a result of the unseaworthv condition should 
come within the meaning of clause 4 (3) (g). 
The legislative objective is to enlarge the categorv of 
57. (1884) L.H. 10 C.P. 59. 
58. See Chapter Six, Part II, dealing with injuries to seamen. 
59. (191-.2) 66 C.L.R. 624. 
60. Ibid., p. 637, e§f McTiernan, J., in his dissenting judgment 
Bv the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), s. 59, obligation ' 
as to seaworthiness of the ship is implied in everv con-
tract of employment and instrument of apprenticeship 
relating to the sea. 
61. In relation to goods carried, see Clifford v. Hunter (1827) 
M. & M. 103. 
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f l 'f 62 l . . . claimants in proceedings rem. Loss o 1 ·e or persona In]urms 
may, as a result of the unsafe condition of the ship or her appli-
ance, be suffered by any of the Cf'ew members, passenger's, visit-
-· 
ors or stevedores on board, or by any person outside the ship. 
Clause 4 (3) (c), when implemented, will fill many of the gaps exist-
ing in Australian admiralty law despite the wide construction con-
sistently placed by judges on section 7 of the Admiralty Court 
Act 1861 (Imp.). Thus loss of life or personal injuries, though not 
caused by a ship as an active instrument as exemplified in The 
Thefta~3 can under this proposed head found an action i!J.. r..§!! 
against the ship. In that case, the plaintiff sustained personal 
injuries through falling down into the ship's hold because the 
hatchway was co\/ered only with a tarpaulin. The action in rem 
seeking damages was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. It was 
held that the damage was not "done by any ship" within the mean-
ing of section 7. 
An important reform needed relates to seamen's claims for 
of life and personal injuries arising under the Seamen's Com-
pensation Act 1911 (Comth.f4 and the various State workmen's 
compensation enactments?5 We have noted that the 1911 Act 
(Comth.)66 and the Western Australian Act6'~ make limited provision 
for enforcing compensation payments by ordering the detention 
of the ship concerned. It is suggested that this proposed head 
of jurisdiction should be extended to encompass claims arising 
under the 1911 Act (Comth.) and any State workmen's compensation 
legislation. The change suggested will confer on seamen and other 
workmen associated with the shipping industry wider protection. 
62. As unde-\ Enplish law, the right to reco\/er damages for 
loss of life IS statutory: Compensation to Relatives Act 
189: (N.S.W.), s. 3; Common Law Practice Act 1867 (Qld.), 
s. 12; Wrongs Act 1958, Part III (Vic.), s. 16; Wrongs Act 
1936, ~art II (S.A.), s. 19; Fatal Accidentals Act 1959 (W.A.), 
s. t~; Fatal Accidents Act 1934 (Tas.), s. t~. 
63. [1894] P. 280. 
64. See CI-Japter Six. In The IV'!olliere [1925] P. 27, Roche, J., 
held that statutory compensation paid for loss of life 
was not within the admiralty jurisdiction. 
65. See Chapter Six. 
66. s. 13 (1 ). 
67. By the lllorkers' Compensation and Assistance Act (W.A.) 
(~o. 86 of 1981), s. 1'79, a District Court may, in certain 
Cl~curnstances, by order direct the bailiff to detain the 
stup. 
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Clause 4 (3) (c) is not entirely related to the provisions on 
limitation of liability under the Navigation Amendment Act 1979 
(Comth.)~8 The owner of a sea-going ship may limit his liability 
for "loss of life or personal injury caused to any person carried 
in the ship" unless it is the result of the actual fault or privity 
of the owner.69 Situations may occur where a person, e.g. a vis-
itor, port official or stevedore, though lawfully on board, is 
strictly "not carried in the ship." If he loses his life or suffers 
personal injuries as a result of any defect in the ship or her 
equipment, it is arguable that the claim may not be limitable un-
der the 1979 Act (Comth.). 
Moreover, since the loss of life or personal injuries are 
not caused by collision but by a ship's defect, the matter will fall 
outside the 1910 Convention~0 The statutory defence of contrib-
utory negligence as provided under the law of each State may 
appl/1 
(4) Claim for loss of life, or for personal injury caused by an act 
or omission of -
(i) the owner or charterer of a ship; 
(ii) a person in possession or control of a ship_; QL 
(iii) a person for whose wrongful acts or omissions the owner, 
charterer or person in possession or control of a ship i~ 
liable, 
-Qging an act or omission in the navigation or management 
of the ship, including an act or omission in connection wit~ 
(iv) the loading of goods on to, or the unloading of goods 
from, the ship; 
(v) the embarkation of persons on to, or the disembarkation 
of persons from, the ship; and 
(vi) the carriage of goods or persons on the ship. 
68. S. 65 amending Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), Part VIII. 
69. 1957 Convention, Article I, para. 1 (a). 
70. International Convention for the Unification of certain 
Rules with respect to Collision; as to statutory effect 
given, see Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), ss. 259-261 
and s. 396; Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (U.K.). 
71. Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (N.S.W.) (No. 32 
of 1965), s. 1 0; Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, 
Contributory Negligence and Division of Chattels) Act 
(Qld.) (1 Eliz. II No. 42) s. 10, Wrongs Act (S.A.) (No. 2267 
of 1936), s. 27a; Tortfeasors and Contributory Negligence 
Act (Tas.) (No. 1l, of 1954), s. 4; Wrongs Act (Vic.) (No. 
6420 of 1958), s. 26; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence 
and Tortfeasors' Contribution) Act (W.A.) (No. 23 of 1947), 
s. 4. 
572 
This proposed head in clause 4 (3) (d) and the preceding head com-
bined will cover about the same gr~nd as section 20 (2) (f)?2 It is 
significant that, apart from certain exceptions, clause 4 (3) (d) is 
modelled on Article I paragraph 1 (b) and Article 6 paragraph 2 of 
the 1957 Convention:3 relating to the limitation of liability for 
loss of life and personal injuries. This proposed head of jurisdic-
tion is only exercisable where the wrongful act or default of any 
of the persons nemed in paragraphs _ill to (iii) occurs in the navi-
gation, management or any of the operations mentioned in para-
graphs ili{) to ~- The two key words "navigation" and "manage-
ment" are not defined anywhere in the Draft Admiralty Bill or the 
Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.). 
Guidance as to their meaning may have to be sought from 
judicial pronouncements in cases on limitation of liability and bill 
of lading contracts. In The Warkworth?4 the issue before the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal concerned the meaning of the words "improper 
navigation" in section 51 (4) of the Imperial Act~5 Fry, L.J. endors-
ing the dictionary meaning of the work "navigation" used by Dr. 
Phillimore, said:76 
"[O]ne of the definitions there given is that navigation 
is the science or art of conducting a ship from place to 
place through the water; if that be true it includes the 
supply of such instruments as are proper for the ship, 
and such men as are skilled in their calling .. .If either 
of them are wanting, and a collision happens, then we 
have a case of improper navigation. The words may in-
clude other cases .... " 
Brett, M.R., and Bowen, L.J. favoured a broader proposition. In 
their view, "all damage wrongfully done by a ship to another whilst 
it is being navigated" would come within the words provided the 
wrongful action of the ship was due to the negligence of the 
72. Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.). 
73. Given effect by the Navigation Amendment Act 1979 (Comth.), 
s. 65 (1). 
74. (1884) 9 P.O. 145. 
75. 25 & 26 Vic., c. 63. 
76. (1884) 9 P.O. 145, p. 148. 
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. f h . 'bl 77 B 'h h 'J 78 shipowner or those or w om he IS responsi e. ai ac e, .. , 
and Wright, J.;9 had held that the word "navigation" referred to a 
ship in motion, or being cast off. In The Vigilant~0 a ship came in-
to collision with a pier and received damage. The cause was the 
improper casting off of the tow rope by the tug. Sir Henry Duke, 
President of the Probate Division, held that this negligent act was 
improper navigation within the meaning of section 503 of the 
chant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.). 
Further light is thrown on the meaning of "navigation" by 
American decisions relating to contracts of carriage. Thus, fail-
ure to have a damage caused by perils of the sea repaired at a 
port of refuge~ 1 disregard of storm warnings when commencing 
voyage~2 neglect to take careful notice of a light upon a reef~3 
and improper selection of a place to anchor84 were held to be 
faults of navigation. 
Provided that the wrongful act or default is committed in 
the navigation of a ship, the Court should have jurisdiction to 
entertain the claim. It is immaterial whether the death or person-
al injury occurs on board the wrongdoing ship, or caused by the 
wrongdoing ship to someone on a wharf or on board another ship. 
A ship may be so negligently navigated as to run into another ship 
or cause a mounting swell which engulfs a small craft. A claim for 
loss of life 85 or personal injury as a result of the collision or sink-
ing in such circumstances should come within this proposed head. 
Despite the wide compass given judicially to "navigation", it 
does not embrace certain acts done in relation to, or for the pur-
pose of, assisting a ship. The facts of the Alde86 are interesting. 
77. Ibid., pp. 146-148. 
78. Lord (S.S.) (Owners) v. Newsum, Sons and Co. Ltd. [1920] 
1 K.B. 846. 
79. Svenssons v. Cliffe S.S. Co. [1932] 1 K.B. 490, p. 500. 
80. [1921] P. 312. 
81. Carsar v. Spreckels (1905) 141 Fed. Rep. 260 (C.C.A.). 
82. Hanson v. tJaywood (1907) 152 Fed. Rep. 401. 
83. 1he E.A. Shores (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. 324. 
84. The Etona (1896) 64 Fed. Rep. 880; 71 Fed. Rep. 895. 
85. As has geen stated, this right to claim damages for loss 
of life due to a wrongful act or default is statutory. 
86. [19261 P. 211. 
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An action was brought to limit the liability based on tile tonnage 
of the barge Alde. Damage was caused when she forced another 
barge, the Torn tit, onto the propeller of the steamship Ascania. 
There was doubt whether any assistance to tile forward movement, 
of the Alde, which caused the damage, was received by the person 
in charge of her from some men working on a capstan on another 
stationary vesseL Bateson, J. laid down an irnportBnt exception in 
the following words:87 
"The navigation is that of the vessel which is being 
moved, and not of the implement which stationary, 
either on a ship or on shore, whether it made to 
revolve by steam or used by hand." 
Hence the improper use of a capstan on a stationary vessel did not 
constitute an improper navigation on the part of that vessel for 
her to be held jointly and severally responsible for the damage. In 
fact, the negligence of individuals in carrying out their tasks, 
whether on board the ship in question or some other ship, may not 
be related to navigation. Unless the IAJrongful acts resulting in a 
loss of life or personal injury occur in circumstances within the 
meaning of this head, no action in r:gm_ can be brought. 
A further limit to the meaning of "navigation" is set by the 
decision in The Tojo MarJ8 which has been considered elsewhere. 
The House of Lords held that the firing of a Cox bolt gun, which 
negligently set off an explosion and caused extensive damage to 
the ship being salved, was not an act "in the navigation or manage-
ment" of the tug. Moreover, the act was not an activity performed 
on board the salvors' tug. 
The meaning of the words "management of the ship" was con-
sidered in connection with the limitation of liability in Athalvic 
tor~9 A tanker with three sea valves negligently left open by the 
plaintiffs' servants arrived at Lagos. When the appropriate valves 
were opened to discharge cargo through the port pipe line, some 
sixty tonnes of pr~trol escaped from the ship into the sea. The 
petrol on water became ignited, causing a quantity of depth char-
ges on the admiralty trawlers to explode. A number of persons in 
87. Ibid., p. 215. 
88. [1971) 1 All E.R. 1110, supra. 
89. [1946] P. 42. 
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the ships and on shore lost tt1eir lives or suffered injuries. Pilch-
er, J., had no difficulty in rejecting the argument on tJehalf of the 
tanker-owners that the negligence of the tanker's personnel con-
stituted "improper navigation". He analysed the legislative inten-
tion of introducing those words "management of the ship" in sec-
tion 1 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1900 (Imp.). 
The purpose was to cover acts of negligence by shipowners' 
servants in the management of the ship's furnances or in the hand-
ling of dangerous cargo which might do damage to other ships, car-
go and property on shore. He took the words "in their very broad-
est and popular sense" to include the many duties of the ship's 
master and officers in relation to the safety of the cargo and the 
well-being of the passengers. The words "management of the ship" 
were held to be wide enough to cover negligence of which the own-
ers' servants were guilty. 
The learned judge rightly refused to follow the more limited 
construction given to those words when used in exception clauses 
and contracts of carriage of goods?0 Under the repealed Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act 1924 (U.K.)?1 a fine distinction is drawn be-
tween "management of the ship" and cargo care:2 The provisions 
relating to cargo care imposes on the carrier a strict obligation 
which must be fulfilled to protect the interests of cargo owners. 
The words within quotes are necessarily given a restricted sense 
to include "any part of the ship or any operation with regard to 
the ship as a whole, which carried out for the ship's purposes 
d t l . l t' t u93 an no mere y 1n re a 1on o cargo. 
90. In the Harter Act 1893 (U.S.), s. 3 contains these words 
" ... faults or errors in the management of the ship." 
91. And also the Sea-Carriage of Goods Act 1924-73 (Comth.). 
92. Gosse Millerd, Ld. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine 
[1929) A.C. 223, where the House of Lords affirmed the 
judgment of Wright, J., as reported in [19271 2 K.B. 432, 
p. 435; see also Foreman and Ellams, Ld. v. Federal Steam 
Navigation Co. [1928] 2 K.B. 424, pp. 437 and 439, per Wright, 
J. 
93. Gosse Millerd, Ld. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine 
[19291 A.C. 223, pp. 238-241, per Lord Sumner. 
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The broad interpretation adopted by Pilcher, J., will no doubt 
include the restricted meaning given to those words as used in the 
Hague Rules. It therefore covers management of the ship's mach-
inery and appliances which are fitted for the purposes of both the 
h . d 94 s 1p an cargo. 
To the already vast sphere covered by the two terms t!navig-
ation11 and "management'' are added the operations mentioned in 
paragraphs \1.0 to (W of clause 4 (3) (d). The object to provide 
a remedy in \lirtually every instance where death or personal in-
jury wrongfully caused. 
In essence, clause 4 (3) (d) gives strong recognition to the 
personality of the ship by making her answerable for the wrong or 
default of each of the persons named in paragraphs (i) to (iii). 
Unfortunately, the word "owner" is not defined in the Draft Admir-
alty Bill. It should include an owner of a foreign ship, an unregis-
tered ownet:5 an equitable owner,96 and possibly a person holding 
majority shares in a ship:n A !!person in possession" embraces a 
demise charterer, a ship's mortgagee who has taken possession of 
her, whether it is actual or constructive?8 a shipyard owner when 
the sl1ip is under repair?9 a bailee and a salvor in certain instanc-
es. In the literal sense, a ship's master, who has charge on board, 
has control of the ship. It appears that the position remains un-
changed even where a pilot, who is on board, has the conduct of 
the ship. The reason is that the pilot is subject to the authority 
of the master who is not relieved from responsibility for the con-
duct and navigation of the ship1. Where a ship is being towed, the 
tug may be under the control of the person in charge of the tow 
and vice versa, depending on the circumstances of the case. An 
agent who is given wide authority as to the employment of the ship 
may be deemed to have sufficiBnt control of her within the mean-
ing of clause 4 (3) (d) @ and (iii). 
94. The Athalvictor [1946) P. '~2. 
95. Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Comth.), s. 14. 
96. Ibid., s. l~7. 
97. Ibid., s. 11, which pmvides that the propE~rty in an Aust-
ralian ship shall be divided into sixty-four shares. 
98. Rusden \/. (1868) L.R. 3 Ex. 269. 
99. A shipwright has a possessory lien on the ship for payment 
due for work done: Williams v. Allsupp (1861) 30 L.J.C.P. 353. 
1. Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), s. 4108. 
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One aspect of vicarious liability should be mentioned. It is 
true that stevedores, who undertake to load and unload cargo, act 
as independent contractors and do not have possession or control 
of the ship. They carry out the work under the control and dir-
ection of the ship's master or officer. If, during the stevedoring 
operations, someone is killed or injured because of improper sup-
ervision or default by the ship's master or officer, it is probable 
that a claim under this proposed head will lie. 
It is submitted that this proposed head should be enlarged to 
embrace seamen's claims arising under the Seamen's Compensation 
~ 1911 (Comth.) and various State workmen's compensation enact-
ments. 
(5) Claim for damages (including a claim for damages for economic 
2 loss).... The jurisdiction to be conferred under this proposed head 
will remedy a number of defects in common law if actions in tort 
for purely economic loss, e.g. loss of profit, are allowed. Here we 
are concerned with situations where no physical loss of or damage 
to property has occurred. It will be recalled that, as a policy of 
English common law, the tort of negligence does not provide a rem-
edy for a wrong resulting in purely economic loss.3 No difficulty, 
however, would arise if there is, in addition to economic loss, phy-
sical loss or damage as well~ 
An epoch-making exception to the general rule of English 
common law is made by the decision in Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. 
Ltd. \1. The Dredge "Willemstad": Although as a result of damage 
negligently caused to an oil-carrying pipeline purely economic loss 
was suffered by the plaintiff, who did not own the pipeline, the 
High Court unanimously found for him on the special facts of the 
case. Unless the scope of this decision is enlarged, entailing a 
change in substantive law, few claims for purely economic loss could 
2. Clause 4 (3) (da). 
3. D. Partlett, "Recovery of Economic Loss for Negligence in 
Australia'' (1980) 9 Syd. Law ~· 121; P.F. Cane, ''Recovery 
for purely Economic Loss in Australia" (1977) 93 1.:f1B.: 333; 
S. Thomson, Negligence and Economic Loss" (1977) 40 M.L.R. 
714. ---
4. See case where the plaintiffs succeeded in claiming for 
loss oL.profit and rJamage to machinery: S.C.M. CU.!~.) Ltd. 
v. W.J. Whittall & Son Ltd. [1970] 3 All E.R. 245 (C.A.). 
5. (1976) 51 A.L.J.R. 270. 
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be brought under this proposed head. Justice would be denied to 
innocent third parties who are victims of negligence. The anomaly 
is exemplified by Societe Anonyme de F~.A. Helice v. Bennetts? When 
the plaintiffs' tug was engaged under a contract in towing a ship, 
the defendant's steamship negligently collided with and sank Um 
tow. The collision did not cause any damage to the plaintiffs' tug 
or her equipment. The plaintiffs failed in their action to recover 
as damages the amount of towage remuneration which thEN would 
have earned if they had completed the towage operation. The 
reason was that the loss of such remuneration was not damage to 
the plaintiffs that 11\/as the direct consequence of the defendant's 
servants so as to be recoverable in law. 
This gap in the law is further highlighted by the facts of 
_Margarine Union G.m.b.H. v. Cambay Prince Co. Ltd? The plaintiff 
accepted delivery orders. At the port of discharge, the copra 
which was shipped in bulk was separated according to the quanti t-
ies stated in the delivery orders. Owing to the defendant ship-
owners' fault, the copra had been sedously contaminated by cock-
roaches during the voyage. In the action by the plaintiffs as hol-
ders of delivery orders, judgment was given for the shipowners. 
The court held that the plaintiffs were not owners or entitled to 
possession of the goods when the damage in question occurred. 
The fact that the risk of loss or damage was assumed by the plain-
tiffs was insufficient for the purpose. In effect they were unable 
to recover for an antecedent tort or for purely economic loss. 
It is felt that this proposed head of jurisdiction could be the 
answer in situations where the damage or loss sustairu~d has result-
ed from an indirect cause. Illustrations may be drawn from the 
facts of the two historic Privy Council decisions? Due to the 
spillage of fuel oil from a ship, extensive fire damage was caused 
to a wharf and four ships. The oil spillage was the ret3ult of neg-
ligence or default on the part of the clemisr::l charterers1 ~mr-
vants in the management of the ship. It is submitted that the 
6. [1911] 1 K.B. 2113. 
7. [1969] 1 Q.B. 219. 
8. The Wagon Mound (No. 1) [1961] A.C. 388: 
Z) [J.967] A.C. 617; sefJ also ChapLer Five..:...:......:::...::::..:=:.::..;_.;_;_;;;;:..:;;.:.;:.;;::. 
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owners of the wharf and the four ships damaged by fire should be 
able to institute proceedings iD.. I.§!!.! against the ship from which 
the spillage occurred. 
Unlike the Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.Y and its precedess-
ors,10 the Draft Admiralty Bill does not provide a head for claims 
for "damage received by a ship." To prevent a serious gap in the 
jurisdiction, it is desirable to construe this proposed head broadly. 
The purpose is to provide relief where the loss or damage suffered 
is not directly caused bv another ship as "the active cause". A good 
example of damage done bv a ship as an indirect cause is furnished 
bv The Minerva1.1 The elevator barge had completed discharging a 
grain cargo from the holds of the Norwegian steamship Minerva. 
Due to the negligence of the shipowners' servants in handling and 
using the ship's gear and to faults in such gear, the wire on the 
derrick broke. The ship's elevator and gear fell together, damag-
ing the elevator barge, her deck and her equipment. Bateson, J., 
allowed the appeal. He held that, as the plaintiffs' barge had re-
ceived damage and as parts of the defendants' ship had caused it, 
the action in r~1 was rightlv brought. Alternativelv, the claim 
could be brought under clause 4 (3) (da) as the damage sustained 
was connected with the discharge operation. 
At common law, actions in public nuisance mav be brought to 
recover damages in certain situations. Where special or particular 
damage is proved, e.g. as a result of obstruction bv or pollution 
from a ship, a claim for purelv economic loss should be allowed un-
12 der the proposed head. 
(6) Claim in the nature of salvage (including life salvage): 3 We 
have seen that under the statutes of Richard II salvage on the 
high seas was one of the areas reserved for the High Court of 
9. S. 20 (2) (B). 
10. Administration of Justice Act 1956 (U.K.), s. 1 (1) (_g); Admir-
alty Court Act 1840, s. 6. 
11. [1933] P. 224. 
12. See P.F.P., Higgins, .Elements of Torts in Australia (1970), 
QE.: cit., pp. 360-361. 
13. Draft Admiraltv Bill, clause 4 (3) (g). Cf. Supreme Court 
Act 1981 (U.K.), s. 20 (2) (j) which extends to salvage under 
the Civil Aviation Act 1949 (U.K.). 
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d . lt v, A rmea y. Tt1us with regard to salvage on the high seas this 
Court was able to exercise an exclusive jurisdiction, and to develop 
salvage law according to the dictates of public policy. In The , __ .....;:.. 
of Chester; 5 Sir William Brett, M.R., observed that the "large equity 
of Admiralty law" left the matter of salvage award very much at 
large and almost entirely in the discretion of the court. In explain-
ing the role of the Court, Street, J., pointed out that it looked 
"not merely to the exact quantum of the services to be performed 
but to the general interests of navigation and commerce of the 
country, which are generally protected by exertions of this nat-
ure."16 
Since the statutes of Richard II, there had been many historic 
developments in the nature and extent of the jurisdiction conferred 
on the High Court of Admiralty. For the first time, it was empower-
ed by section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act 1840 (Imp.) to adjudicate 
upon salvage claims whether the services arose within the body of a 
county or upon the high seas. The Wreck and Salvage Act 1846 
(Imp.)17 consolidated and amended the previous legislation ~n salvage. 
It invested the High Court of Admiralty with jurisdiction in broad 
terms by supplementing section 6 of the Admiralty Court Ac~ 1840 
(Imp.). Many of the uncertainties previously encountered were re-
moved. Section 40 of the 1846 Act (Imp.) gave tt1e Court a wide-rang-
ing jurisdiction to decide upon "all claims and demands whatsoever 
in the nature of salvage services performed ... whether in the case 
of ships or vessels, or of any goods or articles either at sea or 
cast upon the shore and whether such services shall have been per-
formed upon the high seas or within the body of any county." There 
were some doubts as to whether section 19 created a jurbdiction 
with regard to life salvage. When the law IAIBS later expanded by 
14. See Chapter One. 
15. (1884) 9 P.O. 182, p. 187. 
16. North Coast Steam Navigation Co. v. The Ship ''Eugene" (1909) 
9 N.S.W.S.R. 246, p. 250. 
17. (1846) 9 & 10 Vic., c. 99. 
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legislation to cope with the new facets of this fast-growing mari-
time business, a different approach to the problem of jurisdiction 
had to be found. Many aspects of the Wreck and Salvage Act 1846 
(Imp.) were consolidated and enlarged in the _Merchant Shipping Act 
1854 (Imp.) to give effect to what appears to be a new salvage pol-
icy. The latter Act (Imp.) conferred jurisdiction on the High Court 
of Admiralty in respect of claims for the salvage of life from any 
ship or boat provided that the services were rendered within the 
limits of the United Kingdom1.8 Section 9 of the f\dmiralty Court 
Act 1861 (Imp.) signified a further change in legislative policy to-
wards life salvage. It rendered all the provisions of the 1854 Act 
(Imp.) relating to life salvage applicable to the salvage of life from 
any British ship or boat in any port of the world. 
Australian colonies benefited from the developments in Imper-
ial salvage law. Under the Vice-Admiralty Courts Act 1863 (Imp.), Im-
perial courts in the colonies were empowered in general terms to 
adjudicate upon claims for the "salvage of any ship, or of life of 
goods therefrom."19 The move was part of the process for elevating 
the Vice-Admiralty Courts to the level of the High Court of Admir-
alty. The object was achieved as we have noted - under the Col-
onial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 (Imp.). 
In re-organising the Admiralty Courts in her Majesty's Domin-
ions, the Imperial Parliament appeared to have liberalised its life 
salvage policy. It implied that in appropriate cases payments out 
of the Mercantile Marine Funi0 could be made for the salvage of 
life in British waters and from British ships anywhere in the world 
even though the claims were actually dealt' with by a Colonial 
Court of Admiralty, in Australia. However, no award out of the 
British Mercantile Marine Fund could be made in respect of the sal-
vage of life from non-British ships in Australian waters~ 1 By reason 
18. See ss. 458 and 460. 
19. s. 10 (4). 
20. Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (Imp.), s. 459; 1 B94 Act (Imp.), 
s. 544 (3). 
21. See 1854 Act (Imp.), s. 458; 1891~ Act (Imp.), s. 544 (1). As t;o 
reward for purely life salvage, see Navigation Act 1912-73 
(Comth. ), s. 315, being first introduced by Navigation Act 
(Comth.)-(1\lo. 36 of 1958), ~3. 1')7. 
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of the Interpretation Act 1889 (U.I-<./2 the repeal of the 1854 Act 
(Imp.) and the re-enactment of similar life salvage provisions in the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) will leave intact the jurisdiction 
conferred under section 9 of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 (Imp.). 
Today Australian courts administer salvage law based on jurisdic-
tions derived from Imperial Actl3 and Commonwealth legislation~4 
In consolidating the salvage provisions of the 1854 Act (Imp.) the 
i"lerchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.) has, in many instances, failed to 
include Colonial Courts of Admiralty as the competent tribunals for 
administering salvage law. So far as Australian courts are concern-
ed, the difficulties were removed when the Navigation Act 1912-73 
(Comth.) re-enacted with modification the salvage provisions of the 
1894 Act (Imp.). Section 565 has been reproduced almost verbatim as 
section 328 of the Commonwealth Act~5 It empowers ~::very State 
Supreme Court,including every Court in a State having admiralty 
jurisdiction_. to entertain "all claims whatsoever relating to salvage, 
wherever the services ... were performed, and wherever the wreck .. .is 
found." 
Section 405A of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth .) is a re-
enactment of section 29 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (U.K.). 
It does not authorise proceedings in ~ in respect of any claim 
against the Commonwealth or a State, or the arrest, detention or 
sale of a ship, cargo or other property belonging to the Common-
wealth or a State. However, in exceptional circumstances, the 
court may permit proceedings in £.!ill!, which have been instituted, to 
continue as proceedings in personam against the Commonwealth, a 
State or some person designated by court. 
22. By section 38 (1), where any Act passed after the Interpret-
ation Act 1889 "repeals and re-enacts, with or without modif-
ication, any provisions of a former Act, references in any 
other Act to the provisions so repealed, shall.. .be construed 
as references to the provisions so re-enacted." 
23 . .£.J:h_f\drniralty Court Act 1840 (Imp.), s. 6; Admiralty Court 
f\ct 1861 (Imp.), s. 9; Colonial Courts oF Admiralty l\ct 1890 (Imp.). 
214. Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), Part VII. 
25. As amended by [\Javigation Amendment Act 1980 (Comth. ), s. 
88; see also Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), Part VII on 
wrecks and salvage. 
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At present, there is no Commonwealth legislation \Aihich ex-
pressly protects salvors against the consequences of their neglig-
ence.26 The House of Lords decision in The Tojo Marl7 indicates 
that situations could exist where the liability of salvors may be 
limited. The limitation of liability under the Navigation Act 1912-73 
.78 (Comth.), as amendeD, may apply where the loss or damage caused 
is the result of negligence in the management or navigation of a 
salving tug or the default of anv person on board the tug. 
It is submitted that this proposed head should be construed to 
cover two broad aspects of salvage. The first aspect concerns 
claims by salvors who have rendered services in preventing or red-
ucing spillage of oil or other noxious substances from any ship or 
tanker. In making the award, the Court should also assume jurisdic-
tion in considering the extent and nature of tt-18 pollution damage 
averted and the clean-up expenses avoided. The second concerns 
not only the issue of salvorial negligence but also salvors' right to 
limit their liability in certain circumstances. 
(7) Claim arising out of an agreement that relates to the carriage 
of. goods or persons by a ship or to the use or hire of a shie, 
whether by charterparty or otherwise~9 Except for the inclusion 
of carriage of persons, this proposed head resembles section 20 (2) 
Cb2 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.). This widely-worded draft 
provision has the advantage of covering most claims arising out of 
contracts of carriage, even though no physical loss or damage is 
caused to the goods carried or to be carried. 
Under this proposed head, passengers may recover damages 
for breach of contract of carriage. Thus a breach may arise if 
26. Cf. Merchant Shipping Act 1979 (U.K.), Schedule 4, Part I, 
Article 2 para. 1 (a) and (c). 
27. [1971] 1 All E.R. 1110. 
28. Navigation Amendment Act 1979 (Comth.), s. 65 (1 ). 
29. Clause 4 (3) (f) as to claims for actual physical loss or dam-
age, see the next head. 
584 
there is failure to provide the services undertaken or unreasonable 
delay in the ship's d~warture.. It appears that, for an action in 
!::§!!!..to be brought, it is immaterial whether the breach of contract 
or act of negligence is committed by the shipowner, carrier, chart-
3D 
erer or an employee of any such person. 
A bill of lading endorsee for value will usually suffer by 
acting in reliance on the bill of lading statements that the goods 
are shipped in apparent good condition when in fact they are not. 
At common law, a shipowner or carrier, who issues a clean bill of 
lading in a fraudulent manner, will be estopped by admissions con-
tained therein~ 1 Also situations may be envisaged where goods de-
livered to a shipowner or carrier are shipped only after undue de-
lay, forwarded to the wrong destination or delivered after an un-
justified deviation in the voyage.32 It is submitted that the breach 
committed or loss inflicted by the shipowner or carrier in such cir-
cumstances should entitle cargo claimants to institute proceedings 
under this proposed head. 
The The St Elefterio;3 the English court had to contrue the 
scope of section 1 (1) (h) of the Administration of Justice /-\ct 1956 
(U.K.), which is re-enacted in section 20 (2) (b) of the 1981 Act (U.K.). 
The facts are rather unusual. For a cargo of cattle cake put on 
board, the charterer received bills of lading which were wrongly 
antedated. The charterer, as shipper, sold and endorsed in blank 
the documents to the plaintiffs who in turn resold them to the pur-
chasers. Upon discovering that the goods were not in fact shipped 
on the dates specified in the bills of lading, the purchasers reject-
ed the goods. In an attempt to recover the loss expected to arise, 
30. It submitted that the action will lie where an agreement 
is breached even though no goods are actually shipped or 
no persons are carried physically. 
31. At times a shipowner or carrier willing to issue to a 
shipper a clean bill of lading m;en though the goods are not 
in good condition provided the shipper gives him an indem-
nity against any claim by the endorsee of the bill of lading: 
Silver v. Ocean S.S. Co. [1930] 1 I~.B. 416. 
32. As to consequences of unjustifiecj deviation, see Sir A. 
Abraham, M. Mustill and S. Boyd, Scrutton on Charterparties 
.and Bills of Lading (19th ed. 1984), op. cit., pp. 259-267; 452-
454. - --
33. [1957] P. J79. 
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the plaintiffs, as one~time holders of the documents, brought the 
action in !:§!!l against the ship. In giving judgment for the plaintiffs, 
Will mer, J., took a broad view of the words of section 1 (1) (h) of the 
1956 Act (U.K.). He held that thev were wide enough to cover claims 
arising out of anv agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a 
ship, whether such claim was founded on contract or tort. 
The wording of the proposed head is capable of dealing with 
most of the problems faced by Australian cargo importers. Proceed-
ings in ~may be instituted by cargo claimants, irrespective of 
whether they are holders of bills of lading, combined transport doc-
uments or merely shipping receipt~4 It is immaterial whether the 
cargo loss or damage occurs on an in-coming or out-going ship. The 
anomaly highlighted in F. Kanematsu and Companv Ltd. v. The Ship 
"Shahzada"35 will be eliminated. 
We now turn to the second limb of the cjraft provision, viz. 
"agreement relating to the use or hire of a ship." Its scope, as 
explained in several cases, tends to be comprehensive. In The Queen 
pf the South~6 the plaintiffs, as watermen, instituted an action i!l 
rem against the ship to recover £290 for services rendered to her 
in the River Thames. It was established that under the agreement 
between the plaintiffs and the ship's managers services were rend-
ered bv the use of the former's motor boats suitably manned for 
the work to be done. Under section 8 (1) of the Administration of 
.Justice Act 1956 (U.K.), a "ship" included a motor boat. Brandon, J., 
held that the plaintiffs' claim was well founded within section 1 (1) 
(b) of the Act. 
In The Conoco Britannia,37 Brandon, J., refused to construe 
the meaning of the words "relating to the use or hire of a ship" 
merely in terms of the carriage of goods in a ship. He held that 
34. See Chapter Six. In The Ship "Marlborough 11ill" v. Alex, 
Cowan and Sons Ltd. [1921] 1 A.C. 444, the Privy Council 
held that a document acknowledging receipt of goods for 
shipment was a bill of lading within the meaning of Admiral-
ty Court Act 1861 (Imp.), s. 6. It would probablv be held 
otherwise if it was found that none of the goods had in 
fact been received on board. 
35. (1956) 30 A.L.J. 478, p. 482, per Taylor, J.1 ...--~..----
36. [1968] P.j.49. 
37. [1972] 2 All E.R. 238. 
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the words in the ordinary and natural sense are "amply wide enough 
. n38 to cover the case of the htre of a tug under a towage contract. 
If the decision is good law, there is an overlap between this prop-
osed head and clause t~ (3) (j):9 
The second limb of the draft provision, if adopted, could red-
ress an unusual defect in the law as disclosed in the Queensland 
case of Larsen v. The Ship "Nieuw Holland"~0 The ship arrived at 
the port of Brisbane. After the termination of her employment as 
shopkeeper on board, the plaintiff was prevented by customs off-
icers and ship's officers from removing certain plant, equipment and 
stock-in-trade belonging to her. In her action against the ship and 
her owner claiming the return of the goods or the sum of £2,195, a 
writ was issued but was later set aside. The appeal to the Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland was dismissed on the 
ground that the Court had rm jurisdiction to entertain the claim. 
In the single judgment delivered by Philip, J., the t'llords "goods carr-! 
ied in any ship" in section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 (Imp.) 
were held to refer" only to goods carried as cargo," 41 as to which 
the shipowner has a duty as carrier. His view is correct in that it 
was not the Legislature's intention to allow a passenger, or person 
in the plaintiff's situation, to bring an action in ~ where her 
camera or chattels were detained. It appears that the plaintiff's 
claim could come within the second part of the proposed head. 
(8) Claim for loss of, or damage to, goods carried by a shie.42 This 
is in substance a re-statement of part of section 2 (1) of the _Coun-
ty Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Amendment Act_ 1869 (U.K.). For 
Australia, the enactment of this draft provision is imperative. The 
wording has a number of distinct advantages to offer. Provided 
that the goods lost or damaged have in fact been put on board or 
38. Ibid., p. 242. 
39. Clause 4 (3) 
s. 20 (Z) (k). 
corresponds to Suereme Court Act 1981 (U.K.), 
40. [1957] St. R. CJd. 606. 
41. Ibid., p. 615. 
42. Clause 4 (3) (g), in pari materia with Supreme Court Act 1981 
(U.I'\.), s. 20 (2) (g). The term 'rgoods", however, is defined in 
s. 24 (1) to include "baggage". 
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shipped, a cargD-O\,'Iiner should be able to invoke the in DllJl juris-
diction. It is immaterial that the contract of carriage is not evid-
enced by a bill of lading but by some other shipping document. 
Equally irrelevant is the consideration that the cargo or dam-
age has occurred on board a ship while sailing out of an Australian 
port or that one or more of her owners are domiciled in Australia. 
The anomalies of the law as highlighted by the unjust decisions in 
Co-operated Dried Fried Fruit Sales Pty. Ltd. v. The Ship "Terukawa 
_Maru" 43 and The Victoria 44 will be rectified. 
This proposed head has other ad\/antages. It will gi\/e effect to the 
classic reasoning on which the decision of the Full Court of the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales in J. Gadsden Pty. and Another 
\1. Australian Coastal Shipping Commission45 was based. Although by 
Article III rule 6 of the Hague Rules scheduled to the Sea-Carriage 
of Goods Act 1924-73 (Comth.), the claim of the plaintiffs, as cargo 
consignees, was time-barred, they were permitted to enforce their 
right founded on tort by proceedings in ~· The sound reasoning 
applied there will be strengUmned by the draft provision when en-
acted as law. 
In today's maritime business, ships are often chartered or 
sub-chartered to different persons. The draft pro\/ision has a 
wide scope. Irrespecti\/e of whether the immediate charterer or the 
sub-charterer is the carrier under the contract of carriage made 
with any shipper, a cargo claimant should be entitled to institute 
proceedings in !:.§!.!:! against the carrying ship. This right should 
apply despite the express inclusion of the shipowner in the definition of 
43. [1972] 46 A.L.J.R. 357, supra. 
44. (1887) 12 P.O. 105. This decision has exemplified a notorious 
inadequacy of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 (Imp.), s. 7. It 
was held that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain 
an action !:.§!!l. by cargo owners against the carrying ship 
for damage caused to goods by her negligent collision. The 
damage caused was not regarded as "damage" within the 
meaning of s. 7. 
45. (1977) 31 F.L.R. 157, supra. 
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"carril!r". It is very likely tl1at the same reasoning will hold under 
the HamtJurg Rules. It should be immaterial whether the carrier or 
actual carTier is al~3o tt1e shipowner himself. The word "carrier" in 
Artie lr~ I rule 1 and the term "actual carrier" in Article 1 rule 2 are 
not defined to include the shipowner .46 
The meaning of the words "carried in a ship" is decisive wt1ere 
the loss or damage occurs while the goods are in a lighter or barge 
before being loaded on board the carrying ship or after their dis-
charge from such a ship. It is submitted ~hat where the lighter or 
barge is provided by the carrier in fulfilment of the contract of 
carriage the loss or damage is deemed to have been sustained by 
the "goods carried in a ship". A lighter or barge, "not ordinarily 
propelled by oars only," will come within the meaning of section 6 
(1) of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.). The facts of the Hague 
Rules case of East and West Steamship Company v. Hossain Brother~' 7 
are relevant. After the bales of cotton had been discharged from 
the tackle of the carrying ship into a lighter provided by the 
carrier, they were damaged by rainwater. The carrier was held lia-
ble for the damage sustained on the ground that the lighter with-
out a fixed roof was unseaworthy for the carriage of tea. The car-
go claimant should be allowed to bring an action in r~ against the 
carrying ship, as the lighter was of little value. 
(9) Claim in respect of general average.1~8 In Birkley v. Pregrave, 
Lawrence, J., is wellknown for his pronouncement couched in these 
words:49 
"All loss which arises in consequence of extraordinary 
sacrifices made or expenses incurred for the preserva-
tion of the ship and cargo comes within general average, 
and must be borne proportionately by all who are inter-
ested." 
The definition of "general average act" as adopted by both the 
46. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Year-
book, (1978), val. IX, p. 212; for definition of "carrier" in the 
Hague Rules, see Article 1 (a). 
47. [1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 145. 
L,8. Clause '• (3) (b). 
49. (1801) 1 East 220, p. 238. 
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United Kingdom's and Commonwealth legislation on marine insurance50 
is identical. A clear meaning of the term is presented in Rule A of 
the York-Antwerp Rules 197'• which are often incorporated into con-
tracts of carriage.51 
For reasons of legal history, general average law was adminis-
tered as part of common law.52 Just over three decades ago, claims 
for general average contributions fell outside the English Admiralty 
Court. The inclusion of the "general average" claim in section 1 (1) 
[g) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 (U.K.) was due largely 
to the United Kingdom's adoption of the 1952 Arrest Convention.53 
In practice, however, there will little need for suits to be 
instituted under this proposed head. Where any extraordinary sac-
rifice involving cargo or any part of the ship is made, nr any gener-
al average expenses are incurred during the voyage, the shipowner 
has a possessory lien on the goods saved for general average con-
tributions due?4 He will be able to detain the goods until adequate 
security, e.g. a Lloyd's average bond or bank guarantee, has been 
furnished by the owners!5 The security is given as an undertaking 
by cargo owners to pay their share of general average contribution 
when the adjustment is completed. Moreover, at common law, a ship-
owner is bound to exercise his authority for the protection of all 
merchants, including himself, entitled to receive contributions. 
50. Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) (6 Edw. VII, c. lt1), s. 66 (1) 
and (2); Marine Insurance Act 1909-73 (Comth.), s. 72 (1) and 
(2). 
51. Rule A is a re-enactment of its 1950 precedessor. See Sir A. 
Mocatta, M. Mustill and S. Boyd, Scrutton on Charterparties 
and Bills of Ladins (19th ed. 1984), QE.- cit., pp. 276-288. For 
further information on the subject, see generally Lowndes 
and Rudolf, General Average (10th ed. 1975). 
52. Pirie & Co. \J. Middle Dock Co. (1881) 44 L.T. 426, p. 429, 
Williams, J. 
53. Article 1 (1) (g). 
54. Crooks v. Allan (1879) 5 Q.B.D. 38. This lien was held to pre-
vail over the claim under an earlier respondentia bond: 
Cargo Ex Galam (1B63) 2 Moo. P.C. (N.S.) 216. 
55. See 1\J. Hudson, "New Forms for General Average Security11 , 
[1977] 4 L.M.C.L.Q. 501; J. Crump, "General Average, Salvage 
and the Contract of Affreightment", [1985] 1 L.M.C.L.Q. 19. 
590 
There is another reason why shipowners rarely need to invoke 
this proposed head of jurisdiction. Since the goods carried are us-
ually covered by quasi -negotiable bills of lading, they may change 
hands after the general average sacrifice or loss has occurred. 
The persons liable for contribution are owners of the goods saved 
at the time of such a sacrifice or loss?6 However, it appears that 
purchasers to whom the goods are subsequent! y assigned will only be 
answerable for the contribution if the bills of lading contain an app-
ropriate contractual stipulation to that effect. It is submitted that, 
irrespective of whether or not the liability to contribute is trans-
ferred to subsequent purchasers, shipowners are able to enforce 
payment of the contributions by exercising their possessory lien. 
This proposed head will undoubtedly be of benefit to cargo 
owners who are entitled to general average contributions. At com-
mon law, they may sue the shipowner or the other cargo owners? 
But common law proceedings could be abortive. Often the shipowner 
may not be within the court's jurisdiction. The subsequent cargo 
purchasers, as bill of lading holders, may not be liable to contrib-
ute. These problems can be overcome if a general average claimant 
is able to institute proceedings in .r.:gm against the ship and the 
goods on board which are liable to contribute. 
(10) Claim in the nature of towage of a ship:s An identical provision 
first appeared in section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act 1840 (Imp.). 
It applied whether the services were rendered within the body of a 
county or on the high seas. Today, towage agreements are often 
entered into based on the United Kingdom Standard Condition~9 A 
towage may turn out to be more onerous than expected at the time 
of the contract. For instance, the vessel towed may be much larger 
than at first understood, or extra work in the nature of salvage 
has to be performed. These factors could change the character of 
the services rendered from towage to salvage?0 If both towage and 
56. Hain S.S. Co. v. Tate & Lyle (1936) 41 Com. Cas. 350. 
57. Stranq v. Scott (1889) 14 A.C. 601. 
58. Clause 4 (3) (j). 
59. See e.g. Federal Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. J. Fenwick & 
Co. Pty. Co. (1943) 68 C.L.R. 553. 
60. The "Cartella" v. The "Inverness Shire'' (1916) 21 C.L.R. 387. 
In The Leoborg [1962] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 146, it was held that a 
claim in the nature of towage extended to escorting services 
provided by a tug from outside a port into a port. 
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salvage operations are alleged to have been performed, it would 
obviouslv be necessarv to split the claims so that thev can be 
brought under the appropriate heads, i.e. in clause 4 (3) (e) and (j). 
Todav it is common for parts of oil rigs, building structures, 
dredges, beacons, drilling machinerv, diving and exploration gear 
and other equipment to be strapped onto water-borne platforms. 
These weight-bearing floats are transported across water bv towing. 
It is submitted that Australian courts should be invested with ad-
miraltv jurisdiction to entertain claims involving the towage of such 
objects,even though thev are not ships.61 
(11) Claim for the pilotage of a ship62 It seems strange that jur-
isdiction over "claims in respect of pilotage" was conferred under 
the Vice-Admiraltv Courts Act 1863 (lmp.f3 though not given under 
the Admiralty Court Acts (Imp.), 1840 and 1861. A plausible explana-
tion is that in earlv law both towage and pilotage were treated bv 
the High Court of Admiraltv as giving rise to maritime liens.64 As it 
purportedlv had jurisdiction over such claims, legislative provision 
was not regarded necessarv. Vice-Admiraltv Courts, on the other 
hand, had to be expresslv invested with the jurisdiction in order to 
enforce pavment of dues imposed bv colonial enactments for comp-
ulsorv pilotage in the ports and harbours.65 At present, marine 
boards and harbour authorities in Australia are empowered bv State 
legislation to require the use of, and pavment for, pilotage services 
provided in the districts under their jurisdiction.66 For a claim to 
61. For definition of "ship", see Draft Admiralty Bill, clause 3 
(1); cf. Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.), s. 24 (1). 
62. Clause 4 (3) (k). 
63. s. 10 (3). 
64. See D. Thomas, Maritime Liens (1980), QE· cit., pages 16-17. 
65. See, ~ Shipping and Pilotage Consolidation Ordinance (18 
Vic. No. 15) (W.A.), ss. 7 and 8; Marine Board and Navigation 
Act 1881 (S.A.), Part V. As to the historv of English Pilotage 
law, see G.K. Green and R.P. Douglas, The Law of Pilotage (2nd 
ed. 1983), chap. 1. 
66. Express provisions are found in the Marine Act 1976 (Tas.), 
Part XII; Marine Act 1958 (Vic.), Part V Div. 3; Queensland 
Marine Act 1958, Part VIII; Shipping and Pilotage Act (W.A.) 
(No. 17 of 1967). The Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), s. 410 
B deals with the liabilitv of the master and owner of the ship 
while un_der pilotage., · 
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.. 
be brought under this proposed head, it should not be necessary 
for compulsory pilotage services to have been rendered. Probably 
what is required is that a pilot has been employed on a ship to dir-
ect her course in or out of a port or harbour in some way. 
(12) Claim in respect of goods, materials or services (including 
stevedoring and lighterage services) supplied to a ship for its oper-
.ation or maintenance. This proposed head in clause 4 (3) (!!!) is 
broader in scope than sections 4 and 5 of the ,Admiralty Court Act 
1861 (Imp.) taken together, and also section 20 (2) (m) of the Supreme 
Court Act 1981 (U.K.). The onerous conditions to be met in sections 
4 and 5 of the 1861 Act (Imp.) are no part of the draft provision. 
We saw that by adopting a wide construction for "necessaries" 
Australian judges were able to give effect to a larger number of the 
claims of materials men.67 Hmvever, jurisdiction should not be confused 
with the underlying principle of law. Although a great variety of 
things supplied to ships68 are capable of qualifying as necessaries, 
no suit in ~can be successfully brought unless the shipowner, as 
distinct from the charterer, is liable to pay for them~9 Another 
requirement to be met is that the goods or materials must have 
been supplied for the operation or maintenance of the ship. 
Obviously provisions for crew, stores, medical supplieJ0 and what-
ever engine parts required to render the ship seaworthy would gen-
erally come within the rule. 
The term "services" will embrace a range of operations relat-
ing to cargo, ~ loading, stowing, discharge, transhipment and 
67. Christie v. The Ship "Karu" (1927) 27 S.R. (N.S.W.) 443, p. 446; 
Lewmarine Pty. Ltd. v. The Ship "1-\aptayanni" [1974] V.R. 465. 
68. Including, e.g. bunker or oil as in The D'Vora [1952] 2 All 
E.R. 1127 or Shell Oil Company v. The Ship "Lastrigoni" [1974] 
48 A.L.J.R. 295; nuts and bolts as in LeiAJmarine Pty. Ltd. v. 
The Ship "Kaptayanni" [1974] V .R. 465. 
69. Shell Oil Company v. The Ship "Lastrigoni" [1974] 48 A.L.J.R. 295; 
The Turgot (1886) 11 P.O. 21. 
70. Rendered obligatory under the Navigation Act 1912-73 
(Comth.), Part II, Divs. 13 and 14. 
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lighterage, inspection or survey of a ship, whether to comply with 
statutory provisions or otherwise, and other work done?1 Claimants 
seeking payment in respect of such services include stevedores, 
lightermen, statutory authorities, ship surveyors and possibly freight 
forwarders. Their right to institute proceedings in ~ will depend 
on the two requirements being met. It is uncertain whether, under 
this proposed head, the court will entertain an action in !Jill.~ against 
a ship merely for breach by her owner of an executory agreement to 
obtain supply of goods or services. 
(13) Claim in respect of construction, alteration, repair or equipping 
of a ship:2 Some doubts may be entertained as to whether a ship-
building contract is an agreement to sell the ship or an agreement 
for work and materials?3 In the former situation, an unpaid ship-
builder will be unable to bring a claim under the draft provision. For 
the purpose of the proposed admiralty jurisdiction, it is vital that a 
shipbuilding contract should not be construed merely as a transac-
tion governed by the sale of goods legislation. Diplock, J., as he 
then was, in McDougall v. Aeromarine of Emsworth Ltd. correctly 
pointed out the twofold aspect when he said?4 
"[I]t seems well settled by authority that although a ship-
building contract is in form a contract for the construc-
tion of the vessel, it is in law a contract for the sale of 
goods." 
In practice an unpaid shipbuilder or shipwright will only need 
to invoke the jurisdiction after he has parted with possession of the 
ship:s Otherwise the common law lien, based on his possession of the 
71. Research Paper No. 1 - An Australian Admiralty Act; The 
.Ambit of Admiralty Jurisdiction, QE. cit., pp. 198-199; see also 
Dr. S. Cigoj, "Legal Relations of Stevedores in Comparative 
Law", [1975] 3 L.M.C.L.Q. 296. 
72. The simplification effected under clause 4 (3) (!:!) has resulted 
in the removal, of claims for dock charges and dues to be 
covered under the next head. Cf. Supreme Court Act 1981 
(U.f\.), s. 20 (2) (n). 
73. In Cammell Lavid & Co. Ltd. v. Manganese Bronze & Brass Co. 
Ltd. [1934] A.C. 402, a contract for the construction of two 
ship propellers was held to be an agreement for the sale of 
goods; see Dr. M. Clarke, "In Consideration of Building Ships", 
[1981] 2 L.C.M.L.Q. 234; Dr. S. Mankalady, "Shipbuilding Con-
tracts", [1983] 3 L.C.M.L.Q. 477, pp. 479-480. 
74. [1958] 3 All E.F~. 1,31, p. 436. 
75. As to the passing of property in the ship to buyer and the 
position under the shipbuilding contract normally adopted 
by the Associotion of Western European Shipbuilders, see 
Dr. M. Clarke, Shipbuilding Contracts (1982), c~1apter 4 and 
page 158. 
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ship, will provide adequate protection?6 It is submitted that, under 
this proposed head, a claim for alteration, repair or equipment of a 
ship cannot lie unless the shipowner, as distinct from the charterer, 
is liable to pay for it. 
(14) Claim in respect of a liability for port, harbour, canal or light 
tolls,77 charges or dues, or tolls, charges or dues of a like nature 
in respect of a ship. Clause 4 (3) (o) differs from section 20 (2) (n) 
of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.) in one important way. It sets 
out the various types of liability which a port authority, harbour 
board or statutory body may impose on a ship for services or facil-
ities provided. The object no doubt is to raise revenue. Unfortun-
ately, the variety of terms used in different State enactments to 
achieve the purpose tends to be confusing?8 Often it is impossible 
to denote accurately all forms of liability created by legislation. 
An Australia-wide policy should be formulated to ensure uniformity. 
Courts are less concerned with semantic labels than with the 
nature of the liability. This approach to the problem is seen in 
Newman & Dale v. Lamport & Holt?9 The charterers of a ship exer-
cised the option, reserved to them upon payment of port charges, 
76. In The Tergeste [1903] P. 26, it has been held that, from 
the time of a ship's entry into dry dock, a shipwright's lien 
ranks in priority to the maritime lien of the crew and the 
master. 
77. Light due is payable under the Lighthouses Act 1911 (Comth.). 
78. Notable examples are found in Marine Act 1976 (Tas), ss. 74 
seg.; Marine Act 1958 (Vic.), ss. 257, et. seq., as amended; 
Queensland Marine Act 1958, ss. 171~. 219, 243 QJ2 and (j1 
79. [1896] 1 Q.B. 20. In Societa Anonima U.A.M. v. Hamburg S.A. 
S.S. Co. (1912) 106 L.T. 957, under the charterparty, the char-
terer was bound to pay "all dues and duties on the cargo and 
the steamer to pay all port charges, pilotages, as cus-
tomary." The court held that the dues paid were not "dues 
and duties on the cargo'' but were "port charges". 
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of unloading part of the goods at D. When the ship entered the 
Port of London, the whole of the lig~1t dues up to and including 
Leith became payable. Without such a de\Jiation, the shipowners 
would be answerable for the light dues at Leith. The charterers 
avoided detention of the ship in the Port of London by paying the 
light dues. They regarded light dues as different from port charg-
es which were payable by them, and claimed to offset them against 
the freight. The court gave judgment for the shipowners by hold-
ing that the light dues were charges. . 
Obviously the outcome of any proceedings brought under this 
proposed head will depend largely on the particular port or harbour 
legislation. If the ship as a ~ is answerable for the tolls, charges 
or dues imposed, it is no defence that under the charterparty some 
person other than the shipowner is personally liable therefor. 
Proceedings in rem may be instituted against the ship. 
(15) Claim in respect of a ship, including a shipping levy imposed by 
the Protection of the Sea (Shipping Levy) Act 1961 ... ~0 Levy on 
ships, which is the creation of Commonwealth legislation,81 has been 
considered in Chapter Five. 
Under the Protection of the Sea (Shipping Levy Collection Act 
1981 (Comth.), recovery of levy due is effected by detention and 
sale of the goods or equipment belonging to the ship82 and also by 
detention of the ship.83 Since the Act (Comth.) does not empower 
the Collecto~4 to sell the ship under detention, this proposed head 
will supplement the enforcement mechanism. In the final analysis, 
the levy due may be paid out of the proceeds of sale of the ship 
ordered by court. 
(16) Claim by a master, shipper, charterer or agent in respect of 
disbursements on account of a ship.85 Section 1 (1) (p) of the 
80. Clause 4 (3) (p). 
81. Pollution of the Sea by Oil (Shippins Levy) Act 1972 (Comth.) 
and Pollution of the Sea by Oil (Shipping Levy Collection) 
Amendment Act 1979 (Comth.) repealed by Protection of the 
,~:lea (Shipping Levy Collection) Act 1981 (Comth.), s. 3. See 
also Protection of the Sea by Oil (Shipping Levy) Act 1981 
(Comth.). 
82. S. 11 (Z). 
83. S. 12 (1). -For penalty imposed, see s. 12 (2). 
84. He is the Collector for the purposes of the Lighthouses Act 
1911 (Comth.). 
05. Clause 4 (3) (q).\ 
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Administration of Justice Act 1956 (U.K.)86 contained an identical 
provision. It has been reproduced yerbatim in section 20 (2) (p) of 
the Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.). When given effect, this proposed 
head will rectify a number of anomalies in Australian admiralty law. 
One serious difficulty faced by creditors in maritime law is 
the tendency of courts to place a narrow construction on the auth-
ority of persons who act as the shipowner's agent. In the Victorian 
case of The "Albion""87 a person advanced money to pay off and dis-
charge a crew for insubordination. His suit in the Vice-Admiralty 
Court brought under section 10 (2) of the 1863 Act (Imp.) failed. The 
reason was that at the time when the advance was made another 
person was officially in charge of the ship as master. In the South 
Australian case of The Louise Roth~8 the chief mate had the ship 
seized by the Marshall of the Admiralty Court. The purpose was to 
enforce claims for, inter alia, disbursements for the ship's supplies 
and payments made by him to the crew for overtime. For a number 
of reasons his claims failed. Under maritime law, a mate had no lien 
for disbursements made by him. Moreover, it was also held that the 
Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a mate's claim for 
wages paid to the crew~9 
It is submitted that the person who advances money or incurs 
liability on account of the ship should be allowed to enforce his 
claim under this proposed head. Although he not the ship's mas-
ter, he should be permitted to institute proceedings in ~ in his 
capacity as an agent. The inclusion of "shipper" and "charterer" 
in the draft provision is a far-sighted measure. It takes cogniz-
ance of the fact that a shipper or charterer has a connection with 
the ship and that he may, in appropriate situations, incur liability 
on account of the ship. Lllhat is unclear is lfllhether a claim can be 
brought if, as a result of certain compulsion, "disbursements'' are 
made by a shipper, charterer or agent on account of the ship. To 
86. As to extent of repeal, see Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.),; 
Schedule 7. 
87. (1872) 3 V.L.R. 1. 
88. [1905} S.A.L.R. 107. 
89. The Victoria 37 L.J. Adm. 12. 
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take delivery of goods, a shipper or charterer may be compelled to 
pay freight dues or certain rates which are by law imposed on the 
carrying vessel. Otherwise the goods may be indefinitely detained 
by port or harbour officials. In such instances, the payments are 
not made on the request of the shipowner or master. 
We saw that section 1 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1889 (Imp.) 
gave the ship's master a maritime lien in respect of "disbursements 
properly made" and "liabilities properly incurred by him on account 
of the ship." Unfortunately, in The "Castlegate";o the House of 
Lords adopted a narrow construction of the words "disbursments on 
account of the ship." For disbursemr·mts for which a master was not 
authorised to pledge the owner's credit, the section was t1eld not to 
confer on the former a maritime lien on the ship. Consequently no 
lien could attach to the frBiCJht. 
At the international level, difficulties in obtaining credit fac-
ilities and defects in admiralty law must have contributed to the 
formulation of Article I paragraph (n) of the 1952 Arrest Convention. 
It reads: 
"'Maritime Claim' means a claim arising out of one of the 
following: 
Master's disbursements, including disbursements made by 
shippers, charterers or agents on behalf of a ship or her 
owner." 
The provision was modified, reworded and given effect in the repeal-
ed section 1 (1) (E2 of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 (U.K.). 
g1 In The Westport, it was held that under the section an agent could 
include agency fees in the charge for disbusements made by him on 
account of the ship. 
One questions .the wisdom of the observation made by the Aus-
tralian Law Reform Commission in the following terms: 
"It is less clear that disbursements should extend beyond 
the current definition of payments made 'on account of 
the ship' ." 92 
90. [1893] A.C. 38. 
91. [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 31.2. Based on the decision in The Fair-
port (No. 5) [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 162, it is submitted that 
there is no reason why advances made by the charterer, 
shipper or agent on account of the ship should not be 
recoverable as disbursements within the Supreme Court 
Act 1981 flJ.K.), s. 20 (2) ..(E2. 
92. Research Paper No. 1 - An Australian Admiralty Act; The 
Ambit of Admiralty Jurisdiction, 9.£· cit., p. 190. 
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The wide range of situations covered by this proposed head will 
provide the answer to many of the problems currently encountered 
by both shipowners and financiers. Even where a ship's master is 
unable to recover the advances made or liability incurred as dis-
bursements under section 94 (2) of the Navigation Act 1912-73 
(Comth.), he may have the alternative of proceedin~J i!J rem under 
this proposed head. 
(17) Claim for an unpaid premium or other like amount due in respect 
of the insurance of the shiJ:3 This proposed head will provide a 
significant remedy for a centuried defect in the law of Australia. 
It will be a far-reaching reform consistent with the increasing im-
portance of marine insurance in modern shipping. 
In The Andre Theodore94 it was held that an insurance was not 
a necessary for i:J ship. Accordingly, neither tile broker nor the 
underwriter could proceed i!]_ rem under section 6 of the Admiralty 
Court Act 1840 (Imp.) against a foreign ship for premiums. Also, as 
we have seen, in the New South Wales case of Stokes and Others v. 
The Conference~5 the ship's agent was unable to recover the prem-
ium he had paid at the sllipowner's request for the insurance upon 
the ship and the freight. Under the existing law and insurance prac-
tice, the gap is a problem not so much for underwriters as for 
brokers. 
Sections 58 to 60 of the Marine Insurance Act 1909-73 (Comth.) 
which concerns the payment of premium are in pari materia with 
sections 52 to 54 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.I'\.). Baylm;, J., 
in Power v. Butcher96 explained the position in tt1ese words: 
"According to the ordinary course of trade between the 
assured, the broker and the underwriter, the assured does 
not in the first instance pay the premium to the broker, 
nor does the broker pay it to the underwriter. But, as 
between the assured and the underwriter, the premiums 
are considered as paid. The underwriter .. .tcmks to the 
broker for payment, and he to the assured. 11 
93. Clause 4 (3) (r). 
94. (1904) 10 Asp. M.C. 94. 
95. (1887) 8 N.S.W.R. 10. It was based on the judgment of Sir 
James Hannen in Henrich Bjorn, L.R. 8 P.O. 151. 
96. (1829) 10 B. & Cr. 329, p. 340; seH also p. 347, Qer Parke, J. 
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This usage is now embodied in the Marine Insurance Act 1909-
73 (Comth.). Section 60 reads: 
''LLlhere a marine policv effected on behalf of the assured 
bv a broker acknowledges the receipt of the premium, such 
acknowledgement is, in the absence of fraud, conclusive 
as bet~t~/een thB insurer and the assured, but not as between 
the insurer and the broker." 
So firmlv established was the practice that Collins, J., in Universo 
Insurance Co. of Milan v. Merchants Marine Insurance co?7 refused 
to give effect to an assured's express promise in the policv to pav 
the premiums to the underwriters. 
The prerequisite for proceedings in rem under this proposed 
head is that the insurance must have been effected on the ship. It 
should be immaterial whether the premiums due to the broker are 
pavable bv the charterer, the person in possession of the ship, the 
shipowner or his agent. 
The remedv rem exercisable bv a broker against the ship 
for recovering the premiums due is of special importance. The In-
ternational Convention on Civil Liabilitv for Oil Pollution Damage 
has been given the force of law bv the Commonwealth Parliament:8 
Australian and foreign oil tankers entering or leaving anv Austral-
ian port are required to carrv insurance certificates. These cer-
tificates are issued on proof that valid insurance or other financ-
ial securitv is maintained in respect of the oil tankers in an amount 
sufficient to cover the liabilitv limits prescribed bv Article V para-
graph I of the Convention?9 The proposed jurisdiction will enhance 
the readiness of brokers and underwriters to issue oil-tanker pol-
icies on credit. 
There is probably another substantial reason for making avail-
able the right to proceed i.D..JJmh Manv shipping companies around 
the world are members of Protection and Indemnitv Associations. They 
operate on the principle of mutual insurance within the meaning of 
section 91 of the Marine Insurance Act 1909-73 (Comth.)~ Although 
97. [1897] 1 Q.B. 205; upheld by the English Court of Appeal (1897] 
2 Q.B. 93. 
98. See Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Comth.), 
;:>upra. 
99.Ibid., s. 16 (3) (a). 
1. Apparenth;, the provisions are a re-enactment of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.), s. 85, -
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under the rules, the members are bound to contribute to the losses 
which occur, it is clear that no premium can be quotecf Since no 
losses or casualties can be known in advnace, the policies issued to 
members omit the ordinary provision as to premium~ The principle 
applied is that each member must answer the calls when made,and 
also pay his share of the contribution to indemnify the losses suf-
fered. It is submitted that the words "other like amount in respect 
of the insurance of the ship" should include contributions and calls 
payable to mutual insurance associations. 
(18) Claim by a master, or a member of the crew, of a ship for 
wages (including a claim for an amount that a person. as employer, 
is under an obligation to pay to an employee, IA1hether the obligation 
. arises out of the contract of employment or by operation of law, 
including by operation of the law of a foreign counti'y). 
The enlarged jurisdiction to be conferred under clause 4 (3) 
(s) is best explainecl in two ways. The object is to I'emedy the de-
fects. It provides the mechanism to enforce certain new rights and 
benefits to \vhich seamen are entitled under improved terms of ern-
plovment. 
We have noted how various enactments were passed in the 
nineteenth century to empower magistrates, Supreme Court judges 
and later Vice-Admiralty Court judges to compel payment of wage 
claims of mariners. Successive legislation and judicial decisions, 
both Imperial and Australian, have consistently extended their 
rights. 
The pattern of protection for seafarers was set by a number 
of pre-1840 decisions. In The City of London~ a mariner who was 
discharged from a vessel after signing the articles but before the 
commencement of the voyage was held entitled to sue for wages in 
the Court of Admiralty. It was not necessary for him to have 
2. For further discussion on such associations, see V. Dover, 
A Handbook to Marine Insurance (18th ed. 1978), pp. 498-508. 
3. E. Ivamy, Chalmers' Insurance Act 1906, (6th ed. 1966), pp. 
132-133. 
4. (1839) 1 Wm. Rob. 88. An amount not less than one month's 
wages will be payable foi' premature discharge of a seaman: 
Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), s. 88 (1). 
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actually served on board. Case authorities have held that seamen 
wrongfully discharged in breach of ordinary contracts were entitled 
c 
to be paid wages until the ship's return to the original port In The 
Great Eastern6, Dr. Lushington decided tllat a lien existed for dam-
ages for wrongful dismissal. Phillimore, J., in The Tergeste 7 gave a 
broad meaning to the term "wages". The victualling allowance gran-
ted to seamen who remained by the vessel after she was taken into 
a shipwright's dry dock was held to be equivalent to wages, carry-
ing a maritime lien. 
Section 118 (1) of the Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) has 
adopted the effect of the decision. Thus where the provisions giv-
en are reduced or are of bad quality, seamen are entitled to recov-
er, as wages, compensation according to a specified scale. 
It is interesting to note that in the Victorian case of Keeney 
and Others v. The Ship "Aneiura"8 jurisdicticm o\/er the wages of sea-
men and the master was extended. They were short of provisions. 
The court granted a shipping broker, who advanced money to pur-
chase food supplies, a first charge on the Proceeds of sale of the 
ship for the outlay together with eight per cent interest. 
A valuable exception to the restrictive rule of practice is 
afforded to wage claims in The Fairport? Cairns, J., after discuss-
ing the authorities, allowed the appeal against the registrar's rul-
ing. He held that wages for services rendered after proceedings 
had commenced were recoverable as wages and not merely as part 
of the costs of an action. "The rule that claims in an action can be 
made only in respect of causes of action that have accrued at the 
commencement of the action" is held to be inapplicable to seamen's 
t . . 10 ac 1on m rem. 
5. The Elizabeth (1819) 2 Dods 403; The Beaver (1800) 3 C. Rob. 
92; see also The British Trade [1924] P. 104. 
6. (1867) L.R. 1 A. & E. 384. 
7. [1903] P. 26. 
8. (1927) V.L.R. 387; discussed in Chapter Seven in connection 
with wage lien and rJisbursement lien. 
9. [1967] P. 167. 
10. Ibid., p. 178. 
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Subject to a minor exception, "seaman'' is defined bv section 
85 (6) to include a person emploved or engaged in anv capacitv on 
board the ship. Whereas section 85 (8) defines "wages" to include 
such allowances as are prescribed," section 77 (6) gives it a narrow-
Ell' meaning lJV excluding any allowance for overtime work or pav-
ment which is not part of tt1e ordinEH'V wages of a seaman. It is 
submitted that whether a particular claim will qualify as wages 
within this proposed head depends on the meaning to be determined 
according to the relevant provision. 
The wording of clause 4 (3) (s) seems broad enough to embrace 
social insurance and other contributions required to be made by 
emplovers under the law, whether Australian or foreign, for the 
benefit of seamen~ 1 In The Halcyon Skies; 2 the plaintiff was em-
ployed under a special mariner's contract. It \Alas held that he was 
entitled to a maritime lien as regards both the employee's and the 
employer's contributions. The reason given was that section 1 (1) 
C9.2. of the A.dministration of Justice Act 1956 (U.K.) had the effect 
of extending the maritime lien to such claims. It is submitted that 
a person who is allotted any sum out of the wages13 or adjudged by 
a superintenden~ 4 to be entitled to any such money should be all-
owed to invoke the jurisdiction. Probably, in proceedings in rem by 
seamen and the ship's master to recover wages, the Court should be 
expresslv empowered, in its discretion, to award interest on the 
amount due: 5 
(19) Claim for interest in respect of a claim referred to in para-
graphs (a) to (s) of clause 4 (3). Like that of clause L~ (2) (d), its 
scope will depend largelv on the construction qiven to the word "in-
terest". If it is treated as a "catch-all" provision. i.e. extending 
beyond the meaning of an amount of money pavable at a certain 
interest rate or per cent for usE.~ of a principal sum, its operation 
may create problems for the court. 
11. In The Acrux [1965] P. 391, the court held that emplovers' 
social insurance contributions WE:!re not emoluments and were 
therefore outside the court's jurisdiction. 
12. [1976] 1 All E.R. 856. 
13. Nmtigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.), s. 71. 14 . .!lJid., s. 81. 
15. See ~· Merchant Shipping Act 1970 (U.K.), s. 12 which 
prov.ides .for interest to be awarded. Howl~ver, it onlv 
applies to a master or person employed in a ship other 
than under a crew agreement. 
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(20) Other jurisdiction. One would have thought that the proposed 
legislation would expressly include the jurisdiction currently exer-
cisable under the Colonial Courts of Admiraltv Act 1890 (Imp.). The 
object is to forestall any loopholes that may arise. For example in 
16 
. d tl t l . f . The Queen of the South, 1t was note 1a c a1ms or necessanes 
did not figure at all in the lettered paragraphs of section 1 (1) of 
the 1956 Act (U.K.).17 Brandon, J., very ably alluded to the sweeping 
-up provisions at the end thereof. The effect "is to preserve to 
the court independently of and concurrently with any jurisdiction 
specifically conferred over claims for, inter 9lia, necessaries, as 
was formerly conferred by paragraphs (a) to (s), the same jurisdic-
tion over claims for, .inter alia, necessaries, as was formerly con-
·s ferred by the Acts of 1840, 1861, 1873 and 1875, and 1925." 1 
A similar approach is taken in formulating the Draft Admiralty 
Bill which seeks to confer on certain court~> jurisdiction over relat-
ed matters. Clause 13 reads: 
"The jurisdiction that a court has under this Act extends 
to jurisdiction in respect of a matter of i\dmiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction not otherwise within its jurisdiction 
that is associated with a matter in which the jurisdiction 
of the court is involved." 
Clause 13 differs from the repealed sweeping-up provisions in that 
it is designed to vest in Australian courts v~::;f'y extensive admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction. Clause 14, however·, set.s the limit by 
expressly excluding from a court's jurisdiction any matter not men-
tioned in paragraph 76 ill) and (iii) of the Commonwealth Constitu-
tion. 
Under the proposed 1-\ct, jurisdiction is vested in the Federal 
Courts, State Supreme Courts and, with regard to actions in rem, 
the Supreme Courts of the Territories.19 --
16. [1968] P. 449. 
17. As to extent of repeal, see Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.), 
Schedule 7. 
18. [1968] P. 449, p. 455. 
19. Draft Admiralty Bill, clause 11. As to the geographical 
consti_tutional and other limits imposed on the jurisdiction 
exercisable by courts, see clause 41. 
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5. Scope of Claims and Mode of Exercise of Admiralty 
Jurisdiction 
One policy matter concerns the extent to which thE! proposed 
Act should be given extraterritorial operation. It has to be consid-
ered in the light of many factors, including the availabiLity of 
court officers to cope with the added IAJork and the long-term bene-
fits to Australia. The Draft Admiralty Bill di~>plays a bold deter-
mination that Australia should capture a fair share of the lucrative 
litigation work in shipping matters. It has adopted the United 1\ing-
dom's approach as Gmbodied in section 20 (7) of the SuprE~me Court 
1981 (U.K.). Thus by clause 5 (1), tht~ proposed Act will applv to 
"(a) all ships,20 irrespecth1e of the place of residence or 
domicile of their owners; and 
(b) all maritime claims~ 1 wherever arising, including claims 
for salvage of cargo or wreck found on land." 
It should be borne in mind that the underlying philosophy of 
the Administration of Justice /\ct 1956 (U.K.) and the Suoreme Court 
Act 1981 (U.K.) hmi its origin in the two International Conventions~'? 
The 1952 Arrest Convention, in particular, serves to harmonise the 
widelv-diffedng ship arrest procedures used in the Unitl:;d Kingdom 
with a common law background and in other European States follm.;-
ing the broader civil law approach~3 In giving effect to the uni-
form rules contained in the 1952 Arrest Convention, the United 
1"\ingdom had modified, and apparently deviated from, tt1e original 
plan to establish a unique Empire-wide system of maritime law. 
Invested with the new jurisdiction, the English Admiralty Court is 
seen to be operating alongside its European counterparts in admin-
istering and enforcing similar rules of <Jdmiralty law. The Draft 
Admiralty Bill is a belated move to tJring /\ustralian admiral tv l::1w 
into line with the vital changes and developments which characterise 
20. Subject to minor exceptions, the definition of "ship" in 
clause 3 (1) wide enough to embracB a vessel propelled 
by oars, a foreign vessel ami an unregistered vessel. 
21. They comprise proprietary maritime claims and gonera1 mari-
time claims as defined in clause L1 (1). 
22. I.e., the International Convention on certain Rules concern-
ing Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision, 1952, and t.he 
International Convention relating to the Arrost of Seago-
ing Ships, 1952. 
23. O.R. Thomas. "The Sister Ship Action in f~ern", ['1979] 2 L.C.M. 
L.Q. 158. -
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the admiralty laws of European maritime nations. 
Clause ·10 differs from section 22 (1) of the .Supreme Court Act 
1981 (U.K.) in two significant respects. First, bv clause 10 jurisdic-
tion is conferred on various courts to entertain proceedings 
personam on ''a maritime claim" or "on a claim for damage done to a 
ship". The expression "maritime claim" is defined by clause 4 (1) as 
a reference to a proprietary maritime claim or a general maritime 
claim. It includes a claim for loss of life or for personal in:jurv. 
Section 22 (1) is stated to apply to any claim for damage) loss of 
life or personal injury arising in cases of collision, navigation and 
non-compliance with the collision regulations. Secondly, under sec-
tion 22 (2), the High Court's jurisdiction to entertain an action in 
.eersonam in relation to anv claim in ~:;ection 22 (1) cannot be exer-
cised unless the conditions laid down are satisfied. The jurisdic-
tion conferred bv clause 1 [] is not expressed to be subjBct to any 
requirements bBing met. It is questionable t.vhetrmr tr1e usual pre-
requisites with regard to ordinary civil actions will apply. 
6. Proceedings in Rem 
(i) l"laritime. Lien or other charge 
In Chapter Seven, the types of claim carrying maritime liens 
have been examined. With the exception of bottomry, each of the 
other four t~'pes of maritime lien is exoref;sly taken cognizance of 
in clause 17 (2) of the Draft Admiralty Bill. Like section 21 (3) of 
the Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.), clause 17 (1) permits the holdee 
of "a maritime lien or other charge" to proceed in I'.§:!!! against the 
ship or other peopertv~4 The IAJords "other ct1arge" are not defined 
in thB Draft Admiraltv Bill. In Tile St. Merriel~5 it was held that 
thEl\f do not include a possessory lien on a ship. Thev appear to 
have the meaning specially given to them in the context of certain 
provisions of the Merchant Shipping Acts (Irnp.f6 and the Navigation 
24. Including the proceeds of sale of the ship or other prop-
ertv: Draft Admiralty Bill, clause 21+; Draft Admiralty r~ules, 
Order 70 (1). 
25. [1963J P. 247. 
26. 1894 Act (Imp.), s. 51.3; 1906 Act (Imp.), ss. 35 (2) and '~2. 
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.6£1 1912-73 (Comth}7 In keHping with the extraterritorial object 
of the proposed Act, it is suggested that 11other charge" could be 
applied to a right or interest acquired under foreign law, which has 
h t . . ' 'l t th f 't' 1' 28 c arac enstlcs s1m1 ar .o ose o a man 1me 1en. 
(ii) Proprietary Maritime Claims 
These claims are set out under four paragraphs in clause 4 (2). 
Proceedings in rem may be brought on any of them against the ship 
concernecf9 In so far as such proceedings are permitted on claims 
under clause 4 (2) ~), (c) and (d), the Draft Admiralty Bill is 
seen as going beyond principle of the 1952 Arrest Convention~0 
(iii) f3eneral Maritime Claims 
Ship beneficially owned or under demise charter. L!Je shall now 
consider situations where, based on one or more of the claims aris-
in~J und~Jr clause 4 en (ill to (..tl. proceedings in rem may be instituted. 
By clause 19, the ship or property may be the subject of the 
action 1111here "a relevant person 
(a) ~,.as, at the time when the cause of action arose, the 
mvner or chc-1rterer of. or in possession or control of, 
the ship or property concerned; and 
(b) at the time when the proceeding is commenced, the 
mvner of the ship or property." 
In several important respects, the action contemplated by clause 19 
differs from that based on section 21 (4) of the Supreme Court 11:\ct 
27. Ss. 128 (2), 163A (2) (d) and 298 (2). 
28. E.o. in The Colorado [1923] P. 102, the English Court of 
Appeal appears to have accepted a French hypotheque as 
giving rise to the equivalent of a jus in !:.§.!.!l· It gave mort-
gagees a limited right to follow the property into the hands 
of a subsequent purchaser. It is not suggested that the 
class of maritime liens currently recognised under Aust-
ralian admiralty law should be enlarged. It seems that for 
the purpose of jurisdiction exercisable under clause 17 (1), 
claims which are recognised by foreign laws as carrying 
maritime liens, though not so under Australian law, should 
be treated on par with "other charge11 • 
29. Under the Draft ,"\dmiralty Bill, clause 24, procendings in rern 
may be brought against the money paid into court as the -
proceeds of sale of the ship. 
30. See Article 3 para. 1. Clause 4 (2) is much wider in scope 
than the Supreme Court Act 191:31 (U.K.), s. 21 (2). 
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1981 (U.K.). Under clause 19, there is no requin~ment tt1at "a rele-
vant person" must be one who \AJould be liable on the claim in an 
action personam. The removal of this obstacle will strengthen the 
claimant's position and is in line with the enlightening judgment in 
The St. Elefterio~ 1 There the bills of lading issued for a cargo of 
cattle cake shipped by charterers were signed and wrongly anted-
ated by the ship's master. rhey were endorsed in blank to the 
plaintiffs who presented them to their purchasers. The purchasers 
rejected the bills of lading when the dates of shipment were found 
to be incorrect. H'le plaintiffs brought an action in rem under 
sections 1 (1) (h) and 3 (4) of the 1956 .Act (U.I-\.). The defendant 
shipowners mm1ed to set aside the writ in r£illl and warrant of arrest 
directed against the ship. For the defendant shipowners two issues 
were raised in argument. First, before the plaintiffs could succeed 
in proceedings i!l £.!l!!l regarding the claim they had to show that the 
defendants were persons who would be liable on the claim in an 
action in personam. Second, the defendant~; could not in law be 
held liable even if the antedating of the bills of lading was done 
fraudulently by the ship's master. Willmer, J., had no difficulty in 
rejecting the arguments. He rigt1tly held t11at the purpose of the 
words "the person who would be liable .. .i!J. porsonam" is to identify 
the person (the "relevant person'') whose Rhip may be arrested in 
relation to the new right under section 3 (4). 52 He further explain-
ed:33 
'' ... the natural construction of those quite simple words 
is that they mean the person who woulcJ be liable on the 
assumption that the action succeeds. rhis action might 
or might not succeed if it were brought in personam." 
The ''relevant person" need not be personally liable in respect 
of any of the claims in clause '• @.2. to (!J. It implies that the 
liability could have been incurred by someone uther than the rele-
vant person, with or without the latter's consent. We have seen 
31. [1957] P. 179. 
32. Administration of Ju§tice J\ct 1956 (U.I'\.). 
33. [1957] P. 179, p. 186. 
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. '' l t n34 d h . that m The Cast ega e , the charterers, an not t e stlipowm_,rs. 
were personal!\; answerable for the coals supplied to the 
ship. For the condition in clause 19 (.§.2_ to be met it is essential for 
the person in question to be identified in a certain capacity with 
the ship or property when the cause of action arose. This identify-
ing link, which also an underlying aspect of the principle of the 
1952 Arrest Convention, is based on his being the owner or charter-
er of, or ir1 possession or control of, the ship or property. In The 
"Permina 108",35 the Court of Civil Appeal of Singapore construed 
the term "charterer" in section 4 (4) of the High Court (Admiralty 
Act (S' pore), which was in pari materia with section 3 _________ :.___
(4) of the 1956 Act (U.K.), to include an ordinary charterer~6 On 
the other side of the line falls the Hong Kong High Court decision 
in The Ledesco Uno37 which seems to have unwarrantedly confined 
the term "charterer" to a demise charterer. It is arguable that the 
words "or in possession or in control of the ship", as used in the old 
1956 Act (U.K}~ indicate what the United Kingdom Parliament had 
unrJerstood to be the policy of the 1952 Arrest Convention. Taken 
in the ordinary natural sense, the words appear wide enough to em-
brace the interests of non-demise charterers, bailees, shipwrights, 
while the ship remains in their shipyard, and possibly agents or 
management companies with unlimited authority as to the employ-
ment of the ship. A ship mortgagee who, in the exercise of his 
right, has takcm possession of the ship, whether actual or construc-
tive, will be included?9 What is not clear is whether a master 
officially in char~]e of the ship is deemed to be ln control thereof 
34. [1893] A.C. 38. 
35. [1977] 1 [VJ.l.J. 49. 
36. Ibid., p. 50, l2£IT Wee, C.J. 
37. [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 99. 
38. Administration of Justice Act 1956, s. 3 (4). 
39. When actual possession cannot be taken of the ship which 
is overseas, a ship mortgagee may take constructive poss-
ession of her. The acts done, e.g. appointment of a new 
master to take charge on the mortgagee's behalf, must show 
a clear lntentlon to assume the right of ownership: The 
.Benwell Towell (1895) 72 L.T. 664. 
609 
within the meaning of clause 19 (a). 
The condition in clause 19 (b) requires the person in question 
to be owner of the ship or propertv at the time when the action 
commenced.40 In order not to restrict undulv the right of a claim-
ant it is desirable to construe "owner" in a broad sense. It should 
include an equitable or unregistered owner as respects all the 
shares in the ship and also a person to whom propertv in the entire 
ship has passed under a contract of sale. 
It is interesting to note that the identifving link is extended 
to the owner of the "propertv" other than ship. Cargo or anv equip-
ment carried on board at the material time mav be deemed to be in 
the possession or control of the shipowner, demise charterer or 
mortgagee in possession of the ship within the meaning of clause 19 
(a). Moreover, in some cases, a salvor working on a wreck or der-
elict mav acquire sufficient control or possession41 of the propertv 
so as to come within the meaning of clause 19 For the propertv 
to be proceeded against in an action in .r.§!!!l, the condition in clause 
19 Ct..U_ must also satisfied. The right which clause 19 seeks to 
confer is wider in scope than that provided under the 1952 Arrest 
Convention or section 21 (!~) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.). 
Clause 20 differs from clause 19 in two respects. It does not 
provide for proceedings in against propertv other than ship. 
40. It is submitted that the criterion is the time when the writ 
is issued, even though it is not served on the ship or prop-
ertv concerned. In The Monica [1967] 3 All E.R. 7Li0, it was 
decided that a statutorv right of action in Di!J.l is unaffec-
ted bv a change of ownership of the ship after the issue of 
the writ, even before service. In v. Ind. Coope (West 
Midlands) Ltd. [1967] 2 All E.R. 900, English Court of Appeal 
construed the word "dav'' in the English R.S.C., Order 6, r. 
8 (1) to mean dav. As no account of fractions of a dav was 
taken, the time of the dav when the writ was served was 
immaterial. 
41. In The Tubantia [1921~) P. 78, the President held that the plain-
tiff salvors had had sufficient possession of the Tubantia 
to exclude third parties from interfering v..1ith the propertv. 
As to the possessorv right of salvors, see G. Brice, Mari-
time Law of Salvage, (1983 ed.), pp. 92-94. --
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On the other hand, c=Jn action in rem may be brought against the ship 
even thou~Jh the relevant person is merely a demise charterer under 
clause 20 (b). 
It appears that the overriding object of the 1952 Arrest Con-
vention is to prevent the claims of creditors vis-a-vis the ship from 
being unjustly defeated. The provision to be rnade by clau~1es 19 and 20 
will serve to forestall devious arrangements made by shipowners to 
overreach the rights of creditors. Australian courts will be able to 
adjudicate upon many of the maritime claims hitherto diverted to 
admiralty courts in England and other Commonwealth countries, and 
to provide adequate redress for wrongs suffered by creditors and 
claimants. 
Surrogate ship. By clause 21, an action in r_gm may be instit-
uted against the surrogate ship (or "sister ship") provided condi-
tions (a) and (b) are satisfied. Condition (a) is the same as that in 
clauses 19 (a) and 20 (ill, discussed above. By clause 21 (b), the rel-
evant person must, "at the time wr1en the proceeding is commen-
ced", be "the owner of, or demise charterer of, the other ship." 
From the viewpoint of comparative aspects, it should be noted 
that the words "beneficially owned as respects all the shares," as 
used in both section 3 (4) (a) and (b) of the 1956 Act (U.K.), had giv-
en rise to two conflicting interpretations. In The St. 1"1erriel,42 
Hewson, J, had to construe those words. He recognised the circum-
stances where a ship, though owned by one person with the right to 
sell, is yet "beneficially possessed, or tJeneficially controlled, by 
some other person such as in this case .... " '~ 3 He held that the words 
"as respects tllerein" were intended by the Legislature to refer to 
"the true owner". On the interpretation he adopted, the ship was 
held not liable under section 3 (4) since the liability for the 
ship's repairs was incurred by the demise charterer and not by the 
true owner. 
About eight years later, similar facts arose in The Andrea 
Ursula~4 Beandon, J., succeeded in coming to grips with the problem 
42. [1963] p. 247. 
43. Ibid., p. 258. 
41~. [1973] 1 Q.B. 265; the decision in The St. Merri.el [1963] P. 247 
was not followed. 
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by resorting to judicial analogy 45 and taking a fresh look at the 
principle of the 1952 Arrest Convention. His premise was that if 
section 3 (4) was to give full effect to article 3, including in part-
icular paragraph (4) of that article, the expression "beneficially 
owned" had to be given a broad meaning. He therefore ruled that 
"beneficial owner" "includes not only a demise charterer but also 
any other person with similar complete possession and control" 46 
who would be liable under section 1 (1) (d) to (r) of the 1956 Act 
(U.K.). 
Unfortunately, the construction applied by Brandon, .J., in 
dealing iAiith the grievances of ship repairers in Britain created an 
anomalous situation. Several courts in the British Commonwealth 
have in effect endorsed the view of Hewson, J., and have declined 
to follow the proposition of Brandon, J. In The "Pangkalan Susu/ 
Permina 3001"47 the High Court of Singapore held that full possess-
ion and control did not have the meaning of "beneficially owned as 
respects all the shares therein" in section 1, (4), the Singapore equiv-
alent of section 3 (4) of the 1956 Act (U.K.). On appeal, the judg-
ment was upheld by the Court of Civil Appeal. Wee, C.J. said:~8 
"In our opinion, it would be a misuse of language to equate 
full possession and control of a ship with beneficial 
ownership as respects all the shares in a ship. The word 
'ownership' connotes title, legal or equitable whereas the 
expression 'possession and control', however full and 
complete, not related to title." 
The judgment of Wee, C.J., was closely followed by the Malaysian 
Federal Court of Civil Appeal in The "Loon Chong".49 It was held 
that, since the bareboat lease agreement did not confer legal or 
equitable ownership of the ship but only possession and control, 
the action in rem was not maintainable against the ship. By section 
26 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (MaL), the civil jurisdiction 
45. Reliance was placed on the House of Lords decision in The 
Hopper No. 66 [1908] A.C. 126, p. 136, where the word "o~r" 
in tr1e MercF18nt Shipping Act 1894 (Imp.), ss. 503 and 504 was 
held to include a demise charterer: [1973] 1 Q.B., pp. 272-
273. 
46. [1973] 1 Q.B. 265, p. 272. 
47. [1977] 1 M.L.J. 141. 
48. [1977) 2 M.L.J. 129, p. 130. 
49. [1982] 1 M.:..L.J. 212. 
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of Malaysian High Courts embraces "the same jurisdiction and auth-
ority in relation to admiralt'./ matters'' as t,vas exercisable under the 
f\dministration of Justice Act 1956 (lJ.!".). 
The inclusion in section 21 (4) .m.50 of "charterer ... under a 
demise charter" means that, for the purpose of this provisiion, dem-
ise charterers and mvners are placed in the same position. Accord-
ingly, the enlarged provision is intended to remove the effect of the 
construction given by Hewson, J., in The St. Merriel,5.1 which t'\Jas foll-
owed by Singapore and Malaysian courts. But section 21 (4) (ill only 
permits proceedings in rem to be brought against the other ship ''of 
wl1ich ... the relevant person is the beneficial owner as respects all 
the ships in it." With the provision must be compared the proposed 
Australian position. Clause 21 (ill provides tt1at the other ship may 
be proceeded against in rem where the relevant person is the owner 
or demise charterer thereof. Creditors will enjoy wider protection 
under the proposed law than under current English or Singapore law. 
It is submitted that a claimant, whose right is derived through sub-
rogation Ol' based on an assignment, should also tm permitted under 
d . h t h' 
52 
clause 21 to procee rer11 agamst t e surroga e s 1p. 
Since court process including the warrant of arrest cannot be 
served out of the jurisdiction~3 "surrogate ship" actions are an 
answer to rnan\f of the problems presently faced by creditors. The 
practice of English and Singapore solicitors this. Where it is 
unknown in advance which of the defendants' ships would come with-
in the admiralty jurisdiction of the court, the names of all their 
ships are included in the writ of summons and warrant of arrest. 
When one of the defendants' ships shows up, the writ and the warr-
ant of arrest are quickl\f amended by deleting the other ships' names 
and are served on the ship. A ship, when arrested constitutes a 
50. This provision in Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.) differs from 
the repealed f\dministration of Justice Act 1956 (U.K.), s. 3 
(4) ill). 
51. [1963] P. 247. 
52. Very likely the action will have to be brought in the name 
of the subrogator or assignor. 
53. Draft /\dmiralty Bill, clause 23 (1) and (2); in Aichtmrn & Co. 
K.G. and Switzerland General Ins. Co. Ltd: v. The Ship M.V. 
"Talaboe'(19P.) 132 C.L.R. 41f9, the High Court-held that ser-
vice of a writ i.!J.. ~cannot be validly effected out of the 
jurisdiction. 
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valuable security to the claimant. Indeed the PI'otection under Eng-
lish Jaw has been remarkably strengthened by the decision in The 
Monica~£· Brandon, J., held that a change of ownership of a ship aft-
er the issue, but before service of the writ_,did not defeat the right 
to proceed in rem against the ship under the Administration of Jus-
tice Act 1956 (U.K.). There is no reason why this rule should not 
apply to a sister-ship action provided, of course, that the name of 
the sister ship appears on the writ which is issued before the change 
of ownership occurs. Otherwise the princjple of the 1952 Arrest 
Convention may be easily circumvented. 
One vital issue concerns the number of ships that may be arr-
ested. This aspect of claimant protection is of immense importance 
where the loss or damage suffered exceeds the value of the ship 
against which proceedings are brought. Under English law, a defend-
ant in an action in rem, who does not enter an appearance, is not 
liable for the full amount of the judgment55 where it exceeds the 
value of the D2§:6 The wording of clause 31 (1) of the Draft Admiralty 
Bill 1985 suggests that, in cer·tain circumstances, "a relevant person" 
may not be able to limit his liability that way. If the view is correct, 
clause 31 (1) when enacted as law could result in another important 
difference between the laws of the two countries. 
In !"lonte Ulia (Owners) v. Banco and Others (0wners)~7 the ~-
was so negligently navigated that the Monte Ulia had to take em-
ergency action to avoid the former. In so doing, the Monte Ulia coll-
ided with the jetty and damaged a large oil pipeline. Crude oil 
escaped and caught fire, destroying the jetty. The Man own-
ers, as plaintiffs, brought an admiralty action in ~· They claimed 
damages estimated at £9,000,000 for the damage to tt1e Monte Ulia and 
indemnity or contribution in respect of the claims made against them 
b\1 the oil company and others. The writ and warrants of arrest were 
served on the Banco and six sister ships, all owned by the defend-
ants. Lane, J., set aside the service of the writ on the six sister 
54. {1967] 3 All E.R. 740. 
55. The Dictator {1892] P. 30t.; The Joannis Vatis (No. 2) {1922] P. 
213. 
56. /\s to position where appearance was entered and bail given, 
see The Dupleix {1912] P. 8; The Dictator [1892] P. 304. 
57. [1971] P. 137. 
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ships and discharged the warrants of arrest on thE:!rn. The English 
Court of Appeal unanimouslv dismissed the appeal lJrousJtlt bv the 
plaintiffs. Although the United Kingdom did not r·atifv the 1957 
Arrest Convention until 18th March, 19')9, the provisions of the 1956 
Act (U.I<\.) relating to "Admiraltv jurisdiction wem, at least to some 
. !! f . 58 
extent, enacted m order to con orm to the 1952 Arrest ConventiOn. 
In both article 3 paragraph 3 of the 1952 Arrest Convention and sec-
tion 3 (4), the word "or" made it unambiguouslv clear that the admir-
altv jurisdiction in !.:.§.!.!l could be invoked either against the offending 
ship, i.e. the Banco, or against anv other 'ship in the same ownership, 
but not against both. 
As regards the number of ships that may be arrested, the Draft 
Admiraltv Bill adheres closely to Article 3 of the Arrest Convention. 
Bv clause 22 (2) where a ship has been arrested under clause 17, 19, 
20, or 21, no other ship "shall be arrested!! in the proceeding. The 
restrictions do create a serious problem for plaintiffs with large 
claims. If a defendant shipowner does not enter an appearance or 
furnish bail, the plaintiff will be disadvantaged. He may have only 
one ship as security for the payment of his claims. However, 
clause 22 {2)7when read in conjunction with clause 22 (3)"suggests 
that an exception exists in respect of claims which carrv a maritime 
lien or other charge. If the reasoning is correct, a plaintiff should, 
wherever possible, split up his claims into two categories. Despite 
clause 22 (2), it appears that a plaintiff mav enforce those claims 
which carrv a maritime lien or other charge on the ship by taking 
proceedings 1D_~ against her. It submitted that the other claims, 
which are of a different categorv and wt1ich do not carry any such 
lien or charge, may be enforced bv taking proceedings in IJill! against 
another ship. 
Another approach to the problems is to construe the words "same 
claim" in clause 22 (1) to mean any instalment or sum due and unpaid 
in eespect of any charterpartv hire or anv single transaction. Thus 
where monthly instalments due under a charterpartv are not paid for 
two months or costs of repairs effected on the ship on two different 
occasions remain unpaid, it is submitted that there are two separate 
causes of action. A classic example of this ingenious line of 
58. Ibid., p.157, per Megaw, L.J. 
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reasoning is found tn the Singapore case of The "PE!rmina Sarnudra 
XIV." 59 The respondents owed the appellants the sum of $U.S. 7,230, 
711.48 bv wav of charterpartv hire in of the ship "Ibnu". Two 
writs - each claiming for roughlv half the amount - were taken out. 
Each writ and the warrant of arrest named onlv one ship. In this wav, 
two ships belonging to the respondents namelv, the "Permina 108" and 
the "Permina Samurdra XIV" were arrested. The trial judge held that, 
where a number of instalments for charterpartv hire were due, thev 
merged and became a single debt and that onlv one ship could 
arrested. The appeal to the Singapore Court of Civil Appeal was all-
owed. Wee, C.J., held that two separate writs, each based on a 
tinct cause of action and naming onlv one ship, had been issued and 
served on the ships, respectivelv~0 
It is suggested that one wav of defeating "surrogate ship" ac-
tions is to incorporate single-ship owning companies. The argument 
rooted in the principle of separate legal entitv is that the company 
that owns the ship a different person from the shareholders. An 
alternative method suggested is to split up the shares in f]ach of the 
ships so that thev are held beneficiallv bv two or more persons. It 
is submitted that no proceedings in rem mav be maintaim~d under the 
draft provisions61 if the expression "owner of the ship" is construed 
to mean that the relevant person must beneficially own all the 
shares in the particular ship. 
Since the object of decentralizing the holding of shares in 
ships is to oust the court's jurisdiction, the facts of each case will 
be examined closelv. A sophisticated attempt was made in The 
"Enfield"62 to defeat the creditors' claims bv relying on the concept 
of separate legal entitv and the defence of different ownership. 
The m.v. ''Enfield" was arrested in Singapore bv the plaintiffs as 
securitv for' disbursements incurred bv them as shipowners' agents in 
59. [1977] 1 M.L.J. 47. 
60. The Singapore Court of Appeal decision appears to have 
undermined the principle underlving tr1e 1952 Arrest Conven-
tion, Article 3, paras. 3 and 4. 
61. Draft Admiraltv Bill, clauses, 19, 20 and 21. 
62. [1982] 2 M.L.J. 106. 
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Madras. In trial court, the allegedly new shipowners sought un-
successfully to set aside the writ and all proceedings. It was their 
argument that the requirement of section 4 (4) of the Singapore Act63 
was not satisfied. The defence raised was that the ship had been 
transferred several times and that, since the accrual of the causes 
of action, a Panamian corporation, Barbury, had become the latest 
owner. It was found that Richard Ht<l!a was the principal shareholder 
and managing director of CJary Line which had rights to the ship 
prior to her purported sale to the Panamian corporation. Of the 
three offices in the Panamian corporation, one was held by Richard 
Hwa's mother as president, and another was held by Richard Hwa's 
wife as secretary. D'Cott, J., dismissed the motions. The lear-
ned judge had no difficulty in holding that Richard Hwa was the own-
er of the vessel at the time the cause of action arose and also ben-
eficially owned all the shares therein at the time the proceedings 
commenced. In dismissing the appeal, the Singapore Court of Ci\/il 
/\ppeal held that the purported of the ship to Barbury was a 
de\/ice and a sham designed to defraud the respondents and to put 
the ~3hip as security out of ttwir reach~4 
It is questionable whether it is necessary for the proposed 
Australian Act to pro\/ide for the corporate veil to be lifted in the 
abo\/e circumstances. The cases where a corporate entity has been 
disregarded illustrate no consistent principle?5 Under the compan-
ies legislation of Australia and the United Kingdom and at common law, 
the courts generally are competent to deal with fraudulent transac-
tions and de\/ious m'llnership arrangemt:!nts effected under the cm1er 
of corporate personality~& Few serious problems have been encount-
ered in this area. 1t is undesirable for Australian courts to be 
expressly empowenHi by legislation to disregard the corporate \/eil 
63. The High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act, Cap. 6, Singapore 
Statutes, 1970 Re\1. Ed.; the pro\/ision being in Qari ~=~ 
with the _Administration of Justice Act 1956 (U.K.), s. 3 (4). 
64. [ 1982] 2 M.L.J., p. 108. 
65. See L.C.B. Gower, Gower's Principles of Modern Companv Law, 
(4th ed. 1979), pp. 123-'133, as to situations concerning agency, 
trust, fraud and improper conduct; also H.A.J. Ford, Principles 
nf Company Law, (3rd ed. 1982), paras. 701-107 and 2229. 
66. llowever, in The "Asean Promoter" [1982] 2 M.L.J. 108, the judge 
refused to accept the counsel's argument that the corporate 
\/eil shouid be lifted. It was not proved ttmt the relationship 
between the two companies was that of a holding company 
and a subsidiary company or that of principal and agent, 
or that fraud was in\/olved. 
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of ship-owning companies. Otherwise it might open the door to harr-
assment bv creditors against shipowners. It is submitted that clause 
32 (1) of the Draft Admiraltv Bill 1985 which deals with related corp-
orations extends too far bevond the principle underlving the 1952 
Arrest Convention. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Australian admiraltv law is probablv one of the most backward 
and neglected areas of the jurisprudence. The problems we have 
considered in Parts II, III and IV of this chapteri and elsewhere in the 
work point to the gross injustice suffered bv maritime creditors and 
other claimants over a prolonged period. 
The earlv colonial legislation represented initial attempts to 
invest magistrates, Supreme Court judges and Vice-Admiraltv judges 
with limited admiraltv jurisdiction. The proposed Admiralty Act is 
an epoch-making move, currentlv under wav. to confer on Australian 
courts wide-ranging jurisdictions for the purpose of administering 
maritime law. One feature of trJB prospective law is that it is based 
on the hitherto little-used powers exercisable bv the Commonwealth 
Parliament~7 The Draft Admiraltv Bill is wider in scope that the 
Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.I'\.). When enacted into law, it will usher in 
a new era of significant development in Australian maritime law. In 
a number of situations, the remedies and redress available will be 
more extensive than those which are currentlv open to claimants un-
der the Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.). 
The proposed Admiralty Act is not intended to be a code in anv 
sense. Where the wording of the proposed heads of jurisdiction is in 
2ari materia with that of corresponding provisions in the United 
Kingdom's legislation~8 relevant English case authorities will provide 
67. See Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp.), 
ss. 51, 76, 77, 98 and 122. For elaborate comments, see 
Research Paper No. 1 - An Australian Admjraltv Act; TtJe 
.Ambit of Admiralty Jurisdiction. Q.P: cit., pp. 62 et. seg. 
68. I.e. heads of jurisdiction in Administration of Justice Act 
1956 (U.K.), and in Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K~. 
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valuable precedents. One observation in relation to the novel heads 
of jurisdiction proposed, ~ claims for interest, for freight mort-
gage, for economic loss, etc. should be made. Unless they are con-
strued and exercised IAJithin well-defined limits, thev could result in 
vexatious proceedings iQ_ ~ being instituted for the purpose of 
harassing shipowners. Undoubtedlv, the proposed Act will markedlv 
increase Australia's revenue from litigation in maritime lmAI, and the 
present level of legal work. 
There could be undesirable economic effects. The likelihood of 
Australia being chosen bv creditors and other claimants as the "ship 
arrest" forum mav deter shipowners and ship operators from sending 
their ships to Australian ports. To avoid arrest, foreign ships mav 
refuse to carrv goods into Australian ports. Alternativelv, Australia 
-bound goods mav be transhipped for delivery to Australian import-
ers. Cargo transhipment can be carried out on the high seas, just 
outside Australian courts' jurisdiction, or at a foreign port. This 
forum-avoiding strategv, if frequentlv adopted bv foreign ships, will 
increase freight charges, cargo damage and transit time. 
It is felt that the omission from the proposed Act of a head of 
jurisdiction which empowers courts to order the forfeiture and con-
demnation of ships is unfortunate?9 A ship which is forfeited or 
condemned for breach of legislation?0 or bv reason of international 
law 71 mav, b\f order of court, be sold free from encumbrances. It 
69. The Australian Law Reform Commission regards ship forfeiture 
or condemnation as a penal remedv which is out of place in the 
proposed Act conferring basicallv civil jurisdiction: Research 
Paper No. 1 - An Australian Admiralty f\ct; The Ambit of Admir-
alty Jurisdiction, op. cit., pp. 200-20£~. Cf. Supreme Court Act 
1981 (U.K.), s. 20 (2) ~-
70. _Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Comth.), ss. 32 and 33. Forfeit-
ure is frequentlv used bv the Legislatures to enforce revenue 
policies, §hEl_. under the Customs Act 1901-73 (Comth.), ss. 148 
and 228; as a control mechanism to prevent over-exploitation 
of fish resources in Australian waters, ~- under the Fisher-
Jes Act 1952-75 (Comth.), ss. 4 and 130. In Fang Ct1in Faa v. 
Puffett (1978) 22 A.L.R. 149, the master's appeal against thE~ 
court's order to forfeit the fishing boat was allowed. Gallop, 
J., construed s. 13C of the Act as giving the court a discretion 
in the matter. 
71. Bv established usage and the recognition of nations, goods 
being conveved to a belligerent State mav be seized as contra-
band, and the ships carrving them mav be captured and 
condemned for running blockades: Ex p. Chavasse, ~ 
Grazebrook (1865) 4 De G. & S. 655; The Helen (1865) L.R. 1 A. 
& E. 1, 4, lllif Dr. Lushington. 
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will be expedient for the same court7 if not in the same proceedings, 
to assume jurisdiction over all such matters, including the claims of 
third parties, relating to the [g§_. Thel'e is an other reason in supp-
ort of conferring the "forfeiture or condemnation'' jurisdiction under 
the proposed Act. A ship may be arrested by creditors in an action 
in ~- If proceedings for her forfeiture or condemnation are 
brought against her, the creditors - it is submitted - should be able 
to defend their interests in the same court. 
Two aspects of the courts' jurisdiction does not appear to 
have been considered by the Australian Law Reform Commission. 
First, it is nowhere provided in the Draft Admiralty Bill that the 
Australian courts concerned will be empowered in their discretion to 
award compound interest. This matter is of importance in the light 
of the "interest claims" introduced by clause 4 (2) (Q) and (3) (!.J.. The 
terest was awarded on the limitation figure under English law app-
ears to apply to maritime claims as a general rule. He said?2 
'' ... I am not aware that compound interest has been awarrjed 
on the limitation figure let alone compound interest on sim-
ple interest which the court awards in addition to the lim-
itation figure." 
In cases involving large claims and prolonged delays before the 
delivery of judgment, a successful plaintiff may, for reasons of 
inflation and currency devaluation, suffer injustice unless the dam-
ages awarded carry compound interest. 
Second, in view of the international character of most of the 
claims, it is suggested that the proposed law shDuld expressly em-
power the /\ustralian courts concerned to award damages or compen-
sation in foreign currency. This submission is in line with develop-
ments emerging from a number of fairly recent Englisll decisions~3 
72. [1984] 3 All E.R. 59, p. 65. 
73. The effects of these cases are clearly analysed by S. Isaacs, 
in "Foreign Currency Claims and the English Courts", [1977] 
3 L.M.C.L.Q. 356; see also D. Hene, "Judgments in Foreign Curr-
encies" [1975] 1 L.M.C.L.Q. 19, pp. 23-24. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
It is desirable to n~viow the follmving matters. lhese 
ern£cJrge from a con~:>ideration of the material which has been the 
sutJjt-c:ct matter of thi.s re:cit:!arch pr·oject l'elating to Australian 
maritime law. 
I. RECEPTION AND DEVELOPf"lENT OF MARITH'1E 
LAW IN AUSTRALIA 
Ttle package of pre-1900 Imperial Acts1 operated as the main 
1
'lm111 transfer" mechanisms both before and, for over four decades~ 
after tliB Commonwealth was formed. English maritime law, both 
statute and unenacted, was systematically incorporated into thf:J 
Australian jurisprudence. The close resemblance that existed be-
tween the laiJ\IS of the two countries up to 1920 reflects Bri Lain's 
success in implementing her Imperial shipping policy in Australia. 
foday the reception of English maritime law on a much red-
uced scale. Colonial Courts of Admiralty continue to operate as 
par·t of the Commonwealth and State court systems. IndBed, their 
jurisdiction has been extended to administer i\ustralian maritime law 
and to entertain claims and causes arisinu therounder: Part I of 
the f1tlt:Jrchant Shipping f.\ct JB94 (Imp.) was repealed. However, the 
Shipping RBgistration Act 1981 (C:omth.) has reinstated, as part of 
the laws nf the Commonwnalth and the States, the principles of 
equity and most of Um statutory prm;isions relating to ship mort-
gages which applied under the repealed Imperial Act. fhB 
:..=~.;;::..=.:...: 
1913-73 (Comth.) wa~1 largely a con~mlidated re-enactment of 
the Imperial legislation. !'Jioreover, the Draft Arjmiral Bill 1985 has 
adopted a number of expressions which are similar to thosB used in 
the Administration of Justice f\ct 1956 (U.I'\.) and the Supreme Court 
1981 (U.f,.), Consequently, the judicial pronouncmnents of 
Superior Courts in England in those matters t'llill invariably influence 
the development of Australian maritime law. 
Tile post-1920 er<,1 saw the emergence of two diverging trencls 
in lpgal his[,ory. They lla'Je undermined the "law reception" mechan-
isms, and the longstanding consistency between the laws of the two 
1. See CJeqeeal Introduction. 
~~. Lc'. until thB Statute of lJJe~3tminstor /\doption Act 1942 
(CornthJ 1A1as passmf 
3. ~3en ~)hippillg RegiDtration Amendment Act 19[ll, (Comth.), s. 
29 and i\iavigation /\ct 1912-73 (Cornth.) generally. 
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countries. 
First, in the United 1'\ingdom, the process of breaking away 
from the Imperial goal of establishing an identical body of maritime 
law for the entire Empire was set in motion by a new legislative pol-
icy. The reason found in the United Kingdom's alignment with the 
other maritime nations in the effort to promote international certain-
ty and uniformity in certain areas of the law. This move marked 
by the passing of a series of Acts (U.K.) which, unlike most of the 
pre-1920 Acts (Imp.)~ had no application to Australia. The post-1920 
Acts (U.K.) not only extended the admiralty jurisdiction of English 
Courts but also gave effect to a number of international maritime 
con\Jentions. These legislati\Je measures have produced major 
changes in English maritime law. It is equally true that the Common-
wealth's failure or delay to implement similar changes, particularly 
with respect to admiralty jurisdiction and the limitation of liability, 
has resulted in important differences between the laws of the two 
countries. 
The second more decisi\Je trend arose from the establishment 
of the Commonwealth and her subsequent attainment of Dominion 
status. It is entitled to pursue an independent policy in Australia's 
best interests. The exercise of its so\Jereign right has given rise 
to the steady growth of Commonwealth maritime law for the regula-
tion of inter-State and foreign shipping trade. 
An important result achie\Jed was to confine the operation of 
State enactments on the subject to ports and harbours in State 
territorial waters and to intra-State shipping. A significant aspect 
of the development is the increasing extension of Commonwealth 
legislation to areas of shipping which, in the past, were considered 
to be within the exclusi\Je province of State Parliaments. A classic 
example is provided by the High Court decision in Kirrnani v. Captain 
5 Cook Cruisc:1s Pty. Ltd. The provisions of the new Part \/III of the 
4. Administration of Justice Act 1920 (U.K.), s. 5 (1); Supreme 
Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 (U.K.), s. 22; 
Aciministration of Justice Act 1956 (U.K.); Merchant Shipping 
(Liabilitv of Shipowners and Others) Act 1958 (U.K.); Merch-
ant Shipping Act 1979 (U.K.); Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.). 
5. (1985) 59 A.L.J. 265; see Chapter Eigt1t. 
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Navigation Act 1912-73 (Comth.) were held not merely to operate as 
Cornrnonwealth law but also to have repealed Part VIII of the 1894 
Act (Imp.) in its application to each of the Australian States. Since 
the implementation of the 1957 Convention involved an exercise of 
the "external affairs" power, the new Part VIII will apply as part of 
the law of each of the Australian States. Another example of such 
an exercise the Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability Act) 1981 
(Comth.) which is expressed to apply "both within and outside Aust-
ralia .... " 6 Clearly the operation of such Commonwealth legislation 
on an Australia-wide basis will promote consistency and certainty. 
In two important respects, the Australian ship-registration 
policv differs from that of the United Kingdom. To a limited extent, 
Commonwealth legislation permits foreigners to own shares in /\ust-
ralian ships. The concept of "genuine link between the State and 
the ship"7 is construed in terms of the owners' residence in Austra-
lia and the effective control which the Commonwealth Government 
has over the shipowners. This midwav position between the "flag of 
convenience" concept and the strict British school of thought is a 
departure From the Imperial policv. While offering scope for foreign 
investments, the Australian svstem does not detract from the prin-
ciple of Australia's sovereignty as an independent nation. Judging 
from the progress made since the Shipping Registration Act 1981 
(Comth.) came into forct-J, the "balanced" approach appears to have 
worked well. 
II. NEED FOR REFORMS 
There appears to be a need for reForm oF Australian maritime 
law in a number of directions. 
In Chapter Six, we looked at the claims of seamen, cargo own-
ers, necessaries men and ship repairers against shipowners. Most of 
the serious obstacles, which ha\/e hitherto prevented the claimants 
from successfullv instituting proceedings in against the ship, 
will removed aFter the Draft Admiraltv Bill 1985 is implemented as 
law. Our analvsis has shown that the present scheme of statutorv 
compensation dons not cover every accidental injurv or death suff-
8 
ered bv seamen. To fill the gaps, it is necessarv to include a 
"catch-all" provision in the State and Commonwealth legislation. It 
6. See s. 
7. Geneva Con\/ention on the High Seas 1950, s. 15. 
8. J\s to case illustration, see Chapter Six. 
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is desirable for seamen's entitlement to statutory compensation to 
be supplemented by a right to proceed in rem. This reform, if intro-
duced, will brin~] thtJ protection of seamen into line with current 
Australian policy: 
Another anomaly concerns the use of the time-honoured words 
11bill of lading" in .Australian State legislation. Legislation should be 
pas~md to extend the expression to include any through bill of lading, 
shipping receipt or transport document which, by custom or law, is 
recognised as evidence of title to the goods carried. The amendment 
is urgently needed to take cognizance of modern developments and 
to promote certainty in international maritime trade. 
It is crystal clear that purchasers of goods shipped under con-
tracts of carriage subject to the Sea-Carriage of Goods Act 192Lf-
73 (Comth.) suffer a number of disadvantages. The reason is that the 
Commonwealth Parliament has not given effect to the Brussels Pro-
tocol 1968. With regard to the limitation of liability of shipowners 
and other persons, the protection available is largely based on the 
1957 Convention. The United Kingdom's law was upgraded in 1979 
when effect was given to the Convention on Limitation of Liability 
for Maritime Claims 19761.0 Implementation of the Brussels Protocol 
1968 and the 1976 Convention means an unusual increase in the 
amount of cargo-damage and other claims payable under Common-
wealth law. The /\ustralian Government will be adversely affected 
since it owns the Australian National Line: 1 probably the largest 
fleet in U1e country. 
another aspect of Australian law where reform is 
needed. An escape or discharge of oil may occur as a result of neg-
ligence or some wrongful act, e.g. a collision. Suppose that measures 
are taken by property owners and others, who are damnified, to pre-
vent or reduce the pollution dama~Je. It is unclear whether, under 
Australian law, the expenses and liatJilities incurred - if recoverable 
are limitable under the Navigation i-\mendment Act 1979 (Comth.).12 
9. Navigation Act 1912-73 (Cornth.), s. 83. 
10. 1"1erct1ant Sr1ipping Act 1979 (U.K.), Schedule 4, supra. 
11. Tile registered narne under which the fleet operates. 
12. Merchant Shipping Act 1971 (U.K.), s. 15 (1) and (2),as 
amende_d by Merchant Shipping Act 1979 (U.K.), Schedule 5 
para. 6 (2). 
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In terms of the maritime causes and matters presently dr:Jalt 
with, the English Admiralty Court four stages ahead of the Aus-
tralian courts. The reason is this: while the jurisdiction of the 
latter has remained virtually static since the Colonial Courts Ad-
miralty Act 1890 (Imp.) came into force, the jurisdiction of the for-
mer has, between 1890 and 1st January, 1982, been extended four 
times: 3 Besides implementing the principles of the two Internation-
al Conventions~ 4 the Administration of Justice Act 1956 (U.K.) stood 
out as a milestone in the de\lelopment of the United Kingdom's 
maritime iaw. The Draft Admiralty Bill 1985, when enacted as law, 
will more than rectify the present situation. In a number of matters, 
Australian courts will be able to exercise a wider admiralty jurisdiction 
than the English Admiralty Court. Undoubtedly, Commonwealth 
legislation urgently needed to invest /\ustralian courts with new 
admiralty jurisdiction to entertain all those claims which should be 
protected by proceerHngs in rem. 
The problems of oil pollution have assumed new dimensions. 
We saw that the anti-pollution laws passed by State and Common-
wealth Parliaments share a common feature. They are enforced 
mainly by Ul8 imposition of severe penalties and strict civil liabil-
ity on shipowners and masters. In many situations, the basis of 
such penal and no-fault civil liability is basically inconsistent with 
the cause-and-effect principle and business realities. Tt1e ship 
carrying a cargo of oil in bulk may be in the possession of a demise 
charterer, a mortgagee, a salvor or some other person. The spill-
age could have been caused by the negligence of the ship's engin-
eers. In principle, it is irrational that by being mere registered 
owners, without possession and control of the ship, thev become 
personally subject to penalties and strict liability for oil spills and 
pollution damage. It is felt that the penalties, strict liability, 
expenses for preventing or mitigating pollution damage and clean-
up costs - if recmJBrable should be enforceable against the ship 
13. I.e. by Administration of Justice Act 1920 (U.K.), s. 5; Sup-
reme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 (U.K.), 
s. 22; Administration of Justice Act 1956 (U.K.); Supreme 
Court Act 1981 (U.K.), ss. 20 to 24. 
14. See Chapter Nine. 
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bv proceedings in rem. It is submitted that a practical, equitable 
solution to the problems of pollution is for legislation to provide 
that the proceeds of sale of the ship and her cargo of oil, if any, 
and the insurance mone';/s payable will constitute the entire com-
pensation fund. The legislation should enable law enforcers and 
claimants for pollution damage to proceed in rem against such a 
fund. lt heartening to note that a move towards rendering the 
ship answerable under the anti-pollution legislation is made by the 
Draft Admiralt';/ Bill 19851.5 
There another ground for integrating the anti-pollution 
legislation with maritima law. rhe enforcement of anti-pollution leg-
islation will, in many instances, interfere with valuable rights ac-
quired under maritime law and with cargo interests. A shipowner's 
only assets may comprise the ship and freight. Thus) where compet-
ing claims arise under anti-pollution legislation and also under mar-
itime law>it is expedient for the same court to distribute the pro-
ceeds or fund according to principles within the same branch of taw. 
The study shows that, where a public nuisance resulting from 
an oil spill occurs, special or particular damage may be caused. It 
is suggested that the law should be amended to enable victims of 
::luch damage to recover by instituting proceedings in rem against 
the ship and her cargo of oil from which the spillage emanated. 
1'\s a policy matter, it is crucial that the laws of the States and 
the Commonwealth relating to maritime claims and rights are consis-
tent. It unfortunate that no pm\/ision is made in the legislation 
of several States for the period of limitation relating to salvage 
lien, damage lien and wage lien, and for the di\/ision of loss in cases 
of collision caused by the contributory negligence of tL\IO or more ships.16 
The neglect has stemmed from the failure of tile State Parliaments 
concemed to give effect to two International Conventions1.7 Legis-
lation is necessary to remove the anomalies in each of those areas by 
15. Clause 4 (3) (Q). For comments, setcJ Chapter Nine. 
16. See Chapter Seven. 
17. Con\/ention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
Relating to l\ssistance and Salvage at Sea. Brussels, 1910; 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain 
RulE~s with respect to Collisions lletween Vessels, Brussels, 
1910. 
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brinfJing State laws into line wiU1 Commonwealth lm'll. 
Our inquiry into the various types of competing maritime claims 
has highlighted the complex problems facing the courts. The "lex 
fori" approach,as applied by Lord Oiplock in "Halcyon Isle" 1 ~ sl1ould 
be adopted. It commends itself in several wavs. Besides being just 
in terms of principle and sound in logic, it safeguards the rights of i 
claimants acquired under Australian maritimFJ la1A1 by preserving the 
order of ranking of their claims. 
III. THE FUTURE 
It is reasonable to presume that the reforms suggested 
above will, in due course, be substantiallv, if not fully, implemented. 
This legislath1e measure, when completed, will constitute a virtual 
restructuring of Australian maritime law. 
/\nti -pollution legislation tends to safeguard the interests of 
pollution-damage \Iictims at the expense of other' persons. Thus 
I.Nhere anti-pollution legislation is enforced, whether lawfullv or 
tortiously, maritime lienees, ship mortgagees and other creditors of 
the ship are adversely affected. This anomalous situation is not 
peculiar to Australian law. It is desirable for sucr1 valuable rights 
arising under maritime law to expressly protected by legislation 
bas!'Jd on a new international convention to be formulated. 
The ship or the proceeds of sale, tile cargo carried and the 
freight, when arrested, constitute a tangible security for the pay-
ment of claims enforceable by proceedings rem. Difficultit'~s will 
arise with respect to the ocder of ranking of statutory charges, 
which render the ship liable to detEmtion, possessory lions and the 
different classes of maritime liens. Legislation is needed to clarify 
the position and to deal with the growing unecJsiness of cornpeting 
creditors. 
It is envisaged that international maritime conventions will 
provide the source material to enable Australian maritime law to 
be systematically updated, and brought into line with its foreign 
counterparts. ro ensuro that court decisions are consistent in 
countrieB which are signatories to the conventions, f\u~3tralian 
judges should adhere to the policy of construing the "convention" 
18. [1980] 3-All E.f~. 197. 
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Acts according to the underlving principles. To curtail adventur-
isms, one Supreme Court judge in each State and a High Court Judge 
at the Commonwealth level should be assigned the task of coordin-
ating court work covering shipping. 
Australia is either slow or disinclined to implement internat-
ional conventions for limiting the liabilitv of shipowners and other 
persons. For example, in giving effect to the 1957 Convention un-
der the 1\lavigation Amendment Act '1979 (Comth.), the Commonwealth 
Parliament expresslv excluded,from operation as law,paragraph 1 (g) 
of Article r} 9 Shipowners and other persons are, therefore, unable 
to limit their liabilitv imposed bv law relating to the removal or 
destruction of any ship which is sunk or stranded, and liabilitv 
arising out of "damage to harbour works, basins and navigable wat-
erwavs." Moreover, the extended protection or relief provided bv 
the Convention on Limitation of Liabilitv for Maritime Claims 1976 is 
not available under Australian law~0 Accordingly, there will be a 
rise in insurance premiums for' ships operating in, or carrying goods 
and passengers to or from, Australia. Unless rectified early, this 
anomaly will undermine the progress and competitiveness of Aust-
ralian inter-State and foreign shipping trade. One serious disad-
vantage is the increased freight charges that have to be borne by 
both consumers and Australian exporters. 
Under a contract of sale, the risk of cargo loss or damage, 
though not the propertv in the cargo shipped, may have passed to 
the buyer. If he js not the holder of the bill of lading or some 
recognized document of title, he is not entitled to institute an 
action in rem in his name. 21 However, under an insurance policy, 
19. Navination Act 1912-73 (Comth.), s. 333, as amended bv 
Navigation Amendment Act 1979 (Comth.), s. 65 (1). 
20. Cf. Merchant Shipping Act 1979 (U.I<;.), Schedule 4, supra. 
21. In The St. Elefterio [1957] P. 179, the bill of lading endors-
ees rejected the antedated documents. In an attempt to 
recover the expected loss, the plaintiffs who were the 
original bill of lading purchasers succeeded in their action 
in rem. Their action would have failed if thev had not 
been assignees of the bill of lading contract. It is sub-
mitted that the decision in Margarine Union G.m.b.H. v. 
Carnbav Prince Co. Ltd. [1969] 1 Q.B. 219 should not be 
followed in Australia. 
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hr::~ is deEJrnecl to have tmd an insurable interest. In such cases, the 
insurer is not entitlr:Jd to reduce t1is loss bv bringing an action in 
rem .in the assured's name. It is submitted that, to promote cert-
aintv in intBrnational trade, this serious gap in the law should be 
filled in the near future. For various reasons, it is not alltJavs 
possible or desirable for an overseas buver in such circumstances 
to institute proceedings in the original shipper's name. 
[t is expected ttmt anomalous situations and inadequacies in 
the law will be brought to light through various means. A maritime 
law reform committee should be established permanentlv to monitor 
devt:lopments in the field and submit specific proposals for reform. 
Its long-term goal is to ensure that manv of the difficulties curr-
entlv encountered bv the law reformers will not recur. 
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APPENDIX 
This part 1s included for reference purposes only. 
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFOR."1 COMMISSION 
Reference on Jurisdiction 
Research No. 3 
Draft 
Procedure and Rules 
Dated: September, 1985 
A BILL 
FOR 
f\n Act to make provision with respect to Admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction, and for related purposes. 
(1) 
BE IT ENACTED by the Queen, and the Senate and the House of 
Representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia, as follows: 
PART I - PRELIMINARY 
Short title 
1. This Act may be cited as the Admiralty Act 1985. 
Commencement 
2. This Act sholl come into operation on a date to be fixed by 
Proclamation. 
Interpretation 
3. (1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears 
"Australia", when used in a geographical sense, includes each 
externa!T erri tory; 
(2) 
"Civil Liability Convention" means the International Corl\/ention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage done at Brussels on 29 
!\lovember 1969 and, if the Protocol to that Convention done at 
London on 19 1\lovember 1976 is in force in relation to Australia. 
includes that Protocol, a copy of the English texts of which are 
set out in Schedules 1 and 2 to the Protection of the Sea (Civil 
Liability Act 1981); 
"Federal Court" means the Federal Court of Australia; 
"foreign ship" means a ship that is not registered, and is not permitted 
to be registered, under tho Shipping f~egistration .Act 1981: 
"fn~ight" includr'"s passage monev and hire; 
"initiating pi'ocess11 includes a third party notice; 
''inland waters" means waters within Australia other than waters of 
the ~;ea; 
"inland waterways vt:;ssel'' means a vessel that is used or intended to 
be used wholly on inland ttJaters; 
"Liabilitv Convention" means -
(a) the Civil Liability ConvEmtion: 
(b) the Limitation Convention; or 
any other international convention that is in force in re la-
tion to 1\u~>tralia and makes provision with respect to the 
lirnitaUor1 of liability in relation to maritime claims; 
''Limitation Convention" means the International Convention relating to 
the limitation of the liability of owners of sea-going ships signed 
at Brussels on 10 October 1957, a copv of the English text of which 
is set out in Schedule 6 to the Navigation Act 1912; 
''mortgage", in relation to a ship or a share in a ship, includes a 
twpothecation or pledge of, and a charge on, t.he ship or share, 
whether at law or in equity and whether arising under the law 
in force in a part of Australia or elsewhere; 
"relevant person", in relation to a maritime claim, means a person who 
woulrJ be liable on the claim in a proceeding commencr::d as an action 
j!sea'' includes 1111aters within tim ebb and flow of the tide: 
"ship" means a vessel of any kinrJ u~1ed or capable of beinq used in 
nm;igation by water, however it is propelled or mmted, and 
includes -
(a) a banJe, lighter or other floating vessel; and 
(b) a hovercraft, 
but does not include -
(c) a seaplane; 
(d) an inland waterwnys vessel; or 
(3) 
(e) a vessel under construction that not been launchE~d; 
"this Act" includes regulations and the rules made under this ,1:\ct. 
(2) ,13., reference in this Act to the timE! vJhen a proceeding 
commenced is a n:~ference to thr:~ time IAJhen the initiating process in 
relation to the proceeding is filed in, or issued bv, a court. 
(3) A reference 
a refr:!rence to the 
on the ship, being 
carried on the ship. 
this Act to goods, in relation to a ship, includes 
and other possessions of a person IAJho is 
and possessions that are carried or to be 
(4) For the purposes of this Act. where -
(a) a proceeding Dn a maritime claim mav be comnmnced against 
a ship undet' a provision of tllis Act (other than ser:tion 21); and 
(b) under section 21, a proceeding on 
aqainst somr:! other ship, 
claim may be commenced 
the other ship is, in relation to the claim, a surrogate ship. 
Maritime claims 
4. ('l) A reference in tr1is Act to a rnaritime claim is a 
to a proprietary me:1ritime claim or a general maritime claim. 
(2) A reference in this Act to a proprietarv maritime claim is a 
reference to -
(a) a claim relating to -
(i) possession of a ship; 
(ii) title to, or ownt:1rship of, a ship or of a in 
a ship; 
(iii) a mortgage of a ship or of a shan~ in a ship; or 
a mortga~lf:J of a ship's freight; 
(b) a claim between co-owrmrs of a ship relating to the 
possession, ownership, operation or earninsJ~' of the ship; 
(c) a claim for the satisfaction OI' enforcement of a judgment 
given anainst a ship or uther property in a procGeding in 
Admiral tv bv a r:ourt (including tJy a court of a foroign 
country); or 
(d) a claim for interest in nJspect of a clairn refr~rrecJ to in omJ 
of Lt'IB pl'ececlinD parugrCJph~;. 
(4) 
A reference in thi.s /\ct to a gennral maritime claim is a 
reference to -
(a) a claim for damage demo bv a ship (lruhether by collision or 
othen'llise); 
(b) a claim in resp!'Jct of the liability of the owner of a ship 
arising under Part II or Part !\/ of the Protection of the Sea 
~~~~~~~~~c~~ or under a law of a StatP or 
Territory that makes provision as mentioned in sub-s£~ction 
7 (1) of that f\ct; 
a claim for loss of life, or for personal injury, sustained in 
consequence of a defect in a ~:;hip or in the apparel Ol' 
equipment of a ship; 
(d) a claim for loss of life, or for personal injury, causBd by 
an act or omission of -
(i) the owner or charterer of a ship; 
(ii) a person in possession or control of a ship; or 
(iii) a per~mn for v.Jhose 1.\/rongful acts or omissions the 
owner, charterer or person in pos~mssion or con-
trol of a ship is liable. 
being an act or omission in tim navigation or management 
of ship, including an act or omission in connection 
t.vith 
the loading of goods on 
goods from, the ship; 
or the unloading of 
(v) the embarkation of pt:!rsnns on to, or the disem-
barkation of persons from, the ship; and 
(vi) the carriage of goods or persons on the ship; 
[(da) a claim for damages (including a claim for damages for 
economic loss) caused by an act or omission of 
(i) the owner or charterer of a ship; 
(ii) a person in possession or control of a ship; or 
(iii) a person for whose wrongful act~:l or omissions the 
owm'!r, chartBrr:!r or· person in possession or con-
tml of a ship is liable, 
being c:m act or omission in the navigation or rnEmagement of 
tt1e :.:;~lip, including an act or omission in connection with -
(iv) the loading of !::JDods on to, or the unloading of 
goods from, the ship; 
(\!) the wnbarkatior1 of persons em to, or the disembark-
ation of pnrsons from the ship; and 
(vi) the corri<JCJE'J of goods or per~:mns on the ship;] 
(5) 
(e) a claim relating to salva~JB (includinD life salvage); 
(f) a claim arising out of an agreement that relates to the 
carriage of goods or per~mns by a ship or to ttle use or hire 
of <:~ ship, wheU1er by charterparty or otheriAJise; 
(g) a claim for loss of, or damage to, S}oods carried by a ship; 
(h) a claim in respect of general average; 
(j) a claim in the nature of tmvage of a ship; 
(k) a claim for pilotage of a ship; 
(m) a claim in respect of goods, materials or services (including 
st8\mdoring and lighterage services) suppliE!d to a ship for 
its operation or maintenance: 
(n) a claim relating to the construction, alteration, repair or 
equipping of a ship; 
(o) a claim in re~3pect of a Liability for por·t, harbour, canal or 
light tolls, charges or Liues, or tolls, charges or dues of a 
like nature, in respect of a ship; 
(p) a claim for a levy in respect of a ship, including a shipping 
ievv imposed by the Protection of tht=! St~a (Shipping Levy) 
Act 1981, being a 18\f\/ in respect of IAihich a PD'vver to detain 
tile ship is conferred by a law in force in Australia or in a 
part of 1\ustralia; 
(q) a claim by a master, shipper, charterer or agent in respect 
of disbursements on account of a ship; 
(r) a claim for an unpaid premium or other like amount due in 
respect of the insurance oF a ship; 
(s) a claim by a master, of a member of the crew, of a ship for 
wages (including a claim for an amount tl1at a person, as 
employer, is under an obligation to pay to an emplo\,lee, 
whether the obligation arises out of the contract of 
employment or by opF.:ration of law, including by operation 
of the lavJ of a foreign country); 
(t) a claim for interest in respect of a claim referred to in one 
of the preceding paragraphs. 
f\pplication 
5. (1) Subject to thr? succeeding provisions of this section, this 
Act applies to and in relation to 
(a) all ships, irre~;pecthJe of the place of n~sidencP Dr domicih~ 
of tf1eil' owners; and 
(b) all maritime claims. wherever arising, including claims for 
sal\1ago of cargo or wreck found on land. 
(6) 
(2) This Act applies to and in n:dation to a proceeding commen-
ced after the cornmencernrmt of this 1\ct. 
(3) This 1-\ct, other than section 18, does not apply in eelation 
that arose -
Df an inland waterways vessel; or 
to a cause of 
(a) in 
(b) in of the use or intended use of the ship concerned 
on inland \/l}aters. 
(4) (3) (b) does not have effect in relation to a cause 
of action if, at time when the cause of action arose, the vessel or 
the ship concerned was a foreign ship. 
C~Jrtain rights not created or c:d'fpctecj 
6. This /\ct. does not ha\ie effect to 8xtend the cases in which 
monev or property is recm1erable DI' to create a maritime llen or other 
charge t,hat ttJould not have r~xi~~t.ed if this Act had not bf~en passed. 
Innocent passage 
7. (1) Wht=Jre the arrest of a 
with a right of innocent passage that 
this J\ct does not authorize the arrest. 
ship \:vould be inconsistent 
being exercised by the ship, 
(2) For the purpose of this sBction, "innocent has 
the meaning it under the C:onvention on the Territorial Sea and the 
C:ontiguous Zone done at Geneva on 29 April 1958, a copy of 
English text of which is set out in SchedulB to the Seas and Subm8rged 
Lands Act 1973. 
External Territories 
8. This Act extends to t:1ach external Territory. 
Act to bind Crown 
9. (1) This Act binds the C:mwn in nll its capacities. 
(2) 1\c t does not authorize -
(a) a proceeding to be commenced as an action against ;;.;..;._.o..=.:..; 
a government ship or no11ernment peopertv: or· 
(b) the arrest, detention or of a governrnFJnt ship or 
government peoperty. 
(3) Where a proceeding has been cDmmencc!d as <:m action 
in rem against a governrnrmt ship oe goverflment prcJpPrty, the court 
may, if it i!::; satisfied that t.he peocEH:!dinCJ \.<\las so commenced in the 
(9) 
ship may be commenced as e:m action in rem agEJinst the shiP. 
Right to proceed in rem on owner's liabilities 
19. LLihere, in relation to a general maritime claim concerning a 
ship or property, a relevant person 
(a) was, at the time '.Nhen the cause of action amse, the owner 
or charterer of, or possession or control of, the ship or 
property concerned; and 
(b) is, at the time when the proceeding is commenced, the 
owner of the ship or propert\/, 
a proceeding on the claim mav be commenced as an action _in rem 
agair1st the !::lhip or property. 
Right to proceed in rem on demise charterer's liabilitir~s 
20. lllhere. in relation to a general maritime claim concerning a 
ship, a relevant person -
(a) was. at the time when the cause of action arose. the OIAinee 
or charterer of. or in possession or control of, the ship; and 
(b) is, at the time tvhen the procm~ding is commenced, a demise 
charterer of the ship, 
a proceeding on the claim may be commenced as an action in rem against 
the ship. 
Right to proceed in rem against surrogate ship 
21. A proceeding on a general maritime claim concerning a ship 
mav be commenced as an action in rem against some other ship if a rel-
evant PE~rson in relation to the claim -
(a) was. at the time when the cause of action arose, the owner 
or charterer of, or in possession or control of, the ship 
concerned; and 
(b) is, at the time when the proceeding is commenced. the owner 
of, or a demise charterer of, tt1e other ship. 
Service on and arrest of only one ship 
22. (1) Where service of initiating process in a proceeding com-
menced as mention eel in section 17, 19, 20 or 21 has been effected on a 
ship, service of initiatinq process in a proceeding on the same claim 
commenced em mentioned in those sections rnav not be effecterJ on any 
other ship. 
(2) l!Jhere a ship has been arrostt:Jd in a proceeding commen-
ced as mentioned in section 17. 19, 20 or 21, no other ship ~~hall be 
(10) 
arrested in the proceeding. 
C:)) Sub-section (2) does not prevent tl1e arrest of EJ ship in a 
procEmding on a maritime lien or other charge in respect of th~3 ship. 
Service and execution out of jurisdiction 
23. (1) Initiating process in a proceeding commenced as an action 
in rem may not be served on a ship or other property out of the 
locality IAJithin which the court that issued it has jurisdiction. 
(2) lJJhere a ship or other propGrty is out of the locality within 
which a particular court has jurisdiction, the ship or property is not 
liable to arrest by that court under this ,1\ct. 
(3) Sub-sections (1) and (2) have F3ffect notwithstanding the 
~3enJice and Execution of Process Act 1901. 
Proceeds 
214. ltJhere, under· this !-\ct. a procrleding may be commenced as 
ar1 action in rem against a ship or other property, the pmceeding may 
be commenced instead against money that has been paid into a court 
as the proceeds of the sale of the ship or property. 
Limitation of liability uncjer Liability Conventions 
25. (1) A person who apprehends that a claim fm compensation 
under a law (including a law of a State or a Territor~;) that gives eff-
ect to provisions of a Liability Convention may be made Lly some other 
person mav apply to the Federal Court tu determine the question 
whether liability may be limited under that law. 
(2) Jurisdiction is conferred on the Federal Court in respect of 
proceedings under sub-section (1), but this sub-section does not affect 
the jurisdiction of anv other court. 
(3) On an application under sub-section (1 ), the Ff-Jderal Court 
may, in accordance with the law referrc'::d to in that sub-section -
(a) determine whether the applicant's liability may be so limited 
and, if it may be so limitecj, determine the limit of that 
liability; 
(b) order the constitution of a limitation fund for the payment 
of claims in respect of which the applicant entitled to limit 
his or her liabilitv; and 
(c) make such orders as are just \.\lith respect to the adminis-
tration and distribution of that fund. 
(!~) lJJhf'JI'e a court has jurisdiction under this f\ct in respect of 
a pmceerJing, that jurisdiction extends to entertaining a defence in 
(11) 
the proceeding by way of limitation of liability under a law that gives 
effect to provisions of a Liability Convention. 
Proceedings under Civil Liability Convention 
26. A proceeding under this Act on a maritime claim referred to 
in paragraph 4 (3) (b) shall not be brought otherwise than in accordance 
with paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article IX of the Civil Liability Convention, 
whether or not the procoeding also relates to another maritime claim 
or to a maritime lien or other d1arge. 
PART IV - TRAI\JSFER AND REMITTAL OF PROCEEDINGS 
rransfer 
27. (1) A court in which a proceeding under this Act is pending 
may, at any stage of the proceeding, upon application or of its own 
motion, by order, transfer the proceeding to some other court that 
has jurisdiction under tt1is ,L\ct with respect to the subject-matter of 
the claim. 
(2) Where a proceeding has been so transferred, the second-
mentioned court shall proceed as if the proceeding had been comm-
enced in that court and as if the same or the like steps in the pro-
ceeding had been taken in that court as were taken in the first-men-
tioned court and as if the orders made by the second-mentioned court 
in the proceeding had been made by the first-mentioned court. 
Remittal 
28. (1) Where a proceeding commenced as an action in rem is 
pending in the Federal Court or in the Supreme Court of a State or 
Territory, the Federal Court or that Supreme Court may remit the 
proceeding for hearing to a court that, apart from this Act, would 
have had jurisdiction if -
(a) the proceeding had been commenced as an action in personam 
on the claim against the relevant person; and 
(b) ser\/ice of initiating process in that proceeding had been 
effected within the locality within which the court to which 
tile proceeding is romitted has jurisdiction. 
(2) The court from which the proceeding is remitted may gi\/e 
such directions as are appropriate in relation to the further steps to 
be taken in the proceeding and, subject to any such directions, the 
court to whictlthe proceeding is remitted may gi\/e dir£~ctions of a 
like kind. 
(12) 
(3) ThE! court from ~vhich a proceeding remitted under this 
section shall give effCJct to a judgment or order given in the proceed-
ing, being a judgment or order that finally disposes of the proceedin~J. 
as though tt1at judgment or order were a judgment or order of that 
court in the proceeding. 
(4) Sub-section (3) does not affFJct -
(a) any riqht of appeal that a party to the proceeding has; or 
(b) the power of a court to stay execution pending an appeal. 
(5) 1\ court to which a proceeding has been remitted under this 
section is invested IAiith federal jurisdiction, or, if that court a 
court of Territory, jurisdiction is conferred on that court, in respect 
of the proceeding. 
Security in relation to stayed or dismissed proceedings 
29. (1) Where -
(a) it appears to ttm court in which a proceeding under this Act 
is pending that the proceBding should be stayed or dismissBd 
on the ground that thB claim concernBd should be dBter-
mined by arbitration (whether in Australia or elsewhere) or 
by a court of a foreign country; and 
(b) a st1ip or other property is under arrest in the proceeding, 
the court may order that the proceeding bB stayed on con-
dition that the ship or property be retained by the court as 
security for the satisfaction of an award or judgment that 
may made in the arbitration or in a proceeding in the 
court of the foreign country. 
(2) Sub-section (1) dm~s not limit an~t other powBr of the couet. 
(3) The power of the court to stay or dismiss the proceeding 
includes power to do so on such conditions as are just, Including a 
condition -
(a) with respect to the institution or prosecution of thB 
arbitration or pmceeding in the court of the foreign 
country; and 
(b) that equivalent security be provided for the satisfaction of 
any award or judgment that may be made in the ar·bitration 
or in the proceeding in the court of the foreign country. 
(l•) Whex:e a court made an order uncler ~;ub-section (1) Dr 
(3), the court may make such interim or supplementary orders as are 
(13) 
appropriate in relation to the ship or property for the purpose of 
preserving -
(a) the ship or property; or 
(b) the rights of a party or of a person interested in the ship 
or property. 
(5) Where -
(a) a ship or other property is under arrest in a proceeding; 
(b) an award or judgment as mentioned in sub-section (1) has 
been made in favour of a party; and 
(c) the award or judgment is enforceable by the court, 
then, in addition to any other proceeding that may be taken by the 
party to enforce the judgment or award, the party may apply to the 
court in the stayed proceeding for an appropriate order in relation 
to the ship or property to give effect to the award or judgment. 
Power to deal with ship or other property 
30. (1) This section applies where a proceeding has been 
transferred or remitted under the preceding provisions of this Part 
and a ship or other property is under arrest in the proceeding. 
(2) The court from which the proceeding was transferred or 
remitted may -
(a) deal with the ship or property as though it were under 
arrest in a proceeding that had not been so transferred or 
remitted; and 
(b) make such orders as are necessary or convenient for 
transferring the custody of the ship or property to the 
court to which the proceeding has been so transferred or 
remitted. 
(3) Where a court has made orders under paragraph (2) (b), the 
court to which the proceeding has been transferred or remitted has 
the same powers in relation to the ship or property as it has in 
relation to a ship or other property that is under arrest in a proceed-
ing commenced in that court. 
PART V MISCELLANEOUS 
Effect of judgment 
31. (1) ~here judgment is given for the plaintiff in a proceeding 
commenced as an action in rem, the extent to which a defendant in 
(14) 
the proceeding who is a relevant person in relation to the maritime 
claim concerned is personally liable on the judgment is not limited by 
the value of the ship or other property against which the proceeding 
was commenced. 
(2) lJJhere judgment is giv~::m for the plaintiff in a proceeding 
commenced as an action in rem, a defendant in the proceeding who 
is not a relevant person in relation to the maritime claim concerned 
is not personally liable on the judgment except so far as it is an 
order for costs against that defendant. 
(3) Sub-section (2) does not prevent execution being levied 
against a ship or other property that is under arrest in a proceeding. 
Related corporations, & c. 
32. (1) In determining the ownership of a ship for the purposes 
of a provision of this Act, but without limiting the generality of any 
such provision, the succeeding provisions of this section have effect. 
(2) Where the owner of a ship is a body corporate -
(a) i::l ship owned by a body corporate that is, or would, if both 
bodies corporate were incorporated in the Australian 
Capital Territory, be, a related corporation within the 
meaning of the Companies Act 1981 in relation to the first-
mentioned body corporate, shall be taken to be owned by 
the first-mentioned body corporate; 
(b) a ship owned by a natural person who is in a position, by 
virtue of his or her shareholding or other interest in the 
body corporate, to control the operations of the body 
corporate shall be taken to be owned by the body corpor-
ate; and 
(c) if a natural person is in a position, by virtue of his or her 
shareholding or other interest in the body corporate and in 
some other body corporate, to control the operations of 
both the bodies corporate -- a ship owned by the second-
mentioned body corporate shall be taken to be owned by 
the first-mentioned body corporate. 
(3) Where the owner of a ship is a natural person who is in a 
position, by virtue of his or her shareholding or other interest in a 
body corporate, to control the operations of the body corporate, a 
ship owned by .the body corporate shall be taken to be owned by the 
natural person. 
(15) 
Powers of Federal Court in relation to register 
33. In a proceeding in the Federal Court on a proprietary mari-
time claim, the orders that the court may make include orders that a 
court may make under the Shipping Registration Act 1981. 
Co-m111nership disputes 
34. In a proceeding on a claim between co-owners of a ship 
relating to the possession, ownership, operation or earnings of the 
ship, the orders that the court may make include orders -
(a) for the settlement of accounts outstanding and unsettled; 
and 
(b) directing that the ship concerned, or a share in the ship, 
be sold. 
Damages for unjustified arrest, & c. 
35. (1) Where -
(a) a person unreasonably and without good cause demands 
excessive security in relation to a proceeding commenced 
or to be commenced under this Act; or 
(b) a party to a proceeding under this Act unreasonably and 
without good cause -
(i) obtains the arrest of a ship or other property 
under this Act; or 
(ii) withholds consent to the release from arrest 
under this Act of a ship or other property. 
the person or party is liable in damages to a party to the proceeding, 
or to a person who has an interest in the ship or property, being a 
party or person who has suffered loss or damage as a direct result. 
(2) nm jurisdiction of a court in which a proceeding under this 
Act is pending extends to determining a claim arising under sub-section 
(1) in relation to the proceeding. 
(3) Where no sud1 proceeding is pending, jurisdiction is vested 
in the Federal Court, the Supreme Courts of the States are invested 
wiU1 federal jurisdiction and jurisdiction is conferred on the Supreme 
Courts of the Territories, in respect of matters arising under sub-
section (1). 
(5) The jurisdiction conferred on a court of a State, or with 
which a court of a Territory is invested, under this section is 
(16) 
exclusive of the jurisdiction that belongs to any other court of the 
State or Territor'y, respectively. 
Priorities 
36. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law (including 
a law of a State or Territory), where a proceeding has been commenced 
under this Act against a surrogate ship in n=!spect of a claim concern-
ing some other ship, the order in which general maritime claims against 
both the ships shall be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the 
surrogate ship shall be determined as if all the claims were claims 
against the surrogate ship. 
Statutory pmvers of detention 
37. (1) This section applies where -
(a) a law other than this Act (including a law of a State or 
Territory) confers on a person a power to detain a ship in 
relation to a civil claim; and 
(b) a proceeding on the civil claim may, under this Act, be 
commenced as an action in rem against the ship. 
(2) Where a sllip is under arrest under this Act, the power to 
detain the sllip may not be exercised. 
(3) The exercise of tile power to detain a ship does not pre-
vent the arrest of tile ship under this Act. 
(4) lJ.Jhere a ship that has been detained under a power 
referred to in paragraph (1) (a) is arrested under this Act, then, by 
force of this sub-section, the detention is suspended for so long as 
the ship is under arrest. 
(5) lJ.Jhere a ship that has been detained or would, but for 
sub-section (2), be liable to be detained, under such a power is 
arrested and sold under this Act, tile civil claim is, unless the court 
otherwise directs, payable in priority to any claim against the ship 
other than the claim of the Marshal for expenses. 
Limitation periods 
38. (1) A proceeding may be brought under this Act on a 
maritime claim, or on a claim on a maritime lien or other charge, e:1t 
any time before the expiration of -
(a) the limitation period that would have been applicable in 
r~lation to the clEJim if it had been brought otherwise than 
(17) 
under this ;-\ct; or 
(b) if the claim could not have been so brought -- a period 
of 3 vears after the cause of action arose. 
(2) Sub-section (1) does not applv if a limitation period is 
fixed in relation to the claim bv an Act, an Imperial Act, an Act of a 
State or an Act or Ordinance of a Territorv, including such an Act or 
Ordinance in its application in a part of Australia. 
(3) Where a court has, otherwise than bv virtue of this ~;ec­
tion, power to extend a limitation period in respect of a claim that is 
of the same kind as a maritime claim, or a claim on a maritime lien or 
other charge, then, bv force of this sub-section, it has a like power 
to extend the period fixed bv sub-section (1). 
(4) The absence of the ship or propertv concerned from the 
jurisdiction of the court shall not be taken into account in relation 
to the exercise of the power conferred bv sub-section (3). 
(5) A claim brought IN'ithin a period fixed bv or under this 
section is not affected bv the operation of the doctrine of laches. 
Mode of trial 
39. A proceeding commenced as an action in rem, a limitation 
proceeding and a proceeding (whether or not under the Act) that is 
associated with a proceeding commenced as an action in rem or a 
limitation proceeding shall be tried without a jurv and without 
assessors. 
Appeals 
40. (1) Where, but for this section, a person would have a right 
to seek leavE'] or special leave to appeal from a judgment or order of a 
court given in a proceeding under this Act to the Full Court of the 
Supreme Court of a State as defined bv sub-section 24 (5) of the 
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, the application for leave or spec-
ial leave shall be made instead to the Full Court of the Federal Court. 
(2) lllhere, but for this section, a person would have a right 
to appeal from a judgment or order of a court given in a proceeding 
under this Act to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of a State as 
defined bv sub-section 211 (5) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 
1976, the appeal shall be ma(je instead to the Full Court of the Fed-
eral Court. 
(18) 
Jurisdiction limits 
41. The jurisdiction invested or conferred on a court of a 
State or Territory by a provision of this Act is imtested or conferred -
(a) ~vithin the limits of jurisdiction of the court, whether 
those limits are as to locality, subject-matter or other-
wise; and 
(b) to the extent that the Constitution permits. 
Fees 
42. lllhere a person or body has power under a law (including 
a law of a State or Territory) to prescribe or scales of fees in 
connection with proceedings of any kind in a court, then, by force of 
this section, the person or body has a like power to prescribe fees in 
connection with the exercise of pmvers and the performance of duties 
and functions by the court or by an officer of the court under this 
Act. 
Rules 
'~3. (1) The Governor-General may make Rules, not inconsistent 
with this Act, making provision in relation to the practice and proced-
ure to be followed in courts exercising jurisdiction under this Act and 
matters incidental to such practice and procedure. 
(2) In particular, the Rules may make provision in relation to -
(a) pleading; 
(b) appearance; 
(c) the service and execution of process; 
(d) bail; 
(e) caveats against arrest or release of ships and other prop-
erty; 
(f) the arrest, custody and sale of ships and other property; 
(g) the furnishing of security; 
(h) the forms to be used; 
(j) records and registers and the inspection of those records 
and registers; 
(k) limitation proceedings, including -
(i) the parties to those proceedings; and 
(U) ttm operation of determinations made in those 
proceecHngs; 
(l) evidence. 
(m) e;:,forcement anrJ satisfaction of judgments of courts in 
matters under U1is Act; 
(19) 
(3) The Rules me:w presct'ibe penalties, not exceeding ... , for 
offences a~]ainst the Rules. 
( '-!) Jurisdiction is vested in the Federal Court, the several 
coul'ts of the States are invested with federal jurisdiction and, to the 
extent that the Constitution permits, jurisdiction conferred on the 
courts of the Territories, in respect of matters arising under the 
Rules. 
(<)) The jurisdiction conferred on a court of a Tl:?rritorv, and 
the jurisdiction with which a court of a State is imJc!sted, under sub-
section (4) does not extend in respect of a ship or other propertv that 
is not within the Territorv or State, respectivelv. 
(6) Rules made under this section shall -
(a) be notified in the [;azette; 
(b) subject to this section, take effect from the date of 
notification or, if some later date is fixed bv or in 
accordance with the Rules, that later date; and 
(c) be laid before each House of Parliament within 15 sitt-
ing davs of that Hnuse after the making of the Rules. 
(7) Part XII of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 applies in 
relation to Rules made under this section as it applies in relation to 
regulations. 
Regulations 
44. The Go\lernor-General mav make regulations, not inconsis-
tnet with this Act, prescribing all matters -
(a) required or permitted bv this 1-'\ct to be prescribed; or 
(b) necessarv or convenient to be prescribed for carrving out 
or giving effect to this Act. 
